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Stephen Pickard: 
ABSTRACT 
THE PURPOSE OF STATING THE FAITH: AN HISTORICAL AND 
SYSTEMATIC INQUIRY INTO THE TRADITION OF FUNDAMENTAL 
ARTICLES JfiTH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ANGLICANISM 
Stating the faith in the form of fundamental articles has, 
historically, provided an important strategy by which the identity and 
continuity of the Church has been expressed. The issue underlying this 
ecclesiological context of fundamental articles concerns the truth of 
the one-in-Christ bond in Christianity. However discussion of 
fundamental articles of the faith has, from the Post-Reformation 
period, tended to occur as somewhat disconnected from wider concerns to 
do with the belief, discipleship and mission of the Church. One result 
is that important issues and motives implicit in the attempt to 
articulate the fundamental articles of Christianity remain undisclosed 
and undeveloped. 
By means of a multi-level approach - contemporary relevance (Part 
One), historical development (Part Two), case studies (Part Three) and 
systematic inquiry (Part -Four) - this thesis develops an understanding 
of fundamental articles which shows how the theme is enmeshed within 
and contributes to the dynamic of Christian faith in the Church. The 
resources for this inquiry are drawn from an extensive, but hitherto 
largely unexamined treatment, of the theme of fundamental articles in 
Anglicanism. 
The Protestant tradition of speaking about fundamental articles of 
faith is found to offer an important medium through which the reality 
of being one-in-Christ can be identified, communicated and 
strengthened. In this way the tradition proves a valuable means for 
uncovering and examining the purpose(s) of stating the faith. 
The problematic role of fundamental articles in Anglican self-
understanding reveals itself as an instance of a more general, 
controversial and unfinished task in theology to state the truth of 
God's creating and redeeming love. 
The thesis thus draws attention to the significance of fundamental 
articles for expressing the nature and form of ecclesial faith and 
discipleship. A positive rationale emerges for a more intensive and 
discerning engagement with the fundamental articles tradition as a 
strategy by which theology can serve the mission of the Church. 
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PART ONE 
CHAPI'ER ONE 
THE FUNDAMENTALS OF CHRISTIANITY: 
Perspectives on a Theme in Contemporary Anglicanism 
It is the masterpiece of all the divines of Christendom 
what is fundamental in Christianity and what is not 
Thorndike)!, 
The Priority of Truth 
to say 
(Herbert 
Discussion of the fundamentals of Christianity has occupied an 
important place within the history of Anglicanism,2 This is hardly 
surprising given the fact that fundamentals inquiry can simply indicate 
an intention to identify what is important and constitutive for any 
area of concern.J More specifically it can be argued, that in 
Christianity fundamentals inquiry operates as a strategy for finding, 
ordering and communicating the truth of ecclesial reality. In this 
way such a strategy properly belongs to a heuristic process in which 
truth itself is the object,4 
This link between inquiry into fundamentals and a concern for 
truth has, in the history of the Christian tradition, become evident 
in the continuous attempt to state the faith in the form of articles of 
belief. However, with the growing recognition of the multiform 
character of Christianity, particularly from the late Middle Ages, the 
attempt to state the saving faith of the one Church became increasingly 
controversial. One response, developed within the emerging 
Protestantism of the sixteenth century, was to propose agreement upon 
certain fundamental articles, in order to distinguish them from other 
beliefs considered to be of lesser importance for faith and unity. 
These developments will be briefly explored in Chapter Two. 
At this preliminary stage a number of simple points are worthy of note. 
Firstly, inquiry into what is fundamental in Christianity 
1 
I: Fundamentals of Christianity 
ideally proceeds from the conviction that the Church already dwells in 
the truth as it is in Jesus (Eph 4:2lb). Secondly, in the effort to 
express the nature of the truth that bonds the Church, the fundamentals 
strategy has been further refined by an appeal to certain articles of 
faith deemed fundamental for the Church's life and mission. 
Unsurprisingly, this strategy to state the faith involves a 
complex of issues concerning the nature of truth itself - its 
apprehension, communication and social form and function. These quite 
major issues will surface repeatedly in the course of this inquiry 
both complexifying and enriching an understanding of the theme of 
fundamental articles in Christianity and ultimately of the purposes of 
stating the faith. 
Finally, insofar as the task of finding, dwelling-in and 
communicating truth, belongs to the province of Christianity per se, it 
is to be expected that fundamentals discussion should be evident in the 
history of Anglicanism. 
has taken place. What 
The following Chapters will show that 
this indicates is that the attempt 
this 
in 
Anglicanism to identify the fundamentals of Christianity is simply 
evidence of a particular Church's engagement with the persistent and, 
strictly speaking, unavoidable question of truth, that in various ways 
has occupied and will continue to occupy the energies of churches and 
theologians throughout the course of Christian history. 5 
An Anglican Tradition? 
It has been argued that concern for the fundamentals of 
Christianity is relevant to life and thought in Christianity wherever 
it is practised. As such, this concern belongs to the common 
theological inheritance of Christendom and therefore also to the 
Anglican communion. However a question arises as to whether 
fundamentals discussion in Anglicanism displays a particular form - at 
least a conventionally recognised one - which is characteristic of, 
2 
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though not necessarily unique to Anglicanism.s It is not unusual here 
for Anglicans to point to a distinction between fundamentals and non-
fundamentals in matters of Church and faith. This distinction is 
linked to a specifically Anglican method and as such is considered to 
belong to the 'spirit' of Anglicanism. 7 Though it needs to be stressed 
that such a differentiation between fundamentals and non-fundamentals 
in Christianity is a contrast that Anglicanism has shared with other 
Protestant churches of the Reformation. 8 Furthermore, the distinction 
has not been foreign to Roman Catholic theology. 9 
What appears to be significant is not the distinction as such but 
the different ways in which the distinction between fundamentals and 
non-fundamentals has been determined and deployed. Thus the stress in 
Continental Protestantism on doctrinal purity and correct definition, 
particularly in Lutheranism, gave the theological problem of 
fundamental 
sophisticated 
developed by 
belief a high profile.lO As a 
rationales for the fundamentals 
Continental Protestants for the 
result, 
of the 
purposes 
some quite 
faith were 
of church 
teaching, confessional identity and as a means for reconciling 
separated communions,ll The distinction between fundamentals and non-
fundamentals in the faith, though theoretically recognised in Roman 
Catholicism, ceased to be particularly relevant because the ambit of 
faith tended to be resolved into the formal authority of the Roman 
Magisterium,l2 A certain Protestant scripturalism likewise rendered 
the distinction unworkable.13 
Within Anglicanism discussion of fundamentals has traditionally 
entailed a distinction between fundamentals and non-fundamentals. This 
recurring theme in Anglicanism has been repeatedly offered as a 
strategy for the handling of conflict and identity in the Church. The 
distinction has usually expressed itself in an appeal to certain 
articles of faith deemed fundamental either for salvation or the 
existence of a Church.l 4 This resolution of the credenda of the Church 
3 
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into certain fundamental articles of the faith in contrast to beliefs 
deemed non-fundamental, contains within it an oppositional way of 
handling things, as the continuous controversy generated by the 
implicit dialectic of the distinction makes clear. This controversy has 
ranged over matters to do with both church credenda (beliefs) and 
agenda (practices and order). This arises because in Anglicanism 
discussion of fundamentals has included (because it is church faith), 
an appeal to the particularities of church order and practice insofar 
as they have been deemed constitutive for the being of the Church,l5 
Questions of practice and order have not always been included in 
fundamentals discussion, or perhaps more to the point, have 
specifically been classified as matters 'accessory', not necessary for 
salvation.l6 In the actual history of fundamentals discussion in 
Anglicanism, questions of faith and order have continually converged 
and complexified fundamentals discussion.l7 The history of this 
discussion will be sketched out more fully in Part Two of this thesis. 
What needs to be recognised at this stage is the fact that 
fundamentals discussion has exercised a powerful force in the shaping 
of Anglican self-understanding. Anglicans have invested significant 
energy in the espousal of what has been variously referred to as the 
'doctrine' or 'theory' of fundamentals, the fundamental articles 
'apologia' or 'tradition'.l8 Implied here is the development of a 
quite particular theological tradition to which Anglicans, in common 
with other Protestant communions, have continued to make direct appeal. 
Important in the more recent development of this tradition has been the 
claim that Anglicans have 'no special doctrines' of their own; that 
they simply share in what is fundamental to the Church universal. 19 Not 
surprisingly, such a view is highly relevant for an understanding of 
Anglican ecclesiology, for at the least the claim of 'no special 
doctrines' suggests a special doctrine of the Church not shared by 
other communions.ZO 
4 
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The word 'tradition' is,however, used in its broadest sense at 
this stage. Later in this Chapter some of the problems of identifying 
the parameters of this tradition and its status in Anglicanism will be 
elaborated more fully. 
Fundamentals and Ecclesial Diversity 
The force of this tradition has continued to be recognised in 
contemporary Anglicanism and there is, as shortly to be seen, plenty of 
evidence of the deployment of this tradition as a strategy for the 
handling of ecclesial identity. More particularly, the argument of 
this Chapter is that fundamentals discussion in Anglicanism is to be 
located within the general area concerned with identifying and 
communicating requirements for the practice of being one Church.21 
The continuing importance of the fundamentals tradition in the 
above context is evident in the four elements of the Chicago-Lambeth 
Quadrilateral (Scripture, the creeds, two sacraments and the historic 
episcopate). This formu-la, cons-tructed and adopted by the 1888 Lambeth 
Conference and repeatedly endorsed, though lately with qualifications 
and amplifications,22 constitutes, in the mind of one commentator, "a 
notion of fundamentals and a possible way of construing it",23 
Furthermore, at the 1968 Lambeth Conference, the theme of fundamentals 
emerged in the Report of one section of the Conference in relation to 
the comprehensiveness of the Anglican Communion: 
Comprehensiveness is an attitude of mind which Anglicans have 
learned from the thought-provoking controversies of their history 
Comprehensiveness demands agreement on fundamentals, while 
tolerating disagreement on matters in which Christians may differ 
without feeling the necessity of breaking communion,24 
This statement suggests that the desire and struggle for a genuinely 
inclusive and pure faith in Anglicanism will mean that fundamentals 
discussion remains relevant, controversial and urgent. This will 
necessarily be the case where the oneness of the Church in its 
diversity is of particular significance for a church's self-
5 
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understanding. This is clearly the case in Anglicanism insofar as it 
does not - according to the above Lambeth statement - understand itself 
as a monolithic institution but self-consciously admits plurality. A 
corollary of the recognition of a natural ecclesial plurality is 
controversy over those fundamental constituents of the Church's life 
and mission. This tension necessarily remains ongoing and is evident 
in the continuously controversial and unresolved status of fundamentals 
discussion in Anglicanism.25 Implicit in this Anglican self-
understanding is a highly positive theological rationale for continuing 
controversy in a church. It would seem to be the logical corollary of 
a vision of Christian discipleship which includes living in a godly way 
within the irreducible diversity of human social existence. From this 
perspective it can be argued that fundamentals discussion in 
Anglicanism has provided a critical means by which such an ecclesial 
vision is kept circulating in the Church.26 
The linking of fundamentals discussion to the attempt to 
practice oneness in diversity is relevant for Anglicanism in both its 
'inter' and 'intra' church dimensions. 
The Intra-Church Context: Some Examples 
At the intra-church level issues concerning the nature and limits 
of that consensus in faith necessary for being a Christian in the 
Church are clearly evident in the 1938, 1976 and 1981 reports of the 
Doctrine Commission of the Church of England,27 A feature linking all 
these reports is their various attempts to articulate the unity of 
faith amidst a burgeoning doctrinal pluralism. In this respect it is 
instructive to consult the 1938 Report's Appended Notes printed at the 
end of a chapter "On the Sources and Authority of Christian Doctrine" 
entitled, "On the Application to the Creeds of the Conception of 
Symbolic Truth" and "On Assent". The discussion here seemed designed 
to ensure the integrity, or at least the legitimacy, of certain more 
6 
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'liberal' theological positions. It was equally clear, however, that 
in this manoeuvre the Anglican fundamentals tradition was being 
reaffirmed in a quite particular and novel way,2 8 This development 
became even more clearly evident in the 1976 Report's individualistic 
emphasis,29 This ensured that the tradition of speaking about 
fundamentals of the faith could be owned by everyone. A consequence of 
this was that it was no longer clear how the tradition was a tradition 
of the one Church. This situation was redressed somewhat in the 1981 
Report where the fundamentals tradition in Anglicanism was more clearly 
contextualised by 'the corporate nature of faith'. 30 
The continuing significance of the tradition as an Anglican 
strategy for dealing with the limits of internal diversity in matters 
of faith emerged in the 1986 statement by the House of Bishops on The 
Nature of Christian Belief,31 Here the tradition was seen to be not 
only an important but also a highly flexible feature of Anglican 
theological method. This method included a strong moral component: 
''love for the total inheritance of fai th"32 was stated as the framework 
for diversity in Christian faith. 
The Inter-Church Context: Some Examples 
In the ecumenical context there is much evidence of a recognition 
and deployment of a fundamentals tradition in Anglicanism. The 1968 
Malta Report proposed, as one possible way forward for Anglican-Roman 
Catholic relations, an investigation of: 
the possible convergences of lines of thought .••• between the 
Anglican distinction of fundamentals from non-fundamentals and the 
distinction implied by the Vatican Council's references to a 
'hierarchy of truths' (Decree on Ecumenism, 11).33 
The subsequent history of Anglican-Roman Catholic dialogue indicates 
just how significant a role the aforementioned proposal has played in 
the exploration of church unity. 
At a general level the various Reports have envisaged an important 
role for doctrinal consensus in the achievement of future church unity. 
7 
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In this regard it is claimed that 'substantial' agreement on 
eucharistic faith has been achieved. In this context substantial is 
meant to indicate that 'differences' and/or 'divergences' in matters of 
practice, and 'theological judgements relating to them', "may well 
coexist with a real consensus on the essentials of eucharistic 
faith ... ". 34 In a similar vein, on matters to do with ministry and 
ordination, the Commission has claimed to have achieved a 'consensus' 
"on essential matters where it considers that doctrine admits no 
divergence".JS 
In the more recent ARCIC II on Salvation and the Church the 
Commission concludes: "We believe that our two Communions are agreed on 
the essential aspects of the doctrine of salvation and on the Church's 
role within it",36 The rapprochement intended here in respect of the 
doctrine of justification, whilst not uncontroversial, suggests that 
both parties envisage some kind of 'fundamental consensus' having been 
established on the doctrine,37 It is evidently "not an area where any 
remaining differences of theological emphasis, either within or 
between our Communions, can justify our continuing separation",38 
Identifying areas of common belief has, it seems, important 
ecclesiological significance for both Anglicans and Roman Catholics. 
In the highly sensitive area of church authority the Anglican 
fundamentals apologetic has emerged with clarity and urgency. When 
fundamental matters of faith are in question the Church can make 
judgements, but in this respect conciliar authority belongs to only 
those decrees "which formulate the central truths of salvation",39 Both 
Roman Catholics and Anglicans ascribe such authority to "the ecumenical 
councils of the first centuries",40 An alleged ambiguity here on the 
Anglican side is later clarified: 
only those judgements of general councils 
'exclude' what is erroneous or are 'protected 
have as their content 'fundamental matters 
formulate the central truths of salvation and 
to Scripture and consistent with Tradition.41 
8 
are guaranteed to 
from error' which 
of faith', which 
which are faithful 
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Enshrined in this elucidation is the familiar Anglican 'theory of 
fundamentals' in which the faith is antecedent to the judgement of the 
Church. The significance of this position emerged quite clearly in the 
1976 statement, on the issue of the Marian dogmas, of which "Anglicans 
doubt the appropriateness, or even the possibility, of defining as 
essential to the faith of believers",42 
Later, in 1981, both ecclesial traditions are said to recognise 
that one consequence of their separation has been for both alike: 
to exaggerate the importance of the Marian dogmas in themselves 
at the expense of other truths more closely related to the 
foundation of the Christian faith."43 
At this point the convergence between the Anglican distinction between 
fundamentals and non-fundamentals and the Vatican Council's concept of 
the 'hierarchy of truths' becomes explicit. However the only way 
beyond an apparent impasse at this point, at least for Anglicans, seems 
to lie in the retention of the freedom of the Anglican Church not to 
subscribe to such Marian dogmas in any future church union,44 In this 
way the familiar theory of fundamentals espoused by Anglicans would 
remain intact. 
The particular thrust of the above dialogue - to identify areas of 
commonality and differences in matters of faith and order - has given 
the Anglican appeal to fundamentals a seemingly high relevance and 
usefulness. This does not seem to be the case in Anglican-Orthodox 
dialogue, where the Orthodox participants have shown themselves 
resistant to the appeal,45 
In the context of Anglican dialogue with the Reformed and Lutheran 
churches the appeal to fundamentals emerges as an important strategy 
for achieving a higher degree of unity,46 Thus, drawing upon earlier 
conversations, the Anglican-Lutheran Niagara Report (1987) refers to 
"the common sharing of fundamental beliefs and practices". 47 
Recognition of this 'comprehensive doctrinal agreement'- including the 
ancient creeds, 'the basic Trinitarian and Christological Dogmas', 
9 
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Baptism, Eucharist, and Justification - led the Anglican and Lutheran 
participants to acknowledge "each other as true Churches of Christ, 
preaching the same gospel, possessing a common apostolic ministry, and 
celebrating authentic sacraments".48 
In Anglican dialogue with Reformed Churches the stress has been 
not so much upon agreement in the faith - in respect of which there 
does not appear any problem - but rather on exploring the relationship 
between 'orthodoxy' and 'orthopraxis'.49 Accordingly, in the 1988 
Meissen statement, Anglican, Lutheran and Reformed participants 
referred to "a common confession of the apostolic faith in word and 
life" as a necessity for "full, visible unity",SO In this respect the 
statement recognised the common bond of faith in Scripture, Creeds and 
Reformation inheritance. It went on to identify an 'agreement in faith' 
witnessed in Scripture and early Creeds, particularly emphasising "the 
basic trinitarian and christological dogmas to which these creeds 
testify",51 The Meissen statement concluded with an acknowledgement of 
"one another's churches as churches belonging to the One, Holy, 
Catholic and Apostolic Church of Jesus Christ and truly participating 
in the apostolic mission of the whole people of God",52 
It would be quite wrong to conclude that the appeal to 
fundamentals in these conversations was uncontroversial. The point 
here is that the familiar Anglican differentiation of fundamentals and 
non-fundamentals is in fact a purely formal operation which has a 
variety of possible applications in different contexts. The 'theory of 
fundamentals' in Anglicanism is relevant not simply to Anglican-Roman 
Catholic relations, but also to dialogue with other Protestants. In 
the latter case the shape and content of the fundamentals strategy is 
differently construed. Questions of Church order and specifically of 
Episcopacy its practice and the doctrine of the practice -
significantly intrude into the realm of what is perceived to be 
relevant and essential for future unity.s3_ 
10 
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Anglican discussion with other Protestant Churches has only served 
to highlight the highly flexible nature of the traditional fundamentals 
apologetic. Perhaps unsurprisingly such dialogue has raised some quite 
central issues for Anglicans about the significance of this appeal for 
the handling of their own identity.s4 
Aspects of the Tradition 
So far in this Chapter an Anglican fundamentals tradition has been 
identified within the larger framework of fundamentals discussion in 
Christianity. Some examples of the use of this tradition in 
contemporary Anglican thought and practice have been also provided. 
Further understanding of this important strategy in Anglicanism can be 
pursued in a preliminary way through a consideration of four aspects of 
the tradition; its persistence, its documentation, its controversial 
status, and its unresolved nature. 
A Persistent Theme 
The fundamentals apologia has been a persistent theme in 
Anglicanism. At a general level this is not urprising. Iden tifying 
fundamentals can be a useful strategy for finding and communicating the 
truth of Christianity. Anglicans continue to recognise and deploy this 
tradition, and continue to write about it. The tradition has a history, 
one which is in fact shared but variously interpreted within and 
outside of the Anglican communion. In Part Two of this thesis a more 
detailed consideration of the historical significance and development 
of this tradition in Anglicanism will be presented. 
Literature of the Tradition 
Identifying the literature of the tradition is a highly 
problematic exercise. Any attempt at a survey raises some quite 
critical questions about the nature of the tradition under examination. 
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Such questions will be considered more fully later in this 
Chapter. For the moment it is to be noted that the literature on the 
subject is either potentially vast or rather meagre depending on how 
one construes the province of fundamentals discussion and accordingly 
decides what counts as evidence for the discussion in the history of 
theology. This problem is particularly acute in Anglicanism where there 
is little evidence of the development of a genuinely critical handling 
of a mode of argument so important to its own history.ss 
One useful way of identifying the literature of the tradition is 
to focus on a particular way in which fundamentals discussion has been 
developed historically. Important here is 
about fundamental articles of the faith. 
the tradition of speaking 
This concept has a high 
profile in fundamentals discussion in Anglicanism.5 6 This is not 
surprising, arising 
Protestant heritage. 
at one level from Anglicanism's particular 
At a deeper level, however, it is important to 
note that the differentiation in Christianity between matters 
fundamental and non-fundamental presents itself most clearly at the 
level of doctrine. Of course to speak of fundamental and non-
fundamental doctrines does not negate the relevance of Church order and 
practice for they too have their doctrines.5 7 
The aim here is not (nor would it be appropriate or possible) to 
identify the vast array of literature on fundamental articles, even 
from the period of its popularization in post-Reformation Christendom. 
However the tradition of fundamental articles does have a history in 
Anglicanism. The aim here is simply to identify the literature in which 
the significance of this tradition is recognised and usefully detailed, 
insofar as this has relevance for Anglicanism. 
In 1970 the French Dominican scholar Yves Congar, in commenting on 
the well-known importance of the notion of fundamental articles in 
Anglicanism, noted that the history of the concept had never been 
written, 58 Congar was unaware at that time of a 1968 work written in 
12 
I: Fundamentals of Christianity 
the wake of Vatican II by the German Lutheran, Ulrich Valeske.59 
Valeske had provided a well-documented account of the development of 
the related concepts of hierarchy of truths and fundamental articles, 
the latter being discussed as a feature of Protestant dogmatics.so 
Valeske's bibliography provided a most comprehensive documentation of 
the history of the fundamental articles concept, at least insofar as 
the discussion belonged to Continental, and in particular, German 
Protestantism. 
Two aspects of Valeske's work are interesting from the 
perspective of this study. Firstly, the Anglican fundamental articles 
discussion is usefully set within a much wider attempt in Protestantism 
to articulate the theological problem of the fundamental article. 
Secondly, 
articles 
consultation of Valeske's documentation of fundamental 
discussion in Anglicanism gives the rather distorted 
impression that, apart from the possible relevance of the Lambeth 
Quadrilateral to fundamental articles discussion, the Anglican history 
of the fundamental articles concept ended in the early eighteenth 
century with William Wake and Daniel Waterland. 61 Valeske's work is a 
useful guide to Continental Protestant discussions of the fundamentals 
of the faith but quite inadequate in its documentation and appreciation 
of the Anglican contribution. 
In Congar's own ecumenical concerns he has provided helpful 
material on the fundamental articles concept. In his major work on 
Tradition and Traditions he linked the emergence of the fundamental 
articles concept to the development of the notion of truths necessary 
for salvation,62 In the 1970 essay referred to above, the concept of 
fundamental articles was discussed in relation to the concept adopted 
at Vatican II of the hierarchy of truths. In Diversity and Communion, 
written at the end of his life, Congar traced the origins and contexts 
for the various Protestant discussions of fundamental articles. 63 
Congar has made a useful contribution to the study of the Anglican 
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fundamental articles tradition. His documentation of Anglicanism is 
more comprehensive than Valeske's, and his highly suggestive remark 
that "the question of fundamental articles has become an article of 
ecclesiology in Anglicanism" 64 invites further examination. 
It is perhaps not surprising that important discussion on the 
fundamental articles concept has emerged since Vatican II. Ecumenically 
-minded Roman Catholic theologians have invested significant energy in 
examining the notion of a 'hierarchy of truths', and the relevance of 
the fundamental articles concept has not gone unnoticed.ss Indeed 1 the 
very notion that not all truths are of the same order has encouraged 
the view among Roman Catholic theologians that doctrinal agreement 
between the churches might be sought in the interests of achieving a 
shared Christian vision,66 
Even in earlier more critical discussions usually dismissive of 
fundamental articles appearing in Roman Catholic Theological 
Dictionaries, helpful historical treatments of the subject> which 
include reference to the Anglican tradition,can still be found. 67 The 
subject continues to receive brief and more general treatment in Roman 
Catholic Theological Dictionaries,6B 
The subject has generated its own history within Protestantism. 
The history of this tradition is usefully documented and discussed in 
nineteenth and twentieth century dictionary articles,69 Important 
contributions to the theme can also be found in more recent Protestant 
theology,70 Generally1 reference to the Anglican discussion of the 
subject is minimal,71 Two things are clear. Firstly, the rather 
sophisticated 
the impact 
development of the tradition by Lutherans. 7 2 
on the tradition of the complexities of 
Secondly, 
doctrinal 
development emergent in the nineteenth century. 73 This challenge did 
not so much remove fundamental articles concern from the agenda as 
serve to intensify an already difficult theological problem.74 
The concept of fundamental articles has, from early in the 
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Reformation period, been linked with strategies for reconciliation and 
toleration. Consultation of important works in these areas will provide 
useful, if scattered, information on the history of the fundamental 
articles concept. 75 This ecumenical context provides an occasion for 
continuing Protestant discussion of fundamental articles,76 
Within Anglicanism literature on the history of the tradition is 
fairly meagre. Stephen Sykes' recent article on "The Fundamentals of 
Christianity" is the first significant attempt for over one hundred and 
fifty years to detail the development of the fundamental articles 
tradition within Anglicanism.77 More will be said later in this 
Chapter on Sykes' history of the Anglican fundamentals tradition. Paul 
Avis' recent book on Anglicanism and the Christian Church includes 
useful summary information of fundamentals discussion in Anglicanism, 
particularly as it developed in the seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries.7 8 
In 1970 Henry Chadwick delivered a short paper to the Catholic 
Faculty of Theology at Tubingen on the theological problems of 
fundamental articles. In this context Chadwick provided a brief account 
of the early development of the tradition in Anglicanism. The paper was 
subsequently published in German.79 
Henry McAdoo's historical studies on Anglicanism include material 
on the fundamental articles apologia.BO The literature in which the 
tradition is both recognised and subjected to even minimal analysis 
is sparse. A more searching examination of an important part of 
Anglican apologetic is required.Bl In this respect it is indeed a 
curiosity that the subject of 'fundamental articles' continues not to 
be treated in what, for most Anglicans at any rate, would be considered 
a basic reference in theology,B2 
Controversial Status of the Tradition 
The tradition does then have a continuing and relevant history 
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within and outside Anglicanism. Nevertheless, although Anglicans 
continue to write about it, documentation and analysis of the tradition 
in Anglicanism is far from adequate. Even the briefest acquaintance 
with the foregoing literature would be sufficient to indicate the 
highly controversial status of the fundamentals tradition within and 
outside the Protestant communions. In Anglicanism at least, with its 
positive commitment to diversity, fundamentals discussion is not only 
unavoidably controversial but vitally necessary for the endurance of 
its own life and mission. However the history of the tradition reveals 
some sophisticated developments, continued challenges, modifications 
and, of course, outright dismissals. 
Protestant theologians have been critical of the fundamentals 
apologetic in various ways. The learned Tractarian, William Palmer, 
(1803-1885) of Worcester College Oxford, dismissed what he termed the 
Doctrine of Fundamentals on the basis of its arbitrariness and the 
terminological confusion associated with its deployment. 8 3 John Henry 
Newman's passage to the Roman communion was, among other things, a 
signal that the theory of fundamentals, in which he had invested a good 
deal of energy in his apology for the via media of Anglicanism was, in 
his view, unable to deal with the difficult issues associated with the 
problem of doctrinal development.B4 
A certain Protestant scripturalism has, from the early seventeenth 
century, rejected the division between fundamental and non-fundamental 
articles upon the rationale that the selection of certain doctrines 
from Scripture to the neglect of others could not but be dangerously 
arbitrary.BS This challenge was the logic of an 'inspirationalist 
school of teaching' which was at odds with a soteriological development 
of the fundamentals apologetic that may be found in Luther. 86 
In the history of the subject inspirationalism has continually 
threatened to neutralise all critical deliberation on the problem of 
the fundamental article.B7 This inspirationalism was capable of being 
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assimilated within later eighteenth and nineteenth century views on the 
development of doctrine through the influence of organic theories of 
doctrinal development which owed their influence to a Romantic school 
of thought. 8 8 In this context any attempt to distinguish between 
beliefs of greater and lesser importance will ultimately fail. The 
thrust towards doctrinal differentiation will be continually thwarted 
by an inspirationalist theory of the Word of God that requires 
obedience to the content of Scripture in its entirety. 
However the charge of arbitrariness is inevitably one to which the 
fundamental articles tradition is vulnerable. It has been developed in 
the twentieth century in a sharp and sophisticated manner by the 
Reformed theologian Karl Barth,89 Barth located the development of the 
fundamental articles apologetic within the high orthodoxy of 
seventeenth century Continental Protestantism. As Barth noted; 
its choice of the fundamentum dogmaticum was not in fact a bad 
one . . . . • . But it was bad in principle, because it involved a 
definition, limitation and restriction of the Word of God 
The power of the real Word of God cannot possibly be expected 
from a Word which is fettered in this way by arbitrary human 
action, or actually crowded out by a human system of beliefs. 90 
In Barth's view the danger arose when a legitimate 'serviceable 
heuristic' was raised into a kind of 'classic text' which, in relation 
to the 'real Word of God', could not but appear arbitrary. For Barth, 
the whole development degenerated into "the thin formulae by which 
later Neo-Protestantism thought it could grasp the so-called 'essence 
of Christianity'",91 
Barth's forceful critique calls attention to some of the inner 
dynamics present in fundamentals discussion: articles of faith are not 
self-generating but are derived from and refer to an encounter with the 
free Word of God - the fundamentum substantiale and organicum,92 As 
such the fundamental articles tradition lives, as it were, suspended, 
so that it "can become a matter for vital new decision by the Word of 
God itself". 9 3 
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This kind of critique has to be taken seriously, notwithstanding 
its own Romantic presuppositions,9 4 and the related question as to 
whether Barth has correctly identified the fundamental articles 
tradition 
he fails 
with the idea of the essence of Christianity,95 
to take account of a tradition which has a 
context other than Continental Protestantism. 
Furthermore 
history and 
Despite his strong critique of the fundamental articles tradition, 
Barth still wished to speak of 'a certain distinction' in dogmatics 
"between the essential and the non-essential, the central and the 
peripheral, the more important and the less important",96 For Barth it 
was a matter of the 'proper use' of this distinction. This occurred 
when the fundamentum dogmaticum expressed "the possible and necessary 
account by the Church of its own particular experience of encounter 
with the work and activity of God in His Word". 97 When this expression 
of an encounter with 'God in His Word' became the pretext for "the 
establishment of specific, irrevocable, fundamental articles" then the 
way was blocked for the free operation of the Word of God and the 
Church. 
Barth's dismissal of the fundamental articles tradition turns, it 
seems, into a qualified endorsement,98 For Barth the matter had 
important ecclesiological consequences: "When we speak of Lutheran, 
Reformed or Anglican Church, we are not speaking of three different 
Churches, but of the three present forms of one and the same Church -
the Evangelical Church, the one holy, catholic, and apostolic 
Church",99 Barth supposed an essential commonality in the 'one 
Evangelical Church confession', notwithstanding diversity of doctrine. 
Echoing Calvin, Barth argued that not every difference of doctrine need 
imply 
the 
separation or schism. "Unity in the Church is possible even on 
assumption that there are differences of doctrine in it",lOO This 
is the familiar Anglican doctrine of fundamentals, expounded by one 
deeply and rightly critical of improper uses of the appeal to 
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fundamental articles. 
Some of the fiercest challenges to the tradition of articuli 
fundamentales have come, not surprisingly, from Roman Catholic 
theologians. They have regularly dismissed it as a Protestant theory 
subversive of true church unity and unrealisable in practice without an 
infallible authority to determine content. 10 1 This was the view of the 
early twentieth century Roman Catholic theologian Adolf Tanqueray 
(1854-1932). Tanqueray argued that Protestant preoccupation with 
identifying fundamental articles of the faith betrayed both a false 
ecclesiology destructive of the oneness of the visible Church of 
Christ and, more dangerously, a rationalistic temper destructive of 
Christianity. 1 02 This latter feature was evident in a refusal to 
accept the authority instituted by Jesus Christ (the Roman magisterium) 
and in the proliferation of Protestant sectarianism. Tanqueray found 
support for his position in the writings of such Latin Fathers as 
Tertullian, who argued that all heretics damned themselves by the fact 
that they made choices between revealed verities.l03 
At the basis of Tanqueray's criticisms is the familiar Roman 
Catholic argument that all truth revealed by God is worthy of the same 
faith. The disciple of Christ is to believe the mystery of the Trinity 
with the same faith as that required for belief in the immaculate 
conception. The incarnation and the infallible magisterium of the Roman 
Pontiff likewise require the same faith. This position was clearly 
enunciated in the papal Encyclical Mortalium Animos(1927): 
Furthermore, it is never lawful to employ in connexion with 
articles of faith the distinction invented by some between 
'fundamental' and 'non-fundamental' articles, the former to be 
accepted by all, the latter being left to the free acceptance of 
the faithful. The supernatural virtue of faith has as its formal 
motive the authority of God revealing, and this allows of no such 
distinction. All true followers of Christ, therefore, will believe 
the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of the Mother of God with 
the same faith as they believe the mystery of the august Trinity, 
the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff in the sense defined by the 
Oecumenical Vatican Council with the same faith as they believe 
the Incarnation of our Lord. That these truths have been solemnly 
sanctioned and defined by the Church at various times, some of 
them even quite recently, makes no difference to their certainty, 
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nor to our obligation of believing them. 
them all?l04 
Has not God revealed 
appears little room for movement given the different 
ecclesiological positions implicit here. The Anglican theologian Henry 
Chadwick has noted, 
The Roman Catholic thinks: we have the church, and that is why 
we keep the fundamental doctrines. The Protestant thinks: we 
keep the fundamental doctrines, and that is why we have the 
church. There is virtually no hope of a union or a compromise 
between these two attitudes,lOS 
In the more open climate of post-Vatican II, the ecumenically-
minded Roman Catholic theologian Yves Congar has recognised that modern 
Catholic theology has increasingly c~nstructed its account of faith on 
the quo (the authority or formal motive for belief) rather than upon 
the quod (the material content of faith),l06 In this development 
the nature of the content of faith has been obscured. For Congar the 
fundamental articles relate to the content of faith and in this way he 
has linked the concept to the Vatican II notion of a 'hierarchy of 
truths'. In this context the mystery of the Trinity is, argues Congar, 
more fundamental for the nature of Christianity than the infallibility 
of the papal magisterium. Congar is clearly in sympathy with the 
intention behind the distinction between fundamentals and non-
fundamentals. Despite his expressed reservations of an ecclesiological 
kind the distinction clearly has programmatic force for him, since 
the very idea of 
necessary but 
held in common 
object of all my 
diversities compatible with communion, or of 
sufficient minimum of common doctrine to 
if unity is to be preserved, is in fact 
research,l 07 
the 
be 
the 
Congar's sympathies have been more radically developed by Karl 
Rahner and Heinrich Fries who have mapped out eight theses for the 
unity of the future Church,l08 The first thesis calls for agreement on 
the fundamental truths of Christianity as expressed in the Scriptures 
and the Nicene and Apostolic creeds. The second thesis outlines 
requirements for diversity in matters of faith. Other theses deal with 
ministry, authority and the Petrine office. It is a remarkable piece 
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of work from Roman Catholic theologians in which a new theological 
amalgam for future unity has been constructed. The familiar 
fundamental articles apologetic has not been directly challenged but 
has been modified by being placed in a wider, more forward-looking 
ecclesiological context. Accordingly, the fundamental articles concept 
is shown to offer a potentially useful, though limited strategy, for 
the reconciliation the churches. Whatever the practical outcome, the 
proposals of Fries and Rahner have sparked off an important debate, 
though largely confined to the Continent.l09 
Consideration of the controversial nature of the appeal to 
fundamental articles of the faith cannot overlook the significance of 
what the Dutch Reformed theologian G.C.Berkouwer, in speaking of the 
nature of Christian confession, has referred to as "a tendency to 
simplicity, to concentration in what is most 'essential'",llO It is of 
course a feature recognised by Protestant and Catholic theologians. 
Karl Rahner's proposals for a 'short-formula' (Kurzformel) of faith 
testify to his conviction that the important aim is "to express what is 
essential in brief to today's highly preoccupied men"lll in an 
atheistic world. This compression of the faith for confessional and 
apologetical purposes entails, in Berkouwer's view, a paradox: "the 
concern in the brevity is precisely to say 'everything' in its 
qualitative richness",112 Accordingly, Berkouwer states that "whenever 
this concentration [of the faith] comes up for discussion, the deepest 
questions of the Church always come to the fore",113 
Berkouwer's comment points to the inherently controversial nature 
of any attempt to state the faith in brief form. Disputation over 
fundamental articles cannot be interpreted, as Tanqueray suggested, as 
merely a peculiarity of undisciplined Protestantism. Rather, the 
controversial status of the tradition belongs to the logic of faith 
itself. This recognition leads to a consideration of the unresolved 
nature of the fundamentals tradition. 
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Unresolved Nature of the Tradition 
The fundamentals tradition continues to attract interest and 
generate controversy across the ecclesiological spectrum. It is neither 
redundant, nor parochial, nor, if the contestability of the tradition 
is to be taken account of, is it resolved and secured. 
What can at one level appear to be an eminently reasonable and 
practical appeal to certain fundamentals of the faith in fact turns out 
to be neither as simple nor unchallengable as it might first seem. 
There are, as Stephen Sykes notes, 
considerable complexities hidden in the proposal 
Christians do, can or should agree on fundamentals, a 
which on the surface appears to be self-evident, or 
highly desirable.114 
that all 
proposal 
at least 
Most commentators on the subject share a common conviction concerning 
the difficulty of the task of fundamentals inquiry. When, in the early 
seventeenth century, the ecumenically-minded Anglican Bishop John 
Davenant (1572-1641) turned his mind to the subject he stated that he 
was "not ignorant on how dangerous a rock he toucheth, who appeareth to 
define Fundamental! Doctrines or to bound them within certain 
limits ... ". 115 The complex and unresolved nature of the task has been 
clearly evident in history for, as the Anglican systematician Daniel 
Waterland (1683-1740) noted in 1734, the subject of fundamentals had 
passed through many learned and judicious hands, most of them 
complaining of the perplexities in it, but all bearing testimony 
to the great weight and importance of it.11s 
Even the briefest acquaintance with the history of fundamentals 
discussion in Anglicanism is sufficient to confirm the difficulty 
inherent in adequately tackling the subject. There are a number of 
reasons for this. Firstly, the very fact that exponents of the 
tradition under examination have provided different solutions both at 
the same and at different periods in time to the question about the 
fundamentals of Christianity, does not signal the outright failure of a 
tradition but indicates the complex phenomenon that Christianity is. 
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Important here is what Michael Polanyi has termed the 'ineffable 
domain' 117 - that unspecifiable component in reality that is resistent 
to definitive thematization, and generative of what has been referred 
to in theology as the 'essential contestability of Christianity' ,118 
From this perspective the attempt to state the faith in the form of 
fundamental articles will remain controversial and unfinished. Here 
the question arises of how the determination of fundamentals might be 
developed to take account of the contingent nature of Christian faith. 
Consideration of these matters is important and urgent in 
Christianity insofar as stating the faith is an attempt to communicate 
the presence and action of God in contemporary life,l 19 The challenge 
here is to penetrate complex phenomena and achieve ideal communication: 
a task vital for the Church's life and mission but, as already 
suggested, an inherently difficult and necessarily ongoing task. 
Achieving good communication is exacerbated in the theological 
enterprise because it continues to be impeded by a lack of "a 
comprehensive theory of theological statements in present theology",l20 
Consequently, the genre of regulative communication in fundamentals 
discussion remains unresolved. There is little consensus concerning 
appropriate methods and strategies for theological communication. This 
is evident in the terminological puzzle which prevails in fundamentals 
discussion in Christianity. Various terms including fundamentals, 
fundamental articles, fundamental truths of faith, essentials of 
Christianity, essence of Christianity, fundamentum dogmaticum, and 
truths necessary for salvation, have emerged as relevant in the history 
of the discussion. They have been applied to church credenda (faith) 
and/or agenda (order), for the purpose of identifying matters necessary 
for salvation or necessary for the being, well-being or perfection of 
the Church. In short there are a matrix of possibilities relevant in 
such discussion and clarification will be achieved only by attention to 
particular contexts. 
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Matters here are further complicated by the use of a variety of 
terms, old and new, which are related in as yet undetermined ways to 
the foregoing. These include the notion of fundament or foundation, 
rule of faith, hierarchy of truths, adiaphora, Vincentian Canon, and 
the consensus quinquesaecularis or agreement of the first councils.lZl 
What is clear is that the dynamics of regulative communication remain 
at best obscure. Some of the more important aspects of this problem, 
as they affect the theme of fundamental articles, will be attended to 
in Part Four of this thesis. 
Finally, in Anglicanism, issues concerning truth and communication 
in Christianity continue unresolved, because in this communion 
fundamentals discussion has, as has already been observed, usually been 
associated with its own apologia. This apologia, developed by various 
ecclesial traditions within Anglicanism, has operated in a variety of 
contexts - polemical, ecumenical, intra-church contexts to do with 
discipline and authority. These are all unconducive to careful 
attention to the difficulties inherent in fundamentals inquiry. To 
recognise this is of course to identify institutionality as a problem 
for fundamentals discussion,lZZ Highly relevant is the fact that as a 
particular apologetic strategy gathers strength from successive 
deployments in the historical process, it becomes increasingly risky to 
allow the force of challenges to one's own position: the threat of 
subversion of a well-entrenched position is difficult if not impossible 
to countenance. The apologia begins to operate as an important 
theological strategy for the maintenance of a pre-established 
ecclesiological position. In this way the fundamental articles 
tradition gathers ideological significance which requires uncovering 
and critical analysis,123 
This discussion of the fundamentals of Christianity in 
Anglicanism has drawn attention to the persistence of the tradition in 
history, the relatively scant attention given to this history in 
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Anglicanism, and its continuing highly controversial and unresolved 
nature. The tradition is clearly of ecclesiological significance but it 
is neither as self-evidently simple nor as unchallengeable as it may on 
first inspection appear. 
Some Recent Anglican Discussions of the Tradition 
There is, as indicated, plenty of evidence for the continued use 
of an appeal to fundamentals in Anglicanism. A preliminary attempt to 
understand this tradition has revealed certain difficulties inherent in 
its operation. The tradition is clearly important in contemporary 
Anglicanism. It is a theory which evidently informs an Anglican desire 
for a principled ecclesial practice. A question arises as to how 
critically attentive Anglicans have been to a strategy that has been an 
important determinant of Anglican self-understanding. 
Anglicans, however, have not been particularly attentive to the 
need for theological self-criticism.l24 The fundamentals apologetic is 
a victim of this indifference, if not antipathy. Moreover, in a self-
consciously ecumenical environment the more urgent impulse to identify 
doctrinal consensus and divergence means that potential difficulties 
inherent in the fundamentals apologetic are more likely to be ignored. 
As has already been suggested1 difficulties in Anglican dialogue 
with other Protestant and Roman churches can be traced to different 
ways of handling fundamentals in Christianity. Such differences are 
linked to well established positions with regard to faith and authority 
in the Church. From another point of view it seems that where the 
concerns of practical ecclesiology dominat~ the tradition does not 
readily offer itself for interrogation. Consequently, some of the more 
interesting and important issues concerning the generation and purpose 
of the fundamental articles tradition simply never surface. 
In recent years a few Anglicans have quite self-consciously turned 
their attention to the fundamentals tradition in Anglicanism. Four 
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contributions will be considered here; the two former ones warrant only 
brief comment while the latter two require more extended appraisal. 
John Baker 
The Anglican commitment to the fundamentals apologia was 
addressed by the Anglican representative John Austin Baker (then Canon 
of Westminster) at a conference in 1979 on Church Unity and the 
Hierarchy of Truths organised under the auspices of Academie 
Internationale des Sciences Religeuses.l25 Baker concluded that there 
was, in Anglican practice,something that may be compared to a doctrine 
of the 'hierarchy of truths'. However it was not a developed doctrine, 
not a pyramid with many levels. Rather1 it consisted of a simple 
distinction between those authoritative sources of belief and the basic 
definitions of its outline, and the multitude of ways in which 
Christians work out their own individual or corporate faith in each 
generation within the guidelines drawn by the former category. Baker 
recognised that discussion over essentials had historically been 
complicated by problems of the comprehensiveness of the Anglican 
communion, externally in relation to Roman Catholic and to other 
Protestant groups, and internally with the development of ecclesial 
'party' structures. Other strains on the traditional Anglican position 
on fundamentals had arisen with the rise of biblical criticism and the 
challenge of the ecumenical movement. 
The theme of the 'hierarchy of truths' gave importance to the 
discussion though Baker's paper simply restated a well-known Anglican 
position. In the context of an ecumenical exchange further exploration 
of fundamentals issues was not pursued. 
Henry Chadwick 
Earlier, in July 1970, the distinguished Anglican scholar Henry 
Chadwick, in considering the problem of fundamental articles of the 
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faith, had traced its history back to the doctrinal conflicts generated 
by fourth century Arianism,l26 In briefly tracing the development of 
the problem into the more recent ecumenical context Chadwick paid 
particular attention to the early seventeenth century Anglican 
theologian 1 Richard Field (1561-1616). Chadwick argued that Field could 
be rightly regarded as one of the founders of the World Council of 
Churches in that he accepted the divisions of Christendom as a fact 
and proposed a future reunification upon the basis of an agreement in 
basic truths. 
Chadwick referred to the theoretical and practical difficulties 
entailed in the appeal to certain basic truths of faith. These included 
the problem of locating ecclesial existence and endurance in doctrine 
rather than in the life of the community, the difficulty of deciding 
upon and imposing certain beliefs, and the danger of a rationalistic 
and reductive faith as a solution for ecumenical problems. Chadwick was 
equally desirous of pressing home to his Roman Catholic colleagues the 
fallacies involved in simply resorting to an appeal to the Roman 
Magisterium for the determination of essential belief. 
Underlying the question of agreement on basic truths Chadwick 
identified a number of questions concerning the nature of a doctrine 
and the determination of binding doctrinal definitions. Within this 
context Chadwick endorsed neither a retreat into Roman infallibility 
nor a Protestant reductionism but an amalgam in which ecclesially 
binding doctrines were achieved through a process of careful 
examination 
discussion 
of declarations of faith and tradition, 
and deep thought. Chadwick concluded 
and by 
that 
means of 
if Roman 
Catholics could take a decision on doctrine in this manner then they 
were as close as possible to the common Protestant position that the 
declaration of faith is the norma normans and the decisions of the 
Church are normae normatae: that decisions of the Church obtain their 
validity from their loyalty to the faith professed,l27 
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Chadwick's analysis of the problem of fundamental articles remains 
at best partial. His useful treatment of the historical development of 
the theme is offered in the interests of dialogue with Roman Catholics 
in relation to their own handling of fundamentals discussion. However 
the issues that surface are not pressed into systematic form. This 
ensures the marginalization of questions to do with the status and 
operation of an important aspect of Anglican apologetic. 
Chadwick's more recent comments on the subject indicate a 
qualified endorsement of the idea of fundamental articles.128 Drawing 
upon the theology of the eighteenth century theologian} Daniel 
Waterland, Chadwick identified fundamental articles as pertaining to 
that which "the Church must teach to be authentically the Church, to be 
true to the calling and gospel of God". 129 Whilst recognising that the 
continuing life of the Church cannot be resolved into a list of 
doctrines Chadwick clearly wished to commend the notion of fundamental 
articles to his Roman Catholic colleagues. 
The reality of the matter is that despite all Pius XI's 
reservations and censures, the notion of fundamental articles is 
presupposed throughout the long history of Roman approaches to the 
eastern Orthodox churches, where western theologians have sought 
to persuade their eastern brothers that behind and beneath the 
different formulas there is substantial agreement. Pluralism in 
theology is compatible with unity at the level of faith. 130 
In the context of practical ecumenism the theme of fundamental 
articles appears to offer an important means of affirming diversity and 
unity in the Christian faith. 
Henry McAdoo 
Henry McAdoo, the former Archbishop of Dublin and Anglican co-
chairman of the Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission, has 
been aptly described as "a distinguished contemporary exponent of this 
[fundamentals] tradition."131 
McAdoo's historical studies of Anglicanism, particularly of 
theological themes in the seventeenth century,132 coupled with his own 
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attempts to articulate Anglican self-understanding in a wider 
ecumenical context, 133 have left him in no doubt that the distinction 
between fundamentals and non-fundamentals " has been part and parcel 
of the Anglican understanding of the unity of the faith from Hooker 
through Laud and Taylor to the present " .... 134 Fundamentals 
discussion in Anglicanism belongs 1 for McAdoo, to an 'amalgam of stress' 
which is focussed on the faith once-for-all delivered in Scripture, the 
faith and practice of the primitive Church (the hapax) and the 
continuity of faith with the early Church.135 This 'amalgam' 
repeatedly surfaces in the history of Anglicanism as it reflects on its 
own identity in relation to other communions,136 It emerged in the 
Reformation of the sixteenth century to substantiate the Anglican view 
that "the Church of England understood itself as the representative of 
the Church universal on English soil",1J7 
McAdoo can also refer to fundamentals terminology as belonging to 
a 'whole cluster of concepts' relevant to the Anglican amalgam 
including comprehensiveness, synthesis and symbiosis, fundamentals and 
non-fundamentals, and a specific theological method,1 38 In McAdoo's 
view fundamentals discussion belongs to the conceptual artillery which 
Anglicans have historically deployed to commend their arguments for the 
reformed and catholic character of Anglicanism, on the supposition that 
it is the representative of the Church universal on English soil. 
In the light of developments in biblical criticism and the 
ecumenical movement of this century McAdoo argues, in The Unity of 
Anglicanism, that there is a need to re-examine the fundamentals 
apologia, to see "how well or how ill this persistent element in 
Anglicanism has worn."139 His analysis is developed along two lines; 
firstly in response to a critique by Stephen Sykes of the fundamentals 
tradition140 and secondly by developing remarks on fundamentals by the 
ecumenically-minded Archbishop of Canterbury, William Wake (1657-1737). 
From these two angles McAdoo offers his own proposals concerning the 
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form and content of the fundamentals apologia in Anglicanism. 
A number of relevant issues emerge. Firstly, McAdoo is confident 
that there is no cause for anxiety as to the Anglican Church's 
commitment to the traditional fundamentals of the faith. The Preface 
to the 1975 Declaration of Assent "is in the classical line going back 
to Jewel and is a clear summary of where, for Anglicans, doctrine is to 
be found". 141 The hapax is here preserved. According to McAdoo, 
Sykes' anxiety is partly the result of his own failure to properly 
distinguish between public, corporate declarations of faith and the 
opinions of individual theologians ''who modify, question or reject the 
concept of the hapax as enshrined .•.. in the 1975 Declaration of 
Assent" . 14 2 
On the difficult problem of doctrinal development McAdoo wants to 
affirm both the 'historic given-ness of Christianity',l43 'the richness 
of the given faith in its totality',l44 and the need for an 'ever-
moving response' to this historical given-ness which acknowledges the 
limitations of language in expressing what has been given. McAdoo 
identifies with the Venice Statement on Authority in the Church in its 
recognition of the need for restatements and new expressions in the 
faith, notwithstanding the fact that there are 'certain formulas' of 
the faith "whose significance transcends the setting in which they were 
first formulated",l46 
A second issue concerns the ambit of fundamentals discussion. 
McAdoo argues that this cannot be limited to the region of doctrine per 
se. Those things 'essential to the true being of the Church'l47 include 
Apostolic faith, Apostolic order (a commonly acknowledged ministry) and 
Apostolic worship (Baptismal and Eucharistic liturgy), These are the 
fundamentals "without which the household of faith could have no 
existence",l48 The supposition here is that a fundamental is " a 
principle which serves as groundwork for a system, or as the base from 
which other aspects derive",l49 
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Within the context of McAdoo's highly embodied ecclesiology it is 
crucial that that which is the 'groundwork' or 'base' that which 
constitutes the Church's apostolicity- must be 'clearly evident' if 
the Church is 'to be recognizably the Church' ,150 
McAdoo's handling of the subject of fundamentals is inadequate for 
a number of related reasons. Firstly, the context for his discussion 
is not conducive to critical analysis. It seems that the pressing 
apologetical concerns of having to provide a rationale for 
Anglicanism not only to itself but to other communions - so dominate, 
that important issues in fundamentals discussion remain undetected or 
are simply skimmed over. Thus in McAdoo's investigations of 
seventeenth 
interplay 
which is 
century Anglican theology he notes that 
of the idea of continuity with the finality of 
one of the characteristic aspects of the 
"it is the 
fundamentals 
spirit of 
Anglicanism" (my italics),lSl According!~ McAdoo contends that there 
was 'no essential difference' in the views of the leading theologians 
of seventeenth century Anglicanism. Responses varied in:so:far as each 
theologian placed different emphasis on one element of an established 
and shared method which was, notes McAdoo "the outcome and active 
expression of a deep-seated conviction as to what constitutes 
fundamentals"(my italics),l52 McAdoo's historical view of the subject 
is important but it is only a first stage in the development of a 
genuinely theological inquiry into the whence and why of 'what 
constitutes fundamentals'. 
McAdoo's espousal of a particular view of doctrinal development 
indicates little awareness of the difficulties that attend a theory of 
the identity and continuity of the Church that is fraught with 
problems, given the recognised complexities of development in faith and 
doctrine. In this respect his dismissal of Sykes' concerns is too neat 
and unconvincing. The point here is that what seems like a self-
consciously chosen role as a reaffirmer of a tradition prevents McAdoo 
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from taking a more genuinely critical stance. 
The inadequacy of McAdoo's treatment of fundamentals in 
Christianity arises not only from preoccupation with apologetic 
concerns, but also from a methodology which is heavily focussed upon an 
historical mode of inquiry. It is one thing to present an historical 
view of the 'Anglican amalgam' in which a 'cluster of concepts', 
including fundamentals, can be discerned. It is another thing to 
uncover the inner logic of such concepts and inquire into the 
suppositions about truth present in particular understandings of 
fundamentals in the history of the tradition. Without some adequate 
analysis at this level there is no sufficient basis for judgements as 
to the relative merits of various ways of construing fundamentals. It 
is not self-evident that fundamentals are concerned with the 
'groundwork for a system'; that they have to be 'clearly evident' for 
purposes of 'recognizing' a Church. There is a kind of theological 
empiricism operating here. Theology is reduced to the assembly and 
strong statement of certain facts gleaned from the Christian tradition 
in Anglicanism. Such statements carry with them an assumed self-
evidence as to their significance for current issues of authority and 
faith.l53 
A third related inadequacy in McAdoo's handling of fundamentals 
concerns the issue of the universal and the particular. McAdoo wants to 
stress the importance of a general principle in Anglicanism: 
differentiating between fundamentals and non-fundamentals belongs, it 
seems 1 to part of a general method that recurs and shapes Anglican 
identity. For McAdoo this general category distinction can be discerned 
in particular historical contexts. 
fundamentals discussion makes it 
and true account of the 
However this basic orientation in 
extremely 
operation 
difficult 
of the 
to give an 
fundamentals adequate 
apologetic in its quite different and specific historical contexts. 
Particular contexts and exponents of fundamentals - e.g. William Wake -
32 
I: Fundamentals of Christianity 
can only contribute, so it seems, to an understanding of fundamentals 
issues insofar as they confirm a pre-established view of the operation 
of the tradition.154 
In short, McAdoo's handling of fundamentals in Anglicanism betrays 
a particularly ahistorical method of procedure. For McAdoo it seems 
that the really interesting features of the tradition are not, in the 
final analysis, particularly relevant. The diversity within the 
tradition {regarding both form and content) remains undetected. The 
possibility that there is not simply one tradition but that Anglican 
fundamentals discussion is multidimensional, is a possibility that can 
not be genuinely and adequately investigated where the particular and 
contingent in the historical process is not taken with the seriousness 
it demands. The demand for a unitary and all-encompassing methodology 
overrides attention to the rich and diverse contexts within which the 
Anglican attempt to state the fundamentals of the Christian faith has 
occurred. 
Stephen Sykes 
An important contribution to fundamentals discussion is offered by 
Stephen Sykes, formerly the Regius Professor of Divinity at Cambridge. 
Significant here is the wider ecclesiological context in which the 
subject has repeatedly emerged. Anglican fundamentals discussion was 
clearly central in his inquiry into The Integrity of Anglicanism 
(1978). In this context Sykes, like McAdoo, recognised the significance 
of the historic Anglican appeal to certain fundamentals and raised some 
critical questions as to the health of this tradition in the light of 
the impact of modern liberal theology,155 
Sykes' critique was designed, in part> to raise Anglican 
consciousness of the fact that changes in the traditional fundamentals 
apologetic, however subtly they occurred, had important consequences 
for Anglican ecclesiology. This issue was not only relevant in relation 
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to theological liberalism but was similarly subtly present in 
developments in the nineteenth and twentieth century in Anglo-Catholic 
ecclesiology. The espousal of a particular view of the historic 
episcopate as being of the esse of the Church was, in Sykes' view, a 
direct challenge to the traditional theory of fundamentals.156 An 
important conclusion of this inquiry was the recognition of the 
importance of worship as that activity ''which seeks at once to evoke 
the fundamentals and induct the worshipper into the heart of the 
Christian experience", 15 7 Purity of belief required a worshipping 
Church. 
It was precisely the range of belief implied in Christian worship 
that lay at the heart of Sykes' call for a fresh theological endeavour 
in Anglicanism. His essay pointed to the importance of a renewed 
preoccupation with normative definition in Christianity. This essay 
generated a good deal of attention and analysis.158 One commentator 
linked Sykes' proposals with an earlier work in which Sykes had 
recognised that, 
For the normative quest it is not a matter of identifying what, 
if anything, may be common to all who profess the name of 
Christian. It is the more difficult and adventurous task of trying 
to state what ought to characterize true Christianity,159 
The theme of fundamentals in Christianity was further developed in 
a work already referred to, The Identity of Christianity. Christian 
identity consisted for Sykes "in the interaction between its 
[Christianity's] external forms and an inward element .... "160 In this 
context the Anglican appeal to fundamentals belonged to a vigorous 
'externality tradition' in Christianity where identity and continuity 
in the faith were 'lodged in certain external features' including 
doctrines, myths, ethical teachings, rituals and social 
institutions,161 In this respect the Anglican appeal to fundamentals 
belonged to "a particular tradition of interpretation of the identity 
and continuity of Christianity stemming from the Reformation",162 Sykes 
noted that the doctrine of fundamentals had historically operated as a 
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vital and flexible tool in Anglican apologetic, "against Roman Catholic 
additions, Presbyterian rigidity and independent wilfulness",l63 
Moreove~ the doctrine was governed by an appeal to antiquity but was 
actually quite variable in its content. 
Sykes' critique of the externality tradition included an implied 
critique of the doctrine of fundamentals as he had identified it. In 
church conflict the externality tradition began with an evident natural 
advantage over the tradition of inwardness. The reason being that it 
had already been carefully defined and refined in language, making for 
easy reference and conflict resolution. Nevertheless,the externality 
tradition was, argued Sykes, "by itself, clearly and in principle 
inadequate and impossible",l64 This tradition could easily operate in 
a law-like way, it was 'profoundly unhistorical', and it disregarded 
elements of 'interiority' and non-verbal dimensions of Christianity. 
Furthermore, it was unable to deal with new questions and always 
required "authoritative contemporary expounders, whose reasons and 
arguments are bound to involve certain non-traditional features",l65 
These inadequacies were clearly evident in the way the externality 
tradition in Christianity had characteristically depicted the 
continuity of the gospel. Thus the fundamental articles belonged to 
the 'deposit' (paradosis) of faith construed as a permanent durable 
'specific quantum of hard matter',l66 One option was to understand 
this substance as 'exclusively invariable', admitting of absolutely no 
subtractions or additions. Sykes argued that this 'purely physical 
model' underpinned the fundamental articles tradition ,16 7 An 
alternative option was to regard substance as 'inclusively variable' 
which allowed for a development in the tradition in the sense of "a 
mere unveiling of an idea already implicitly present in the 
original",l68 As Sykes correctly noted, this latter move destroyed the 
analogy since "the substance of faith is much more complex than the 
analogy can allow",l69 
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Sykes' discussion of the externality tradition was developed in 
relation to an 'inwardness tradition' - "the reiterated appeal to that 
inner spiritual reality of personal lives transformed by God"l 70 - and 
a 'dialectical tradition' which incorporated "an element of each in 
some kind of interplay",l 71 This third tradition could be depicted by 
the model of 'centre-circumference', the inwardness element 
corresponding to the notion of centre. 1 72 Each tradition had its roots 
in Scripture. In this respect the biblical language of foundation and 
superstructure (ICor 3:11-15) was appropriate to the externality 
tradition.1 7 3 On the supposition that it was always possible to build 
poor superstructures, the idea of a return to the foundation or 
fundamentals was a useful tool for ecclesial self-criticism. 
Furthermore, this model did have the merit of drawing attention to the 
problem of building. It entirely failed, in Sykes' view, to specify 
how the foundation and superstructure were related. Nor did it 
indicate how the superstructure might be derived from or enrich the 
foundation. 
It is difficult to know Sykes' own position in respect of the 
Anglican fundamentals apologetic as he has depicted it. In his earlier 
inquiry into the integrity of Anglicanism there was a certain 
ambivalence. The tradition had proved unable to counteract distorting 
developments within liberalism and Anglo-Catholicism . Yet the work as 
a whole was aimed in part at re-routing Anglicanism into the pathway of 
doctrinal integrity as it was embodied in worship, and articulated in 
the articles of the faith. This first discussion was inconclusive as to 
the possible future for the articles tradition, though the ambivalence 
here was perhaps evidence of an ambivalence towards confessionality in 
Anglicanism per se,174 
Sykes' analysis of the doctrine of fundamentals in The Identity of 
Christianity 
HotJI!.ver1 is clear and perceptive. given the larger set of issues 
being considered in that work the subject is not treated with the 
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fullness required. Even in this work Sykes' own position with respect 
to the tradition remains unclear. His critical remarks are well made; 
it seems the tradition, as he has depicted it, has no future. 
It is arguable that Sykes has in fact, reconstructed 
/ 
his own 
version of the tradition. This emerges more clearly in the final 
chapters of the The Identity of Christianity where he discusses the 
importance of a formal definition of Christianity as satisfying 
the minimum conditions of intelligibility 
common use of a particular set of 
Christianity, and so forth,175 
required for the 
terms, Christian, 
Such formal definition is useful in indicating 'the area which 
believing occupies'.176 Accordingly, Sykes defines a Christian "as one 
who gives attention to Jesus, whose achievement is contextualized by 
God",177 Such a definition gives maximum scope for contestability 
concerning types of Christology. Furthermore, Christology is placed 
high on the theological agenda. When such a definition is treated as a 
sufficient expression of Christian discipleship it immediately becomes 
reductivist. 
In short, formal definition indicates the parameters for Christian 
discourse and contest. Interesting!~ Sykes links this definition and 
function with the articles of the fundamentum fidei of the early 
Church. Sykes argues that this fundamental articles tradition accords 
with his own depiction. What is important in Sykes' view is that in 
such summaries into articles 
we are not dealing with a condensation of the whole content of 
Christian believing, but with a slightly elaborated version of a 
formal definition of the area which believing occupies,1 7B 
Thus it seems that from Sykes' perspective a fundamental articles 
tradition is not only legitimate but also necessary. Not surprising!~ 
Sykes' own formal definition receives further elaboration in the form 
of what might be termed extended articles, though Sykes speaks of 
"elements which together narrate the life and story of Jesus in the 
context provided by two horizon affirmations",179 This articulation 
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is, he notes, 'an insider's depiction'. 
From Sykes' point of view the issue is not whether distillation 
into articles of belief and even in their specialized form as 
fundamental articles is legitimate. Rathe~ the question concerns the 
kind of fundamentals tradition Christianity should generate. ThisJ at 
leass seems to be the implication of his thought and it is strengthened 
when he later notes that, 
the attempt permanently to locate Christian identity in a 
specifiable quantum of propositions,,,,,, was seen to be a 
failure in its ability either to account for the fact of 
conflict or to assign to conflict any positive significancelBO (my 
italics) 
The problem in the procedure of which Sykes is rightly critical is 
that an unhealable rupture is created between Christianity's internal 
and external dimensions. The result is that the articles tradition is 
unable either to recognise or give an adequate account of the essential 
contestability of Christianity. The implication of Sykes' critique is 
that a fundamental articles tradition has to operate in such a way as 
to recognise Christianity's double foci. Such a view immediately 
destabilizes the solidification of the fundamental articles tradition 
associated with what Sykes calls the externality tradition. From this 
point of view the problem in the externality tradition is that the 
dynamic actually operating in the externalizing process is suppressed 
in fixed formulas of faith. This suggests the operation of a rigid one-
to-one correspondence between that which is mediated and the language 
of faith. In other words the logos realism underpinning the 
fundamental articles tradition hardens in form, the tradition looses 
its function as witness and begins to operate as a control over, rather 
than an expression o~ sacred reality,lSl 
Nevertheless, from Sykes' point of view, it seems there are 
certain 'minimum conditions' for discourse about Christianity which 
accord with the articles of the fundamentum fidei of the early 
Church.1s2 It seems crucial for Sykes that such articles are not so 
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much content rich, but rather indicators of Christianity's formal 
parameters. His primary concern is rather narrowly based, i.e. to 
explore how some such articles tradition might assist in the resolution 
of conflict and contribute to ecclesial identity. 
Sykes does not, however, regard Christian identity as something 
that can be achieved apart from worship, where the external and 
internal dimensions of Christianity are continually opened up to each 
other. This suggests that Christian identity is not a state but a 
process. 183 Yet this process includes a doctrinal aspect: Christian 
identity cannot be without its minimum or fundamental articles of 
faith. Furthermore, Sykes wishes to affirm a continuity between his 
proposal for the fundamentum fidei and that of early Christianity. 
However the strength of that continuity requires to be tested by the 
capacity of the truth expressed to generate an 'identity of response' 
to God "which is the proper practical expression of knowledge of his 
character",l84 To this extent at least the articles tradition remains 
at best provisional. 
Summarising then, for Sykes the traditional fundamental articles 
apologetic has proved inadequate as a strategy for taking account of 
Christianity's double foci (external and internal dimensions), insofar 
as it is unable to give a true account of ecclesial conflict and 
identity. It seems, however, that the tradition is not to be rejected 
but reintegrated into theological discourse in a modified form. This 
reintegration involves at least three moves. 
The first involves recognising the interplay between 
Christianity's external and internal dimensions. The implication here 
is that the dimension of interiority ought to be relevant to a proper 
construal of the fundamental articles tradition. It was the recognition 
of the interiority of faith that had led Barth to reject the latter 
tradition. Sykes' examination of Barth led him to a more positive 
though qualified recommendation of the tradition,lBS However, in his 
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consideration of the tradition of fundamental articles, there is 
clearly more scope for a fuller account of the generation and the telos 
of this articles tradition in relation to what might be callecl 
Christianity's founding reality or fundament. How this fundament is 
understood and communicated belongs to any consideration of the 
tradition of fundamental articles,l86 
Secondly, reintegration of the tradition is to be achieved by 
recognising worship as the place where the interplay between external 
and internal maximally intersect and open up to one another for the 
purification and renewal of Christian discipleship. This involves an 
effort by Sykes to overcome a commonly presumed distance between 
worship and the heavy accent in the Western tradition upon doctrinal 
purity,187 Accordingly s Sykes wants to speak of communal wofhip as 'a 
theatre' in which the various dimensions of Christianity including 
doctrine, are 'integrally related',l88 Worship is thus a 
1 doctrinally loaded activity',l89 Where true worship was offered "it 
would embody the truth of the doctrinally formulated relationship 
between God and humanity",l90 Thus "all Christian doctrinal belief is 
worshipping belief", 191 Consequently "a doctrine which is not 
formulated in such a way as to be a vehicle of worship of the creature 
is open to the most fundamental criticism of all, that it has lost 
touch with its origins",192 This leads Sykes to speak of his 'formal 
definition of Christianity' - i.e. his own construal of the fundamentum 
fidei; the deeds of Jesus set in the context provided by creation 
beliefs and eschatology - as "the natural substance of the rituals of 
worship",193 Sykes' development of belief in relation to worship is 
important and gives some clues as to how beliefs ought ideally to be 
held. A certain woodenness and detachment in the fundamentals tradition 
can thus be overcome; the tradition can be freshly appropriated. 
To the extent, however, that the supposition of a distance between 
worship and doctrine determines the theological agenda, strategies for 
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response are somewhat limited. For instance, in this context it will 
be difficult to break free from constricting discussions of the status 
of doctrine as a criterion for worship,l94 Sykes' effort here is not 
wholly successful. He wants to talk about true worship embodying the 
truth of doctrinal formulations, of such formulations ideally operating 
as a 'vehicle' for worship, and of the articles tradition as 'the 
natural substance' of the rituals of worship. There is a lingering 
sense here of doctrinal formulations driving worship along. 
What is clearly envisaged but not fully explored is the notion at 
least partially implicit in the above, of the natural reciprocitJ' 
between belief and worship. Such a view does not allow worship to be 
reduced to the context for belief but requires a notion of worship as 
the activity in which doctrine is realised in a particular way. 
Alternative!~ such a view opens up the possibility that doctrine - and 
hence the tradition of fundamental articles - operates as a form of 
Christianity's discipleship tradition transferred and concentrated in a 
particular form. Perhaps the point to be made at this stage is that 
Sykes' attempt to clarify the relationship between doctrine and worship 
is important but raises as many issues as it solves. It encourages the 
view that there may be certainly more involved in the tradition of 
fundamental articles in the Christian life than Sykes himself has as 
yet uncovered. 
A third way in which Sykes attempts a rehabilitation of the 
fundamental articles apologetic is by locating it within the province 
of 'formal definition' of Christianity. An articles tradition begins 
in, and is developed out of, formal definition. He can talk of "an 
elaborated version of a formal definition"l95 or propositions that are 
"fuller than a merely formal definition",l96 Nevertheless such extended 
articles have the primary focus of depicting 'the area of context',l9 7 
A focus on 'formal definition' and context leaves wide scope, in 
Sykes' view, for legitimate theological contest among a variety of 
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participants. Diversity here is not destructive of any fundamental 
unity. In this Sykes has achieved the reinstatement of Christianity's 
doctrinal dimension and more particularly the necessity and legitimacy 
of "the persistent movement towards a series of statements in which the 
central content of the Christian faith comes to expression",l98 This 
thrust towards concentrated and correct definition is able, in Sykes' 
account, to be pursued with integrity, given his reinterpretation of 
such a programme. 
It is questionable, however, whether Sykes' own proposal 
concerning 'the ground occupied by Christianity' is wholly free from 
the charge of arbitrariness,l99 This possibility is given credence by 
examining more carefully the content of Sykes' proposal that "a 
Christian is defined as one who gives attention to Jesus whose 
achievement is contextualized by God",200 
This formal definition is given more extended 'propositional 
expression' to include the 'life-story of Jesus' set in a context 
provided by the 'two horizon affirmations' of creation beliefs and 
eschatology,201 However this manoeuvre emerges from what Sykes ''would 
suggest that further examination reveals" as to what is entailed in his 
initial formal definition,202 The tendency to sterility inherent in 
overformalization betrays itself by the fact that this 'insider's' 
depiction lacks any decidedly Trinitarian form and dynamism. This loss 
of content richness is a serious problem which is only partially offset 
by a stress on formal definition as pertaining to context and the 
disclaimer that such summaries of faith do not involve "a condensation 
of the whole content of Christian believing",203 This is by no means 
an uncontroversial position and there is some evidence of Sykes' own 
inconsistency in this matter,204 Sykes' attempt to reclaim some 
integrity for the articles tradition in Christianity provokes rather 
than settles the issue of its significance in ecclesial life and 
encourages a more concerted engagement with this particular tradition 
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in Christian theology. 
It is to be recalled that Sykes' discussion and reconstruction of 
a fundamental articles apologetic belong to a broader discussion of the 
identity of Christianity in which the concept of the 'essence of 
Christianity' was very much the central focus of attention. 
In his recent essay on "The Fundamentals of Christianity", Sykes 
addresses himself quite deliberately and directly to the Anglican 
fundamentals tradition. Significant here is the fact that Sykes 
forfeits the opportunity to develop further many of his earlier 
insights into this tradition, electing instead to trace the history of 
the tradition in question. Given the briefness of the essay, the 
schematic and highly selective nature of the treatment of the tradition 
is inevitable. Furthermore1 it is an important essay insofar as it draws 
the attention of Anglicans (and presumably those of other communions) 
to an aspect of Anglicanism's Protestant heritage which has remained 
quite central to its own self-understanding. 
In some important respects this essay is the least satisfactory of 
Sykes' discussions of the fundamentals tradition. The continuing 
importance of the tradition is recognised, as are its links with 
Continental Protestantism, its particular appeal in Anglicanism and the 
various ways in which the tradition has been modified and used in 
history. What is missing is an uncovering of any inner rationale for 
the tradition. The essay has the character of an interesting excursion 
into the history of an important piece of Anglican apologetic, useful 
but insufficiently focussed as to the wider significance of the 
tradition. Thus the inconclusiveness of the essay is, if disappointing, 
not surprising: 
The history of enquiry in the fundamentals 
contains ambiguities, confusions and errors. 
that reason to be set aside.2os 
of Christianity 
But it is not for 
The essay itself provides no compelling reason why the tradition 
should not be 'set aside'. Furthermore, it can fairly be asked, is 
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this essay what a history of fundamentals discussion in Anglicanism 
should look like? Admittedly it is necessarily selective, but the 
criteria for selection remain undisclosed. This issue directly concerns 
how fundamentals discussion ought to be construed, what constitutes 
fundamentals discussion, and why. It is precisely these kinds of 
questions, questions that were implicit in Sykes' earlier inquiries, 
that are clearly relevant to any inquiry into the subject. 
This inquiry into some recent Anglican writings on the 
fundamentals tradition indicates a relative lack of systematic inquiry 
into the subject. The examination of four fairly recent examples of 
Anglican fundamentals discussion has served only to illustrate the 
problematic status of this important tradition. Many of the central 
issues concerning the truth presuppositions implicit in the operation 
of this tradition and the determination and function of the tradition 
in ecclesial life have either been raised but inadequately handled or 
simply not even recognised. 
The Thesis: Some Methodological Considerations 
Aim and Scope of Inquiry 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the nature, function and 
significance of the tradition of fundamental articles in Christianity. 
The preliminary inquiry in this Chapter into the theme of 
fundamentals discusssion in Christianity has drawn attention to the 
fact that fundamentals inquiry provides an interesting and important 
strategy by which to explore a range of issues to do with the purposes 
of stating the faith. Furthermore, by developing this more general 
issue through contemporary Anglican handling of fundamentals issues in 
Christianity attention has also been drawn to the essential 
ecclesiality of the attempt to state the faith in the form of 
fundamental articles, In this respect inquiry into the tradition of 
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fundamental articles in Christian theology, developed through a 
particular Church's treatment of the theme, is simultaneously a way of 
uncovering and clarifying what is involved in stating the faith in the 
Church today. 
Not surprisingly then, through such an inquiry important matters 
concerning the nature of Christian faith its apprehension, 
communication and social form and function - will repeatedly surface in 
the course of this thesis. Where appropriate the relevance of such 
matters will be specified and traced insofar as this contributes to the 
main aim of the thesis. 
Some Presuppositions 
The thesis proceeds upon two premises. Firstly that fundamentals 
discussion is ecclesially significant. The argument of the thesis is 
designed to justify this premise and in doing so to show more 
especially how this significance ought to be understood. Secondly, the 
thesis proceeds on the basis that fundamentals inquiry provides an 
important means for observing and assessing the strength of the 
operation of theological realism in contemporary Christianity,206 It 
is not the intention of this thesis to launch a comprehensive inquiry 
into the legitimacy of theological realism in Christian discourse per 
se. This might be an issue more properly pursued in the light of this 
thesis. Howeve~ in this thesis it is intended, through an analysis of 
the operation of the fundamentals tradition in Anglicanism, to clarify 
and evaluate a range of possibilities (without being exhaustive) for 
the operation of theological realism in the fundamentals tradition in 
Christianity. According!~ an important issue in the systematic 
treatment of the theme in Part Four of this thesis is the extent to 
which the tradition of fundamental articles admits of a fully realist 
theological development. Such an inquiry transcends particular 
ecclesial interests, being relevant to theological discourse generally. 
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Strategic Considerations: Focus Upon Anglicanism 
Anglicanism, as it has developed historically upon English soil, 
provides the particular focus through which the theme of fundamental 
articles will be pursued. A special reference to Anglicanism offers a 
positive and manageable area upon which to treat a major discussion in 
Christian 
Reformation 
there has 
theology, particularly as it has been developed 
Protestantism. As has clearly emerged from this 
been a long history of association with the 
in post-
Chapter 
theme of 
fundamentals discussion in Anglicanism. Moreover,the theme apparently 
remains highly relevant to the attempt in Anglicanism to handle 
questions of its own identity, and engage in ecumenical endeavours. 
Furthermore, critical analysis of the theme in Anglicanism, unlike its 
Protestant partners, remains in its infancy. This preliminary inquiry 
suggests that clarification of the Anglican treatment of the tradition 
will make an important contribution, not only to this communion's self-
understanding and theological commitments, but also to much wider 
issues to do with stating the faith in the Church today. 
Identifying a Fundamentals Tradition 
In developing an adequate strategy for the thesis some preliminary 
clarifications are required in two areas. First is the issue of what 
the fundamentals tradition includes. The terminological puzzle 
relevant here has already been alluded to. Sykes has recognised the 
problem but has not clarified it, choosing instead to use various terms 
(fundamentals, fundamentals of Christianity, fundamental articles) 
interchangeably. This might well be inevitable. Where theological 
discourse finds itself confronted with an array of similar terms with 
no settled usage pattern, some confusion is inevitable and a certain 
type of rigidity would seriously reduce the legitimate range of the 
discussion. Indeed~ the history of fundamentals discussion shows that 
the tradition has constantly run into difficulties precisely because 
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rigid distinctions could not be maintained. 
One possible strategy is to focus on fundamentals per se bearing 
in mind that the move into articles is a key strand in the discussion. 
As stated in the aim the preferred alternative is to pursue 
fundamentals discussion in Anglicanism through attention to a key motif 
in the tradition i.e. fundamental articles. Through an inquiry into 
this theme, some of the more wide ranging, persistent and difficult 
issues in fundamentals discussion in Christianity can be examined. 
It is important to bear in mind that inquiry into the fundamental 
articles concept can never be an isolated inquiry. Fundamentals issues 
do have a doctrinal form, but they also have other ways of presenting 
themselves, e.g. certain church practices and rituals, customs, ways of 
being and relating. In short, fundamentals issues concern the variety 
of ways in which people are held together, in which their One-in-
Christness is secured and endures. These matters will be developed 
further in Part Four of the thesis. Howeve~ it is important to note 
here that to focus on fundamental articles can not be construed as a 
withdrawal from the larger context of fundamentals concern. Rather, a 
concentration on the articles tradition will be found, as already 
indicated, to be a useful strategy by which to plot a way through the 
complexities that attend fundamentals inquiry in Christianity. 
In concentrating on the fundamental articles concept this thesis 
will, as already suggested, focus attention on the operation of the 
concept in the changing contexts in which it has been 
different contexts or horizons, representing differing 
deployed. The 
hermeneutical 
moves within the tradition, each disclose, in their own ways, a variety 
of presuppositions about the truth. In this substratum of truth 
suppositions the inner logic of the various construals of the articles 
tradition will be located. It is precisely in the uncovering and 
depiction of the dialectic between the fundament (as substratum or 
founding reality) and its doctrinal form in fundamental articles that 
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an adequate understanding of the tradition is made possible and 
judgements made as to its ideal operation in the Church. 
Identifying a Tradition of Fundamental Articles 
A second issue related to the above concerns the status of 
fundamental articles as a tradition. Earlier the term 'tradition' was 
applied advisedly to fundamentals discussion in Anglicanism. It is now 
necessary to make some further clarification of the use of the term 
tradition. 
In fact the issue is acute for there are few grounds upon which to 
decide whether the fundamental articles tradition is a discernable 
whether it is one tradition or many. This 
the result of different determinations 
problem 
of the 
tradition and/or 
is not simply 
fundamentals of Christianity at the same and different periods in 
history, though this is not irrelevant. 
The problem here is the one already discussed concerning the 
nature of the framework within which the tradition operates. This 
framework is all that is included in fundamentals discussion, it has 
both breadth and depth. Belonging to the tacit dimension of the 
tradition, the substratum of presuppositions exercise a decisive 
impact upon the tradition as it is embodied in a variety of forms. 
Important points of continuity in the historical flux of the tradition 
will only be detected as the true breadth and depth of the tradition 
is recognised, uncovered and clarified. 
What has this to do with the problem of speaking of a fundamental 
articles tradition as such? Stephen Sykes' attempt to trace the 
history of the Anglican discussion of the theme is instructive at this 
point. For the most part Sykes traced what has been referred to as a 
'conventionally recognised form' of the fundamentals tradition in 
Anglicanism. But because of the way he has construed this tradition, 
or rather precisely because he has not genuinely taken account of the 
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larger framework implicit in his inquiry, he has no means by which he 
can integrate into his treatment of the tradition the variety of quite 
different construals of the tradition. The range from which his 
selection of instances of the tradition's operation comes is too 
narrow. The interesting richness of the tradition remains undetected. 
Sykes has no method for incorporating into his history the mystical 
theology of William Law, the evangelical and pietistic thrust of 
Charles Simeon, or the theology of social order as manifest in 
F.D.Maurice, to name but a few. But, as this thesis will argue, these 
Anglican theologians have all contributed to fundamentals discussion; 
they have all in various ways been involved in the tradition of 
distillation into articles of belief in its specialized form as 
fundamental articles. Accordingly it is relevant to find a place for 
such contributions in any account of the operation of the fundamentals 
tradition. This suggests that identifying the tradition of fundamental 
articles in Anglicanism can not be achieved without attention to the 
diverse forms of its expression and operation. 
Indeed, the argument of this thesis is that the history of the 
operation of this tradition indicates a diversity much broader, more 
interesting and significant than generally recognised. This situation 
needs to be integrated into an Anglican ecclesiology which has spoken 
much of the virtue of comprehensiveness but found it difficult to 
recognise the richness and variety that go to make up free and open 
life in the Church. Accordingly, to track the history of the 
fundamental articles tradition provides a useful commentary on Anglican 
ecclesiological vision. In the uncovering of the inner rationale and 
ideal form of the operation of the tradition, criteria emerge by which 
the health and vitality of Christian theology and discipleship may be 
evaluated and renewed. 
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Method of Prodedure 
Part Two of the thesis will trace the early history of the 
fundamental articles tradition as it developed in Anglicanism. This 
phenomenology of the tradition does not intend to be historically 
exhaustive but purposefully selective with the aim of showing a range 
of ways in which the tradition has operated in the context of the 
theological problem of the oneness of the Church. Part Two is thus an 
attempt to answer,in a preliminary wa~the question, what might a 
history of this tradition in its early phases look like? 
From a preliminary placement in relation to the early history of 
the tradition, Part Three of the thesis engages in a more intensive 
analysis of the dynamics of the tradition by reference to some selected 
case studies occurring in a particular phase of the tradition. 
Part Four develops, in a systematic way, a range of issues 
relevant to fundamental articles discussion as they have emerged in 
Parts One, Two and Three. Part Four is thus concerned to display the 
inner logic of the tradition and its significance within a more general 
ecclesiological framework. 
What is proposed is the development and use of a multilevel 
approach to the theme. This method is designed to move through 
historical reflection, to more detailed case study inquiries, opening 
up to a fully systematic examination of the logic of the tradition of 
fundamental articles. The method thus intends to uncover and clarify 
what is on the theological agenda when the theme of fundamental 
articles arises in the Church. 
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FUNDAMENTAL ARTICLES IN ANGLICANISM: 
The Early History of a Tradition 
Introduction: Aim and Method 
The aim in Part Two of this thesis is to trace the theme of 
fundamental articles in terms of its antecedents in the Christian 
tradition, its formation in sixteenth century reformation England and 
its consolidation and modifications in seventeenth century Anglicanism. 
The introductory survey offered in the following Chapters provides a 
springboard for a more intensive engagement with the tradition in the 
case studies in Part Three and a more fully systematic inquiry in 
Part Four. Accordingly, Part Two offers a selective treatment 
of fundamentals discussion, as it has been evident jn the early history 
of the tradition in Anglicanism. 
In Chapter One it was noted that the appeal to fundamental 
articles in Anglicanism had operated as a strategy for identifying the 
unity of the Church in its diversity and divisions. The attempt to 
state the faith in fundamental articles indicated a desire to secure 
common agreementqb~tthe one-in-Christ bond. Thus to be concerned with 
fundamental articles is one way of handling the question: what is the 
practice by which the Church is one? 
For purposes of this historical treatment, at least four important 
phases can be identified in the history of the discussion of 
fundamentals in Anglicanism,! The formation of the tradition in phase 
one belongs to the attempt in the sixteenth century English Reformation 
to establish a right focus and balance in the Christian faith. During a 
second phase in the seventeenth century the tradition is consolidated 
and modified. By the end of the seventeenth century an intensified 
rationalistic and moralistic temper in theology provides the background 
for a third reconstructive phase. The challenges posed for the 
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tradition in phase three are taken up with renewed vigour in a fourth 
reconstitutive phase which becomes apparent in the first half of the 
nineteenth century, though its antecedents can be found in eighteenth 
century developments. Differentiation between phases three and four 
draws attention to the quite different contexts in which fundamentals 
discussion have occurred. Within phase four the survey concentrates 
on important early attempts to reconstitute the tradition against the 
background of a set of problems that have only intensified in the 
course of the twentieth century. 
The above framework draws attention to the differing contexts for 
the operation of fundamental articles and thereby facilitates a 
hermeneutic of the tradition. What becomes interesting is precisely 
how, in differing and similar contexts, the tradition functions as a 
lens through which the continuous attempt in Anglicanism to practise 
being one Church can be observed and illuminated. It is this concern 
which informs the methodology in both Parts Two and Three of this 
thesis. In Part Two the inquiry considers the antecedents of the 
tradition and its historical development in its formative and 
consolidating phases. Part Two thus offers a general survey of the 
early history of the tradition. 
However such an inquiry, though useful, has important limitations. 
Probably the most serious one is the inability of such an approach to 
uncover the really interesting and important dynamics of the tradition 
as it operates in its wider and richer intellectual and ecclesiological 
environment. Accordingly, phases three and four of the fundamental 
articles tradition are developed in Part Three of the thesis through a 
series of case studies. Here major attention is focussed upon three 
exponents of the tradition - John Locke, Daniel Waterland and William 
Law. These three belong to what hC\s been referred to as the 
reconstructive phase of the tradition, which begins roughly in the 
later decades of the seventeenth century with Locke and extends to the 
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mid-eighteenth century with Law. These case studies reveal that all 
three thinkers were responding to some quite new and particular 
problems which shaped their respective treatments of the tradition in 
view. A final Chapter in Part Three of the thesis considers important 
attempts to reconstitute the tradition in the early and mid-nineteenth 
century in England. 
In tracing the historv of the above theme it is important to 
recognise two inter-related strands. The first concerns the methods of 
determining fundamental articles. A second concerns the function of 
the tradition. Both strands have ecclesiological significance, the 
former indirectly, the latter strand quite explicitly. Tracing the 
operation of the tradition through its differing contexts in terms of 
these two recurring strands offers a way of retaining control of 
material and organising the variety of issues 
the tradition of fundamental articles in the history of 
relevant to 
Anglicanism. 
Finally, it is important to recognise that the immediate 
background for the operation of the fundamentals tradition is the 
social, political and intellectual conflicts of Post-Reformation 
Europe. In this disunited and conflictual context two questions arise: 
is Christianity one thing? and, what is the truth of that oneness? From 
this perspective the attempt to state the fundamental articles of the 
faith in Anglicanism provides an important indicator of how the problem 
of the unity of Christianity, in and through conditions of high 
conflict, has been argued about, and practised. By locating the 
Anglican fundamentals tradition within the above conceptual frame it is 
possible to draw from a wide range of historical examples of the 
operation of the tradition but in a highly selective manner. 
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THE ANTECEDENTS OF A TRADITION 
It seems that the term articuli fundamentales was first used 
in 1593 by Franciscus Junius (1545 - 1602), a French born Reformed 
minister and later Professor of theology at the University of Leiden.2 
Junius, in one of the first Reformed irenical works, proposed, without 
elucidation, acceptance of the fundamental articles of the faith as a 
means for overcoming rivalries between the churches,3 Irenic motives 
and the desire to establish ecclesial identities in Post-Reformation 
Europe fostered the deployment of the idea of fundamental articles 
among the Reformed Catholic Churches of England and the Continent in 
the early decades of the seventeenth century,4 As the appeal to 
fundamentals became more widely used it was subjected to careful 
analysis and more sophisticated development.s However a tradition of 
fundamental articles had been developing and crystallizing throughout 
the course of the Reformation in the sixteenth century. 
Articles in Ecclesiality: Early Develop•ents and Anticipations 
Exactly why the development of articles of faith into their 
specialized form as fundamental articles occurred in the conflicts of 
the sixteenth century is a question whose answer may appear rather 
obvious from a position enlightened by nearly four hundred years of 
acquaintance with the fact of this development. However the question 
does merit the asking, if for no other reason than for the previous 
fifteen hundred years the Christian tradition is full of evidence of 
theological disputation without the development of a fundamental 
articles tradition as such.s This Chapter explores the antecedents of 
the fundamental articles tradition and uncovers the conditions for its 
emergence during the Reformation of the sixteenth century. 
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The Emergent Common Faith 
The thrust towards identifying a common Christian faith has 
witnessed to a long held conviction that Christianity was in fact one 
thing. 7 This conviction was generated out of the early Church's 
experience that 'God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself' 
(2 Cor 5:19). A consequence of this was the affirmation of one Lord, 
one faith and one baptism (Eph 4:5). This one faith was encapsulated 
in the early Church's confession of the Lordship of Christ (Acts 2:36, 
Rom 10:9, lCor 12:3). This confession required a fresh appropriation of 
an inherited Jewish monotheism.s 
Initially this enriched understanding of the oneness of faith had 
come to form in various semi-creedal and local statements of faith. 
These functioned primarily as a medium fidei through which the people 
of God recognised their common faith as expressed in prayer, praise and 
confession.9 Multiplicity of confessional forms was not, at this early 
stage, a threat to the oneness of faith. 10 Nor, if we can take Origen 
(c.185-c.254) as an example, was the development of a speculative 
theological strand in Christian faith,ll 
Liturgical, catechetical and particularly apologetical needs 
faith12 and the caused functional changes in creedal summaries of ) 
development of fixed creedal forms of faith out of the earlier 
terminological variety,13 There were aspects of these developments 
in recent times often lamented14 that indicated a positive 
theological thrust to remain as inclusive as possible over against 
these heretical reductionism and exclusivism.IS One result of 
developments was that the unity of the faith became focussed in an 
'orthodox' or 'patristic consensus',16 The internal complexities and 
tensions of this consensus had, in the succeeding centuries, frequently 
emerged and provided the occasion for fresh re-examination and 
synthesis of the centralities of faith in relation to its changing 
contemporary contexts,17 
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These developments suggest that the question of the fundamentals 
of the faith is as old as Christianity itself. The earliest semi-
creedal formularies, the 'rule of faith' or 'truth', the emergence of 
universalized creeds, the appeal to 'Apostolic dogmas' and the 
development of the notion of the Apostolic Symbol, all indicate the 
Church's attempt to recognise that faith by which it was united to the 
one Lord. 18 In this sense it is possible to speak of a recurring 
fundamentum fidei with roots in the earliest Christian professions.l9 
In 
one 
expressing the unity of the faith, 
solution to the problem of the 
this fundamentum fidei provided 
unity of Christianity and 
represented an early anticipation of the later appeal to the 
fundamental articles of the faith,20 
Late Medieval Developments: The Status of Articles 
It is right to speak of an anticipation only, for the tradition 
being traced here only begins to take shape during and after the 'age 
of orthodoxy'21 of the thirteenth century. A number of reasons account 
for this. Firstly, it was only from the late thirteenth century that 
the concept 'article of faith' - a term unknown it seems to the early 
church fathers22 but identified in the thirteenth century with the 
various components of the ancient Apostolic Symbol23 obtained common 
useage in the discussions over the status of theology as a science,24 
The concept 'article of faith' was deployed by Scholastic 
theologians in their attempts to articulate the scientific status of 
theology in the then prevailing Aristotelian sense of 'science'. 
Theology was a derived science, proceeding from the articles of faith -
analogous to the first principles of science and guaranteed by 
revelation to their necessary corollaries by reasoned argument. 
Theology thus established its conclusions in a scientific manner. 
The concept of 'articles of faith' thus came to have an important 
apologetic value in securing the status of theology. In the theology of 
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Thomas Aquinas) however, the concept was more fully developed in 
relation to the content and dynamic of the Christian faith.2s For 
Thomas articles of faith had their origin and end in God the prima 
verita. In this sense articles constituted the vision of God in 
propositional form,26 Articles belonged to the first category of 
truths the prime credibilia in contradistinction to a second 
category. The criterion for the differentiation was the direct or 
indirect relation such truths bore towards God himself and eternal 
salvation,27 In the first category Thomas distinguished articles 
concerning the majesty of the Godhead and articles relating to the 
mystery of the humanity of Christ,2 8 In Thomas' theology articles 
of faith functioned for the Christian as statements witnessing to God 
the Trinity. They were gathered together out of their diffuse presence 
in sacred Scripture into that common bond of faith, the Apostolic 
SJ'mbol.29 Aquinas offered a comprehensive and seminal contribution to 
the status, placement and purpose of the articles tradition in the 
Church,3° 
The Rise of Ecclesiological Self-Consciousness 
The move from articles of faith to fundamental articles, a 
development which crystallized in the seventeenth century, had its 
logic not only within that scientific strand in the Christian tradition 
that focussed on the nature of faith, but also from the strand that 
can be discerned in the rise of ecclesial consciousness from the 
fourteenth century. This development was reflected in a growing 
interest in the doctrine of the Church per se. 31 From the fourteenth 
century discussion of articles of faith occurred in an increasingly 
conflictual context. From the early fourteenth century through to the 
early sixteenth century the Western Church evidenced an accelerating 
crisis of oneness,32 Contributing to this crisis was a burgeoning 
doctrinal pluralism,33 What had held this pluralism together was, as 
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Jaroslav Pelikan notes, "Augustine's elevation of the catholic unity of 
the church as the context not only for moral reform but theological 
difference". 34 
This Catholic unity had been embodied in its most highly 
centralized institutional form in the promolgation by Boniface VIII in 
1302 of his most famous Bull Unam Sanctum.35 In the following two 
centurie~however, this ideal was ruptured by the Great Schism (1378-
1427) and the consequent breakdown of Papal credibility, by the failure 
of attempts to reconcile the Eastern and Western Church, 3 6 and by 
various challenges to Papal authority, e.g. the Hussite revolt of the 
early fifteenth century,37 
The stubborn and embarrassing reality of these schisms, 
especially when combined with the doctrinal pluralism that was 
increasingly obvious within the 'one true faith' of the Church, 
made it obligatory for Western ecclesiology to clarify both the 
nature and the locus of the church's unity with greater 
precision and subtlety than may have been necessary earlier.3S 
It is not surprising then that ecclesiology became part of doctrinal 
discussion from the fourteenth century in a self-conscious manner 
hitherto unknown,39 
The problem of the unity of the Church had been succinctly put by 
Anselm of Hauelberg in the early twelfth century. In his discussions 
on the differences between the East and the West, especially in 
relation to the filioque, he had inquired, " how the Church of God, 
while she is one in and of herself, is multiform as far as her sons are 
concerned, those whom she has formed and continues to form in diverse 
laws and institutions",40 
This problem intensified as the multiform character of 
Christianity, a by no means new phenomenon,41 began to occupy centre 
ground in theological controversy. The problem of the unity of the 
Church now had to be re-negotiated from its multiplicity. How the 
Church was one despite its multiplicity could be variously understood. 
An environment emerged conducive to competing ecclesiologies,42 The 
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various movements of reform in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries 
reflected this ecclesiological multiformity and involved different 
attempts to articulate a theological understanding of the unity of 
Christianity,43 
Multiform Christianity: Conflicts and Strategies 
It is precisely at this point that the developing articles 
tradition and ecclesiological concerns coalesce. The technical 
discussion concerning articles of faith; their derivation, function, 
categorization and enumeration developments which are clearly 
discernable in the pre-Reformation period4 4- become contextualised 
within a highly varied ecclesiological spectrum. This ecclesiological 
diversity was reflected in the functional diversity of the articles of 
faith. 
In the early fourteenth century the papal critic Marsilius of 
Padua (c.1275-1342), in his Defensor pacis (1324, condemned in 1327), 
employed the ecclesia primitiv:a as a model for church reform, i.e. the 
pre-Constantinian apostolic ideal. Marsilius argued that only those 
beliefs contained in canonical Scriptures or those interpretations of 
doubtful meanings of Scripture made by a General Council of faithful or 
catholic Christians, were necessary for salvation,45 Marsilius had 
linked a critical reduction in truths necessary for salvation, with a 
return to a primitive Church ideal. 
William of Ockham's Solution 
William of Ockham (c.1285-1347), when inquiring into what truths 
were Catholic, had argued that "The rule of faith is the Sacred 
Scripture and the doctrine of the universal Church which cannot err",46 
This was a median position between a highly biblicist view later 
epitomised in the works of John Wycliffe(1330-1384), and a newly 
emerging and more comprehensive scheme consisting of categories of 
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catholic truths, including post-apostolic revelations independent of 
sacred Scripture. 17 Ockham's preferred position concerning the 
necessary articles was integrated into a highly original and 
controversial form of a remnant ecclesiology which radicalized the 
solution of ecclesial oneness: 
The true, infallible church consisted only of those Christians 
who in fact assented to the truth even if they formed a silent 
minority in the visible institutional church. In fact, this 
true church might survive in one Christian alone, if he or she 
preserved the faith inviolate.48 
Ockham had shifted the responsibility for determining articles of 
faith from institutional criteria of any kind to cognitive criteria, 
i.e. to the understanding,49 This displacement of authority to the 
individual was consistent with a developing nominalism which rejected 
traditional ways of understanding how things were ordered and held 
together - i.e. by reference to their connections to real universals, 
the Platonic eternal forms - and tended to locate the truth of things 
in particularity. One inevitable result of this shift in perspective 
was a heightening of anxiety over disagreements that could no longer be 
settled by reference to pre-established universal truths.so Henceforth 
traditional solutions to conflict could not be so neatly invoked. 
By contrast to Ockham, Conciliarist and more reactionary 
ecclesiologies51 retained a firmer view of the authority of the 
institutional Church in matters of faith. Here,discussion of articles 
of faith and the differentiation of categories of 'catholic truths' was 
not so directly tied to questions of ecclesiology but belonged to 
those technical matters of 'School' theology.sz The epistemological 
insights associated with Aquinas' derivation of the articles of faith 
were displaced by an overriding concern for the determination of the 
formal authority structure for faith.s3 Oneness of faith was secured 
by obedience to ecclesiastical authorities. 
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The Global Faith of Nicholas of Cusa 
In the vision of someone like Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) the 
problem of articles of faith was placed within a global ecclesiology. 
Here an attempt was made to embrace the world of faiths within a 
comprehensive Trinitarian structure.s4 Oneness in faith was derived 
from God himself. Doctrine per se and articles in particular 
represented approximations towards that one absolute truth, the Triune 
God. The doctrine of the Trinity was implicit in all faiths to the 
extent that they sought the one true God. In this way Cusa could 
develop a notion of fundamental doctrines55 both specific to 
Christianity yet inclusive of other faiths. His forward looking 
proposals represented what might be termed the 'outer-wing' of the 
articles tradition, expressive of the search for commonality in faith 
beyond the narrower confines of traditional ecclesiologies. 
The multiform character of Christianity was by no means a settled 
issue in the early sixteenth century. There was neither a settled 
doctrine of the one Church nor an agreed method of resolving the nature 
of that faith by which the Church was one.ss The reassertion of a 
highly centralized structural unity in the fifteenth century was not so 
much evidence of stability but rather a sign that, for the moment, the 
range of ecclesiological options that had been explored, had been 
contained under a fragile socio-political form of unity,57 
Finding Truth in Diversity: The Renaissance Heritage 
A common presupposition within this ecclesial variety and tension 
remained: Christianity was one thing, the Church was one, bonded by one 
faith.5 8 The puzzling problem concerning how this unity was to be 
understood had not only generated a search for the vera ecclesia but, 
in the two centuries prior to the sixteenth, was a problem that had 
admitted of a variety of solutions all directed in some way or other to 
reform of the Church. Negatively, reform required a critique of 
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prevailing abuses. Positively, it included refocussing on what was 
considered central to Christian life in the Church. 
The changed context in which the various reform programmes were 
pursued had been subtle but decisive. It was reflected in the changing 
conception of the problem of Church unity. The affirmation of 'one yet 
multiform' had become an affirmation of 'one in multiformity'. 
Within the context of Renaissance humanism> however, this new 
orientation of unity in diversity - posed neither a problem nor a 
threat. Rather) it was something to be welcomed and affirmed; 
indicative of that richly varied reality in which human beings, as 
discoverers rather than possessors of truth, were called to creatively 
contribute to the increase of knowledge,59 This outlook presupposed 
the unity of reality not as something merely given but also 
unfinished, to be discerned in and through variety. 
Not all felt able to embrace this more dynamic view of reality and 
human participation in it. The various tensions within and between 
'old' and 'new' ways of learning were evident in the early decades of 
the sixteenth century in the intensified search for viable solutions to 
the problem posed by the burgeoning pluralism in Christianity. This 
situation became evident in the continued pressure for reform.so The 
articles tradition developed in different ways as it was implicated in 
differing reform strategies. Erasmus and Luther make interesting 
comparisons in this regard. 
Truth through Peace: The Rationale of Erasmian Minimalism 
Erasmus' well known advocacy of a dogmatic minimum and stress on 
practical Christian living exemplified the influential strain of 
Christian humanism that was so important in the course of the sixteenth 
century Reformation and seems to be the natural milieu for the 
emergence of the fundamental articles tradition,61 What is not so well 
appreciated is the sophisticated ecclesiological tradition within which 
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Erasmus' reinterpretation of dogma in relation to piety occurred.s2 
For Erasmus, unity was the presupposition for finding, knowing and 
living in the truth. Peace preserved the community of discourse by 
which the Holy Spirit taught the truth.s3 Evangelical peace was 
synonymous with truth. Without consensus and its social concomitant 
'concord~ no dogmatic certainty was possible. Consensus then was the 
principle of intelligibility,64 It was not a static position but 
essentially open and dynamic, witnessing to the continuing dialogue of 
Christ with the flock. This view presupposed a conception of Logos not 
as a single utterance (verbum) but as discourse (sermo), whose social 
form was the ecclesial community.ss 
Such a view of consensus cohered with a minimalist approach to the 
articles necessary for salvation. Erasmus referred to those few 
'primitives' of the ancient Church's faith. Rightly holding to these 
essentials generated conviction leading to an interior apprehension of 
the . gospel and a life of godly piety,66 This was less dogmatic 
reductionism and more a statement about the way in which the Church 
could actually renew its performance of being one. Articles of faith 
belonged to ecclesial practice. Doctrine here operated in a 
directional way. Full definition was irrelevant in this ecclesiology. 
Erasmus' ecclesiological pragmatism and focus on piety informed 
his treatment of the essentials of faith. There are affinities here 
with the appeal to fundamental articles in early Anglican apologetic, a 
matter to be considered in the two following Chapters. 
Godly Transformation: Luther's Reappropriation of the Articles of faith 
Luther makes an interesting contrast to Erasmus. Luther's 
ecclesiology 
Erasmus'. 67 
was highly personalist but less fully social than 
In Luther's view the Church's mediational role had 
failed. The problem was simple. How was access gained to the God of the 
Church? The important issue was finding salvation as a member of the 
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Church, or rather, of being one with God's Church. The emphasis was on 
ecclesial reform via personal transformation. The hermeneutical key was 
justification by faith in Christ through the preaching of the 
Implicit in this was an answer to the question of the oneness 
gospel. 
of the 
Church. Commonality was created through the preaching of the gospel of 
Christ. This commonality had its initial focus in a new relationship 
between God and the individual. The way to a renewed Church was by 
rediscovery of oneness with Christ.68 
What happened to the articles tradition in this context? Firstly, 
Luther's epistemological insight animated the articles of faith. One 
could live in the central truths of faith faithfully. Traditional 
dogmas were not abandoned but reappropriated into the Christian life. 69 
Secondly, this renewal of the doctrinal tradition involved a re-
ordering in relation to a soteriological centre,70 
Luther's insight represented a move away from the later scholastic 
tendency, already observed, to categorize and enumerate lists of 
truths. His concern,rathe~ was with the qualitative wholeness of the 
gospel,71 a focus achieved through a Christologically informed 
centering and ordering of the faith. This entailed judgements as to 
the relative fundamentality of any doctrine72 and included an 
appreciation of things indifferent (adiaphora),73 
The Priority of Doctrinal Consensus - Melancthon and Calvin 
Given Melancthon's understanding of the Church as a 'School' it 
was not surprising that his reforms included a strong thrust towards 
doctrinal correctness,74 Accordingly, with Melancthon, Luther's 
insights into the dynamic of faith, justification and grace received a 
more thoroughgoing doctrinalization,75 The framework was Christian 
humanism. Melancthon's irenic spirit provided the basis for a solution 
to multiformity which placed heavy emphasis on doctrinal consensus and 
a willingness to differ on matters peripheral to faith,76 This 
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orientation included an appeal to the consensus of the early Church and 
the development of the concept of adiaphora,77 themes which were 
important both for the English reformation and among those irenic 
theologians anxious for peace.78 
Controversies among the young Reformed churches indicated that 
doctrinal consensus would be harder to achieve than might have been 
hoped. This was reflected in Melancthon's later ecclesiology where he 
attempted to define the limits of consensus more sharply by an appeal 
to the 'fundamentals' of the doctrine of the 'pure Gospel', i.e. that 
doctrine sufficient for Church unity,79 
Luther's focus on personal transformation was also shared by 
Calvin. 80 Indeed, it was the stress on godliness that made the 
doctrine of justification so central for Calvin.sl Though in Calvin's 
different context the social form of this piety was an important 
issue,82 Consequently, for Calvin Church reform was to be achieved 
through personal renewal and by the reconstruction of the Church in 
society,83 This included doctrinal correctness.84 Indeed a later 
reformer, Bullinger, argued that doctrine was the most important 
thing.ss In Calvin's case this thrust was tempered by the influence of 
a Christian humanism which recognised a distinction between certain 
essential matters of belief and other doctrines, where differences need 
not lead to schism.ss 
This distinction became increasingly important for the Reformed 
churches. Their high doctrine of the Church visible, patterned after 
the Word of God,B7 provided the impulse for securing visible unity in 
the faith among the Reformation churches,BB Precisely because the 
perfection of unity in the Church was viewed eschatologically, it was 
important for those churches reformed according to the Word of God to 
recognise their commonality in a faith that would be perfected in the 
future,B9 This was developed by Martin Butzer in relation to the theme 
of love as the manifestation of the reign of Christ in the Church.90 
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Affirming Unity in Multiforaity: The Appeal to Fundamental Articles 
With the progress of the sixteenth century reform Christianity's 
multiform character became increasingly evident in confessional 
variety. In this context the appeal to fundamental articles emerged as 
a strategy for affirming oneness through multiplicity,91 Here, 
doctrinal consensus in fundamental articles had moved into the 
foreground of ecclesiological concerns. 
Developments in the counter-reformation make for an interesting 
contrast. At one level there was a close parallel to the course of the 
Protestant reformation, for both invested significant energy in 
achieving doctrinal correctness. This came to its climax at Trent, 
where the move from doctrinal pluralism to more precise definition was 
substantially completed,92 Though here a de facto solution to the 
problem of fundamental articles was secured by reference to the Roman 
Magisterium as the authority for faith.93 In this way the desire for 
unity in ecclesial diversity, that had provided the impulse for the 
development of the appeal to fundamental articles, was subsumed within 
a structural unity centred on the Papacy. The problem of doctrinal 
discriminations and articles of faith was restricted to the category of 
technical discussion, not entirely irrelevant to ecclesiology though 
never as significant as it would become in Protestantism,9 4 
The early impulses for reform in the sixteenth century had 
included a call for personal transformation, exemplified in Luther's 
theology and in various ways present in other prominent early 
reformers. The supposition here was clear - oneness in multiformity 
would be achieved by an renewal of Christian discipleship. As the early 
ecclesial ruptures hardened and confessional multiplicity and conflict 
emerged among the churches of the reform, the prospect of maintaining 
unity focussed increasingly on achieving consensus in the doctrine of 
the gospel. The appeal to certain fundamental articles had a certain 
logic in the attempt to secure a kind of pan-Protestant ecclesiology. 
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Appeal to fundamental articles was one way of affirming oneness amidst 
the divisions of developing Protestantism. 
It should be clear from the foregoing that the form and function 
of the tradition whose antecedents have been traced here was, 
throughout its development, significantly influenced by the larger 
ecclesiological framework within which it operated. The impact of this 
ecclesial variety upon the developing articles tradition has been 
briefly noted in Aquinas, Marsilius, Ockham, Conciliarism, Cusa and in 
those important early sixteenth century advocates of Reform, Erasmus, 
Luther, Melancthon and Calvin. 
Attention has been drawn to the dialectical relation between 
ecclesial oneness and multiplicity implicit in the differing solutions 
provided to the problem of the unity of the Church. A common 
presupposition persisted however: the Church was constituted as one by 
virtue of its one Lord, one Gospel and one Baptism. 
Against this background the move from articles of faith to 
fundamental articles of faith appears less innovative than it might at 
first seem. In fact this development offered a way of continuing the 
articles tradition. It did this in two ways. Firstly, in response to 
the perceived Roman tendency to maximize doctrinal definition, an 
appeal to fundamental articles was one way of maintaining a faith 
rightly balanced in relation to the dogmatic tradition. Secondly, in 
response to Protestant confessional multiformity the fundamental 
articles strategy provided a focus for commonality in the one faith. It 
therefore offered an important means for securing stability and 
countering institutional fragmentation. 
Both the above responses were linked to a view which understood 
the Church as constituted by the Word of God. Such a view could, 
without difficulty, be translated into certain fundamental articles of 
the faith expressive of Church unity. The corollary of this common 
Church faith was a recognition that complete uniformity in belief was 
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not a prerequisite for Church unity. 
articles had become welded to the 
The appeal to 
doctrine of the 
fundamental 
Church in 
Protestantism. Moreover, the variety within Protestant ecclesiology, a 
variety which in many ways reflected the crises of late medieval 
ecclesiology, 95 gives rise to the expectation of a diversity of forms 
and functions in the developing fundamental articles tradition. This 
expectation is strengthened when it is recalled that the operation of 
articles of faith had hitherto been largely determined by quite 
specific ecclesiological contexts. The determination and function of 
the fundamental articles tradition - an offspring and expression of the 
articles tradition in Christianity - could be expected to evidence the 
impact of differing ecclesial contexts. 
The importance of the subject of fundamental articles in 
Lutheranism and to a lesser extent in the Reformed churches is well 
known. This brief inquiry into the antecedents of the tradition 
indicates, however, that caution is needed in identifying the course of 
the articles tradition in either of these communions as the measure 
against which judgements are made concerning the significance of a 
tradition which has its own particular history in the Anglican 
communion. The formation and development of the tradition in the early 
history of Anglicanism is the subject of the following Chapters. 
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THE FORMATION OF A TRADITION: 
The English Reformation of the Sixteenth Century 
Identifying Fundamentals: The Ecclesiological Perspective 
The ideal of a fully social ecclesiology provides the larger 
environment in which the developing fundamental articles tradition can 
be traced in the English Reformation of the sixteenth century. Such an 
ecclesial ideal requires some brief explanation. The church historian, 
William Haugaard, has recently depicted the course of the English 
Reformation in the following way: 
In Anglicanism's formative century, the two periods, one of 
fluctuating change and the other of tension-laden stability, 
provided the successive crucibles from which a recognizably 
distinctive form of Christianity emerged,l 
This period was formative for ''shaping the outlines of a distinctive 
way of believing and practising the Christian faith",2 Haugaard, in 
common with most commentators, understands this distinctive achievement 
as a 'political' occurrence, 
provided that 'political' be understood to refer not only to civil 
matters, but to wider human relations as they reflect the varied 
aspects of community life, including religious practices, 
convictions, and church structures,3 
This interpretation of the sixteenth century English Reformation as 
'emphatically a political revolution'4 is well entrenched and colours 
discussion of ecclesiological themes in the English Reformation. 5 
The elevation of the political character of the English reform to 
a position of apparent normative significance betrays, in part at 
least, the desire to find an all encompassing rationale - a principle 
of cohesion for the course of the Reformation in England. The 
'political' interpretation emerges as the only genuine option given the 
commonly echoed sentiment that: 
No single dominating personality, no single coherent theological 
principle, no single developed theological system, no single 
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distinctive vision of community discipline predominated in 
directing the course of events in England.s 
The matter is not, however, so clear-cut. Haugaard's careful 
qualification of the political character of the English Reformation 
suggests an attempt to break free of modern, highly functionalist 
understandings of societal life; understandings quite alien to Tudor 
England. 7 Political, in Haugaard's sense, implies an ideal which is 
comprehensively social. Thus we are not surprised that Haugaard 
locates the particular achievement of the Reformation in "the 
evanescent vision of a coherent Christian faith and practice capturing 
the whole-hearted allegiance of a people in a unitive society",B 
This points to an important theological intention in the English 
Reformation; that reform was social in orientation and achievement. 
Reformation in sixteenth century England was about the doctrine of the 
Church. Ecclesiology was not developed or derived from more fundamental 
human transformation individually conceived. Rather, to talk about 
God's new relation to humankind was to talk about God in human society. 
The question generated by this intention was simply, how might godly 
human society be best achieved, given the particular complexities of 
Tudor England? 
Theologically the answer to this question is discerned in the 
struggle to achieve an ecclesial practice that was rightly proportioned 
or balanced in relation to what was most essential for godly social 
life. This context gives a particular force to the arguments of a 
number of scholars that the English Reformation from Henry VIII, was 
rooted in a distinction between things necessary for salvation and 
things indifferent (so-called adiaphora),9 The roots of this 
theological strategy in Christian humanism, in particular in Erasmus 
and Melancthon, were briefly traced in Chapter Two. Their influence in 
the cross fertilization of ideas concerning this strategy between 
England and the Continent is not a concern of this study,lO What is 
important is that the distinction between essentials and adiaphora 
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the latter term representing a by no means uncomplicated theological 
matterll had its particular force in England as a tool for the 
achievement of healthy social cohesion. This basically ecclesiocentric 
context was responsible for the particular way in which the thrust back 
to fundamentals so much a feature of the sixteenth century 
Reformation - developed in emerging Anglicanism. 
In this context identifying fundamentals of faith belonged to a 
strategy for church reform aimed at reappraising those social bonds 
constitutive of ecclesial unity. In the initial stages of the reform 
this entailed a rejection of Roman jurisdiction. This was not so much 
a novel development but more an affirmation of the ancient catholicity 
of Anglicana Ecclesia,12 With the progress of reform there emerged a 
sharper sense of those features constitutive of common Christian life. 
This included the gradual recognition of the Bible as the common and 
central text of the Church, a common language of faith accessible to 
all (i.e. English from Latin), the development of a common public 
liturgy, and a search for doctrinal consensus. The achievement of 
agreement in these areas was an emergent process, neither inevitable 
nor certain, evidencing periods of rapid progress and regress, cautious 
moves forward and violent opposition from a variety of quarters. 13 
Throughout the uncertain and vacillating course of this 
reformation a recurring preoccupation with the problem of being one 
Church became evident. In this respect it is to be noted that unity did 
not include for most people allegiance to Papal authority. In terms of 
church worship it did include an orientation away from privatised 
liturgical practices towards regular congregational services. 14 For 
some the greater accessibility of the Scriptures was considered 
dangerous to social cohesion, for others it was a pre-condition for its 
achievement,lS The corollary of this latter view was that an informed 
and better educated Church was a healthier Church than one which 
required mere obedience to imposed laws,16 This view became embodied 
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in a doctrine and practice of ministry that focussed on teaching rather 
than its sacrificial function,l7 
It is within the context of an intended - if not always achieved -
social reformation of the English Church that the tradition of 
fundamental articles can be located and traced. The course of this 
tradition is relevant in two related areas of this Reformation. First, 
at a primary level it is implicated in the search for common doctrine 
in the one Church. Here, agreement in articles of faith indicated a 
common understanding of the dynamics of ecclesial formation. The 
ecclesiology implicit in this development of the tradition became 
explicit in the later apologetic efforts of John Jewel and Richard 
Hooker. This second level ecclesiological reflection entailed a shift 
in the fundamentals tradition from concern for agreement in doctrine in 
the one Church, to self-conscious engagement with the doctrine of the 
one Church. This Chapter first examines the search for commonality in 
church faith and secondly considers the fundamentals tradition in the 
ecclesiology developed by Jewel and Hooker. 
Common Doctrine: The Way of Agreement 
What belief, teaching and confession was required to evidence the 
unity of the faith? In the English Reformation an answer here involved 
identifying what was central and what was peripheral in faith. Common 
doctrine required a faith rightly balanced in this regard. 
The achievement in the English reform of a common doctrine can be 
traced through successive Articles documents:18 the Ten Articles 
(1536), the Bishops' Book (1537), the Six Articles (1539), the King's 
Book (1543), the Forty-two Articles (1553), Archbishop Parker's 
Eleven Articles (1561), the Thirty-nine Articles (1563, 1571); also in 
the various Primers (1545, 1551, 1553, 1559, 1560), Books of 
Homilies (Book I, 1547; Book II, 1563), Catechisms (1553; Nowell's of 
1570) and Canon Law Revisions,19 These documents evidenced a general 
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attempt to spell out, in turbulent contexts, what was considered 
central and what was peripheral in belief consonant with the practice 
of being one Church. 
In tracing this attempt three features are particularly relevant. 
Important here was an emergent methodological principle: Scripture as a 
critical but not autonomous criterion of things necessary to salvation. 
This principle was implicit from the early stages of reform when the 
Scriptures in English were ordered to be placed in all churches,2o 
later to be supplemented by the Paraphrases of Erasmus and Homilies.21 
The principle was explicit, though not fully formed, in the ordering of. 
belief and practice in certain Articles documents promulgated in the 
reign of Henry VIII. Thus1 in the Ten Article~ (1536) two categories of 
articles were recognised: those which were "expressly commanded by God 
and be necessary to our salvation", to be distinguished from rites and 
ceremonies which were ''to be observed and kept accordingly, although 
they be not expressly commanded of God, nor necessary to salvation'',22 
The former constituted 'the chief and principal articles of faith',23 
However 1 within this category a distinction could be drawn between what 
was believed to be infallibly true, that "which be comprehended in the 
whole body and canon of the Bible, and also in the three Creeds or 
symbols",24 and those articles of the creeds so necessary to be 
believed for a person's salvation that refusal to believe them in the 
form expressed in the creeds severed one from Christ and his Church.2s 
This hermeneutical power of the creeds merely echoed a longstanding 
tradition which could be found in the teaching of Thomas Aquinas,2 6 It 
represented a considerable pruning of the tradition enunciated by 
William of Ockham, of identifying degrees of catholic truths which 
included independent post-apostolic revelation. 27 
The Ten Articles were substantially incorporated into the Bishop's 
Book (1537), which in turn received a more traditionalist reworking in 
the King's Book (1543). In these early documents of the reform the 
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later pre-eminence of the criterion of Scripture was, at most, 
embryonic. The declared intention to effect reform based on the 
Scriptures2 8 appeared to be consistent with a range of practices and 
beliefs that were later expressly eschewed as being contrary to the 
Word of God,29 
In the subsequent articles of 1553 and 1563 a form of Scripture 
principle clearly emerged. A particular dynamic among the co-ordinates 
of ecclesial authority - Scripture, the inherited dogmatic tradition, 
General Councils, and the authority of the Church militant - received 
formal authority in the Church of England,30 Important in this 
structure of authority werethe freedoms allowed to national churches in 
legislating rites and ceremonies, modifying traditions, and exercising 
authority in controversies of faith,31 The operation of freedoms in 
these areas later proved highly contentious and significant for the 
articles apologetic,32 
A second feature linked to the English reformers' appeal to 
Scripture was a Christological intention as the material principle 
informing the determination of a common faith. The reproportioning of 
belief and practice in terms of the once-for-all and justifying work of 
Christ was at best poorly formed initially, and was directed to the 
pruning of certain aberrant practices and teachings. 33 Later, the 
reformers' Christocentricism sharpened and received a more 
thoroughgoing application. It penetrated 
structure and effected a reordering and 
practice concerning sacraments, ministry 
the Church's mediatorial 
purifying of belief and 
and the life of the 
baptised,34 
presupposed 
dogma. This 
The application of the critical Christological 
the continuing foundational significance of 
was reflected in the English Reformers' 
arrangement of the Thirty-nine Articles of Religion. 35 
principle 
Trinitarian 
particular 
A third feature of the search for consensus was the increasing 
impact of doctrinal adiaphorism in the development of a common faith. 
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The early Articles documents of the reform gave little encouragement to 
the view that doctrines concerning important beliefs and practices 
could be deemed adiaphora (i.e. things that make no difference). It was 
of course a different matter with certain rites and practices neither 
expressly commanded in Scripture nor necessary to salvation,36 This 
had been made abundantly clear for one John Frith (c.1503-1533) who 
applied the term adiaphora to the doctrine of the eucharistic presence, 
and was subsequently burned at the stake for his refusal to believe 
that transubstantiation was ''an undoubted article of the faith, 
necessary to be believed under pain of damnation",37 
Frith's doctrinal adiaphorism was significant, not simply because 
he, along with William Tyndale (1494- 1536), seemsto have been among 
the first of the sixteenth century reformers to apply the term 
adiaphora to doctrine per se,3B but more particularly because his 
ascription of the term to the doctrine of transubstantiation posed a 
challenge to the view that a sacrament necessary for salvation could 
admit of only one correct teaching. For Frith, doctrines concerning 
church practices generally necessary for salvation were of a different 
order from those doctrines articulated in the articles of the creeds. 
Frith had implicitly widened the scope of adiaphora to include, not 
only doctrine per se in addition to practices neither forbidden nor 
commanded, but within doctrine a new category of adiaphoristic 
doctrines, i.e. those that may be 'true yet unnecessary'. The 
complication this move caused for the concept of adiaphora39 was of 
little concern to Frith who did not wish his congregation to be bound 
by anything other than the creed,40 This practical ecclesiological 
view represented a very early attempt to temper the thrust for an 
excessively definitional and doctrinalized faith. 
The text of the Thirty-nine Articles evidenced in subtle and 
important ways the impact of adiaphoristic concerns. Enshrined in this 
document is a view discerned earlier that the Church had the liberty to 
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order and enforce its rites, ceremonies and traditions insofar as they 
were not contrary to Scripture,4 1 Equally significant, the text of the 
Articles presupposed that certain matters to do with the credenda of 
the Church ought not to be legislated upon. In this respect the 
shortening of the article on Christ's descent into hell indicated the 
adiaphoristic nature of doctrinal discussion on a belief which 
evidently belonged to the Church's Trinitarian foundation.42 In 
respect of predestination and election (Article XVII), a rigorous 
double predestinarian logic was refused; the article remained firmly 
Christocentric and hence precise in its restraint. 43 Some freedom of 
opinion was implied in respect of the presence of Christ in the 
Eucharist,44 though the articles here were not totally inconclusive 
transubstantiation was firmly rejected, so too was any notion of the 
repetition of Christ's sacrifice in the Eucharist. 
One modern commentator on the Articles has remarked that the 
English Reformers' 'moderation' consisted 
in a determined policy of 
order from adiaphora ... 
reserving strong statement 
really deserve them.45 
separating the essentials of faith and 
Anglican moderation is the policy of 
and conviction for the few things which 
What this author might also have pointed out was that strong statement 
on a few things was not inconsistent with the English Reformers' subtle 
deployment of a doctrinal adiaphorism in precisely the central matters 
of faith and order. The operation of this doctrinal adiaphorism was, 
not surprisingly, unwelcome among those 'precisions' who desired an 
articles tradition more unequivocally Calvinist in construction and 
application,46 a fact implicit in the controversy over the regulation 
of subscription to the Articles of Religion in 1571,4 7 The quest for a 
common faith in the Reformed Catholic Church in England involved a 
fresh reconstituting of the most important matters for faith. As 
outlined above this included certain methodological, Christological and 
adiaphoristic concerns. 
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What then constituted that common faith of the Elizabethan 
Settlement? There is no doubt that the Articles of Religion provided a 
reasonably comprehensive statement of faith. Significantly, the 
Articles did not purport to offer any final and authoritative 
formulation of fundamental belief. Earlier documents had referred to 
the articles of the creeds as necessary to be explicitly believed for 
salvation. This view was now more subtly present in the recognition 
that the creeds 'may be proved by most certain warrants 
scripture' (Article VIII). Such proof was a prerequisit 
of holy 
for the 
acceptance of any belief as an article of faith and necessary to 
salvation (Article VI). The Trinitarian foundation of the Articles of 
Religion (Articles I- V) further endorsed the traditional value of the 
creeds as containing those necessary articles of faith. 
It was equally clear, however, that neither the creeds nor the 
Articles of Religion in their entirety prescribed a terminus to the 
articles tradition. Scripture now constituted unequivocally the locus 
for the content of articles of faith. The strength of the Articles of 
Religion lay as much in their directional value as in their 
definitional exactness and comprehensiveness. The inclusion of a 
controlling heuristic recommendation within the Articles of Religion 
witnessed to the unfinished nature of the 'Book of Articles', the 
source from which the centre of faith could be freshly opened and the 
way in which the dynamic of an articles tradition could be sustained. 
The implicit unfinishedness of the Articles of Religion evidenced 
the essential ecclesiality of the English Reformation. This point 
requires some comment. In this respect it is important to note that the 
problem of the right 'reading' of faith was, in the English Reform, 
primarily a social or communal activity. The Articles of Religion were 
not simply to be read in conjunction with Prayer Book worship (with its 
rich and measured articulation of the faith in the creeds, in prayer 
and praise, liturgy, collects, homilies, Scripture and sacramental 
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life), but rather the truth of the Articles was to be realised in 
communal worship. To 'read' the Articles in this way was to transform 
their law-like status as tests of clerical orthodoxy. Creedal and 
doctrinal statements might have been "carried into law through their 
presence in liturgical books", 4 8 but in this context the law of belief 
was absorbed within the law of prayer,49 The 'what' of belief was 
brought into relation with the 'where' and the 'how' of belief. 
Articles of belief were to be held to communally.so In common worship 
the individual Christian would be rightly situated within the ordered 
complexity of faith. The impulse to quantify and finalise important 
matters of faith was here tempered by the placement of the articles 
tradition in relation to a life of worship and discipleship. 
The particular way in which agreement in doctrine occurred in the 
English Reformation had important implications for the tradition of 
fundamental articles. Firstly, doctrine per se and articles of faith 
in particular were not accorded an autonomous ecclesial status but 
represented an account of a social reformation of the Church in its 
doctrinal form. Articles were primarily a social form of belief, not 
subservient to liturgical and discipleship concerns but integrated 
within these other areas of Christian life,51 
Secondly, this socialization of doctrine had a significant impact 
upon the important Reformation concept of pure doctrine. Unlike other 
Reformed Churches - particularly the Lutherans the English Church 
conceived the problem of the purity of doctrine as an ecclesial matter 
which included, but was not focussed directly upon, issues concerning 
the personal integrity of belief. This orientation was concerned less 
with achieving perfectly formed doctrine as the basis for communal 
purity, and more with asking the question, what ought perfectly formed 
doctrine to look like when considered as the common doctrine of a 
community? Therefor~ on the vexed question of correct doctrine, 
concerns for exactness and precision were not conceived narrowly but 
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were given a reference to God as present in community. The 
hermeneutical horizon for doctrinal purity was the community in which 
the truth of faith was to be practised. 
One consequence of this perspective was that the thrust towards 
consensus in the faith was an important feature of the English 
Reformation. Given the hermeneutical principles enshrined in the 
Articles of the Elizabethan Settlement it was clear that consensus, 
whilst not achieved apart from the past tradition, was nevertheless 
open and capable of being reformed in community,52 
Thirdly, a necessary implication of the above two points was that 
the Reformed Church of England had not abandoned confessionality per se 
but had secured it, in the wake of much controversy, in its own 
particular way, and determined it by the special placement of the 
articles tradition in Anglicanism.SJ 
Finally, the Elizabethan Settlement made it clear that the 
articles tradition was not conceived as something fully determined and 
static. For both individual and communal discipleship the accent was on 
right direction to and from the centre of faith. Oneness in 
multiplicity meant maximum freedom consonant with loyalty to a 
community consensus. In this fundamentally ecclesial context the ideal 
of 'singleness' and purity in doctrine "for the avoiding of diversities 
of opinions and for the establishing of consent touching true 
religion",54 had both a logic and urgency. 
Fundamental Articles in Eaergent Anglican Ecclesiology 
John Jewel 
When John Jewel (1522-1571) offered his Apologia Ecclesiae 
Anglicannae (1562), the context for articles of faith moved from the 
intra-church to the inter-church sphere. This change entailed a shift 
from preoccupation with being one church in doctrine to a more self-
conscious engagement with the doctrine of the one Church. 
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this development the implicit ecclesiological significance of the 
articles tradition became explicit. 
Jewel seated the church "firmly with the continental Lutherans and 
Reformed in opposition to Roman Catholic and Anabaptist extremes",55 
The anti-Roman polemic had particular poignancy in the light of the 
then current proceedings of the Council of Trent,56 A positive theme 
of 'international protestant solidarity'57 provided the balance. 
Jewel's Apology was a vigorous assertion of the unity of the Reformed 
Catholic Church of England with the Universal Church in time and space. 
Oneness Through Time 
A Church rightly formed in relation to the Word of God was, for 
Jewel, a Church in continuity with the primitiva ecclesia: 
we have searched out the holy bible which we are sure cannot 
deceive, one sure form of religion, and have returned again unto 
the primitive church of the ancient fathers and apostles, that 
is to say, to the first ground and beginning of things, as unto 
the foundations and head-springs of Christ's church.sa 
This argument offered an important polemical weapon. Based as it was 
upon the common presupposition enunciated by Tertillian, "Look, 
whatsoever was first, that is true; and, whatsoever is latter, that is 
corrupt",59 it provided a rationale for convicting the Church of Rome 
of having departed from the purity of the early Fathers, of the 
Apostles and of Christ. To be 'patterned' after the early Church did 
not, however, require the wholesale adoption of primitive belief and 
practice, but rather indicated an intention to eschew Roman novelties 
and focus upon the foundation of faith: 
we have called home again to the original and first foundation 
that religion which have been foully foreslowed [neglected] and 
utterly corrupted,60 
In Jewel's view the early Church's fidelity to Scripture 
exemplified how the Church in every age should be similarly focussed on 
the essentials of the gospel,61 In this context Jewel argued that the 
English Church to which he now belonged held to the same substance of 
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religion as the primitive Church;62 a substance which, for Jewel, 
seemed to cohere with the ancient creeds,SJ and was summed up in a 
brief Trinitarian confession,64 Jewel's patristic argument, in common 
with his opponents, included a distinction between things necessary and 
things indifferent in the early Church.ss The major question concerned 
how this distinction was to be applied. Thus Jewel could taunt his 
opponent Mr Harding: "He fighteth as freely for his pardons and 
purgatories as he could do for the faith of the Holy Trinity'',66 On 
the point of Augustine's belief in purgatory Jewel argued that, 
undoubtedly he took it neither for an article of the Christian 
faith (for therefore it had not been lawful for him to doubt) nor 
for any tradition of the apostles,67 
Similarly, the Fathers could not be considered authoritative on the 
matter of celibacy since they had not considered the doctrine essential 
but a thing indifferent,SB Jewel's appeal to the authority of the 
early Church anticipated what would soon become a common 
controversial characteristic of Anglican polemic. 
Unity Through Space 
The Reformed Catholic Church of England was not only one with the 
Universal Church in time and history but also in space. Confessional 
multiplicity and conflict among the Protestant churches required some 
rationale if this claim was to withstand Roman accusations of heresy 
and sectarianism, and counter the divisive effects of radical 
Protestantism. 
Against the claim that confessional multiplicity evidenced 
uncertainty and division in the one faith Jewel argued that this was 
entirely consonant with the multitude of abuses and errors disseminated 
in many places with diversity of languages: 
yet notwithstanding in the substance and grounds of the truth [the 
Protestant churches] have evermore joined together, and never 
altered. 69 
This was, in Jewel's view, a situation analogous to the ancient Church 
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where the common faith was not restricted to one form of words. Thus, 
in respect of Lutheran and Reformed Churches Jewel argued: 
They vary not betwixt themselves upon the principles and 
foundations of our religion, nor as touching God, nor Christ, nor 
the Holy Ghost, nor of the means to justification, nor yet 
everlasting life ... 70 
This oneness in faith among the Reformed (English and Continental) and 
Lutheran Churches gave Jewel confidence to assert, 
that we agree amongst ourselves touching the whole judgement and 
chief substance of Christian religion, and with one mouth and with 
one spirit do worship God and the Father of our Lord Jesus 
Christ. 71 
Such a unity was, for Jewel, essentially dynamic and Christocentric: 
But the true and christian unity is this, that the whole flock of 
Christ hear the voice of the only Shepherd, and follow him. The band of 
. ,, 7 2 
unity is simple ver1ty ..• 
These claims were all the more remarkable given the fierce 
conflict generated in the Protestant churches over the presence of 
Christ in the Eucharist. The difference between Lutherans and 
Zwinglians on this was, said Jewel, 'neither weighty nor great' , 73 at 
least not 'weighty' in relation to the 'grounds and principles of the 
christian faith'. 74 As far as Jewel was concerned, "if there be any 
dissension amongst us, it is not in any article of faith, but only in 
some particular point of learning",75 
Dispute over the Eucharist belonged to the category of 'errors in 
sundry'76 similar to those errors the ancients 'dissembled and passed 
over in silence'.77 It was a necessary but difficult argument to 
maintain given the fierce disagreements among Protestants over the 
issue. In any case Jewel considered that agreement would be quickly 
achieved on the matter,7B 
Jewel's Apologia for the Reformed Catholic Church of England 
focussed on an apostolic succession considered doctrinally rather than 
ministerially,19 The Church was constituted by its oneness in the 
truth. This truth was present in the Scriptures, faithfully witnessed 
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to in the 'golden age' of the Church of the first six centuries,80 and 
now preserved in the orthodox Churches of the Reform. 
In developing this doctrine of the Church Jewel had applied, for 
apologetic reasons, the particular hermeneutical principles of the 
ThirtJ'-nine Articles, including the notion of doctrinal adiaphorism, to 
the problem of the unity of the Church. In doing so he had further 
elaborated the formal definition of the Church enshrined in article 
nineteen of the Articles of Religion.Bl A sufficient, but in no sense 
purportedly comprehensive statement of the substance of faith, was 
offered as the basis for the unity of the Elizabethan Church. In this 
Apologia there was an early anticipation of what would become, in 
seventeenth century Anglican polemic, the appeal to the fundamental 
articles necessary for the being of the Church. The theological 
hardening that developed in this later move was not present in Jewel's 
early deployment of the tradition. 
Richard Hooker 
In Richard Hooker's ecclesiology the operation of the articles 
tradition was placed within a careful account of the nature of a one 
and free church developed in Book Three of The Laws of Ecclesiastical 
Polity. 82 
The Oneness of the Church 
Hooker had written: "That Church of Christ, which we properly term 
his body mystical, can be but one •. " (111.1.2). This unity was 
derived from the oneness of the Triune God;83 it transcended time and 
space, yet co-inhered in the visible Church in a particular way: 
The visible Church of Jesus Christ is therefore one, in outward 
profession of those things, which supernaturally appertain to the 
very essence of Christianity, and are necessarily required in 
every particular Christian man (111.1.4). 
The God-given unity of the visible Church consisted in the profession 
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of one Lord, one faith, and one baptism. This one faith accorded with 
the 'rule of faith' consisting in "Those few articles of Christian 
Belief" (111.1.5) referred to by such early Church Fathers as Tertulian 
and Irenaeus. Even though this visible Church was "divided into a 
number of distinct Societies, every one of which is termed a church 
within itself" its oneness remained, "as the main body of the sea being 
one, yet within divers precincts hath divers names"(111.1.14). 
Equally important was his careful distinction between the 'sound' 
and 'corrupted' visible Church: 
For lack of diligent observing the difference, first between the 
Church of God mystical and visible, then between the visible sound 
and corrupted, sometimes more, sometimes less, the oversights are 
neither few nor light that have been committed (111.1.9), 
Heretics, unlike infidels, belonged to the visible Church in its 
corruption; they embraced the principles of Christianity though they 
erred 'by misconstruction', and as such they remained "a maimed part, 
yet a part of the visible Church" (111.2.1),84 Whilst heresy 
unrepented of excluded one from the mystical Church, errors and faults, 
even heretical ones to do with outward profession, only separated one 
from the visible 'sound' Church of Christ,BS 
Hooker's ecclesiology provided the basis for oneness in 
multiplicity with maximum inclusivity. It presupposd that the unity of 
the Church was multilevelled and dynamic, something given and something 
to be achieved. That perfection of oneness derived from God's own 
being was most fully participated in by the mystical body. The 
potential for this acheivement was more fully present in the visible 
sound Church by virtue of its common threefold profession and mutual 
fellowship. This achi&vement still, however, remained accessible to 
that Church visible though corrupted in its common profession. Here 
was an ecclesiology in which the presence of a God-given unity provided 
the inner dynamic for movement towards a fuller visible unity. This 
implied a strong teleological component in Hooker's doctrine of the 
Church. The perfection of ecclesia required both the providential 
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ordering of God's Holy Spirit and responsible ongoing human 
participation in this activity. 
This perspective could be developed in a number of directions. 
From the inter-church angle it was clear to Hooker that the Roman 
Church, from which the English Church had separated on account of her 
heretical errors, belonged to the one visible Church of God, albeit the 
corrupted part. This theme had been carefully examined in Hooker's 
1585 sermon "Of Justification, Works, and how the Foundation of Faith 
1s overthrown",86 In this sermon Hooker had inquired into "the 
foundation of faith and what it is: secondly, what it is directly to 
deny it ..• " (para. 22). Salvation through Christ was that foundation 
upon which Christianity stood. The Roman doctrine of works did not, in 
Hooker's view, 'directly' overturn this foundation. He said, 
Works are in addition to the foundation: be it so, what then? The 
foundation is not subverted by every kind of addition: simply to 
add to these fundamental words is not to mingle wine with water 
(para. 29). 
The Roman Church received 'the very fundamental words' (para. 33), none 
refused to subscribe to them. Therefore the Roman Church was part of 
the visible though corrupt Church. An important pastoral conclusion to 
this was that the 'fathers of old' could be saved in it. 87 
A doctrine of works, though built upon the foundation, remained 
necessary though subordinate, "because our sanctification cannot be 
accomplished without them" (para.32). Rome's fault was not that she 
required works of those who would be saved but that she "attributeth 
into works a power of satisfying God for sin; and a virtue to merit 
both grace here, and in heaven glory" (para. 32). This doctrine of 
double justice overthrew the foundation 'consequently by addition'. In 
Hooker's view this was a heresy of the third order, to be distinguished 
from those heresies which either directly denied any one article of 
belief, or those like Nestorious, whose opinion implied the denial of 
every part of his creedal confession. The Roman error was 'removed by 
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a greater distance from the foundation' and not so easily discerned. 
Her error was in the superstructure at some remove from the 
'foundation' ,88 
The infidel directly denied the foundation of Christianity, the 
heretic 'by consequent' in varying degrees. For Hooker this foundation 
of salvation in Christ cohered with the few articles of the Apostles 
creed. 89 When he referred to this foundation as 'the very fundamental 
words' (para. 33) he had provided an early Anglican instance of the 
fundamental articles apologetic.90 
Hooker's argument raised an interesting question concerning the 
doctrine of justification by faith. It evidently did not belong to the 
Ct.! 
foundation articles. It more adTately described how the fundamental 
words were appropriated. Justification by faith, in this context, was 
the operational doctrine of Protestantism; the presupposition of a 
godly profession of the foundation of faith. Hooker's argument was 
delicately balanced, and other Protestants were unwilling to allow his 
carefully nuanced view of heresy and its relation to infidelity. Thu~ 
for the stricter Calvinism of William Perkins (1558-1602), to 
misconstrue the key doctrine of justification was to subvert the 
foundation of faith directly,91 Hooker's larger ecclesiological vision 
could not admit this more exclusivist position. 
In Hooker's ecclesiology the Reformed Catholic Church of England 
remained- by virtue of his appeal to the 'fundamental words'- one with 
Rome. Because of Rome's errors this oneness was of a lesser quality 
than the unity Hooker's church had with those visible, sound churches 
of the Reform. Through a multiplicity of particular church confessions 
a unity of faith was secured by the 'fundamental words' apologetic. 
Fundamentals and Ecclesial Freedom 
Hooker's doctrine of the unity of the Church also included a call 
to responsible freedom. This latter dimension was relevant at the 
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intra-church level where Hooker 
was already embroiled in controversies with moderate Puritans 
still part of the comprehensive Church of England, about 
whether one complete form of church polity has been laid out in 
Scripture, thus forming part of what must be maintained as 
necessary to salvation.92 
Hooker's response to this was, in effect, a corollary of his 
doctrine of the unity of the Church. Visible unity was not required in 
anything other than the notes of external profession identified above. 
The Church was thus free as regards, 
general properties belonging unto them as they are public 
Christian societies. And of such properties common unto all 
societies Christian, it may not be denied that one of the chiefest 
is Ecclesiastical Polity (111.1.14). 
Hooker described Church Polity as ''a form of ordering the public 
spiritual affairs of the Church of God" (ibid),93 The freedom implicit 
concerning polity was articulated negatively: "the necessity of polity 
and regiment in all Churches may be held without holding any one 
certain form to be necessary in them all" (111.2.1),94 This position 
presupposed a distinction for Hooker between matters of discipline and 
church government, and matters of faith. The latter constituted those 
necessaries "of which sort the articles of Christian faith and the 
sacraments of the Church of Christ are" (111.2.3). The particulars of 
Church government belonged to~accessories: 
But as for those things that are accessory hereunto, those things 
that so belong to the way of salvation, as to alter them is no 
otherwise than to change that way, than a path is changed by 
altering only the uppermost face thereof; which be it laid with 
gravel, or set with grass, or paved with stone, remaineth still 
the same path; in such things because discretion may teach the 
Church what is convenient, we hold not the Church further tied 
herein unto Scripture, than that against Scripture nothing be 
admitted in the Church, lest that path which ought always to be 
kept even do thereby come to be overgrown with brambles and 
thorns (ibid). 
Underlying the controversial application of the above distinction 
one common in principle to all disputants95 was Hooker's 
understanding of the hierarchy of the laws of being and life which 
encompassed both the positive commands of Scripture and the light of 
reason. Since all law derived ultimately from God there could be no 
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contradiction between the positive commands of Scripture and the 
operation of the natural law of reason. Therefore the Church could 
have confidence to make judgements concerning the particulars of 
ecclesial polity in the absence of any positive Scriptural 
requirements. From Hooker's perspective the Puritan desire to claim a 
positive-law-status for what were in fact human laws developed from 
more general Scriptural rules, 96 betrayed a fundamental mistrust of the 
capacity of human reason to participate in things Divine. In Hooker's 
ecclesiology the freedom to organise church life was a way whereby 
human agency participated in the providential ordering of Christ's 
Church in history. 
Hooker's vision of a free one Church was thus maximally inclusive 
and responsible. The profession of the 'few fundamental words' of the 
creed represented a practical attempt (a) not to exclude any from the 
Church visible and (b) to identify those areas wherein any church was 
not free to legislate. This did not, however, signal a dogmatic 
reductivism but rather presupposed a strong directional thrust in the 
articles tradition. Unity was not achieved merely by the profession of 
the 'fundamental words'. This profession orientated the Church to 
higher degrees of unity, which included a fuller commonality in 
doctrine. Furthermore, freedom within a church was not simply a matter 
of polity but also included the freedom to be responsible in those 
matters necessary to salvation since, "there is doubt how far we are to 
proceed by collection, before the full and complete measure of things 
necessary be made up" (1.14.2),97 
External profession constituted for Hooker both an important 
barometer of institutional purity and fidelity to its truth concerns, 
as well as a springboard from which a rich oneness and genuinely 
responsible faith could be more fully realised. The articles belonged 
to that enduring dialectic between Scripture and the Church. The goal 
was the coming to be of the mystical body of Christ. This teleological 
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component in the articles tradition cohered with Hooker's understanding 
of law in general as "a directive rule unto goodness of 
operation" {1.8.4). 98 This view of law was somewhat at variance with 
the view that emphasised law as external authority. In respect of this 
other view Hooker had written: 
Law unto 
imposeth; 
term any 
They who are thus accostomed to speak apply the name of 
that only rule of working which superior authority 
whereas we somewhat more enlarging the sense thereof 
kind of rule or canon, whereby actions are framed, a 
law ( 1.111.1). 
Doctrines per se and articles of faith were not laws imposed by 
Scripture but rather embodied those rules whereby godly actions were 
'framed'. Doctrine could not, on this account, be a terminus in itself 
but rather an instrument for directing the Church to a higher end,99 An 
important consequence was that the perfection of the Church could not 
be located in an abundance of correct fully defined doctrine. This 
would distort the true law-like operation of articles of belief. 
From Hooker's perspective the perfection of the Church involved 
the progressive realization in its visible life of the essential unity 
of the Church given by the presence of God. Oneness had to be achieved 
responsibly. It could not be short-circuited by a retreat into fixed 
doctrinal formulas. This latter move only avoided the task of being 
a united community where the practice of the truth included people 
agreeing with one another, rather than excluding one another. Thus, in 
the same way that laws of polity, to be recognised as laws worthy of 
obedience, were not to be imposed but rather offered and agreed in the 
whole community,lOO so too articles of faith were articles proposed and 
agreed in the society of the Church as it had developed through time 
and space. In Hooker's view this social consensus ought not be 
distorted through imposition of further articles. Social cohesion was 
sufficiently secured, doctrinally at least, by the profession of those 
'few fundamental words'. 
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For Hooker the articles tradition was not primarily a logicised 
doctrinal form of the transformation of human personhood, nor was it 
conceived as a set of beliefs necessary to be a right believer, but 
rather it belonged to a finely tuned strategy for achieving a free one 
Church. In this context the 'fundamental words' apologetic informed and 
directed a principled ecclesial pragmatism. 
Hooker sought a balance in which Christian freedom was given 
maximum scope for self-expression within an essential oneness. This 
ecclesiology represented for Hooker the logic of God's active presence 
in human society. God's Trinitarian form - his oneness in multiplicity 
was 
constituted a rich oneness. According!~ God's action in the world 
the exercise of his most glorious and most abundant virtue. Which 
abundance doth show itself in variety, and for that cause this 
variety is oftentimes in Scripture exprest by the name of riches 
(1.1.4). 
Freedom in oneness represented the social form of this divine 
activity in the world. This ecclesial ideal expressed itself 
docrtrinally in Hooker's appeal to the ;fundamental words' of the 
faith. This was the appropriate profession of faith in a godly society 
in which endurance in truth and righteousness required responsible 
human agreement over the terms and forms of its life in God. From this 
perspective the early Anglican development of the tradition of 
fundamental articles was directed towards the perfection of God's 
presence in the society of the Church. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE CONSOLIDATION OF A TRADITION: 
The Legacy of the Seventeenth Century 
During the course of the seventeenth century a variety of factors 
contributed to the consolidation and modification of the tradition of 
fundamental articles in Anglicanism. This Chapter examines firstly, 
some of the important contributions to the formation and defence of the 
tradition, and secondly some of the important modifications to the 
tradition occasioned by religious and scientific developments,! 
Ecclesial Self-Consciousness and the Appeal to Fundamentals 
Recognition of the dividedness of the Church in post-Reformation 
fresh attempts by Anglicans to make sense of the Europe generated 
identity of their own and by implication other communions, and provided 
the context and pretext for the development of the appeal to 
fundamental articles in Anglicanism,2 Whilst the tradition remained a 
point of controversy between Armlnian and Calvinist elements in 
Anglicanism, 3 the crystallization of the tradition was largely the 
result of disputes with Roman Catholicism. Anglican divines found an 
appeal to certain enduring fundamentals of the faith an important and 
useful strategy to convict Rome of introducing novelties in the faith, 
and of affirming the continuity of the Reformed Catholic Church of 
England with the Catholic Church in time and space. Thomas Morton 
(1564-1659), and Lancelot Andrewes (1555-1626) exemplified early 
seventeenth century Anglican apologetic concerning fundamentals.4 
Richard Field: the Right-Believing Church 
Perhaps the most significant ecclesiology of this early period, 
developed in relation to the claims of Roman Catholicism, was Richard 
Field's learned five volume systematic treatise Of The Church (1606-
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1610),5 In Book Three Field detailed those things, 
that do so nearly touch the very life and being of the Christian 
faith and religion, that everyone is bound particularly and 
expressly to know and believe them upon peril of eternal 
damnation.s 
These 'principal heads' of belief were quite detailed in relation to 
the Trinity, Creation, angelic and human fall, redemption in Christ 
including his sacrifice that 'satisfied the wrath of his Father' 
repentance and hope, the church sacraments and ministry, and final 
judgement. Field proposed a comprehensive list of those things that 
'do directly concern the matter of eternal salvation' and constitute 
'the whole platform of all Christian religion'. It accorded with the 
rule of faith 
"delivered 
and, with 
unavoidably 
Dogmatum". 1 
by Tertullian, Irenaeus, and other of the fathers: 
addition of conclusions most easily, clearly and 
deduced hence, by Theodoret in his Epitome 
Elsewhere Field identified this rule with the Apostolic Creed 
containing, "the summary comprehension of such principal articles of 
this divine knowledge, as are the principles whence all other things 
are concluded and inferred",8 Though the rule could also include 
all such things as every Christian is bound expressly to 
believe, by the light and direction whereof he judgeth of other 
things which are not absolutely necessary so particularly to be 
known,9 
In this respect Field referred to "articles of faith, and other 
verities ever expressly known in the Church as the first principles". 10 
These were contained in the Apostle~ Creed by way of 'summary 
comprehension', but they clearly included more than the bare creedal 
articles. 
Field distinguished those principles that made the rule of faith 
of which a person could not be ignorant and be saved, from other things 
so clearly deduced "that, whoso advisedly considereth them, cannot but 
see their consequence from them and dependence of them, a man cannot 
err and be saved",ll Included here were the beliefs that Christ had 
two wills, that there was no salvation outside the Church, that 
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marriage was pure, that there were no meats to be rejected as unclean 
by nature. A third category of beliefs concerning 'the place of the 
father's rest' before the coming of Christ, and the local descending of 
Christ into 'the hell of the damned', being not so clearly deduced, "a 
man may be ignorant of, and err in them without danger of damnation, if 
the error be not joined with pertinacy",l2 
Compared to Hooke~ Field's statement of those beliefs necessary 
for salvation was more extensive and refined, indicative of a concern 
to establish a 'right-believing' Church,l3 This development signalled 
an early hardening in the tradition. 
Field's discussion of the articles of the faith belonged to his 
inquiry into who was 'of the church'. Field, like Hooker, sought a 
.9 
more inclusive Church than that su~sted by the narrower ecclesial 
boundaries of Rome and radical Protestantism.l4 Thu~ contrary to the 
Jesuit Bellarmine, Field argued that inward qualities were not required 
before one was of the Church. IS Furthermor~ schismatics, though they 
broke unity with their pastors, nevertheless remained of the Church 
orthodox by virtue of their adherence to the rule of faith,l6 Finally, 
heretics likewise remained of the Church Christian, insofar as they 
continued to make profession "of sundry divine verities, which still 
they retain in common with right believers"l7 and retained a ministry 
and sacraments. Like Hooker, Field envisaged different levels of 
participation in the one Church.1a 
Nevertheless, it was only those 'companies of right believing and 
Catholic Christians'19 that merited the status of the true Catholic 
Church. The notes essential to the being of the true Church were 
threefold: "First, the entire profession of those supernatural 
verities, which God hath revealed in Christ his Son",20 These truths 
accorded with the rule of faith and were joined to two other notes; 
"use of the sacraments instituted by Christ, and a union of people in 
this faith and with these sacraments under lawful pastors",21 
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Field's ecclesiology presupposed the multiple divisions of 
Christendom. 22 His stress on agreement in basic doctrines of faith 
indicated a heavy investment in doctrinal reconciliation. Upon this 
basis he argued that the churches of the East were all members of 'the 
true Catholic Church'. They retained 'a saving profession of all divine 
verities absolutely necessary to salvation'; their variety in opinion 
concerned 'things not fundamental',23 It was not unimportant to Field 
that these churches, in all the principal controversies between Rome 
and the Reformed churches, gave 'testimony of the truth of that we 
profess'. 24 Furthermore, among those public reformed confessions of 
faith there was, in Field's view, 'no essential, fundamental or 
material difference',25 This extended even to eucharistic doctrine 
where Field doubted not of 'the possibility of a general 
reconciliation',26 
The status of the Roman Church posed a special problem for Field. 
There was no doubt in his mind that the present Roman Church was not a 
true church but an heretical one.27 He considered, however, that it 
still remained "in some sort a part of the visible Church of God". 28 
Its errors were 'fundamental',29 Rome no longer confessed the 'ancient 
profession of the primitive Christians',30 Yet salvation had been 
possible in this church for "Formerly, the Church of Rome was the true 
Church, but had in it an heretical faction: now the Church itself is 
heretical",31 Salvation was still possible but more dangerous: the 
former apostate faction within the Church of Rome now ruled. 32 It was 
an important but difficult argument to sustain,33 
Field's ecclesiology was a major attempt to provide a theoretical 
underpinning for post-Reformation Christendom. The divisions were 
recognised. How were the multiplicity of churches to understand 
themselves in order that the unity of the Church could still be 
affirmed? This was the question Field sought to answer. His argument 
about fundamental beliefs was a strategy for effecting a doctrinal 
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reconciliation. But it is hard to see how it might have been 
translated into any kind of practical unity. It represented a step on 
the way, encouraging charitable mutual recognition among churches 
divided. 
Given the context Field's concern soon focussed on clarifying 
and delineating the boundaries between the churches. One result was 
that 
unity 
the teleological motive in Hooker faded. 
Field wrote of was of a more settled 
The nature of Church 
kind. This ecclesial 
solidification was reflected in the deployment of the concept of the 
'true' church (Hooker did not develop this), and in a stronger concern 
for a right-believing church in determining the status of various 
communions. 
William Laud: Consolidating the Tradition 
Discussion over the fundamental doctrines of the faith 
increasingly intruded into Anglican-Roman Catholic controversy. When 
William Laud (1573-1645) conducted his famous argument with the Jesuit 
theologian, John Fisher (1569-1641}, Field's four page chapter 'Of 
those things which everyone is bound expressly to know and believe' had 
been developed by Laud into a long central chapter of A Relation of a 
ConferenceJ4 entitled 'What are the Fundamentals of the Faith?' The 
lines of the debate were now clearly drawn, the Jesuit arguing that all 
points defined by the Church were fundamental. Laud proposed the 
ancient Apostolic foundation of faith, the dogmata deposita35 contained 
in the articles of the creed,36 as 'absolute fundamental doctrines'(my 
italics)37 necessary to the salvation of all. Such 'catholic maxims' 
were fundamental in the nature of the case, not determined by the 
Church but 'published' and 'manifested' by it,38 
Within this fundamental faith there were, said Laud, quoedam prima 
credibilia, 'certain prime principles of faith', "in the bosom whereof 
all other articles lay wrapped and folded up",39 Included here was 
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that of St John: Every spirit that confesses Jesus Christ come in the 
flesh is of God (1 John 4.2), and another from Hebrews: He that comes 
to God, must believe that God is, and that He is a rewarder of them 
that seek Him. Similarly, the belief of Scripture to be the infallible 
word of God "is an equal, or rather a preceding, prime principle of 
faith, with or to the whole body of the Creed'',40 There may of course 
be many true deductions from the prime principles of faith which become 
necessary belief for those able to go from principle to conclusion.41 
Elsewhere1 Laud spoke of "some few and those immediate deductions from 
the Creed'' not being ''formally fundamental" for all, but only for those 
able "to make or understand them",42 
Laud's depiction of the necessary faith had formal affinities with 
Field. Materially it was less comprehensive, Laud focussing on the 
minimum community credenda. Laud's discussion of fundamental articles 
was foundational for his ecclesiology for "whatsoever is fundamental in 
the faith is fundamental to the Church, which is 'one by the unity of 
faith''',43 
At this point the permanency of church divisions became even more 
apparent in Laud's unequivocal assertion that Rome, whilst neither 'the 
true Church' nor 'a right Church', was nevertheless 'a true Church', by 
virtue of its profession of the fundamental articles of the Creed. The 
change was subtle, Laud treating ens and verum, 'being' and 'true', as 
convertible terms,44 a move not made by Field or Hooker 45 but which 
had become common,46 Laud's vision was that much narrower; either a 
church was true or it was 'no Church',47 Accordingly, Laud had 
difficulty identifying the extent of current Roman errors. It seemed 
that he would not grant Rome a 'right' and hence in his eyes, 
'orthodox' status,48 Rome was said to have 
maintained the faith unchanged in the expression of the Articles 
themselves; but it hath in the exposition both of Creeds and 
Councils quite changed, and lost the sense and the meaning of 
some of them,49 
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Rome held the fundamental points literally but erred "grossly, 
dangerously, nay, damnably in the exposition'',50 Nowhere, however, 
did Laud refer, as Hooker had, to the foundation being overturned 
indirectly. Significantly, Laud's discussion omitted any reference to 
the doctrine of justification, a doctrine so crucial to Hooker's 
. d e. h f h - 1 JU gment upon t e status o t e Roman communion.~ All he asserted was 
that errors in points not fundamental may be damnable,52 
Laud's deployment of the fundamental articles apologetic was 
intentionally conciliatory, though it had begun to assume a distinctly 
'wooden' form. The distinction between foundation and superstructure, 
whilst useful in polemic, was rather too simply drawn and, as John 
Henry Newman was to discover two centuries later, it contained 
unresolved problems affecting the controversy between Rome and 
Anglicanism,53 a fact implicit in the failure of Laud's apologetic to 
deal with supposed Roman errors. 
Laud's argument set the pattern for much future Anglican 
apologetic. The Church was founded upon the primitive apostolic faith 
enshrined in the Apostles' Creed, the 'absolute' fundamental doctrines. 
This became a standard argument of Anglican divines, useful as a way of 
countering Roman claims to infallibility and securing the unity of 
the Church. This strategy enabled Anglicans to accord Rome a true 
church status, though this matter was not uncontroversial. 54 The 
apologia offered a highly practical and self-evidently plausible 
solution to the unity and identity of the Church in its divisions. 
The fundamental articles apologia appeared, however, dangerously 
vulnerable to the Roman claim that Protestants differed over the 
content of the fundamentals and were consequently unable to offer a 
definitive catalogue of saving beliefs. These criticisms proved a 
catalyst for uncovering two important features of the Anglican appeal 
to fundamentals. The Roman criticisms had indicated, in the view of 
Anglican divines, a failure to understand both the nature of individual 
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responsibility in the Church and the institutional significance of 
Christian belief. 
William Chillingworth: The Moral Integrity of Belief 
The nature of the believer's responsibility in matters of faith 
was carefully addressed by William Chillingworth (1~06-16~4) in his 
controversial writing of 1638, The Religion of Protestants, a Safe ffay 
to Sah'ation. 5 5 This work was a spirited defence of another Anglican, 
Christopher Potter (1591-1646), whose controversy in 1633 with the 
Jesuit Fisher had focussed upon the difficulties Protestants had of 
agreeing upon a definitive catalogue of fundamentals.ss 
Scripture, for Chillingworth, was 'true absolutely in all 
things',57 However its truths were of two kinds, those necessary to 
salvation, "of which rank are those only, which constitute and make up 
the Covenant between God and Man in Christ",s& and those 'verities' 
concerning matters of history, prophecy and the like, not intrinsical 
to the covenant, i.e. not necessary in themselves but by accident. 
Chillingworth argued that it was unwise and unnecessary to 
differentiate exactly between belief 'intrinsic' and belief 
'accidental' to the covenant. It was unwise because error could 
easily occur, It was unnecessary because all that was necessary was 
'plain' in Scripture. From Chillingworth's point of view it was 
sufficient for any man's Salvation that he believe the 
Scripture: that he endeavour to believe it in the true sense of 
it, as far as concerns his duty: And that he conform his life 
unto it either by obedience or Repentance.so 
To believe in this way secured one from erring 'fundamentally' and 
ensured that Protestants, notwithstanding their differences 'cannot 
differ in fundamentals'; the same heaven could receive them all.61 
This was not a recipe for confusion and perplexity. Protestants were 
sure enough, that all that is necessary any way, is there [in 
Scripture]; and therefore in believing all that is there, we are 
sure to believe all that is necessary,62 
Chillingworth's confidence was derived from his conviction that 
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the fundamentals that made up the 'essential part of Christianity' 63 
were plainly revealed. In a number of places he did not balk at 
speaking of them. 64 He was not talking here so much about doctrines 
but rather the kerygma itself: "Points Fundamental being those only 
which are revealed by God, and commanded to be preached to all, and 
believed by all"65(my italics). His concern was for 'all that is 
simply necessary',66 Differences arose when one chose from Scripture 
propositions and doctrines "which integrate and make up the bodJ' of 
Christian Religion'',6 7 Since the knowledge of fundamentals was drawn 
from the Bible therefore, 
whosoever doth truly and firmly believe the Scripture, must of 
necessity either explicitly, or at least implicitly 
believe all things Fundamental: It being not Fundamental, nor 
required of Almighty God, to believe the true sense of Scripture 
in all places, but only that we should endeavour to do so, and 
be prepared in mind to do so, whensoever it shall be 
sufficiently propounded to us.sa 
Chillingworth's discussion of fundamentals presupposed a high 
moral component in all responsible believing, a component endangered by 
the imposition of extensive requirements for Christian belief. It was 
'a question of seeking truth with integrity',6 9 Chillingworth had 
recovered the directional thrust of the articles tradition: 
What matters it for the direction of men 
they differ in op1n1on, touching what 
necessary and what not?70 (my italics) 
to Salvation, though 
points are absolutely 
This focus on individual responsibility in Christian pilgrimage made 
sense within the co-ordinates of Scripture and an Anglican liturgy in 
which, in respect of Scripture, one could 'hear them, read, mark, 
learn, and inwardly digest them unto everlasting life. ' 71 
Edward Stillingfleet: Fundamentals in Ecclesiality 
The Roman demand that Protestants provide a full catalogue of 
fundamentals not only subverted individual moral responsibility before 
God, it also failed to appreciate the importance of the articles 
tradition for social cohesion. This matter had not been disregarded by 
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Chillingworth,72 though it was the Anglican apologist, Edward 
Stillingfleet (1635-1699), who was responsible for crystallizing this 
issue. Stillingfleet discoursed on the subject in .4 Rational Account 
of the Grounds of Protestant Religion (1664),73 which was in effect his 
vindication of Laud's earlier argument against Fisher. 
In Chapter Two Stillingfleet considered the grounds upon which 
anything became necessary to salvation: 
For our better understanding of which, we must consider two 
things. 
1. What things are necessary to the Salvation of Men as such, 
as considered in their single and private Capacities? 
2. What things are necessary to be owned in order to Salvation, 
by Christian societies, or as the Bonds and Conditions of 
Ecclesiastical Communion?1-l 
Stillingfleet went on to remark that, 
The want of understanding this distinction of the 
things, hath caused most of the perplexities and 
this Controversy of Fundamentals.15 
necessity of 
Confusion in 
Equally important and easily overlooked was Stillingfleet's 
recognition that fundamentals were properly understood "not as 
Principles, from which Deductions may be drawn of Theological Truths; 
but in regard of that immediate respect which they have to Men's 
Salvation'',76 Accordingly, concerning individuals, that which was 
necessary included a formal component of believing whatever God 
revealed as true, and materially of believing that which made for 
humankind's eternal welfare and happiness. To this end the gospel 
contained "a Covenant of Grace, or the conditions on which our 
Salvation depends",77 
In this respect Stillingfleet spoke of two things 'indispensibly' 
necessary to salvation: "An hearty Assent to the Doctrine of Christ, 
and a conscientious walking according to the Precepts of it",78 The 
full extent of what was included here "must be gathered by everyone as 
to himself from Scripture". No final catalogue could be imposed. In 
respect of the Church catholic, its unity was intended to preserve its 
being. Stillingfleet argued that the 'Bonds of Union' shouldn't "extend 
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beyond the Foundation of its Being; which is, the owning the things 
necessary to the Salvation of all",79 
The communal faith consonant with ecclesial peace went no further 
than the necessary articles of faith. Negatively, this meant that 
nothing was necessary that was not inserted in the Ancient Creeds.B 0 
Positively, Sti 11 ingfleet was content to point, as Laud and 
Chillingworth had done, to the Apostles Creed as "a summary collection 
of the most necessary Points which God has revealed",81 The Articles 
of Religion of national churches clarified abuses in the faith and were 
propositions for peace, a thing quite different from accounting them 
necessary articles of faith. 
In Stillingfleet's view Rome had failed to distinguish between 
articles of faith necessary for the oneness of the Church catholic and 
Articles of Religion,B2 between articles of faith and theological 
\'erities. 83 Accordingly, Rome had imposed upon the Church Universal 
many beliefs beyond the necessary articles of faith, the explicit 
belief of which was required for an individual's salvation. 
It was a familiar enough argument. Stillingfleet had provided a 
sharper analysis than hitherto obtained. In doing so he not only 
highlighted some of the major conflicts between Anglican and Roman 
Churches, but had brought into focus the social parameters of the 
fundamental articles tradition. This concern did not necessarily imply 
a lack of integrity in the matter of truth, but it did 
indicate commitment in Anglicanism to the practice of seeking a 
publicly agreed consensus in faith as a strategy for being one Church. 
The Ecumenical Context 
The appeal to fundamentals for purposes of social cohesion and 
peace was important to many irenic Christians of the seventeenth 
century. Indeed, it has been stated that the distinction between 
fundamentals and non-essentials was "the root-principal of the 
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ecumenical minds"84 of this era. For many, this included an appeal to 
the undivided Church of the first five centuries. In the case of the 
German Lutheran, Georg Calixtus (1586-1656), this was linked to the 
criterion provided by the Vincentian canon.ss At a practical level 
this often resolved itself into proposals for reconciliation which 
included acceptance of the ApostleJ Creed as a dogmatic minimum,86 
Alongside the Scottish ecumenistJJohn Durie (1596-1680)}who also 
received Anglican orders,8 7 the Anglican Bishop John Davenant88 and 
Richard Baxter (1615-1691)89 were among those who found the appeal to 
fundamentals useful, if finally unfruitful in their irenic efforts. 
The Tradition Modified: Ecclesial and Scientific Pressures 
A Widening of Scope: The Restoration Settlement 
Schemes for 'comprehension' were usually minimally dogmatic though 
not uncontroversial in their limitations upon religious freedoms. 90 
Nevertheless, insofar as fundamental articles were identified as the 
necessary communiter credenda, in contradistinction from matters to do 
with polity (communiter agenda), it was clear that consensus in matters 
of faith did not guarantee ecclesial peace and unity. Polity per se 
was a potentially volatile issue, a fact clearly in evidence from the 
later sixteenth century. 
Being one Church had never been construed in England as merely a 
matter of resolving controversies in faith and finding agreement in 
doctrine. It had included (as evident in Articles XX and XXXIV of the 
Thirty-nine Articles of Religion) important freedoms and 
responsibilities for determining commonly agreed church order and 
worship. Not surprisingly then, questions of church polity, customs and 
rites remained highly volatile issues in seventeenth century England. 
Laud's rigour in seeking uniformity in this respect was in marked 
contrast to the freedoms he espoused in matters of belief.91 
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Polity included the form of minis,try. This controversial issue 
came to a decisive climax at the Restoration when some 1,760 incumbents 
were ejected from their parishes. 92 In this settlement clear bounds 
had been set to Anglican comprehensiveness. The amendment in the 
Ordinal, passed by Parliament in 1662, requiring episcopal ordination 
for any one to be "accounted or taken to be a lawful Bishop, Priest, or 
Deacon in the Church of England", and the terms of the Act of 
L'ni formity, were instrumental in undermining the hitherto adiaphorist ic 
nature of Episcopacy in the Church of England.93 
The above action suggested, at least implicitly, that a 
particular doctrine of polity was now integral to the being of the 
Church. The implied breakdown of the traditional distinction in 
Anglicanism 
theological 
between 
confusion 
agenda and credenda 
into the Anglican 
imported considerable 
fundamental articles 
apologetic. In effect what Anglicanism had resisted against Rome, i.e. 
the imposition of further credenda, it had now fallen prey to, as it 
were de facto. It was now fundamental to the being of a church to 
practice a particular doctrine of polity. The scope of the articles 
tradition had been widened in principle. The logic of this development 
found theological expression in a view later exemplified by Henry 
Dodwell (1641-1711), who regarded 'Belief in the episcopal function 
a fundamental of fundamentals',94 The articles tradition had, it 
seemed, been subsumed in a doctrine of polity; a doctrine that when 
practised, had highly significant implications for the relationship of 
Anglicanism with other Protestant communions. This was particularly 
dangerous for the operation of the articles tradition, for henceforth a 
pseudo doctrinal minimalism, proposed in the interests of an 
inclusivist ecclesiology, could easily mask a doctrinal rigorism (in so 
far as doctrines of practical polity were concerned), and foster rather 
sharp and exclusivist ecclesial boundaries. Some of the continuing 
confusions this development imported into Anglican fundamentals 
103 
IV: Consolidation of the Tradition 
discussion have, as outlined in Chapter One, surfaced in more recent 
Anglican dialogue with other Protestant communions. 
Identifying Fundamentals: The Claims of Rationality 
The appeal to fundamentals was enmeshed in a rich social, 
intellectual and scientific culture which was experiencing, in the 
seventeenth century, some profound changes occasioned in part by a 
fresh scientific awakening and increase in knowledge. Such 
developments became evident in a renewed concern for epistemological 
issues and a more general drive towards establishing reliable knowledge 
in science, law and religious life.95 One result was an increasing 
convergence among various strands of inquiry of a scientific, religious 
and philosophical kind, a convergence based on the recognition of a 
common fundamental problem, ''to work out standards for well-founded, 
reasonable, highly probable, but noncertain, belief". 96 
Inquiry into kinds of knowledge and certainties, and concomitant 
concerns for making judgements based on evidences of different 
qualities, had the momentous effect of initiating a fresh appraisal of 
authorities for knowledge and action. The authority of reason becqme 
of central importance in the determination of scientific and religious 
belief. This development was neither simple nor immediate. It became 
apparent, however, that as far as the problem of determining the 
fundamentals of the Christian faith was concerned, the question of the 
rationality of the articles of faith would dominate discussion of 
fundamentals. 
Naturalizing Religion: Commonality in the 'Sub-Fundamentals' 
At one level the impact of the above concerns became evident in 
the new attempts to identify those religious principles that functioned 
more or less as the presuppositions for all faith. This inquiry seemed, 
at least to some, to offer the prospect of much needed peace in 
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religion. In 1624 Lord Herbert of Cherbury (1583-1648) had proposed 
that common to all religions were five innate ideas,97 He exemplified 
a strand in the articles tradition which had affinities with Nicholas 
of Cusa's earlier but more sophisticated development of a global form 
of faith.98 
Cherbury's naturalizing of faith presupposed rather static and 
atomistic conceptions of the articles tradition. This fact emerged in 
the discussion of the Biblical scholar Joseph Mede (1586-1638). Mede 
resolved the formal reason of a fundamental into the necessary 
connection it had with the acts and functions of Christian life. He 
rejected the idea of developing the notion of fundamentals in relation · 
to one central doctrine since little agreement could be expected.99 
His view was less intricate, but not in principle different, from the 
proposal to distinguish 'sub-fundamentals' (the natural principles of 
religion), 'fundamentals' in the sense of a foundation for the 
Christian revelation and 'super fundamentals', which were the immediate 
consequences of the former. Mede felt caution was needed in deciding 
upon the content of the 'super fundamentals'. In regard to fundamentals 
he was careful to distinguish fundamenta Salutis or dogmatum fidei 
(those beliefs 'simply' and 'absolutely' necessary for salvation), from 
the Fundamenta Theologicarum Veritatum or fundamentalia dogmaticum. The 
latter indicated those principles from which theological verities were 
deduced. Mede thought that there may be an overlap in the two latter 
categories but that they were not identical. 
What was interesting in Mede's discussion was that the question of 
sub-fundamentals was not felt worthy of note. 
which there was presumably a common consensus. 
It was a matter over 
The stratified and 
static form of belief this implied was easily susceptible to the 
sterile and reductivist attempts of those like Herbert of Cherbury, to 
lay bare the basic principles of all religion. The content and origin 
of such 'sub-fundamentals' and their relation to the Christian 
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revelation, continued to stimulate important intellectual effort in the 
seventeenth century,lOO This was especially the case among the so 
called 'rational supernaturalists',lOl of which an Archbishop of 
Canterbury, 
example. 102 
John Tillotson (1630-1694), 
Affirming Fundamentals: The Authority of Reason 
was a later important 
Epistemological issues were equally relevant to that strand of the 
articles tradition in which the central articles pertaining to the 
Christian revelation were the focus. The desire for a rational 
grounding of the foundation of faith indicated an attempt to chart a 
course between dogmatism exemplified by Roman claims to 
infallibility and the excesses of sectarian 'enthusiasm' - and 
scepticism in which certain atheistic tendencies could be discerned. 
The necessary articles of faith increasingly became identified with 
'matters of fact', in contrast to mere opinions. This rationalistic 
scripturalism presupposed that it was reasonable to believe any matter 
of fact ''provided there was no contrary evidence which led one to 
doubt",lOJ The self evidence of the articles of faith was derived from 
their plainly being manifest in Scripture,l04 and their warrant by 
credible testimony,lOS Important in this scheme was a notion of the 
veracity of God who would not propose for saving belief that which 
could not be received by reasonable persons.I06 
William Chillingworth provided an important early example of this 
development. He insisted on the importance of articles being 
'sufficiently' propounded or declared as a preconditon of belief. 107 
The point in controversy was Rome's assumed authority to impose 
articles of faith. Chillingworth's response recognised the importance 
of the dynamic through which the 'giveness' of revelation was 
responsibly appropriated. His position presupposed a more finely tuned 
understanding of human capacities and propensity for error. Diversity 
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in doctrine was inevitable. Therefore, errors could not be, in and of 
themselves, 'damnable',108 Claims to infallibility by Rome were simple 
and false solutions to problems of Christian belief. Chillingworth 
retained an infallibility for Scripture as the rule of faith,109 He 
distinguished between absolute and 'conditional', 'dependent' or 
'limited' infallibility; actual or sufficient certainty, and absolute 
infallibility. Such distinctions were important in determining the 
authority of the Church and the proper basis for human belief.llO It 
was Chillingworth's view that the claim that the Church was infallible 
in the fundamentals of the faith was a way of affirming that there 
would always be a Church. Rome erred in failing to distinguish this 
claim from the claim that the Church was an infallible guide in 
fundamentals. Ill 
By the time Edward Stillingfleet wrote his vindication of Laud the 
category of 'moral certainty' had been carefully developed in relation 
to the articles of the faith.l 12 Stillingfleet pointed out that moral 
certainty, which was relevant beyond the bounds of religion, was 
a sufficient foundation for the most firm Assent and therefore 
if the matter to be believed be the infallible Truth of a 
Doctrine upon suitable evidence, though we have now but moral 
Certainty of that evidence, the Assent may be firm to such a 
Doctrine as infallible.IIJ 
Important for an understanding of Stillingfleet's view of the 
derivation of the articles of faith was his remark, that the nature of 
certainty was "not so much to be taken from the matters themselves, as 
from the grounds inducing the Assent" ,114 
Moral certainty took away all 'suspicion of doubt', a thing 'plain 
and evident' to reason. It yielded "sufficient assurance that 
Christian Religion is infallibly true" .us Furthermore, moral 
certainty was all the certainty that religion had ever had. Without it 
the 'benefit' of Christianity would be inaccessible to those separated 
by time and space from the 'originating' events,ll6 
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The Demise of Patristic Authority 
The increasing importance accorded to the authority of reason in 
matters of faith had initiated important modifications in the 
resolution of the fundamental articles tradition. The importance of 
the familiar Anglican appeal to a patristic consensus in matters of 
faith, in particular to the fundamentals, suffered erosion. It is worth 
noting here that the hitherto strong Patristic orientation in 
fundamentals discussion in seventeenth century Anglicanism, had 
succeeded in taming the potentially volatile problem of fundamental 
articles. By comparison with other Protestant churches, particularly 
the Lutherans, the 
articles could not 
unsophisticated,ll7 
Anglican handling of the problem of fundamental 
but appear distinctly under-developed, and 
The Anglican appeal to antiquity for the resolution of the 
fundamentals, an appeal enshrined in Lancelot Andrewes' (1555-1626) now 
famous definition of the boundaries of Anglicanism,ll8 affirmed by Laud 
and climaxed at the end of the century in the writings of the Anglican 
divine George Bull (1634-1710),119 had been subjected to critical 
examination which had exposed a diversity of testimony in the early 
Church Fathers.12o When this development was allied to developing 
notions of certainty, evidences and 'opinion', the result was an 
inevitable decline in the reputation of the Church Fathers, especially 
among those of latitudinarian sympathies,121 
Thus, although Chillingworth was confident of the early Churches' 
trustworthiness in the central matters of faith, nevertheless, in 
principle at least, the authority of reason was determinative. The 
practices and beliefs of the primitive church were, said Chillingworth, 
"a good probable way, and therefore [I] am apt to follow it, when I see 
no reason to the contrary",l22 For Stillingfleet the patristic 
consensus was useful principally as a negative criterion: what was not 
included in the ancient creeds could not now be insisted upon.l23 
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Fundamental Doctrine: Orientations to Piety 
Concomitant with the increasing attention paid to the authority of 
reason in the determination of the articles of faith, was a shift in 
the orientation of the tradition from the cognitive to the moral 
domain. This was true for Chillingworth who had noted that the 
fundamental doctrines of faith, ''have influence upon our lives, a.s 
every essential doctrine of Christianity hath" (my italics). 124 Though 
in the context his point was that one was commanded to believe them, 
not do them. Nevertheless, the moral component in believing was 
crucial. The whole thrust of his apology was that rational human beings 
were morally obliged to scrutinize what was proposed for belief,l2S 
Doctrinal error did not imply moral shortcoming. What counted was the 
integrity and intention to find the truth. The implication for 
ecclesiology was that separation was not so much a doctrinal but moral 
issue.l2 6 
Christianity, it seemed, was not primarily a matter of correct 
believing but of right practice. This perspective received clear 
exposition in a mid-seventeenth century work of over 120 pages by the 
Anglican divine Henry Hammond (1605-1660) entitled, Of Fundamentals, in 
a Notion Referring to Practice (1654),12 7 In this important workl28 
Hammond concentrated, not so much upon the foundation or fundamentals, 
but upon "what superstructure it is to which this foundation doth 
refer, or in respect to which peculiarly any article of faith may be 
denominated fundamental",l29 In Hammond's view 
the way of measuring and defining the necessity of any articles 
of faith • • • is by the 'OCfrr[pHtlo(' or 'sufficiency' of them to 
enable the teacher or persuade good life, to support those vices 
which Christ came to banish out of the world, and to radicate 
those virtues which He came on purpose to implant among men,l30 
From this perspective the ancient creedal articles (Apostolic, Nicene 
and Athanasian) were directed to the practice of piety,l31 The 
fundamentals of belief enshrined therein could be resolved into the 
doctrine of Christ's resurrection, 
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there being no more necessary to the superstructuring all piety 
on that one foundation, but to sink down the belief of that one 
article from the brain to the heart, to reduce it effectually to 
practice.(my italics)132 
Here was a concerted attempt to reintegrate the fundamental articles 
tradition with the practice of being a Christian in the Church. To be 
one Church required not only right believing but right living. 
Implicit in Hammond's development of fundamentals was an intention 
not to forfeit the dynamic of the articles of faith as generators of 
ecclesial life. What was interesting in Hammond's treatise was the 
large space he devoted to the description of that necessary 
superstructure of piety funded by the foundational articles.133 The 
traditional distinction between foundation and superstructure had been 
reinterpreted. The superstructure no longer indicated secondary 
doctrines of faith but instead identified those practices conduch'e to 
a righteous life. Insofar as this superstructure of piety was directly 
related to fundamental belief it was axiomatic that a strong moral 
element had been introduced into the rationale for Christianity's 
fundamental articles. 
This important development in the orientation of the fundamental 
articles tradition had an impact on ecclesial controversy. Thus Hammond 
argued that Roman doctrinal errors tended to 'obstruct' or 'intercept' 
"the cordial superstructuring of Christian life or renovation, where 
the foundation is duly laid". 134 Similarly, certain Protestant 
doctrines of predestination evacuated "all the force of these 
fundamentals, designed by God as motives of great energy to induce good 
life",135 Jeremy Taylor (1613-1637) argued similarly, noting that 
Roman errors destroyed good life rather than faith: 
For false superstructures do not always destroy faith; but many 
of the doctrines they teach, if they [Rome] were prosecuted to 
the utmost issue, would destroy good life,136 
For such theologians the practice of being one Church within a 
burgeoning multiplicity of conflicting doctrinal interpretation,13 7 and 
proliferation of sectarianism, contributed to a movement away from the 
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cognitivity of faith into the domain of the ethical. 
The positive intention implicit in this handling of the 
fundamentals tradition was not all gain. An increasing focus on 
practical Christianity could easily slip into a new form of moralism. 
In fact the foundation-superstructure motif appeared to encourage the 
view that Christianity could be reduced to the belief of a few 
essential articles of faith together with the practice of certain 
virtues that made for a good life. 
The fate of the fundamental articles tradition in seventeenth 
century Anglicanism was intimately tied up with more general 
developments in science and theology in which rational inquiry sought 
facts, evidences and certainties, and scrutinized inherited traditions 
with more confident zeal. Christian belief was sifted accordingly. 
What endured would, of necessity, be of high moral value. The quest for 
certainty and stability in an age of conflict and discovery was 
reflected in the fate of the fundamental articles tradition in 
Anglicanism. In its resolution, its orientation and ecclesial 
deploymentl38 the tradition, despite the efforts of some very able 
exponents, gradually hardened under the impact of late seventeenth 
century rationalism and moralism. One result was that the tradition 
became dislocated from wider Christian life, The serious problems this 
posed for the form and vitality of the tradition were taken up in a 
variety of ways from the late seventeenth century. Part Three of this 
thesis undertakes, by means of extended case studies, a more intensive 
examination of some of the more important strategies developed for 
handling the fundamental articles in the later history of the 
tradition. 
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THE LATER HISTORY OF THE TRADITION: 
Some Selected Case Studies 
Introduction: Aim and Method 
Following the introduction in Part One to the theme of fundamental 
articles in Anglicanism, Part Two of the thesis selectively traced the 
pre-history, early formation and seventeenth century developments in 
this tradition. 
In this way the theme has been located in relation to contemporary 
theology and the history of the Christian tradition. Chapters One to 
Four have provided an important point of departure for a more intensive 
engagement 
theology. 
with the theme of fundamental articles in Christian 
This is pursued in Part Three by analysis of the operation 
of the fundamental articles tradition through extended case studies on 
John Locke, Daniel Waterland and William Law. 
The three studies are drawn from the advent of Enlightenment 
thought in England in the later decades of the seventeenth century 
through to the middle of the eighteenth century. The case studies offer 
quite different responses to the new situation in which theology found 
itself with the increasing intrusion of Enlightenment rationalism. 
By concentrating on some quite specific case studies Part Three 
overcomes the limitation of Part Two by providing a richer 
understanding of the dynamics of the fundamentals tradition within 
particular theological and ecclesial contexts. The three strategies 
for handling the theme reveal themselves as different hermeneutics of 
the tradition each informed by quite particular and important pre-
suppositions concerning the presence and action of God in Church, 
society and human thought. 
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The methodology adopted in Part Three is thus designed to 
facilitate a fuller uncovering of the theological issues relevant to 
the theme of fundamental articles. An aim of Part Three of this study 
is to show how discussion of fundamental articles in Christianity is 
necessarily connected with the larger dynamic of Christian life in the 
Church and the world. 
Part Three concludes with a Chapter on important developments in 
the tradition in the nineteenth century and beyond. The historical 
material of Part Two and the case studies of Part Three provide the 
resources for a properly systematic treatment of the theme in Part 
Four. 
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RECONSTRUCTING THE FUNDAMENTALS TRADITION: 
The Significance of John Locke 
Introduction 
In late seventeenth century England John Locke's restatement of 
the fundamentals of the Christian faith "provided for many the locus 
classicus of the rationalistic reductionism of the eighteenth 
century". 1 This case study explores Locke's attempted reconstruction 
of the Christian tradition through an inquiry into his treatment of the 
fundamental articles of the faith. In doing so it elucidates Locke's 
seminal importance for the fate of the tradition of fundmental articles 
in modern Anglican theology and beyond. 
Theological concerns occupied both directly and indirectly a high 
proportion of Locke's published work,2 and indicated his understanding 
of the central significance of theology for all life and thought: 
There is, indeed, one science (as they are now distinguished) 
incomparably above all the rest, where it is not by corruption 
narrowed into a trade or faction, for mean or ill ends, and 
secular interests; I mean theology, which, containing the 
knowledge of God and his creatures, our duty to him and our 
fellow-creatures, and a view of our present and future state, is 
the comprehension of all other knowledge directed to its true end; 
i.e. the honour and veneration of the Creator, and the happiness 
of mankind. This is the noble study which is every man's duty, 
and everyone that can be called a rational creature is capable 
of . 3 
Furthermore,the Lockean scholar, John Yolton, has highlighted the 
rich theological context in which Locke developed his Essay concerning 
Human Understanding and illuminated its significance for religious 
thought in the eighteenth century,4 Yolton's work has been 
supplemented by more recent studies of Locke's religion and its 
context, especially in relation to Latitudinarianism, Socinianism and 
Deism.s Such studies indicate an attempt to move beyond earlier 
uncritical statements concerning Locke's doctrinal minimalism. 6 
Political theorists have called attention to the theological framework 
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as the real context of Locke's political thought. 7 
The interlacing themes of faith, reason and knowledge, as they 
occur in Book Four of Locke's Essay have, at least in more recent 
scholarship, provoked renewed inquiry and remain controversial in their 
theological implications.a However it has also been noted that studies 
of Locke's religious views have tended to concern themselves with the 
problems of the existence of God, faith and reason, or revelation and 
philosophy, and failed "to deal with the genuinely theological side of 
his [Locke's] thought''. 9 In this respect renewed attention has been 
devoted to Locke's doctrine of justification, and to the themes of law, 
freedom and sin in his writings,lO 
One result of recent inquiries into Locke's religious views has 
been a 
Locke's 
recognition of the centrality of 
philosophical and theological 
Christian 
writings,!! 
apologetics 
Yet it 
in 
is 
questionable to what extent this new sympathy for Locke's religious 
thought has uncovered the true significance of his theological 
programme, and its connection with Locke's wider concerns for science, 
epistemology and social life,l2 An adequate assessment of the quality 
of Locke's apology for Christianity remains on the theological agenda 
and forms part of the backdrop to this present inquiry. 
The context for Locke's religious thought was shaped in part by 
the impact of seventeenth century experimental science, which focussed 
more on the how than the why of things,l3 Priority was given here to 
observation, measurement and judgement. This 'experimental' approach 
accorded high value to the making of reliable human judgements, of 
weighing evidences, and identifying certain and sure foundations for 
knowledge. Experimentation and discovery went hand in hand with the 
quest for certainty, or at least the discovery of its conditions. 14 
The focus of this enterprise was man himself as the one who, in 
exercising reliable human judgements, was inevitably thrust into the 
position of receiver, processor and former of truth. This context was, 
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not surprisingly, ripe for the development of the science of 
epistemology as initiated by Descartes and developed by Locke,l5 
These developments were in large part shaped by a post-Renaissance 
view which conceived the world analogically as a machine.lS In this 
view the world was devoid of intelligence and life. Accordingly, the 
movements which the world exhibited were imposed from without, and 
"their regularity .... due to 'laws of nature' likewise imposed from 
without". 17 Mechanistic understandings of the workings of the world 
offered, among other things, the prospect of achieving a degree of 
understanding and control within an environment made increasingly 
complex through the burgeoning discoveries of experimental science,lB 
Emerging within this new attention to experimental knowledge, rational 
processes and mechanistic analogies was a more fundamental change. A 
sacramental conception of the universe - which presupposed an intrinsic 
meaningfulness in the structure and ordering of the world which was 
derived from God's presence and action - was being supplanted by more 
thoroughgoing naturalistic views. Important here was the tendency to 
treat materiality and its operations as simply there, available for 
human knowing, but without intrinsic meaning or purpose. This 
desacralizing process undermined hitherto assumed authorities for the 
ordering and bestowal of meaning,l9 
Locke's response to this new context constituted a major effort to 
refound science, morality and religion in such a way as to take account 
positively of these developments whilst attempting to remain faithful 
to his Christian inheritance. How this programme was developed in the 
field of religion is traced in this Chapter through Locke's handling of 
the theme of fundamental articles. Locke's attempt to reconstruct a 
positive statement of the Christian faith had close affinities with a 
doctrinal minimalism characteristic of Anglican latitudinarianism. 20 
Within this framework, and under the pressure of strong 
tendencies, what was fundamental was significantly thinned 
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Locke, however, a more dangerous dismantling of the tradition occurred. 
This was the result of the intrusion of an empiricism which was unable 
to move beyond the dispersed and particular as the location for what 
was considered interesting, informative and enriching for human life.21 
Accordingly theology, as a richly concentrated, informative 
communication of truth, was displaced by descriptive discourse that 
left Christian doctrine in a highly dispersed and unorganised form. In 
this context what was fundamental in Christianity, where it was 
located, and how it was to be communicated and contribute to social 
cohesion, underwent important and long-lasting modifications. These 
developments were reflected in Locke's handling of the fundamental 
articles tradition. His attempt to restate the covenant faith reveals 
itself as a failed effort in theological reconstruction; a development 
that soon became evident in the rise of Deism and the challenge to a 
Trinitarian doctrine of God. 
To explore these concerns this Chapter is divided into four parts. 
Part One concentrates on the background for Locke's development of the 
fundamentals tradition. Of crucial importance here is the mechanism of 
knowing as the epistemological presupposition for the tradition. This 
is considered in relation to Locke's Essay concerning Human 
Understanding. Part Two considers Locke's attempt to state positively 
the content of the covenant faith in the light of his epistQmology. The 
impact of Locke's empiricism upon the articles tradition is traced in 
Part Three in his controversy with Edward Stillingfleet and in his 
late-life's work on the New Testament Epistles. In Part Four 
consideration is given to Locke's understanding of the dynamics of 
ecclesial formation, paying particular attention to the 
toleration and trust. 
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PART 1 RECONSTRUCTING KNOWLEDGE: Epistemological Presuppositions 
for the Tradition 
What Locke had to say about the Christian faith belonged to a 
larger framework of thought in which the problem of knowledge - its 
origin, forms and appropriation - was a major issue. Accordingly, a 
brief examination of the epistemology of Locke's Essay concerning Human 
Understanding will provide important clues for an understanding of his 
handling of the fundamental articles tradition. 
The problem of the generation and formation of knowledge was 
primarily, in Locke's view, a question of how the knowing process 
worked. To ask about the how of the process was the logic of a 
mechanistic framework which had regard for 'natural' causation and the 
field of 'efficient causes and Matter' as means to explain the truth 
of things.22 The way the issue of truth and knowledge was expressed 
indicated "a general transference of interest from metaphysics to 
physics, from the contemplation of Being to the observation of 
Becoming",2 3 As Locke inferred in the Essay's 'Epistle to the Reader', 
inquiry into the principles of morality and revealed religion could not 
be usefully prosecuted without a necessary detour, "to examine our own 
Abilities, and see, what Objects our Understanding were, or were not 
fitted to deal with",24 Thus the 'how of things' resolved itself into 
a question of the human agent as knower. An inquiry began which was 
aimed at uncovering and analysing the structure and process of human 
understanding with a view to identifying "the original, Certainty, and 
Extent of human knowledge; together, with the Grounds and Degrees of 
Belief, Opinion and Assent " 25 The aim was to set down 
"Measures of the Certainty of our Knowledge",26 
To know the how of things was of great practical moment, checking 
the unwarranted overconfidences of human beings2 7 and countering a 
kind of incipient scepticism which would emerge as humankind, in a 
confused pursuit of truth, finally despaired of knowing anything. 28 
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It was a matter of finding the 'horizon' which "sets the Bounds 
between the enlightened and dark Parts of Things ",29 with the object 
of right conduct rather than abundance of opinions,JO Locke 
approached the problem of knowledge from the point of view of the 
physiology of the human understanding.Jl This made it almost 
inevitable that the truth of things, in order to attain the status of 
human knowledge, would resemble a product obtained from the processes 
by which the mind received and interpreted data. 
Experience, Ideas and the Way of Knowledge 
The mechanism of knowing presupposed a reality, a world external 
to human beings, which was available to be known - what Locke called 
that 'vast Ocean of Being',32 The truth and goodness of things began 
not in the mind but in nature and history in their particularity,3 3 
This was absolutely central for Locke. It presupposed a thoroughgoing, 
if somewhat crude and undifferentiated realismf-1 which formed the 
basis of his empiricist philosophy. The matter was focussed in Locke's 
concept of experience as the foundation, in the sense of the 
'original', of all knowledge. 35 This inclusive category to denote the 
source of all knowledge was further specified by Locke to include a 
double aspect; sensation and reflection. In sensation the senses, 
conversant about particular sensible Objects, do convey into the 
Mind, several distinct Perceptions of things, according to those 
various ways, wherein those Objects do affect them This 
great source, of most of the Ideas we have, depending wholly 
upon our senses, and derived by them to the Understanding, I 
call SENSATION,36 
In reflection the mind, 
turns its view inward upon itself, and observes its own Actions 
about those Ideas it has, takes from thence other Ideas, which 
are as capable to be the Objects of its Contemplation, as any of 
those it received from foreign things 3 7 
Thus, whilst sensation concerned external objects {particular sensible 
objects), reflection was concerned with the internal operations of the 
mind. This latter source of ideas "every Man has wholly in himself". 38 
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Experience was constituted by reference to an external and internal 
sensing operation. Experience was where "all our Ideas take their 
beginnings",39 It was the 'Fountain' of knowledge "from whence all 
the Ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring". 4 0 Experience was 
the primary location for the richness of reality from which the raw 
materials of knowledge were gleaned. 
In the particularity of experience ideas became present to the 
mind. It was ideas which constituted the 'materials' of all knowledge. 
The term 'idea' was used by Locke "to stand for whatsoever is the 
Object of the Understanding when a Man thinks .•. ".41 It was thus an 
inclusive term to express "whatever is meant by Phantasm, Notion, 
Species or whatever it is, which the Mind can be employed about in 
thinking ",42 Such ideas gained entrance to the understanding 
through the 'inlet' of experience. Ideas in the understanding were 
'coeval with sensation'; sensation being "such an impression or Motion, 
made in some part of the Body, as produces some Perception in the 
Understanding ..... ". 43 However, 
In time, the Mind comes to reflect on its own Operations, about 
the Ideas got by Sensation, and thereby stores itself with a new 
set of Ideas, which I call Ideas of Reflection,44 
There was a strong hint here that ideas of sensation and reflection 
were generically related. Ideas gleaned through sensation seemed to 
function as the catalyst for the formation of ideas of reflection,45 
Their origin in experience was critical. 
The way of experience was the way of the 'historical plain 
method'46 which could provide surer foundations for knowledge and 
certainty,47 Knowledge began with attention to what was given in 
experience,48 In this attending mode the passive mind simply received 
the 'simple ideas' offered to it. It could no more refuse to receive 
what was imprinted, nor 'blot-out' and create new 'impressions', "than 
a mirror can refuse, alter or obliterate the Images or Ideas, which the 
Objects set before it, do therein produce". 4 9 
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In Locke's view experience was something which confronted an 
individual and was passively registered 6y him or her. It may have 
been a distorted or overly restricted notion of experience but, as 
one commentator has noted, it "emerges from the legitimate 
epistemological interest in the given, the reality which is unfalsified 
by human influence". 5 0 Locke's view of the beginning of all knowledge 
supposed that truth and goodness5 1 were not given neat and formed in 
the mind, as taught in the theory of innate ideas,52 but were generated 
in and through experience. 
From experience the raw materials of knowledge in its first form 
(i.e. simple ideas) were acquired. Once received, the stock of simple 
ideas could be complexified by the power of the mind to gather, relate 
and abstract. 53 Locke seemed to envisage the possibility of the mind's 
unlimited potential for active reflection a sort of infinite 
mirroring process 54 - in relation to the simple ideas given in sense 
data. What resulted was a vast store of ideas constructed by the mind 
in which high level abstractions could be traced back to, and thus 
identified as, the products of simple ideas. In this way the complex 
ideas of power, freedom, beauty, infinity, eternity, and even the idea 
of 'a god' could, by a process of induction, be shown to be derived 
from simple ideas given in experience.ss 
Experience provided the location for the generation of the mind's 
simple ideas; the constructive mind was responsible for the 
increase in complexity of the initial input. However ideas were not 
knowledge itself, but rather its 'Instruments, or Materials',56 
Precisely because ideas were the mind's only immediate objects, "our 
knowledge", said Locke, "is only conversant about them",5 7 The 
movement from ideas to knowledge constituted the final phase of the 
mechanism of knowing. 
Ideas may not have constituted knowledge in Locke's strict sense 
of the latter term but they did constitute a necessary moment in the 
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dynamic of knowledge. The mechanism of knowing required, for its 
completion, the assigning of value to the field of ideas. Here it was 
a question of the kind of activity involved in knowing that determined 
the relative status to be accorded to ideas and hence their claim to 
the status of knowledge. In this respect Locke spoke of three ways of 
perception - intuitive, demonstrative and sensitive. Each afforded a 
different degree of knowledge,58 Intuitive knowledge was irresistible 
for "1 ike the bright sunshine, [it] forces itself immediately to be 
perceived''. 59 The discursive operations of reason did not intrude. 
Such knowledge was the basis for "all the Certainty and Evidence of all 
our Knowledge",60 Demonstrative knowledge involved both intuition and 
discursive reasoning, the latter contributing to the lack of 'lustre 
and full assurance' in this knowledge. 61 Locke's reference to the 
category of sensitive knowledge underscored his view that what was 
perceived and processed by the mind did really pertain to the real 
existence of other things. 62 This was simply for him a fact of 
experience. The alternative was thoroughgoing scepticism. 
Probability and Reliable Human Judgements 
The results of Locke's analysis of ideas and ways of knowing were 
not particularly encouraging,63 The 'few and narrow Inlets' for 
knowledge did not seem particularly well equipped to handle the 'vast 
Ocean of Being',64 In the intellectual world knowledge with highest 
certainty was located in mathematics which attained the idea that other 
disciplines aspired to without chance of success,65 In the material 
world human knowledge extended as far as an intuitive knowledge of 
one's own existence, a demonstrative knowledge of God's existence and a 
sensitive knowledge of the external world which faded into the region 
of probabilities. This was simply a 'fact of life'. "For the state we 
are at present in, not being that of Vision, we must, in many things, 
content ourselves with Faith and probability",66 
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The nature of the world, as it appeared to the human agent was, it 
seemed, of probabilistic status. That there was a vast richness to 
reality Locke never doubted. The truth of this reality came to its 
form for the knower in part as real and certain knowledge, but 
otherwise in the form of probabilities, defined by Locke as 
likeliness to be true, the very notation of the Word 
such a Proposition, for which there be Arguments or 
make it pass or be received as true.67 
signifying 
proofs, to 
The region of probabilities was the region of human judgement 
that faculty given by God to man ''to supply the want of clear and 
certain knowledge in cases where that cannot be had",68 The 'grounds' 
upon which probability judgements were made were twofold; "the 
conformity of anything with our own Knowledge, Observation, and 
Experience" and "The Testimony of others",69 Here, relevant 
considerations included the number, integrity, and skill of the 
witnesses, the 'design of the author' where the testimony came from a 
book), the consistency of the parts, circumstances of the relation and 
contrary testimonies. In his treatment of probability Locke was also 
providing a rationale for his appeal to Scripture revelation grounded 
upon the credit of the proposer as coming from God.70 
The mind proceeded rationally as it examined all the grounds of 
probability. Reason was thus the fuel which propelled the mind through 
to the judgement. 71 Where reason didn't operate the mind was entirely 
directionless and arbitrary in its assessments. In human judgement the 
dynamic of the mechanism of knowing had come to its term. 
Locke painted a picture of a world of probabilities in which the 
human task was to make high quality judgements as close to certainty as 
possible. This operation involved the finite operations of human 
reason with its attendant dangers of error.72 The further the 
movement away from the particularities of experience (i.e. by 
reflection), the further the move from the realm of certainty into the 
region of probability.73 Probability was the logic of finitude in most 
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areas. Recognition that this was in fact the human predicament was 
true wisdom. Accordingly, it was a properly responsible position, 
sufficient for the chief ends for which mankind existed; worship of God 
and right performance of one's duties. 
However there was a problem in Locke's gospel of probability. Was 
it reliable? Could human subjects actually make reliable human 
judgements? If not, then in the practical matters of life mankind was 
without direction and decision making was entirely arbitrary. Locke 
seemed to be of the opinion that reliable judgements could be made and 
the necessities of life could be humbly and confidently embraced 
because this was the way Locke appeared to envisage human participation 
in the reality given by God. As God had set some things in 'broad day-
light' of which certain knowledge was possible, 
So in the greatest part of our Concernment, he has afforded us 
only the twilight, as I may so say, of Probability, suitable, I 
presume, to that State of Mediocrity and Probationership, he has 
been pleased to place us in here; wherein to check our over-
confidence .... and liableness to Error; the Sense whereof might be 
a constant Admonition to us, to spend the days of this our 
Pilgrimage with Industry and Care, in the search, and following of 
that way, which might lead us to a State of greater Perfection.i4 
In other words, the very fact that the environment for human life was 
largely one of probability was no reason for scepticism nor mistrust. 
This was simply the way God meant it to be and He who so ordered it in 
this way could be trusted to supply human agents with those capacities 
requisite for living responsibly. The supposition seemed to be that God 
gave people what they could understand. This view found some support 
in Locke's argument that God had given the faculty of judgement for 
humans to live within a probabilistic world.75 
Human judgements, it seemed, were trusworthy. Locke did not make 
it entirely clear why this might be so. The above text gives some 
warrant for the view that Locke's confidence in the process of human 
judgement was derived from his conviction of the essential 
trustworthiness of God. Such a trust may have been conditioned by a 
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belief in God that Locke had tied to the mind's judging operations. 7 6 
Faith itself had likewise been linked to the mind's operations: as a 
form of trust it represented a judgement of highest quality,77 
The human subject was not, from this perspective, an autonomous 
rational agent subject to his or her own arbitrary whims and fancies. 
Rather the human subject appeared to be directly authenticated by the 
Divine. Such a view presupposed that human thinking was nothing less 
than the Divine thinking through human thought. This suggested that a 
godly human life was one in which reliable judgements were made. Locke 
seemed to be searching for a way of bringing the form of human 
judgement into correspondence with the wisdom of God. 
The Human Agent as Former of Truth 
There was, however, a problem with this kind of correspondence. 
The movement from knowledge through to judgement involved a successive 
series of reflections upon the datum of experience,78 Inevitabl~ in 
this process of stimulus-response the focus was increasingly trained on 
the activity of reflection, and the initial stimulus could not but 
recede into the background.79 
In the reflective process human beings received input and 
transformed it into products. In this way truth in its richness was 
drawn down into some manageable form,80 In this process there occurred 
a progressive disengagement of the knowing subject from what was given 
for reflection. The result was a highly purified form of the truth, 
which seemed to require a culling-off of what was considered 
extraneous to the field of knowledge. Absent in this process was any 
recognition that human capacities could be formed by what was received. 
The human agent in Locke,s quasi-mechanistic account of knowing was 
primarily a former of truth rather than one formed by truth. Highly 
significant in this respect was the fact that the active power of the 
human mind, though clearly recognised by Locke, was relegated to an 
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inferior status· 81 The more the mind intruded into the process of 
knowing, the further the movement into the region of probabilities and 
away from certainties. 
Locke's physiology of knowing seemed to offer an inadequate 
account of human participation in knowledge. 8 2 This was the logic of 
the mechanistic philosophy which, as observed earlier, sought stability 
and order and the elimination of the arbitrary and surprising,83 This 
required being highly selective as to the origins of knowledge. It 
also generated a high focus on boundary making between, for example, 
knowledge and opinion, certainty and probability, the mind passive and 
active, faith and reason, and natural and supernatural reality. In this 
schema God became the mechanistic backdrop, the indispensible 
hypothesis. As Basil Willey noted, ''Newton's Machine needed a 
mechanic". 84 Locke's God was the initiator of the natural process of 
the world, a somewhat remote, albeit benevolent, imposer and guarantor 
of the order of things. At another level Locke's schema presupposed a 
quiet particular form of God's presence in the activity of human reason 
and judgement. This was why Locke could speak of reason as natural 
revelation and revelation in its natural form as reason,B5 The 
implication was that in reason the presence of God was immanentised and 
naturalised. This view seemed to offer the possibility of 
human ordering of empirical reality. 
reliable 
Locke's physiology of knowing consisted, it seemed, of a series of 
filters, the last of which was reason, "the Last Judge and Guide in 
every Thing",86 The knowing process suggested a progressive 
restriction upon what might be justifiably claimed as knowledge. 
Explanation of things was tacitly identified with justification of 
knowledge,B7 In Locke's scheme, to determine 'how one knows' was in 
fact to stipulate where knowledge came from and what could be known. 
The restrictions Locke placed upon the origin, process and scope of 
knowledge were mirrored in his treatment of the Christian faith. 
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PART II THE RATIONAL FORM OF CHRISTIANITY: The Covenant of Faith 
Religion in the Essay: Criteria for Faith 
Locke's argument for the reasonableness of Christianity began, 
strictly speaking, in Book Four of the Essay.BB To this extent Locke's 
treatment of faith was already subject to a methodological constraint 
since for him it was a question of showing that faith was compatible 
with reason and so could not harm it. As one commentator has remarked 
"Reason is assumed, and room must be made for faith".B9 This was the 
logic of the epistemology of the Essay and implicit here were further 
lines of demarcation between faith, reason and knowledge. 
In Locke's view faith, unlike reason, did not provide knowledge 
but rather, as a form of trust, belonged to a category other than that 
of 'the certainty of knowledge',90 The reason was that in terms of 
Lockean epistemology, faith did not have its origins in the natural 
faculties of sensation and reflection, i.e. in experience as defined by 
Locke. Accordingly 1 faith could not be considered a candidate for 
knowledge. Faith constituted the mode of access to those matters that 
could not be derived by reason from experience,91 As one commentator 
has remarked, 
Locke's solution to the problem of creating a niche for faith in a 
world increasingly dominated by science was to remove it 
[faith] from the realm of knowledge altogether.92 
Did faith then belong to the region of probability? It would seem so 
since it did involve judgement issuing in 'a firm Assent of the 
Mind'.93 Yet if this was the case, then for Locke faith entailed a high 
quality judgement, an assent of highest probability, the most reliable 
of all judgements- 'an Assent founded on the highest reason',94 Here, 
assent was not based upon the deductions of reason "but upon the Credit 
of the Proposer, as coming from GOD •.• ",95 whose testimony was worthy 
of highest trust. Faith then could not issue in knowledge but did 
represent a high probability judgement, objectively grounded in the 
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testimony of one who "cannot deceive, nor be deceived, and that is of 
God himself",9 6 
Insofar as faith remained a matter of responsible human judgement, 
Locke argued that it had to be found reasonable according to the 
principles of reason. A revelation from God, although it belonged to 
matters 'above reason', could not be contrary to reason otherwise 
reason ( i.e. revelation in its natural form) would be in opposition to 
revelation as given directly by God, 97 That which was 'above reason' 
in its origins had nevertheless to be open to the scrutiny of reason, 
the 'last judge and guide in every thing'. Faith "can never convince 
us of any Thing, that contradicts our Knowledge". 98 Thus objectively, 
faith left no room for 'Doubt or Hesitation'. 
Only we must be sure, that it be a divine Revelation, and that we 
understand it right our Assent can be rationally no higher 
than the Evidence of its being a Revelation, and that this is the 
meaning of the Expressions it is delivered in,99 
The assent of faith, subjectively considered,100 was determined in 
relation to proofs, evidences and grounds extraneous to the thing 
believed. 101 Into this category of external signs vouching for divine 
revelation Locke placed miracles,l02 The Scripture as the 'written 
Word of GOD without us'l03 would seem to come into this category also, 
though this remained unsubstantiated by Locke. He simply took it as 
an accepted fact that Scripture was "attested Revelation and we may 
safely receive it for true",l04 Whenever it seemed that the question 
of the criterion for revealed truths arose Locke simply referred to two 
marks or rules for judgement; 
the rule of reason with its "principles" (which he [Locke] 
not specify) and/or the rule of the word of God, 
Scriptures, lOS 
does 
the 
Faith, in its subjective mode, was thus 'a firm Assent of the Mind' 
properly regulated by reason operating in relation to certain criteria 
external to the object of faith,l06 Reason, in judging of the 
authenticity of a revelation had, it seemed, to have 'marks' by which 
it could not be mistaken. This condition was met when such marks were 
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"e_xtrinsical to the Persuasions themselves" ,10 7 
Locke's handling of faith and reason was designed to counter the 
enthusiast who knew a revelation was of God "by the light it 
[revelation] brings with it, which shines bright in their Minds, and 
they cannot resist",l08 Locke's criteria for faith functioned to 
eliminate certain supposed claims to revelation. 10 9 In this clearing 
operation one was left with genuine matters of faith, i.e. pertaining 
to things above reason. Such revelation, "where God has been pleased 
to give it, must carry it [revelation], against the probable 
Conjectures of Reason."llO In this way Locke had identified the 
province of legitimate revelation i.e. concerning things 'above 
reason'- with the word of God in Scripture. 
Reason operated as the faculty through which a pure form of faith 
was made possible. Purity was objectively grounded in God and what he 
revealed. But for human beings to be fully responsible their assents 
had to be pure, unmixed with notions contrary to their God-given 
faculties. In this sense reason appeared as the arbiter for assents to 
claims 'above reason'. What receded into the background in this 
purification process was the contribution of the grace of God to the 
forming of human faith. Locke's empiricism meant that faith could not 
provide knowledge, his rationalism controlled those assents in which 
faith was justified. 
The Fundaaental Articles of the Covenant: The Reasonableness of 
Christianity 
In 
doctrine 
The Reasonableness of Christianity Locke 
of justification,lll In doing so he spelt 
expounded 
out what 
his 
was 
included within the covenant of saving faith,ll2 Given the formal 
structure of faith outlined in the Essay, it was incumbent upon Locke 
to depict a 'safe' content for faith. In the interests of 
epistemological consistency he had to ensure that what was assented to 
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in faith did not 'spill over' into matters 'contrary to reason'. That 
which was 'above reason' had to remain reasonable. This was the logic 
of the epistemology of the Essay,113 
It was not clear, however, from the Essay how reason was meant to 
operate within matters of faith. It did seem that the 'Principles of 
Reason' were intended to scrutinise that other external measure - the 
word of God in Scripture - when the 'what' of that revelation was being 
considered. 114 Reason was not only to regulate faith's assent on the 
basis of evidence, but also to regulate 'what' was assented to; 
presumably "by some Marks which Reason cannot be mistaken in",llS It 
was not surprising therefore that the 'Historical, plain Method' of the 
Essay was transferred into the region of faith. Thus Locke referred to 
the Scriptures as 
A collection of writings, designed by God, for the instruction of 
the illiterate bulk of mankind, in the way of salvation; and 
therefore, generally, and in necessary points, to be understood in 
the plain direct meaning of the words and phrases: such as they 
may be supposed to have had in the mouths of the speakers, who 
used them according to the language of that time and country 
wherein they lived; without such learned, artificial, and forced 
senses of them, as are sought out, and put upon them, in most of 
the systems of divinity, according to the notions that each one 
has been bred up in,116 
This method was designed to undercut the accretions to Christianity 
associated with the development of 'particular creeds and systems'.ll 7 
Safety and purity were to be achieved by a return to the 'facts' as 
they originally offered themselves, i.e. a return to the 'plain direct 
meaning' of the Scriptures. The truth of faith for the individual began 
as Scripture revelation was received in its simplicity; unadorned, 
unforced and divested of any artificiality. It was a method entirely in 
accord with the empiricism of the Essay. This was the method to uncover 
what in fact had been revealed, that Jesus was the Messiah. This was 
the only belief proposed in the New Testament for a justifying and 
saving faith.11s As such it constituted 'the fundamental article of 
his [Christ's] Church',119 the 'only gospel-article of faith'120 
required to be explicitly believed to make one a Christian and open an 
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individual to that full freedom given in relation to God.121 
This belief presupposed what had been required before the 
revelation of the gospel, i.e. "belief of one invisible, eternal, 
omnipotent God, maker of heaven and earth, etc.". 122 Yet belief that 
Jesus was the Messiah was a requirement consequent upon the fall of 
Adam from original righteousness. In the fall humankind 'lost bliss 
and immortality'. 123 By the coming of the Messiah the human race was 
redeemed from its lost state and restored to life eternal.l24 Insofar 
as Jesus' resurrection was "a mark and undoubted evidence of his being 
the Messiah" it was "commonly required to be believed as a necessary 
article, and sometimes solely insisted on" and was "necessary now to be 
believed by those who would receive him as the Messiah",l25 
To believe this article of faith included repentance and a life of 
obedience to the laws of the Messianic kingdom. The faith which 
justified was insufficient for salvation if it remained a bare faith 
showing no sign of a sincere desire to live a righteous life. The 
Christian covenant in which redemption was won included the necessity 
of faith and good works. "It is not enough to believe him to be the 
Messiah unless we also obey his laws, and take him to be our king to 
reign over us",l26 
Locke's statement of the covenant faith had been developed in 
relation to other recent efforts of Continental Protestants.l27 The 
covenant motif was already important in English theology but what was 
significant in Locke's presentation was his focus on the conditional 
nature of the Christian covenant,128 Locke's strong statement of 
saving belief was developed in relation to a moral imperative that 
included repentance and godly life. He was drawing upon a well 
established tradition of covenantal thinking but developing it in a way 
quite different from Calvinist and Puritan thought.l29 
In Locke's depiction of the content of Christianity, what was 
revealed was 'safe' because it was intelligible. 
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the intelligibility of attested revelation was guaranteed by God. This 
supposed that God gave to humankind what could be understood. 
Scripture revelation encouraged this view when it was treated according 
to the historical plain method, because this method yielded a certain 
'matter of factness'. What was revealed could, it seemed, be more or 
less 'read-off' from the Scripture narrative,130 Locke summarised the 
story of redemption thus: 
God, out of the infiniteness of his mercy, has dealt with man, 
as a compassionate and tender Father. He gave him reason, and 
with it a law .•. But, considering the frailty of man, apt to run 
into corruption and misery, he promised a Deliverer, whom in his 
good time he sent; and then declared to all mankind, that whoever 
would believe .him to be the Saviour promised, and take him 
now raised from the dead, and constituted the Lord and Judge of 
all men, to be their King and Ruler, should be saved .. ",131 
This was 'a plain intelligible proposition', accessible to all 
people regardless of capacity. Incarnational doctrine was here 
naturalised. Jesus Christ was the centre point in a historical 
process. In the man Jesus what had been anticipated in history had now 
been realised. The authentication of his Messiahship belonged to that 
history, It was focussed in the New Testament accounts of the life and 
preaching of Jesus and the first Apostles. 
The Messiahship of Jesus was shown by the miracles he 
performed.132 Locke referred to them as 'matters of fact',133 The 
indirect phrases used by Jesus (e.g. the Kingdom of Heaven) signified 
to the Jews that the times of the Messiah had arrived. The 'plain and 
direct' words of the Apostles after the resurrection confirmed the 
above .claim.134 Such words, actions and purity of life bestowed upon 
Christ and his Apostles 'credit and authority', and evoked trust that 
Jesus was the Messiah come 'from heaven in the power of God'.135 
The intelligibility or 'inner consistency'l36 of Christianity 
also involved a reference beyond the story of salvation in Scripture. 
Implicit in The Reasonableness of Christianity was the idea that the 
Scripture revelation provided a solution to a more generally recognised 
need for redemption. The human experience of moral shortcoming and 
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incapacity to live righteously witnessed, at least tacitly, to the 
need for a saviour. 137 In this way the intelligibility of redemption 
in history was strengthened by the wider natural human context. 
In Locke's account of Christianity what was fundamental was 
located in the historical process. It was focussed in the life of a 
particular man authenticated by God as the Messiah through certain 
external signs. The plain direct meaning of these facts WQS, presented 
in the Scripture text. Locke's attention was trained on the 
particularities of history but he was not so clearly able to identify 
its translucence to the transcendent. For example, the filial relation 
of Christ to the Father was primarily developed in terms of the 
'evidence' this gave that Christ was the Messiah sent by God,138 One 
'advantage' of Jesus Christ was the promise of assistance in living 
virtuously though the agency of the Holy Spirit. 139 Under the pressure 
of Locke's naturalizing of faith the conventional form of Trinitarian 
and Incarnational doctrine had been considerably flattened out. 
The Siaplification of Faith: The Locke - Edwards Controversy 
Locke's reductionist view of Christianity led him into a lengthy 
dispute 
problem 
with the Calvinist Anglican, 
here concerned the extent 
John Edwards (1637-1716),140 The 
to which Locke's position 
represented a legitimate manoeuvre within Christianity and the extent 
to which it constituted a dissolution of the Christian tradition. Was 
Locke's reasonable Christianity an orthodox simplification or a 
simplification of orthodoxy? 
From Edwards' perspective Locke's form of Christianity had all the 
hallmarks of Socinianism and provided the fertile soil for the 
development of Deism and the spread of Atheism. Edwards discerned 
these tendencies in Locke's handling of the doctrines of justification 
and atonement. Particularly important here was Locke's espousal of a 
moralist view of justification in which faith itself was imputed as 
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righteousness, and obedience was coupled to faith for justification,141 
Edwards thought Locke must have derived this view from the Anglican, 
Jeremy Taylor. 142 Insofar as this view undercut the imputation of 
Christ's righteousness to the believer, Christ's death was removed from 
any integral connection with salvation. Edwards argued that Locke's 
reduction of Christianity to belief in the Messiah made Christ's 
satisfaction unnecessary. Accordingly Locke " gave proof of his being 
Socinianiz'd by his utter silence about Christ's satisfying for us, and 
purchasing salvation by virtue of his Death",143 
Locke's dissolution of what Edward's considered fundamental tenets 
of Christianity suggested a dangerous simplification of orthodoxy. By 
way of defence Locke reasserted the main thrust of The Reasonableness 
of Christianity, offered a more thorough treatment of the atonement, 
and exposed the weaknesses of Edwards' own position. Filtering through 
his vindications was a concern to establish his position as a 
legitimate orthodox simplification. The issue came to focus in Locke's 
discussion of fundamental articles. Locke, following Chillingworth, 
stated, "I hope it is no derogation to the christian religion, to say, 
that the fundamentals of it, is easy to be understood by all men",144 
The assumption here was that what God required as necessary 
belief God would plainly declare,145 Locke argued "If fundamentals are 
to be known, easy to be known, (as, without doubt, they are) then a 
catalogue may be given of them",146 But such a catalogue could not be 
successfully achieved 'upon the usual grounds',147 It was 
important to distinguish clearly between what belief was 'required to 
make a man a Christian' and what belief was 'required of a 
Christian',148 The former was 'essential' belief, the latter 
'integral', signifying "such parts as the thing can be without, but 
without them will not be so complete and entire as with them",l49 
Edwards had failed to make this distinction. Locke's concern was with 
the former. This accounted for his focus on the early preaching of 
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Jesus and the apostles in the Gospels and Acts of the Apostles. Here 
the one article proposed for belief unto salvation was plainly 
declared. No 'explication' of this article was necessary: 
I think it may be doubted, whether any articles, which need 
men's explications, can be so clearly and certainly understood, as 
one which is made so very plain by the scripture itself, as 
not to need any explication at all. Such is this, that Jesus is 
the Messiah.1so 
By contrast;Edwards' articles required explication, were capable 
of competing interpretations and disputation, and some of them 'contain 
mysteries'.1 51 This ran counter to Locke's position for it supposed 
that "it is necessary for many men to believe what is not intelligible 
to them ... ".152 Such a position was not possible for Locke. 
For that which can be comprehended by every day labourer, every 
poor spinster, that is a member of the church, cannot be a 
mystery. And if what such illiterate people cannot understand be 
required to be believed, to make them christians, the greatest 
part of mankind are shut out from being christians.153 
In Locke's view a faith accessible to all had to possess a certain 
self-evident quality. 
As men, we have God for our King, and are under the law of 
reason, as christians, we have Jesus the Messiah for our King, 
and are under the law revealed by him in the gospel.l54 
This was the fundamental faith in a nutshell. The fundamental article 
for making people Christians presupposed belief in God, and included 
certain 'concomitant' articles; those events necessarily associated 
with Jesus' Messiahship, i.e. resurrection, ascension and coming 
judgement. To deny these was to deny the fundamental article.lSS 
Locke argued that Edwards' doctrine of the 'satisfaction made by 
Christ', did not belong to the fundamental articles of the Christian 
religion. The word 'satisfaction' did not appear in the New Testament. 
It was not an article laid down by Christ and the apostles as being 
essential to be believed in order to be a Christian, it was not 
included in the Apostles' Creed and therefore, said Locke, "I could not 
put it into my Christianity as delivered in the Scripture".l56 Locke 
did acknowledge that Christ was 'offered up', fulfilling a sacrificial 
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work of redemption,157 but this would have fallen short of what 
Edwards' Calvinism required. 
Locke's discussion of fundamentals was developed in relation to a 
quite specific concern; to determine what explicit belief was necessary 
to make a person a Christian. Any distinction between fundamentals and 
non-fundamentals had no relevance apart from that particular concern. 
The reason for Locke was clear: all divine revelation given by God was 
a matter of faith, and necessary to be believed by all Christians to 
whom it was proposed.l58 Thus he could argue that Christ had taught 
a great many other truths, for the explaining this fundamental 
article of the law of faith, that Jesus is the Messiah; some 
whereof have a nearer, and some a more remote connexion with it, 
and so cannot be denied by any christian, who sees the connexion, 
or knows they are so taught ...• All these truths taught us from 
God, either by reason or revelation, are of great use, to 
enlighten our minds, confirm our faith, stir up our affections, 
etc. And the more we see of them, the more we shall see, admire 
and magnify the wisdom, goodness, mercy and love of God, in the 
work of our redemption. This will oblige us to search and study 
the scripture, wherein it is contained and laid open to us.159 
In this sense all articles of faith were fundamental. All 
doctrines delivered by Christ were true; to deny any one of them was to 
deny Christ's Messiahship and thus forfeit one's salvation.160 The 
list of fundamentals expanded as each person's understanding was 
enlightened. What was required was 
an explicit belief of all those propositions which he, according 
to the best of his understanding, really apprehends to be 
contained and meant in the scripture; and implicit belief of all 
the rest, which he_is ready to believe, as soon as it shall please 
God, upon his use of the means, to enlighten him, and make them 
clear to his understanding,161 
From this point of view everyone was orthodox in their own eyesl62 and 
had their own distinct catalogue of fundamentals; "nobody can fix it 
for him; no body can collect or prescribe it to another",163 Two 
implications followed. Firstly, the attempt by Edwards to enumerate a 
true and complete catalogue of fundamentals was a purely arbitrary 
activity, and was doomed to failure.164 Such systems or creeds, the 
'inventions of men', resulted in a 'narrowing' of Christianity and 
contributed to a fragmented and bloody society,l65 
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Secondly, each person had to take personal responsibility for what 
he or she believed. The alternative was to allow one's faith to be 
impoverished and imprisoned in ignorance by the 'creed-makers' and 
systematizers of religion,166 This could not be countenanced, "for I 
assure you no-body can rob you of your God, but by your own consent, 
nor spoil you of any of the articles of your faith",167 
Locke, following Chillingworth, advocated a diligent search for 
fundamentals in that place "where God has placed them, in the holy 
scripture, and take them as he has framed and fashioned them there",168 
In the Scripture the fundamentals were always to be found 'safe and 
sound'. Thus a rightly formed belief entailed a progress from the 
foundation into the 'superstructure' of faith, from fundamentals into 
the things of 'perfection'.169 
Important in the argument with Edwards was Locke's claim that his 
position was not a departure from but rather aligned with traditional 
orthodoxy. He was referring to the Apostolic Creed of the early Church 
as the sufficient confession for baptism into the Church. Locke 
described this creed as an 'abridgement' of apostolic faith. Such an 
abridgement or abstract of anything was 
The whole in little; and if it be of a science or doctrine, the 
abridgement consists in the essential or necessary parts of it 
contracted into a narrower compass than where it lies diffused 
in the ordinary way of delivery, amongst a great number of 
transitions, explanations, illustrations, proofs, reasonings, 
corollaries etc,170 
This abridgement had been a sufficient rule of faith in the primitive 
church. Furthermore, it had been appealed to by Anglican divines in 
theological disputes and enshrined in the baptismal practice of the 
Church of England. Locke did not hesitate to identify this 'rule' with 
his own short formula. 
How little different the Faith of the ancient church was, from 
the Faith I have mentioned; may be seen in the words of 
Tertullion: Regula Fidei una omnino et, sola, immobilis,111 
Locke's own short formula (i.e. the one gospel-article of faith) 
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was thus 'the whole in a little': not a simplification of orthodoxy but 
an orthodox simplification.l72 
Edwards' comprehensively worked out faith, undergirded by an 
inherited metaphysic, was incompatible with Locke's latitudinarian 
stance. Edwards considered that this latter position dissolved the 
foundation and content of belief. Yet Locke had presented a quite 
different kind of faith; one which was responsible, with apparently 
strong roots in the Christian tradition. If it was reductionist, it 
was in a form that appeared to encourage a healthy and inclusive 
Christianity. It seemed that Locke's depiction of the fundamentals was 
a legitimate manoeuvre within the fundamentals tradition. 
At one level the Locke - Edwards controversy continued a long 
running debate in seventeenth century Anglicanism between conservative 
Calvinist/Puritan and Arminian/Latitudinarian elements.l 73 That Jesus 
was the Messiah was the plain fact of the gospel; it was supported by 
evidences and grounded in trustworthy testimony. This was rational 
Christianity. It was intelligible, it did not involve belief in 
mysteries, and it did not require explication to uncover meaning. 
Locke's paring down of the faith had drawn into theological form the 
epistemology developed in the Essay,114 
Locke's simplification of belief raised a further question about 
the status of doctrine per se. What was greatly simplified was the 
nature of fundamental articles , where they were located and how they 
were to be communicated. To attend to Locke's reconstruction of the 
tradition at this level is to raise more sharply the impact of Lockean 
empiricism upon his theological endeavour. 
PART III REFORMING DOCTRINE: The Significance of Lockean Eapiricisa 
Froa Systea to Text: The Locke - Stillingfleet Controversy 
Relevant here is Locke's extended debate with the Bishop of 
Worcester, Edward Stillingfleet.175 At one level the issue was not 
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dissimilar to the Edwards - Locke dispute. Stillingfleet considered 
that Locke's reductionism in the faith would encourage a rising 
religious scepticism and provide fuel for unitarian and anti-
Trinitarian interests, if not atheism. His critique was neither 
impulsive nor ill-considered, and has given grounds for one writer to 
describe Stillingfleet as the " most formidable and respected of 
Locke's opponents during the final years of the seventeenth 
century .. ". 176 
Stillingfleet bypassed The Reasonableness of Christianity and 
located the roots of Locke's theological reductionism in the Essay 
itself. From Stillingfleet's point of view, the implications of 
Locke's discussions in the Essay - on substance, nature, person, 
identity; his construal of the relationship between ideas and things 
(nominal and real essences), the certainty obtained in these matters 
and the origin of such certainties - all contributed to the undermining 
of the fundamental articles of natural and revealed religion. 
Particularly at stake were the doctrines of the Trinity, Incarnation, 
the resurrection and immortality of the soul. 
Stillingfleet's apology for the central doctrines of Christianity 
(Trinity and Incarnation), was underscored by particular understandings 
of the categories of substance, nature, person and identity. 
Stillingfleet's problem was simple but acute. How could one argue 
intelligibly for the foundational doctrines of revealed religion if 
Locke's understanding of the above categories was accepted as 
legitimate? 
As far as Locke was concerned Stillingfleet's objections to the 
Essay's discussion of the above categories had nothing to do with the 
credibility of the doctrines of religion. He professed puzzlement as 
to how his position was inconsistent with or might 'overturn the 
doctrine of the Trinity' or was 'against mysteries',177 Locke 
(u.cr6) 
distanced himself from Toland's Christianity not Mysterious~ the work 
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which had drawn upon the epistemology of the Essay and as a result had 
sparked off the dispute with Stillingfleet. 
The proposals of the Essay were, however, highly threatening to 
the more traditional orthodoxy of Stillingfleet. Locke's 
notion of 'substance' as a 'substratum', the idea of which was but 
obscure and confused,l7B was impossible for Stillingfleet to 
countenance. It completely undermined a traditional rationale for the 
Trinity which, from Stillingfleet's point of view, required clear and 
distinct ideas of substance. In fact Locke suggested that the 
Trinitarian notion of three persons in one was not appropriately 
explained by an appeal to substance, for 
where there are three persons, there must be three 
complete intelligent substances; and so there cannot 
persons in the same individual essence.l79 
distinct, 
be three 
Locke consistently refused to pursue the matter himself. In terms of 
Locke's understanding of person and nature, Stillingfleet's own 
position was suspect: 
For if a complete intelligible substance be the idea of a person, 
and the divine and human natures be complete intelligible 
substances; then the doctrine of the union of two natures and one 
person is quite sunk, for here must be two persons in this way of 
your Lordships.lSO 
Locke proceeded to charge Stillingfleet with advocating a dangerous 
rationalism in his employment of reason for the commending of what had 
been divinely revealed.lBl In Locke's view Stillingfleet was in danger 
of erecting his own particular interpretations of Scripture into 
articles of faith.l82 
For his part Locke refused to "own the doctrine of the Trinity, 
as it hath been received in the christian church".l83 The doctrine had 
been the subject of such dispute throughout church history that Locke 
confessed ignorance of how the a doctrine had in fact been received. 
Stillingfleet's exposition was as fallible as another's. Locke could 
own the doctrine with an implicit faith but no further.l84 
Stillingfleet's was a short way to orthodoxy but Locke "thought it 
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enough to own it as delivered in the scriptures".l8S 
If your Lordship had showed me anything in my book, that contained 
or implied any opposition in it to any thing revealed in holy writ 
concerning the Trinity, or any other doctrine contained in the 
bible, I should have been thereby obliged to your Lordship for 
freeing me from that mistake.l86 
In noting that Scripture contained 'infallible truth', Locke remarked 
"And I wish I could say, there were no mysteries in it: I acknowledge 
there are to me, and I fear always will be •• ",l87 It had not been his 
intention "to write any thing against truth, much less against any of 
the sacred truths contained in the scriptures". 188 
Locke considered that the New Testament contained all the articles 
of the Christian faith,189 Hence the 'resurrection of the dead' was an 
article of faith but the 'manner of the fact' - resurrection of the 
same body - was not a necessary article: "the apostle [Paul] directly 
proposed nothing for or against the same body as necessary to be 
believed". 190 On the Trinity and Incarnation, Locke pointed to the 
absence from Scripture of the propositions "there are three persons in 
one nature, or, there are two natures and one person",191 The person 
who argued for Scripture containing such propositions was guilty of 
making "a new scripture in words and propositions, that the Holy Ghost 
dictated not",192 
Locke did not wish to question the truth of the above propositions 
or deny that they could be 'drawn from scripture', but he did want to 
assert that such propositions were not in Scripture explicitly. The 
'safe' way was to 'keep close'193 to the words of Scripture. From this 
position he could affirm belief in the Trinity and Incarnation, i.e. 
in:so~far as they were delivered in Scripture. 
This was as far as Locke was prepared to go in any discussion of 
these doctrines. His reticence can be variously explained as an 
expression of his sympathy with Socinian and Deistic interpretations or 
as evidence of his pragmatic orientation in matters religious and moral 
which might have made him reluctant to discuss important theoretical 
141 
V: Locke's Reconstruction 
issues,l94 John Yolton writes: 
[For Locke] the Trinity was simply beside the point of the 
Essay. Whether it was a doctrine Locke accepted (it certainly was 
not a necessary doctrine for being a Christian for him), we 
cannot tell, since Locke never goes through the Bible to indicate 
where the revealed truths are, which ones he does accept as 
revealed. 195 
Locke's silence over matters traditionally considered of 
fundamental importance was only partly explained in the above ways. The 
doctrine of the Trinity could never be a fundamental article for Locke 
because for him the doctrine, at least in its traditional form was, 
though perhaps true, nevertheless irrelevant. The Trinity was a 
doctrine inessential for saving faith not because it might not be true 
but because it was evidence of just one's own judgement as to the truth 
of things. Such judgements might or might not 'reach back' to the truth 
of God. 
What was peculiarly modern in Locke's handling of the fundamental 
articles tradition was not so much his minimalist statement of faith, 
but rather his modification of the nature of doctrine itself. When he 
referred to fundamental doctrines or articles of faith Locke, it 
seemed, was primarily focussed on the Scripture text which provided the 
raw materials in which fundamentals could be discerned,l96 The truth 
given for faith was present primarily in a dispersed form. 
From one point of view Scripture already evidenced the reflection 
of human minds upon 'original' revelation. However, such 'attested 
revelation' also offered itself for continued reflection. From this 
point of view it could be likened to a densely textured repository of 
ideas awaiting sorting and gathering by the reflective component of the 
human mind. This in fact was exactly what happened as the Scripture 
'facts' were ordered, synthesised and complexified. Strictly speaking 
this constituted a key stage in the formation of doctrinal statements. 
It was from this stage that possible candidates for articles of 
faith arose. The process came to its term in the human judgement in 
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which judgements were made as to the relative truth value of ideas. 
For Locke this involved the minimalist claim that Jesus the Messiah was 
the sufficient confession to make one a Christian. This was a highly 
inclusivist statement of faith, designed to undercut the strong 
oppositions generated among competing systems of Christian doctrine, 
epitomised for example in the Locke - Edwards debate. It was clear from 
The Reasonableness of Christianity that Locke had precisely this kind 
of system rivalry in mind,l97 
In the Essay Locke had already developed a method to deal with 
the problem of system rivalry. Thus when he came to the question of 
the content of faith i.e. what was revealed), Locke was engaged in a 
movement backwards through the dynamics of religious knowing to the 
point of origins. Locke's method of religious purification entailed a 
return to the simplicities of the source. Systems were not purged but 
simply rendered irrelevant. In this move the complexities that 
attended the process of doctrinal formation were ignored. This 
development signalled a retreat from doctrinalization back to that 
primordial stage in which high probability judgements were possible, 
i.e. back to the 'given' of Scripture revelation. 
This procedure implied a movement towards reality in its most 
dispersed and unsynthesised form, in the relatively simple ideas given 
in revelation. Complexities in ideas at this level could be tolerated 
only to the extent that they were free from the intrusion of the 
reflective human mind. For, as already observed in the discussion of 
the epistemology of the Essay, the complexification of ideas, their 
gathering, ordering and the processes of abstracting and generalising 
that necessarily accompanied such activity, was the result of the power 
of the mind.l98 Precisely because these operations involved the 
progressive intrusion of the human mind into the processing of 
the possibilities for error were greatly increased.l99 
truth, 
Such 
constructive activity represented 'the artificial Draughts of the 
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Mind' 200 (my italics). Consequently, the product of such operations had 
to receive great scrutiny when it came to the matter of assigning 
relative worth to these idea-complexes. In general, greater intrusion 
of human activity indicated lower degrees of probability. 
Locke, it seemed, conceived of doctrines as high level 
abstractions, the result of the complexification of ideas produced by 
the constructive mind. From this perspective it was inevitable that 
the drive to formulation of statements of faith, and the conflicts this 
produced, would seem unnecessary and puzzling developments, somewhat 
removed from the truth of revelation in the Scriptures. Doctrine was 
clearly for Locke an unsafe territory upon which to trespass. The 
system rivalry of the seventeenth century had left its heritage in 
blood. Doctrinal formulation simply represented speculative human 
judgements. For Locke, the uncertainties that attended human judgements 
and human proneness to error, rendered the traditional doctrinal form 
unsafe. Furthermore, it could not add to what had been revealed in 
the propositions of Scripture. 
The 'attested revelation' of Scripture, though not original 
revelation, was as safe as could be achieved since it had been 
authenticated by God. On the supposition that God would not give what 
could not be understood, whatever ideas were present at the source 
would be worthy of assent. In this context articles of faith had the 
character of the pure particulars of faith; pure because they were as 
free as possible from human constructive activity, and particular 
because they represented those scripture propositions available as 
candidates for articles of faith. 
On this view the doctrine of the Trinity did not require 
Stillingfleet's particular philosophical categories. Indeed, the 
doctrine appeared irrelevant for Christianity in any significant sense. 
By contrast, Locke's fundamental article - that Jesus was the Messiah -
was first and foremost simply a 'plain fact', a given of revelation. 
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This is what the facts of Scripture meant; all the evidence pointed to 
this conclusion, and this was consonant with a covenant of faith 
accessible to all. 
From the above perspective the question of the doctrinal status of 
the proposition 'Jesus is the Messiah', became problematic. Was 
Locke's fundamental of the faith a doctrine, at least in the 
traditional sense of the word? Locke's proposal for saving faith was 
clearly not intended as an abstraction, the speculative product of a 
theologian or a tradition. The proposition 'Jesus is the Messiah' was 
intended to evoke a high quality judgement involving trust in God. 
From the point of view of doctrine per se, the statement, Jesus is 
the Messiah, functioned more like a 'constitutive image', providing 
raw material in the process of doctrinal formulation.ZOl 
The particular way in which Locke effected the displacement of 
Christian doctrine into the region of human judgement was thus 
responsible for what was probably the most damaging blow to the 
articles tradition that was theologically possible: it was rendered 
irrelevant. Locke's thoroughgoing empiricism, his reticence for 
synthesis and his wariness concerning the human capacity for error, 
provided the fertile context in which a rationale for the formulation 
of richly general statements of faith simply disappeared. 
Christianity's doctrinal structure could not but represent an 
unnecessary distortion of the covenant of faith. 
The tradition of fundamental articles could only survive as it was 
severed from systems of belief and relocated in the particularities of 
texts. This was the logic of a view which was unable to grasp doctrine 
as a concentrated and highly informative medium for communication. The 
displacement of doctrine from system into text brought into focus a 
question that had in fact been implicit throughout Locke's 
reconstructive effort in religion. What was the legitimate task of 
theology? 
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eo .. entary on the Fundaaentals: The Paraphrases on St Paul's Epistles 
When Locke wrote A Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. 
Paul, with its important Preface on scripture interpretation,zoz he 
drew upon his earlier inquires into the fundamental articles of the 
faith. Already in The Reasonableness of Christianity he had argued 
against those who selectively highlighted various points from Paul's 
Epistles and 
and necessary 
made them "fundamental articles of the christian faith, 
to salvation ... ".Z03 Such a procedure failed to 
recognise that in the epistles the fundamental 
promiscuously and without distinction mixed with 
discourses that were ..•.. only occasional'',204 
articles, " 
other truths, 
Are 
in 
Locke considered that the fundamentals of the faith were present 
in a 'mixed' form in the Epistles as opposed to a clear and 
unmistakable form in the Gospels. Any attempt to highlight unnaturally 
the fundamentals of the faith in the Epistles was resisted by Locke. In 
fact it was precisely the tendency to treat Scripture 'crumbled into 
verses' as 'independant aphorisms' useful for constructing necessary 
articles of faith for church membership, that Locke was at pains to 
counteract.zos When Scripture was treatedm this way it became the 
occasion for system rivalry and social conflict. This had its origin 
in a failure to attend rightly to the revelation of Scripture, and 
indicated a desire to give Divine sanction to human contrivances. 
Locke's method of Scripture analysis was designed to undercut the 
fancies of the system addicts and to obtain access to the one original 
meaning of the text. Such a method would, said Locke, contribute 'to 
the peace of the church',206 
Locke proposed a thoroughgoing contextualizing of 
material. It was a way "'to observe and trace out 
the 
St. 
epistle 
Paul's 
reasonings". 207 Rigorous attention to the 'train' of the author's 
thought, in which the words received 'a determined sense from their 
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companions and adjacents•,zos constituted the 'infallible rule' for 
uncovering the meaning of Scripture. It was a way that Locke hoped 
would "furnish us with visible grounds, that we are not mistaken",209 
Important here was the repeated reading of the whole of the epistle. In 
this way the chief aim of the author could be more easily grasped and 
from this general sense particular themes could be distinguished. This 
approach to the text protected it from the distortion that resulted 
from isolating certain ideas in the text, disengaging them from the 
text, and using them as foundations for doctrinal systems. 
Locke thus objected to the fragmentation of the Epistles. He felt 
that this process had been aided by the custom of chapter and verse; 
divisions that obscured rather than exposed the sense of the text. This 
fragmentation provided the conditions for the growth of system rivalry. 
For Locke it was simple. 
If the holy scriptures were but laid before the eyes of 
christians, in its connexion and consistency, it would not then be 
so easy to snatch out a few words, as if they were separate from 
the rest, to serve a purpose, to which they do not at all 
belong,,,ZlO 
He proposed a way through the system back to the original sense, the 
'tendency and force' of which was clear to the first recipients. This 
method offered a way of uncovering a sense of the 'strength and force' 
of the text's inner coherence,Zll The implication was that doctrinal 
systems, confessions or articles of any church, were at best formed by 
'extrapolation' from the text, 
Which, however, pretended to 
visibly the contrivances of men, 
and interpretations •••• z12 
be founded on scripture, are 
fallible both in their opinions 
In one sense the Paraphrases represented the second stage of 
Locke's portrayal of the reasonableness of Christianity, In terms of 
the question of the fundamentals of Christianity, what was interesting 
was the way in which Locke construed the presence of God in revelation 
and the ideal form of communicating what had been revealed. Locke's 
theological rationalism controlled the kind of truth to which he had 
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access and was able to communicate. His empiricist frame of mind kept 
him locked in the truth in its highly dispersed form, whether in nature 
or history. The theological form of this empiricism - implicit in The 
Reasonableness of Christianity and explicit in the Paraphrases and 
argument of the Preface - operated on the supposition that generalising 
theological synthesis obscured and distorted what was really present 
for faith in revelation. Accordingly, for Locke, ideal communication 
resolved itself into a kind of 'thick description',213 In this 
activity synthesis was eshewed and attention remained in textual 
detail. Locke seemed to suppose that the text itself had a beauty, 
force and power which, when presented, would maximise opportunities for 
faith of its own accord. 
It is possible to discern in the foregoing the impact on Locke's 
religious views of a tradition of nominalism or 'particularism' in 
philosophy,214 Here everything exists originally in particularity, and 
the only universal propositions that can give information about the 
world are inductive generalizations which can never be more than 
probable. On the other hand propositions can attain certainty but 
only because they are concerned merely with abstract ideas,215 This 
situation resolves itself into a trade-off between informative, 
interesting though uncertain statements, and statements which are 
certain but uninformative. 
This feature of nominalist philosophy has important consequences 
when transferred into the region of theological discourse. Here the 
only task left for theology, to the extent that it is concerned for the 
truth of things, is to sacrifice general and rich informativeness for 
concentration upon description of particulars. This can be discerned in 
Locke's move from system to text. The vocation of theology implodes 
into textual commentary. A corollary of this is the displacement and 
disfigurement of the doctrinal tradition in Christianity. Such was the 
fate of the fundamental articles in Locke's handling of the tradition. 
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PART IV FUNDAMENTAL ARTICLES AND ECCLESIOLOGY: The Letters On 
Toleration 
Locke's reconstruction and displacement of the tradition of 
fundamental articles belonged to his wider concern for the conditions 
for the formation and endurance of social life. 
Conflict and Toleration 
Locke's efforts were part of a widespread attempt in Post-
Restoration England to find a basis for healthy communal life. His 
vision was, as one scholar has said, of "a culture of shared religious 
good intentions",216 The articles tradition functioned in just this 
context. The question implicit here was relatively simple: what can we 
believe together? In other words, given this kind of social vision 
what was fair concerning the articles tradition in Christianity? In 
this sense the articles tradition was heavily implicated in Locke's 
social strategy for a new kind of society. Important here was a 
rationale for the containment of conflict. 
Locke's enquiries into human capabilities in the Essay 
presupposed that a more enlightened understanding of the capacity of 
humankind for knowledge would encourage a more generous, tolerant and 
harmonious social life. Human finitude brought with it certain 
limitations in possibilities for knowledge. Social conflict arose 
when probabilities were treated as certainties. 217 Locke's 
investigations had revealed a far more conservative estimate of human 
capabilities, The overcoming of conflict would occur in direct 
proportion to the recognition of this fact. 
if we look a little into the dark side, and take a view of our 
Ignorance: which being infinitely larger than our Knowledge, [it] 
may serve much to the quieting of Disputes.,,,218 
This negativity was counterbalanced by what appeared to be a rather 
naively optimistic view of the possibility of human consensus. 
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For I am apt to think, that Men, when they come to examine them, 
find their simple Ideas all generally to agree, though in 
discourse with one another, they perhaps confound one another with 
different Names. I imagine, that Men who abstract their thoughts, 
and do well examine the Ideas of their own Minds, cannot much 
differ in thinking,,,219 
In other words, consensus emerged as a consequence of responsible human· 
action. It was founded on the presupposition that God, who could be 
trusted, gave to people what could be understood. Indeed it was 
precisely this fact that created the possibility of human discourse 
with understanding,220 
In the face of conflict Locke's strategy in matters religious was 
to propose a highly inclusive form of faith which offered wide 
parameters for ecclesial loyalty. The necessary articles of faith were 
few indeed. Their reasonableness was such that the least of persons 
could not but understand and the highest intellect could not but 
•n acquiesce~ 221 Locke's strategy for conflict resolution focussed thus 
in the concept of 'toleration'. Toleration was the logic of the 
epistemology of the Essay,222 His proposals on toleration functioned 
as an important backdrop to his presentation and defence of the 
reasonableness of Christianity. The wider ecclesial significance of 
the concept had earlier been articulated by Locke in his Letters on 
Toleration,223 
In these letters the presenting issue concerned the limits of 
civil government's control over ecclesial matters of faith and conduct. 
This long debated issue was focussed for Locke in the legitimacy or 
otherwise of a magistrate's use of force in religious matters. Although 
the letters had a European context they had particular significance for 
an England in which, since 1688, certain limited relaxations in the 
civil law concerning ecclesial dissent had taken effect. 
Central to Locke's thesis concerning toleration was his sharp 
distinction between civil and religious societies. Political society 
was "instituted for no other end, but only to secure every mans 
possession of the things of this life",224 Religious matters belonged 
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to an entirely different region; the salvation of souls. This was not 
the responsibility of the magistrate but of each individual. To this 
end the 'business of religion' was for "the regulating of men's lives 
according to the rules of virtue and piety",225 
Given this sharp division, the limits of civil control over 
religious life could be quite easily defined. Religious opinions, which 
were contrary to human society or morality necessary for social 
preservation, could not be tolerated. Nor could that religion be 
countenanced "in which those who enter it, do thereby ipso facto 
deliver themselves up to the protection and service of another 
prince". 226 Locke instanced the Mahometan who was required to be 
obedient to the Ottoman emperor. It was not difficult to see the 
implications this had for Roman Catholicism in England.227 Finally 
atheists, who denied the being of God, could not be tolerated. The 
atheist, theoretically if not practically, destroyed the basis for 
human social bonds. 
The Ecclesial Ideal 
It was in this context of the limits of toleration that Locke 
offered his definition of Church. 
A Church then I take to be a voluntary society of men, joining 
themselves together of their own accord, in order to the public 
worshipping of God, in such a manner as they judge acceptable to 
him, and effectual to the salvation of their souls,228 
Locke wanted to stress the forming of a Church as an 'absolutely free 
and spontaneous' event, the result of responsible human action. This 
provided him with a basis for a democratic view of ecclesial authority 
and the rejection of force from any quarter. However, this definition 
offered a highly atomistic portrayal of ecclesial reality. A voluntary 
assembly of persons was sufficient for his purposes,229 
The 'chief mark' of the Church was toleration. "I esteem that 
toleration to be the chief characteristical mark of the true 
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church".Z30 The Church, as God's divine society, had to manifest a 
life of mutual tolerance. For Locke, tolerance constituted the true 
social form of the Church, since tolerance was the way by which human 
beings lived rationally in a probabilistic world. 
More specifically, the ways in which tolerance had to be manifest 
concerned the outward form and rites of worship and the doctrines and 
articles of faith,231 In dealing with the latter Locke identified 
'practical articles' -those that 'influence the will and manners' -
and speculative opinions (which for these purposes Locke equated with 
articles of faith or religion), which 'terminate simply in the 
understanding ... ',Z3Z 
Locke's point concerning articles of faith was simply that because 
they had no relation to the civil rights of subjects, magistrates had 
no authority to enforce belief. "But if truth makes not her way into 
the understanding by her own light, she will be weaker for any borrowed 
force violence can add to her",Z33 The terms of communion were, in 
respect of such articles of faith, broad indeed, consisting "in such 
things, and such things only, as the Holy Spirit has in the Holy 
Scriptures declared, in express words, to be necessary to 
salvation ... ",Z 34 For a church to insist on any narrower terms of 
communion based upon human 'inventions' or 'interpretations' raised 
questions about that church's true ecclesial status for "No man has or 
can have authority to shut any one out of the church of Christ, for 
that for which Christ himself will not shut him out of heaven",Z35 
Thus, Jesus' prayer for unity in John's Gospel chapter seventeen, 
did not imply that "all be of one mind in things not necessary to 
salvation",Z36 What was required was an agreement in those "plain 
simple truths of the gospel necessary to salvation," and "the 
maintaining of charity and brotherly kindness with the diversity of 
opinions in other things",Z37 
Toleration in this matter was simply the logic of faith, for a 
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certain knowledge that any church's articles of faith were necessary 
for salvation could not be had.238 Within this context church unity 
was consistent with many divisions which were more apparent than real 
for, 
those who hold all things necessary to salvation, and add not 
thereto any thing in doctrine, discipline or worship, inconsistent 
with salvation, are of the same religion, though divided into 
different societies or churches, under different forms.239 
Diversity it seemed was inevitable. The logic of this was 
tolerance. The danger came from those who insisted on erecting their 
particular articles into fundamentals necessary for church communion. 
For Locke this was heresy which, in the case of Protestantism, occurred 
when separation was made for opinions not contained in the express 
words of Scripture.240 Locke followed the custom of identifying schism 
as a separation made over matters of worship or discipline, i.e. the 
agenda as compared to the credenda of the faith. 
Locke astutely noted that salvation was most imperilled by "that 
religion which comes nearest to it, and most resembles it",241 He had 
the Church of England in mind. It was, he said, simply an exclusive 
'established sect' and had no greater true-church status than the 
various dissenting churches,242 Included here were Presbyterians, 
Independants, Anabaptists, Arminians, Quakers 'and others',243 
Locke's ecclesial boundaries were wide indeed. The toleration he 
proposed presupposed a proliferation of sects. If this situation was 
nourished with charity and an 'innocency of life',244 it was far more 
in accord with the true form of the Church than obtained under an 
enforced uniformity. The tolerance he proposed was more than a mere 
passive acceptance. It had more in common with a positive force of 
reconciliation and was indicative of Locke's positive engagement with 
social realities,245 Locke's discussion of toleration had all the 
hallmarks of a latter day inquiry into Anglican inclusiveness in a 
church that had ceased to be genuinely inclusive in spite of its 
national church status. Locke's minimalist statement for an agreed 
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upon faith represented his attempt to recover the inclusivist ideal. 
The Priority and Siaplicity of Trust 
Locke's development of the concept of toleration presupposed a 
heavy investment in communal trusts, Locke had written to a friend in 
1659, "Men live upon trust ... '~46 Faith, it will be recalled, was for 
Locke a form of trust. It was a trust placed in God whose character 
was one of absolute trustworthiness. It was precisely for this reason 
that Locke's scheme could not sanction atheism. The reason was clear, 
among 
Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human 
society, can have no hold upon an atheist. The taking away of God; 
though but even in thought, dissolves all,247 
The seed bed from which social tolerance grew was mutual trust 
humans, a trust which terminated not in themselves but 
was directed towards and nourished by a trustworthy God who was 
absolutely faithful to his promises. The ecclesial bond was formed 
and sustained by a covenant of trust. 
For Locke 1Christianity was generated and sustained through trust. 
Furthermore, it was a concept of trust that was active rather than 
passive. It was focussed in the life of Jesus, his gospel of peace and 
holiness of conversation,248 This was given fuller shape in The 
Reasonableness of Christianity where the way of divine revelation in 
Jesus was a way of purity in life, and conformity to the prophecies. 249 
There was a reserve in Jesus about speaking plainly of his Messiahship, 
even a reserve in the manifestation of the miraculous. 250 To this 
extent Jesus' life demonstrated not only a trust in God but more 
particularly a trust in the 'evidence and energy' of those ordinary 
qualities of human life through which the power of God could be 
manifest. It was a life in accord with 'the simplicity of the 
gospel',2 51 
The first apostles showed a 'simple trust' which refused to pry 
and speculate,252 There was a precious simplicity to the gospel for 
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Locke which could only be embraced by a fundamental trust. Thus he 
could write in The Reasonableness of Christianity: 
was, 
This ablation of an heart, fixed with dependence on, and affection 
to him, is the most acceptable tribute we can pay him, the 
foundation of true devotion, arid life of all religion.253 
To encourage a recapturing of just this kind of religious life 
explained Locke in his Vindications, the motive for The 
Reasonableness of Christianity. He had not been "without some hope of 
doing some service to decaying piety, and mistaken and slandered 
Christianity".254 This motive had been at work in Locke's emphasis on 
the practice of the practical articles of faith as evidence of faithful 
discipleship. It was too easy to hide behind a profession of 
speculative opinions whilst indulging in all kinds of immorality.zss 
Locke's point was that religious life ought not to be construed in 
a narrowly doctrinal sense, but ideally evidenced in the form of 
godly human life. Justification came by grace through faith1 but not 
apart from a sanctified life.zss From Locke's perspective a 
conditional covenant theology brought into focus the importance of 
ongoing responsible Christian discipleship, in which people were called 
to entrust themselves to God and to each other. 
This central concept of trust was, not surprisingly, implicated in 
Locke's presentation and defence of the Christian faith and formed an 
undercurrent to the missionary enterprise. Locke's point in this 
respect was simple. Christianity did not require any external force, 
whether from civil quarters or from accompanying miracles, 257 to make 
its way in the world. Christianity would, by its own 'light and 
truth', its own 'beauty force and reasonableness', bring conviction of 
the truth.258 To resort to external pressures in order to secure 
profession of faith indicated a lack of trust in the power of the 
gospel.259 
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life operated maximally in the region of 
his understanding of Christianity was 
fundamentally located and manifest in the interpersonal mode. However 
the greater part of this Chapter has focussed on the doctrinal or 
symbolic dimension of Christianity,260 It is clear that Locke had made 
an enormously heavy investment in this dimension of Christianity. This 
effort indicated that Locke remained convinced that believing per se 
was indispensible for the cohesion of the Church and society. 
As previously observed, however, the 'what' of belief remained in 
a highly dispersed form. To this extent Locke significantly restricted 
the operation of Christianity in its linguistic symbolic form. 
Unfortunately one of the results of Locke's handling of the articles 
tradition was that Christianity, as a symbolic structure, became 
extremely uninteresting and impoverished. 
The impoverishment of the symbolic life of Christianity had a 
wider ecclesial significance. The concept of trust was at the centre 
of church life. Trusts given and received generated the dynamic and 
endurance of the ecclesial community. In this context the articles 
tradition inherited by Locke operated negatively as a generator of 
conflict. The articles tradition represented a threat to a society's 
life in Christ. 
concentration 
life. To the 
To focus upon articles of faith diverted and hindered 
upon the true ingredient for healthy inclusive church 
extent that a community placed its confidence in the 
having of particular doctrines, confessions, and fundamental articles, 
it was guilty of betraying the trusts which formed its real and 
enduring existence. 
The articles tradition, focussed in the drive to formulate what 
communities regarded as fundamental, was regarded by Locke as a human 
activity generative of conflict and oppositions. To this extent it was 
an unworthy focus for a community's life. Articles of faith were 
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formed by communities. To the extent that such products of communal 
believing were merely human deeds, subject to the probabilistic 
judgements of finite and foolish human beings, such deeds could not be 
allowed to contribute in any significant way to the ordering of church 
life. From Locke's perspective the only dynamic that he perceived 
operating here was a negative one. The articles tradition served 
only to reinforce prejudices and create ill-formed communities. This 
process had to be resisted. 
It was also the case that Locke's devout Protestant spirit 
would . naturally place a high priority upon Christian discipleship 
nourished from the symbolic dimension of logos. Scripture represented 
the locus of logos communication. However, to the extent that the 
fundamentals of the faith remained immanent in the Scripture)the range 
over which the symbolic region could operate was restricted. The 
symbolic dimension of the word could still contribute to the formation 
and endurance of ecclesial life. But it could now do so in a way which 
freed a community from the tyranny of an articles tradition 
manufactured for the purposes of institutional control. Locke's serious 
attempt to retain a minimalist public statement of saving faith 
resulted in a displacement of the fundamentals tradition. Furthermore, 
as the ensuing conflicts with Deism and Atheism revealed, it also 
indirectly authorised free-running theological discourse unsympathetic 
towards, and consequently unchecked by, the Trinitarianism of the 
Christian tradition. 
Conclusion 
In Locke's view a fragmented social life could not be 
reconstructed by recourse to strictly enforced rules of belief. In one 
sense Locke was perfectly correct. Too much strain had, in the past, 
been placed upon the role of doctrine for peace-making purposes. From 
Locke's perspective the only way the tradition could be rehabilitated 
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was by a change of its form. 
What was lost in this context was the far richer possibilities 
that doctrine, in its form of fundamental articles, might offer. 
Locke's theological programme had forfeited any sense that doctrine per 
se, and fundamental articles in particular, were synthetic 
constructions which concentrated and directed the bond that Christians 
had in Christ. The implied loss of any intrinsic truth reference in 
doctrinal statements was symptomatic of the quite changed world in 
which it was no longer clear how the empirical world - its materiality 
and forms of communication - was translucent to the Divine. The failure 
of Locke's effort to reconstruct a fresh correspondence between Divine 
and human life was manifest in the marginalisation of belief in Locke's 
treatment of the Christian covenant. The transcendentals of ecclesial 
life could not, in Locke's account, break through and be manifest at 
the linguistic level except in a highly dispersed form. Doctrine as a 
dense, highly informative communication, offering direction and 
nourishment in Church life, was foreign to Locke. His frame of mind 
viewed the development of doctrinal forms as the generators of 
oppositions and boundaries between people; barriers rather than 
facilitators of communication and strengtheners of communal bonds. 
Locke's lack of trust in this regard was partly the result of his 
rationalistic and empiricist stance, and partly the result of his view 
of ecclesial conflict and doctrine. 
richness of Christianity per se. 
What was thus sacrificed was the 
The ways in which the fullness of 
truth could be manifest were restricted. His search for a pure form for 
Christianity entailed the displacement and deformation of Christianity 
in its doctrinal form. 
was thus sealed. 
The fate of the fundamental articles tradition 
This consequence was simply evidence of the more fundamental 
problem that was located at the very outset of this Chapter in the 
interpretation of the Essar. the problem of truth management in 
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Locke's programme. Human agents, from beginning to end, were truth 
formers and processors; they were not, for Locke, truth formed. The 
theological form of this development was no where more clearly evident 
than in the puzzle that doctrine, and in particular the doctrine of the 
Trinity, presented for Locke. Locke's empiricist rationalist frame of 
mind had no adequate means to affirm the presence of God in a world 
shorn of its natural sacramentality and seemingly devoid of intrinsic 
meaning. The Trinitarian life of God in the world which constituted 
the inner dynamic of the fundamental articles of faith in the Christian 
tradition had, in Locke's statement of the faith, receded from view.26l 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE RESTORATION OF THE TRADITION: 
Daniel Waterland's Defence of Fundamental Articles 
Introduction 
John Locke's reinterpretation of the fundamental articles resulted 
in significant deformation of the tradition. Moreover, as John Yolton 
has carefully argued, Lockean thought provided the backdrop for the 
defence of the Christian faith in the eighteenth century against the 
rising tide of Deism and Atheism. 1 Among the defenders of orthodoxy 
there was a strong and able band of theologians who sought a synthesis 
between the received tradition and the new thought of the day. Samuel 
Clarke (1675-1729) was perhaps the most prominent and able exponent of 
this mediating tradition,2 
There were, however, other important yet more traditionalist 
approaches to restating the faith. As an example, this Chapter focuses 
on the Anglican divine, Daniel Waterland (1683-1740). A recent study 
by Robert Holtby provides a useful introduction to the thought of 
Waterland in its eighteenth century context.J Holtby noted in his 
Preface that Waterland gained a reputation as 'the leading orthodox 
champion' of the first half of the eighteenth century. This reputation 
seemed to be enhanced with the passing years. 4 Gerald Cragg described 
Waterland as an 'able rather than a distinguished' reaffirmer of 
Anglicanism.s More recently Perry Butler has referred to him as an 
'outstanding exponent of Classical orthodoxy' in the battle against 
eighteenth century Deism,& 
Waterland's defence of the faith offered another response, quite 
different from Locke's, to the displacement of a sacramental 
understanding of the universe in late seventeenth century thought. It 
was replaced by a mechanistic conception of the universe in which 
God's relation to the world had undergone serious 
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Waterland responsed to this emerging context by a vigorous reassertion 
of a universe sacramentally understood, where materiality in its 
variety of forms (including language} mediated God's presence. 
For Waterland, defending the fundamental articles of Christianity 
involved a retrieval and reassertion of the ancient apostolic faith in 
the face of challenges deemed to corrupt that 'received' tradition. 
His defensive strategy was dominated by a drive to recapture the purity 
of the orthodox system. This approach was developed through extensive 
polemical writings on Christology and the doctrine of the Trinity. 
These efforts were crystalised towards the end of his life in an 
important ''Discourse of Fundamentals",7 This work drew upon earlier 
discussions of the subject and developed them in terms of a covenantal 
understanding of Christianity. 
Underpinning Waterland's apologetic was a strong realism of the 
Word in which God's reality as logos was given in the form of speech. 
This logos authorized and empowered human words. In the context of a 
tight mechanistic world view, where God functioned as the imposer and 
guarantor of order, the communication of the logos appeared as law-like 
normative rules. The Divine word was Divine law to be responded to in a 
manner befitting the law of God. Fundamentals of covenantal 
Christianity represented laws for belief, worship and morals. These 
fundamentals were sanctioned by God, issued in Scripture, confirmed by 
tradition, conformable with reason, indicies of ecclesial purity and 
important means for determining terms of communion. Implicit in the 
above framework was a view of theology as essentially repetition of a 
pre-established harmony of Divine law. 
This was reflected in Waterland's recommendation of highly 
objectified statements of the faith. The witness of the fundamental 
articles tradition to logos reality was distorted. In this respect 
consideration of Waterland's handling of the tradition of fundamental 
articles in Anglicanism provides a means to examine the dynamics of 
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failure implicit in any restorative theological programme which 
attempts to purify belief by strong re-statement of 
fundamentals of faith are thought to have been. 
what the 
This study of Waterland is of more than purely historical 
interest. Where there is uncertainty and conflict concerning the 
nature and viability of the Christian fait~as in the late twentieth 
century, the way of orthodoxy implicit in the 'School of Waterland' 
continues to exert a beguiling appeal both within Anglicanism and 
across the denominations of the ecclesial spectrum. 8 
This case study proceeds in two parts. Part One considers 
Waterland's attempt to counter the weakening of Trinitarianism in the 
early eighteenth century. Waterland's perception of the threat to 
Christianity and his responsive strategy are important here. This is 
developed in terms of the intensity, scope and ecclesiological 
significance of the theological drift into undifferentiated monotheism. 
Part One provides the basis for a more critical analysis in Part Two 
of Waterland's attempt to re-state the fundamentals of the faith in 
terms of covenantal Christianity. 
P~T 1 TRADITION THREATENED: The Drift into Undifferentiated 
Monotheism 
Waterland's apology for Christianity was developed in relation to 
a challenge to the fundamental articles of the Christian faith. 
This threatened corruption of the faith operated as a kind of 
theological drift in which a movement could be discerned from the 
Trinitarianism of the Christian tradition into the region of 
generality; a movement from quite determinate construals of the 
presence and action of God to rather more diffuse and abstracted 
notions. Waterland's response to the dissolution of belief is examined 
in terms of the intensity, scope and ecclesial significance of the 
threat to the fundamental articles of Trinitarian faith. 
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Intensity of the Threat to Faith: Fro• Arianism to Atheisa 
The Arian Form 
From Waterland's point of view the threat to Christianity was 
evidenced in a theological drift characterised by a progressive 
corruption of the articles of the faith. A theological spectrum 
emerged in which the loss of the fullness and purity of the primitiveJ 
catholic and apostolic faith was manifest embryonically in an incipient 
Arian form. Arianism gave way to Socinianism, itself a prelude to a 
more thoroughgoing Deism. In Waterland's view, Deism was not far short 
of either a complete profanation of sacred truth in Atheism or its 
radical alternative, the embracing of highly superstitious religious 
forms, of which 'Popery' was but one dangerous example. 
This gradual but inevitable loss of the particular form of the 
Christian tradition represented, for Waterland, one consequence of a 
highly rationalistic age deeply suspicious of the long held mysteries 
of the faith. Unease with the idea of mystery nourished a 
desacralizing process which had a theological form. Waterland captured 
the 'snowballing' effect of this in a 1731 "Charge to the Clergy": 
We live in a disputing age, and infidelity has been long growing 
upon us. It began with exploding mysteries in general, and from 
thence proceeded to a denial of our Lord's divinity in particular. 
Low notions of the person of Christ are apt to bring in low 
notions of his merit and satisfaction, and of the use and value of 
the Christian sacraments, which represent and apply them, And when 
faith in Christ's blood is once deprecated or frustrated, it is 
natural to set up works, not only as the conditional, but as the 
efficacious, or even meritorious cause of salvation. The next 
step is to exalt morality in opposition to faith, and mere 
morality in opposition to instituted religion; which again 
prepares the way for looking upon all revealed religion as 
needless or useless, which comes to the same thing with denying 
its truth, because an all-wise God can do nothing in vain. 9 
What began as a failure to attend rightly to the person of Christ 
led to a more general corruption which passed through a number of 
phases involving a progressive loss of Christianity's Trinitarian form 
of belief. The undifferentiated monotheism of Deism was, in 
Waterland's view, simply a form of practical Atheism. Disputation over 
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the fundamental articles of Christianity would eventually lead to a 
practical, if not theoretical rejection, of the Christian system. 
Such is the connection or gradation of error, when once men desert 
the rules of reason and sobriety, to follow their own wanderings; 
such the obvious and easy descent from disputing the 
essentials of revealed religion, to denying the whole,lO 
The matter was of more than merely theoretical concern. In 
Waterland's view, correct belief was vital for correct religious 
practice. Good religious practice depended on a prior knowledge of God. 
Furthermore; "the perfection of that practice depends upon the 
perfection of such knowledge",ll This being the case, 
A general and confused notion of God may produce as general and 
confused rules of demeanour towards him; while a more particular 
and explicit apprehension of the Deity will of course produce a 
more particular and explicit service. 12 
The disappearance of a Trinitarian form of belief would become clearly 
evident in a failure to live a godly human life. Given this lineage of 
Atheism it was not surprising that Waterland expended such great effort 
in countering what he regarded as the early forerunners of infidelity. 
The theological drift had to be met and excised in its Arian form. 
The argument with Arianism was focussed upon Christology. The 
point at issue between Arians and Catholics concerned the 
consubstantiality and eternity of God the Son with the Father13 • In 
attributing a creaturely status to Christ, Arianism could not but fail 
to affirm the 'received' and Scriptural doctrine of the Trinity. 
Furthermore, the exponents of Arianism appeared muddled. 
The reason of it is this; they take a kind of middle way between 
Catholics and Socinians, which admits of so great a latitude, that 
they know not what to fix ••••• the Ariana supposing him [Christ] 
a creature at large, and not knowing the several degrees of 
perfection on this side infinite, are always in uncertainty; not 
being able to determine how much or how little it may be proper to 
ascribe to the Son of God: and hence it is that they could never 
unite together in any one fixed and certain set of 
principles •.. ,,"14 
In the early stage of drift there was thus a kind of passing in 
and out of orthodoxy. In this oscillation a theological blurring 
occurred which revealed itself in a wrong view of Scripture and a 
164 
VI: Waterland's Defence 
misunderstanding of primitive tradition in respect of fundamentals. 
Thus the testimonies of the ancients were respected, but insofar as 
such testimonies functioned as 'bare illustrations' the Arians, said 
Waterland, 'sink the value of antiquity',l5 
In Waterland's view Arianism came nearest the truth and thus it 
presented the greatest danger to the received tradition. The 
appearance of truth in Arianism lent to this corruption a theological 
respectability such that it could appear 'open and barefaced',l6 
Waterland, however, was quite clear. The development of the 
doctrine of Christ along anti-Trinitarian principles identified 
Arianism as a form of Polytheism. He described this as 'practical 
Atheism', since it did, by implication, though perhaps not in 
intention, ascribe worship to two supreme Gods,17 
The Socinian Form 
Arianism represented the first stage in the dissolution of 
orthodoxy. Waterland recognised that, especially in regard to someone 
like Samuel Clarke, the initial divisive explorations over the article 
of the Trinity were not necessarily inconsistent with 'truth and 
godliness at heart'. 1 8 Nevertheless,the initial 'false step' eventually 
led to a 'deluge of infidelity'. For Waterland it was plain enough: 
"Arianism is but the dupe to Deism, as Deism again is to Atheism, or 
Popery'. 19 
Socinianism represented a second phase of the drift into Deism and 
beyond. 
belief. 
In one sense it enshrined the last vestiges of Trinitarian 
The Socinian corruption had its immediate origins in the 
sixteenth century with one Socinus. The Socinians, dissatisfied with 
the rationale of the 'catholic' doctrine of the Trinity, and convinced 
of the unscriptural Arian position, developed a doctrine of Christ as 
mere man,20 Thus Socinus understood the Johannine reference to the 
Word as applying to a 'real' person, the man Christ Jesus. This had, 
165 
VI: Waterland's Defence 
in Waterland's view, a semblance of truth, but it failed to affirm the 
fullness of Christ's divinity. In so distancing God the Father from the 
man Christ Jesus, the early Socinians were guilty to an even greater 
degree than the Arians of 'practical Ditheism' ,21 
Waterland noted that modern Socinianism had developed along the 
lines of the ancient Sabellian heresy where the Logos or Word spoken of 
by St. John was denied "to be any real or substantial thing, distinct 
from the Person of God the Father",22 Although this Sabellian 
construction appeared 'more ingenious and plausible' it proved fatal to 
the Socinian cause for it signified, from Waterland's perspective, an 
irretrievable breach in the unity of the Godhead. The logic of this was 
the rejection of the worship of Christ: "the natural and inevitable 
consequence of his [Socinus'] scheme, if one would act consistently: 
and the next consequence to that was Deism or Atheism",23 This was, 
said Waterland, the result of a scheme which operated "upon a false 
principle, that human imagination is the measure of di l'ine truths". 24 
The Deistic Form 
The final phase of the drift into unbelief included both Deism and 
Atheism and was categorized generally by Waterland as 'infidelity'. 
Waterland located the roots of modern Deism in the middle of the 
sixteenth century, though in fact he observed strong parallels between 
Epicurean philosophy and modern exponents of infidelity, notably Hobbes 
and Spinoza.zs Waterland recognised some differentiation in the 
degrees of infidelity. Thus whilst the Deists did not directly deny 
the being of a God: 
they did it consequentially, or that they did as 
undermine and destroy all the influences of religion, 
had been professed Atheists •. ,,"26 
Deism thus represented a form of practical Atheism: 
effectually 
as if they 
What Atheism chiefly aims at, is to sit loose from present 
restraints and future reckonings: and those two purposes may be 
competently served by Deism, which is but a more refined kind of 
A theism. 2 7 
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Between the 'broadest Atheism' and the 'most refined system of Deism' 
there were various possibilities; Pantheism and 'Hobbism' were 
'scandalously bad', 'Fatalism' was little better. 28 The drift into 
Atheism was nourished by false notions of the character of the Deity, 
identifying God as either 'universal nature' or a 'kind of Epicurean 
Deity', 
tied up from interposing at all by miracles, and from issuing out 
any positil'e laws, and from making any rule or order in things 
indifferent here, and from doing exemplary justice upon sinners 
hereafter, for such his vindictive justice is profanely miscalled 
or misconstrued spite, wrath, malice, revenge, tyranny, and the 
like,29 
Thus, according to Waterland, the failures in modern Deism to 
give scope for the 'interposing of miracle', for the issuing of 
positive laws, and for the provision of a system of reward and 
punishment were symptomatic of the progressive removal of the presence 
of God from nature, history and human affairs. Waterland considered 
that the term 'Christian Deist' merely signified the embracing of a 
quite particular form of Monotheism identified as Trinitarianism. 
Those within Christianity who rejected this particular 'traditional' 
religion, but yet professed to believe in God, could not legitimately 
claim the epithet Christian,30 
This drift into generalities in belief signalled not only a 
retreat from revealed religion but also a corruption of natural 
religion. As Waterland conceived it, revealed religion was the 
perfection of natural religion.31 The most perfect systems of natural 
religion (considered abstractly, apart from revealed religion) were one 
with revealed religion in certain basic presuppositions. Natural 
religion found its logical outcome in revealed religion. In this way 
Deism represented a corruption of genuine natural religion. Deism 
extolled morality but, devoid of the foundation of faith, this claim 
was spurious: virtue or morality was simultaneously 'complimented' and 
'starved' since it was given 'little or nothing to subsist upon'.32 
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The drift from Trinitarianism into undifferentiated Monotheism 
gained in intensity from mild Arianism through shades of Socinianism 
into Deistic forms. This movement entailed a progressive rejection of 
received revelation and an undermining of the moral order. The outcome 
was practical Atheism. 
Diagnosis of Drift: Infidelity to the Pre-established Consensus 
In Waterland's view these developments were the inevitable 
consequence of forsaking the received faith of the community. 33 This 
had its first stirrings in division over the article of the Trinity. 
Such divisions arose out of excessive deference to the reasoning 
abilities of individuals to the detriment of the received wisdom. This 
predilection for individual fancy failed to take adequate account of 
the fact that: 
Truth is of wide extent, and is all over uniform and consistent: 
and it may require many eyes to look out, and search round, that 
every position advanced may agree with all truths, natural and 
revealed, and that no heterogeneous mixture be admitted to deform 
and deface the whole system,34 
Waterland identified the 'many eyes' with antiquity. In subtle ways 
the particular authority of the primitive tradition had been forfeited 
in the early stages of the drift. This trend had intensified resulting 
in an eventual usurping of traditional faith under the pretext of human 
reason. Dislocation from the received tradition resulted in a 
'freewheeling' human subjectivity which authorized both profanity and 
superstition. The two had the same root.JS 
The slightest movement from the established mean of orthodoxy 
would, in Waterland's view, eventually result in a frenzied movement in 
many opposing and forever changing positions. Thus mild Arianism and 
developed Deism shared the same characteristic of a refusal of any 
certain scheme or adherence to one common invariable rule. Adrift from 
the established faith, the inevitable result was an "independent, 
personal various religion, according as every man may fancy". 36 What 
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resulted was a new belief system which was highly unfocussed in terms 
of the received tradition. Waterland astutely noted that Atheists: 
are great believers in their way .... It cannot be pretended that 
they believe less than we, since our creeds reversed (which 
usually make theirs) are as long creeds as before; like as 
traversing the same ground backwards measures the same number of 
paces .. ,,,37 
It seemed that loss of religious belief was replaced by a complex 
belief structure derived from nothing more than the profundities of 
indulgent human fancy. The difference between infidelity and true 
religion did not concern quantity but quality of faith. 
The logic of this move entailed the refusal of all external 
authorities. For various social and practical reasons this did not 
occur in practice.3B However the emptiness of Deistic generalities 
opened up two possible alternatives: either the development of various 
forms of superstition or the complete loss of theistic belief. 
The progressive surrender of the particularities of Christianity did 
not destroy belief per se but rather increased the possibility of 
believing anything. Thus1 from Waterland's stance, the 'superstition of 
Popery' was as plausible as Atheism,39 
The loss of purity of belief was evident in corruption by defect 
but it could also lead to heightened religious superstition, i.e. 
corruption by excess. In this latter category Waterland located 
'Antinomian' and 'Solifidian' tendencies. These tendencies essentially 
concerned aberrations within the received tradition. This happened 
when, for instance, certain 'moderns' reduced the meaning of 
regeneration to something entirely inward,40 In the context of church 
life, the preaching of such a doctrine by the over zealous was 
dangerous to church structure, and spiritual and moral life. Practical 
Christianity was thereby distorted,41 
From Waterland's perspective any movement off the mean would, if 
persisted in and developed, lead to extremes. From this point of view 
corruptions by defect and excess both represented the danger of 
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'enthusiasm' in its differing forms: 
There may be an irreligious phrensy, as well as a religious one; 
and the imagination may be as soon heated with a spirit of 
profaneness, as with the fervours of piety,42 
At the root of both movements was what Waterland approvingly quoted 
from another writer as 'a certain blind and irrational impetus'. 43 
Thus any movement off the mean represented the operation of an 
irrational principle, under the guise of 'reason' in respect of Deism, 
and 'faith' in the case of religious enthusiasm,44 Both involved the 
exaltation of the human imagination as an authority in matters human 
and Divine. In both cases the foundations of true piety were 
destroyed. 45 In the light of Waterland's depiction of 'true and 
sound religion' as 'The due mean between the two extremes', 46 it was 
clear that a retrieval of the fundamentals of the faith would involve a 
restatement of 'the due mean'. 
Countering the Drift: Apology for 'The Golden Mean' 
Waterland located the mean of orthodox belief at the midpoint 
between two opposite extremes. These extremes were corruptions to be 
refused in favour of a fixed and pre-established mid-position. 
Waterland conceived of a simple mean, neither achieved beyond opposites 
which were absorbed and negated in the process, nor an original 
synthesis out of which contraries arose, nor a mean achieved in the 
perpetual oscillation between extremes. 47 To be at the mean was to be 
at the stable and correct position,48 
Movement off the mean was not a movement of the mean to a 
different place on the spectrum bounded by the extremes. Rather, any 
such move represented a change in the actual structure of the mean's 
configuration. On this account any attempt to develop or state 'the 
Golden mean' in an 'unconventional' manner would, if not checked, lead 
to a negation of the mean in favour of an extreme position. 49 Within 
this context corruption was always deviation from the mean; it involved 
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a distancing from the received tradition. There was little scope in 
this conception for communication between competing conceptions of 
orthodoxy. Waterland perceived only one kind of option available; 
response by reassertion of the tradition. 
The Superiority of the Catholic System 
In Waterland's mind orthodoxy had only one form, it presupposed 
certain principles, and achieved certain goals. Although there were 
three schemes, Arian, Socinian and Catholic, only the third truly and 
purely represented the 'middle way' of orthodoxy. The Catholic scheme 
presupposed one true interpretation of Bible and tradition in essential 
matters. This interpretation was the 'received' one and included the 
Catholic language of the early creeds. This Catholic system was 
qualitatively different from other rival systems.so It operated upon 
Trinitarian principles in Scripture, interpreted according to the 
consensus of the primitive Church and focussed in the ancient Nicene 
and Athanasian creeds,51 
Coupled with these positive principles of orthodoxy went a number 
of negative principles of an anti-metaphysical kind. Waterland, in the 
spirit of his age, was suspicious of speculative metaphysics and was 
critical of the Scholastics. Their wanderings from Scriptural and 
primitive Christianity into metaphysics had encouraged the development 
of Arian and Socinian corruptions,52 Undue deference to metaphysical 
speculations provided the fertile soil upon which anti-Trinitarian 
principles could germinate. Waterland conceded that it was in the 
region of metaphysics that the 'middle way' appeared most vulnerable. 
He was confident, however, that opponents would not be able to 
demonstrate that the 'middle way' was not possible. 53 
In Waterland's view, the Catholic system offered consistency and 
completeness. Maintaining this required strict fidelity to the 'middle 
way'. This was achieved as interpretation of Scripture according to 
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Trinitarian principles and primitive teaching in matters essential was 
rigorously adhered to. In this way a path through the intellectual 
puzzles of Sabellianism and Tritheism could be plotted and heresy 
avoided. The finished wholeness of the Catholic system had another 
concomitant feature; whatever aberrations of orthodox belief arose had 
already been dealt with or could be dealt with in terms of the existing 
stable orthodox system. 54 
For Waterland, orthodoxy was something that had been hammered out 
already. Now 
established 
it was simply a question of re-presenting a previously 
formula for faith. The earlier consensus in fundamentals 
had been secured upon good evidence. This included the testimony of 
Scripture, the consent and confirmation of the early Church, and the 
agreement of reason. In this way Waterland deployed the authority of 
the rationalist appeal to evidences and testimony in his recommendation 
of established orthodoxy. 
Extent of the Threat to Faith: The Doctrine of the Trinity and 
Sacraments 
Not surprisingly the intensity of the drift into undifferentiated 
monotheism manifested itself over a whole range of Church teachings. 
The movement towards generalities in religion was thus to be discerned 
intensively and extensively. The threat to Christianity was present at 
the centre of Church teaching in regard to the doctrine of the Trinity. 
It could also be traced in relation to sacramental theology and was 
finally to be observed in the disintegration of the entire fabric of 
the Christian covenant regarding faith, worship and morals. The threat 
thus penetrated to the core and permeated throughout Christian belief 
and practice. Fundamental doctrine was imperilled and to this extent 
what was fundamental in any doctrine was also at risk. Waterland was 
thus obliged to speak about a whole range of matters relevant to the 
preservation of the Catholic system. 
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In relation to the core doctrine of the Christian faith, the 
doctrine of the Trinity, Waterland inquired into its nature and 
status. His early works relating to Arianism and his Vindications of 
The Dil'inity of Christ concerned the nature of the doctrine.55 His 
later work, The Importance of the Doctrine of the Trinity, focussed on 
the status of the doctrine.ss 
The Nature of the Doctrine of the Trinity 
Controversy over the Trinity involved long and tedious arguments 
over the correct Scriptural doctrine of the Trinity. Waterland drew the 
lines of the debate between the Catholic interpretation and other 
systems which in various ways had their roots in an Arian devaluing of 
the divinity of Christ. This presupposed the existence of various rival 
systems embroiled in a conflict. Important in Waterland's defence of 
the Trinity was the priority he gave to system verification. He pursued 
this offensively by mapping out a number of theological difficulties 
that the opposers of the Catholic position were duty bound to address 
and resolve,5 7 Waterland's defence of his position was woven into this 
essentially offensive strategy. 
These concerns were crystallized by Waterland at the end of his 
Second Defence Of Some Queries, wherein he noted that the controversy 
over the Trinity "may easily be brought to a short issue, and be 
comprised in two sheets of paper",58 The 'received' doctrine was 
verifiable on two counts, one negative and the other positive. Thus,as 
to the possibility of the doctrine1 Waterland concluded: "Upon the 
whole, since the doctrine can never be proved to be impossible; it 
must be allowed to be possible",59 In relation to the 'nature of the 
thing' the received doctrine could not be demonstrated with any 
certainty to be contradictory to reason. Positively, Waterland argued 
that Scripture and antiquity clearly gave evidence of the truth of the 
received doctrine. The balance of probabilities remained on the side of 
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the tradition. Strictly speaking this was the 'reasonable' conclusion. 
The Catholic interpretation secured the 'mean' of orthodoxy and 
thereby straddled the orthodox way over against Sabellian and 
Tritheistic distortions,60 The logic of this position meant that 
Church communion could be refused to those who did not embrace the 
received doctrine. One way to avoid this outcome was to adopt the 
strategy developed by the Dutch Remonstrant theologian Episcopus (1583-
1643) and his disciple Limborch(1633-1712), of distinguishing between 
the truth of the doctrine and its importance,6l Whilst not wishing to 
deny that such a distinction in doctrine was legitimate, Waterland 
perceived that, in the context of the above argument, this distinction 
was simply another way of blurring the divide between pure and impure 
belief and thus furthering the cause of Deism. 
The Status of the Doctrine of the Trinity 
Conflict over the Trinity thus shifted to the question of its 
status. The question was clear. What makes a revealed truth 
fundamental ? However, Waterland's approach, of dealing with the chief 
objections to this doctrine's status as a fundamental of the faith, 
gave little scope for a positive reply to the question. Waterland 
devoted his energies to a rebuttal of the objections; 
That the received doctrine of the Trinity is not clear enough to 
be admitted for a fundamental. That it is merely speculative, or 
however, not practical enough to be important. That it is not 
sufficiently insisted upon in scripture, as of necessity to 
salvation, 52 
In response to the first objection Waterland argued that, at the 
'general level', the Trinitarian mystery was clearly 'conceived' and 
believed, even by common Christians. However he noted that, "even 
mysterious doctrines have a bright side, as well as a dark one; and 
they are clear to look upon, though too deep to be seen through",63 The 
right Trinitarian faith was 'short and plain': 
Any plain man may easily conceive, that Father, Son, and Holy 
Ghost are properly divine, are not one the other, and yet are one 
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God, by an intimate union; and that the Son in particular, being 
God and man, is one Christ,64 
In Waterland's view, to believe ths about God was, it seemed, to hold 
to the article of the Trinity "in its native simplicity, as laid down 
in scripture". 65 Indeed Scripture, "in its plain, natural, obvious, 
unforced meaning, says it, and reason does not gainsay it: upon these 
two pillars our cause rests". 66 It was only when false metaphysics 
intruded into Scripture interpretation that the clarity of Scripture 
as to the doctrine of the Trinity was obscured. 
To counter the charge of the doctrine's speculative nature 
Waterland argued that the doctrine of the Trinity was, "strictly 
PRACTICAL and closel.v interwol'en with the Principles of The Christian 
lit'e". 67 Finally as to the question of scriptural significance, 
Waterland suggested that, 
if the truth of a doctrine be fully and plainly taught in 
Scripture, and it appears from the nature and quality of the 
doctrine itself, that it is important, and that much depends upon 
it, then scripture has by plain consequence declared the necessity 
of believing such doctrine, by declaring its truth. 68 
The importance of any doctrine was not to be judged merely from 
express declarations of it in Scripture but also from the nature and 
quality of the doctrine itself, its relation to other parts of revealed 
religion, and the dangers of refusing it. The witness of antiquity, 
the form of the ancient creeds, the baptism formularies, and the words 
of Christ himself gave a cumulative force to argument about the 
importance of a doctrine,69 
A more positive rationale for the status of the doctrine was 
touched on by Waterland only in an oblique manner. In this respect he 
proposed that the status of a doctrine depended upon its significance 
for the vitals of Christianity. Waterland was fairly confident that 
this relation could, in general, be recognised, though he was equally 
certain that a complete catalogue of fundamentals could not be given. 70 
Fundamental doctrines had the function of preserving the 'Gospel' faith 
'whole and entire'. 71 In this way fundamentals would be those truths 
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connected with 'the whole economy of man's salvation by Christ'. 72 
On other occasions Waterland indicated his reasons for the high 
status he accorded the Trinitarian doctrine in the hierarchy of belief. 
He pointed to the importance of the doctrine for directing, 
determining, and energizing all aspects of Christian worship and 
practice. 73 The doctrine was described as foundational, necessarily 
involving and securing other important doctrines, e.g. doctrines of the 
atonement and of grace.74 
Mistakes in the doctrine of the Trinity affected 'the very form 
and essence of Christianity' such that the 'very life and soul of it' 
were lost. 7 5 This was inevitable given Waterland's view that the 
doctrine 'runs through every part of Christian theology' giving it 'a 
new force and spirit'. 76 He suggested that insofar as the doctrine was 
"interwoven with the very frame and texture of the Christian 
religion'', 77 it provided the rationale for the whole scheme and economy 
of redemption. The object of this scheme was to bring humankind into 
'an acquaintance' with the divine Trinity. As such the doctrine 
belonged to the 'the very life and spirit' of Christianity. 78 
Trinitarian Formalization 
Waterland's suspicion that the 'moderns' had actually lost sight 
of the object of faith itself fuelled his antagonism to new ways of 
communicating the faith. The only option he saw available was 
restatement of the received tradition. Implicit in Waterland's re-
presentation of the faith was an isomorphic correspondence between the 
doctrine of the Trinity and the reality it referred to. To depart from 
the particular received form was to risk loss of the reality itself. 79 
He noted that the technical terms introduced into the history of the 
Trinitarian controversy were in fact only 'names' and 'terms' . 80 Even 
if such 'conventions' were dispensed with it would not, in his view, 
damage the reality of the doctrine itself. It was, after all, there 
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before the technical language emerged. NeverthelessJone result of 
Waterland's development of a tight one-to-one correspondence between 
language and reality was that retrieval and repetition of traditional 
Trinitarian language was proposed as the only means of satisfying the 
demand for purity in the faith. 
The problem in Waterland's approach became evident in his failure 
to develop a sustained positive argument for the doctrine of the 
Trinity. He spoke rather generally of grading belief in relation to the 
'vitals' of Christianity. What remained unclarified was the way in 
which the 'vitals' of Christianity were apprehended, came to form and 
directed Church life. 
At one level this failure was the result of the domination in 
Waterland's apologetic of defensive manoeuvres. What was lacking was a 
positive recommendation of Trinitarianism. In this respect Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge, a later critical admirer of Waterland, discerned his 
failure ''to present the Idea itself of the great Doctrine''. 81 For 
Coleridge this failure raised a suspicion that the Trinitarian reality 
"was never in its cloudless Unity present to him",8 2 Coleridge found 
support for his view in Waterland's tendency to treat the doctrine of 
the Trinity simply as 
a peculiarity of positive Religion which is to be cleared of all 
contradiction to Reason, and then, thus negatively qualified, to 
be actually received by an act of the mere Will,83 
Coleridge's perceptive comments suggest that Waterland's vigorous 
advocacy of the doctrine of the Trinity was in fact subsumed within a 
dominant monarchial doctrine of God. This problem reappears in the 
consideration of Waterland's development of the fundamentals of the 
Christian covenant in Part Two of this Chapter. 
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Sacramental Theology 
The loss of a distinctly Trinitarian form of belief in central 
matters of faith would inevitably lead, in Waterland's view, to a loss 
of what was fundamental in other doctrines. There was in his mind an 
appropriate Trinitarian form of belief which should be evident 
throughout the theological system. Waterland's extensive writings on 
sacramental theology reflect this view,B4 
Waterland's desire to talk about sacraments was motivated by his 
concern to reinstate the sacramental ordinances as fundamental to the 
operation of the Christian covenant. He discerned a general devaluing 
of the sacramental ordinances. It could be detected among those divines 
who, out of a desire to commend a life of moral virtue, espoused an 
'instrumentalist' view of sacraments. Thus Samuel Clarke, while 
recognizing sacraments as being generally necessary to salvation, 
maintained that they were simply means to an end - the life of virtue 
and godliness,85 Thjs instrumentalist view could, in Waterland's 
opinion, only quicken the demise of sacraments altogether and provide 
ammunition for less well intentioned religious thinkers to complete the 
logic of this view and dispense with sacraments altogether,8 6 
Instrumentalism was not only reductive theology, it also led to the 
disintegration of the covenant. In its Socinian form it operated to 
undermine the very thing sought, morality itself. 87 
Waterland's apologetic for the covenant sacraments was undergirded 
by the supposition that sacramental theology functioned as a barometer 
of a right holding to the God of the Christian covenant. This meant 
that the health of the fundamental articles of the faith would be 
manifest in sacramental theology and that dangers to the tradition 
would also emerge there. 
It was in this context that Waterland became embroiled in 
controversy over the Eucharist. This occurred initially at a more 
general level in a critique of Samuel Clarke's instrumentalist 
178 
VI: Waterland's Defence 
sacramental theology. Later Waterland refuted Bengamine Hoadley's 
Socinian view of the Eucharist. Later still he responded to the views 
espoused by Thomas Brett and John Johnson on the nature of sacrifice 
and sacrament. 88 In these controversies Waterland sought to restore a 
richer sacramental theology as a counter to the perceived distortions 
of his opponents. 
Instrumentalism Rebutted 
Against Clarke's instrumentalism, in which sacraments as 'positive 
institutions' were subordinated to 'moral duties', Waterland argued for 
an integrated position in which sacraments, as 'super-added' positive 
duties, perfected all moral duties. Waterland considered that the 
distinction between positive and moral duties was purely notional. 
Sacraments were not merely means to virtue but, as an 'exercise' of 
one's love of God under the Gospel dispensation ''sometimes the 
noblest and best exercise of it" B9 - the sacraments possessed (in the 
worthy participant) virtue in themselves as "part of our moral and 
Christian holiness, piety, and perfection'',90 As such, moral virtue in 
Clarke's sense was ''but the handmaid leading to the door of salvation, 
which the use of the sacraments at length opens, and lets us in",91 
Similarly, sacraments could be understood as 'additional' improvements 
to virtuous practice by 'augmenting' them and thus, "rendering them 
saving by the application of Christ's all sufficient expiation to 
them",92 Accordingly, the Christian Sacraments (Baptism and Eucharist) 
were to be regarded "as Divine ordinances, and as the springs of the 
spiritual life, productive of moral virtues, and perfective of them",93 
Review of the Eucharist 
In an attempt to recover a more balanced view of sacraments 
Waterland developed a eucharistic theology informed throughout by what 
might be called 'a qualified realism' appropriate to his central 
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churchmanship,94 He argued against an incipient reductionism and an 
'objectivist' realism in sacramental theology. Advocates of the former 
group, to a lesser or greater degree, "exclude God, as it were out of 
the sacraments •.. " and "reduce all to a bare human performance". 95 This 
resulted in a barren and ineffectual symbolism; the sign was retained, 
the 'thing itself' was lost. 96 This socinian view of the sacraments, 
typified for Waterland in the doctrine of the Eucharist espoused by 
Bengamine Hoadley, was countered by Waterland's stronger focus on the 
derivation of the sacramental character of the Eucharist from the 
Divine goodness.97 
The Socinian depreciation of the sacramental character of the 
Eucharist resulted in an impoverished understanding of sacraments and 
their function in Christianity. Over against Socinian views which 
restricted the eucharistic anamnesis to a merely commemorative human 
act, Waterland fleshed out a far richer notion in which, following the 
early church apologist Justin Martyn, he referred to the Eucharist as 
an 'emblem' of the incarnate logos. 98 The sacraments generally, and in 
particular the elements of bread and wine, operated in a representative 
and 'exhibitive' manner in relation to the thing signified. Drawing 
upon Hooker, Waterland appealed to a legal analogy; 
A deed of conveyance, or any like instrument under hand and 
seal, is not a real estate, but it conveys one; and it is in 
effect the estate itself, as the estate goes along with it; and 
as the right, title, and property (which are real acquirements) 
are, as it were, bound up in it, and subsists by it. 9 9 
The merits of the analogy aside, it was clear that Waterland's 
'figurative' expressions were designed to recover a more adequate 
theology of symbol wherein "some real thing is in just construction and 
certain effect allowed to be another thing" ,1 o o 
In this context 'commemoration' became a participation in the 
benefits of the passion of Christ,l 01 'Feeding' in the Eucharist was of 
a spiritual kind, in contrast to the Romanist's stress on sacramental 
feeding,l02 Furthermore, against the Socinians, such spiritual feeding 
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was not to be understood in a narrow way, i.e. as 'declarative', of 
receiving Christ's 'doctrine and promises',l03 Rathe~ it was generative 
of a 'mystical union',l04 in which one fed upon the death and passion 
of Christ.lOS In this 'feeding' benefits were received including 
'remission of sins' and 'sanctifying grace',l06 
Waterland's sacramental realism was, as already indicated, a 
qualified realism. Communion and reception of the spiritual presence 
of Christ and his benefits presupposed ''the worthy use of the sacred 
symbols'' . 107 The qualified nature of his eucharistic realism was most 
apparent in his rebuttals of the more thoroughgoing objectivism of the 
Roman variety and in a different Protestant form typified by Thomas 
Brett and John Johnson.IOB In this respect Waterland referred to 
consecration as conferring a 'relative' holiness on the elements, "on 
account of their relation to what they represent, or point to" ,109 
In his consideration of the sacrificial dimension of the Eucharist 
Waterland argued against the notion of 'material sacrifice' and 
attempted to recover the language of sacrifice in Protestantism by 
reference to the Eucharist as a 'spiritual sacrifice'. 110 In this 
regard Cudworth's earlier espousal of the Eucharist as 'a feast upon a 
sacrifice' was taken up: 
The Eucharist, considered as a Sacrament is indeed representative 
and exhibitive of the archetypal sacrifice; not as offered but as 
feasted upon by us, given and applied by God and Christ to every 
worthy receiver,lll 
Sacraments and Fundamentals Issues 
As in the doctrine of God so in sacramental theology Waterland 
sought pure and correct statements which avoided the dangers of 
reductionism (sacramental profanation) and superstition. What was at 
stake was the character and status of sacraments in Christianity. A 
deeper theological undercurrent here was the problem of Christianity's 
mediate forms. Deprecation of sacramental theory and practice was 
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symptomatic of a more generally diminished sense of God's presence in 
the world. Waterland's qualified sacramental realism, whichpresupposed 
a return to a mean position, was an attempt to recover what had been 
lost in this regard. For Waterland a right grasp of the fundamentals 
. ) 
of the faith would be clearly manifest in the area of sacramental 
theology and practice. Discourses on the sacraments became for him the 
arena upon which fundamentals issues were resolved. 
In Waterland's view, those suspicious of the plausibility of the 
'middle way' of orthodox Trinitarian doctrine would naturally be 
suspicious of the construction of a sacramental theology which was 
sufficiently rich in its inclusiveness but exclusive of the 
extremes. 1 12 From another point of view the rejection of 'the Golden 
mean' of orthodoxy was, in Waterland's mind, simply the logic of a 
Trinitarian reductionism which was moralistic and anti-symbolic in 
matters religious. 
For Waterland the matter was simple: the eucharistic mean was 
derived from a correct conception of the Trinitarian mean: 
The view is, that the life and soul, as it were, of the 
Eucharistical remembrance, lies in the due consideration of the 
Divine dignity of the Person whose passion we there remember,l 13 
Here1 orthodoxy in the doctrine of Christ had to be reflected in the 
doctrine of eucharistic anamnesis. Furthermore, this matter could not 
be resolved at a general level for all parties were in agreement that 
the Eucharist was a remembrance. This foundational principle had to be 
teased out in the 'superstructure' of meaning. 1 14 What was fundamental 
in eucharistic theology could only be achieved through an extensive 
unravelling of the articles tradition in its sacramental form. The 
implication was that wholeness in orthodox belief could only be 
recaptured through attention to particulars,11 5 
Slight changes in the core doctrinal areas would have far reaching 
changes in the dimension of sacramental practice, e.g, preparation for 
and obligation to attend communion. 1 16 In Waterland's view, a right 
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holding to the fundamentals of the faith would be evident in correct 
sacramental theology and practice. 
Waterland's defensive strategy was evident in his tendency to 
offer smooth renderings of Patristic material (e.g. on eucharistic 
sacrifice) and in his somewhat restricted focus on the Eucharist in 
relation to a medieval preoccupation with the passion.ll7 This 
defensive frame of mind was particularly highlighted in his development 
of sacraments as boundary markers or 'scaffolding' supporting the 
fundamental articles of the Christian system. 
In a Clergy Charge on "The Doctrinal Use of The Christian 
Sacraments'', Waterland examined the use of the sacraments for 
confirming the Christian faith and its 'prime articles',ll8 At a 
general level Waterland referred to the sacraments as, "standing 
monuments of the truth of Christianity against Atheists, Deists, Jews, 
Turks, Pagans and all kinds of infidels",ll9 He examined the way in 
which, down through history, the sacraments had functioned as 'fences 
or barriers' of the 'most essential articles' of Christianity: 
The doctrine of the visible creation by God most high: the 
doctrine of our redemption by Christ, both God and man: the 
doctrine of sanctifying grace by the Holy Spirit of God, a real 
Person, and also Divine: the doctrines of original sin, and of 
our Lord's meritorious sacrifice, and of a future resurrection 
of the body: these, and as many others as are contained in 
these, have all been eminently preserved and held up by the 
Christian Sacraments.12o 
According!~ such 'sacred deposites' (sacraments) had to be preserved 
for, said Waterland, " Christianity itself appears to be so entirely 
wrapped up in them, that, humanly speaking, it must unavoidably stand 
or fall with them".l21 
Thus 1 in Waterland's theolog~ the sacraments functioned in a 
twofold way. Firstly, as a means for performing the covenant. To this 
extent they had their own place within the logic of the system. 
Secondly, they represented the logic of the entire system in a 
concentrated symbolic form, through which the articles tradition could 
be preserved, its purity monitored and the threat of drift into 
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undifferentiated monotheism rebutted. 
The Ecclesiological View: Preserving the Boundaries of the Church 
The fate of the articles tradition had important consequences for 
Waterland's treatment of certain ecclesiological matters concerning the 
stability and firmness of institutional Christianity. In particula~ 
Waterland was concerned with the problem of clearly delineating the 
boundary between acceptable and unacceptable Church belief. 
Blurring of Boundaries: The Case of Arian Subscription 
Despite the relative lack of any self-conscious reflection on 
ecclesiology per se, it is clear that Waterland's perception of the 
threat to the Church had to do with the twin problems of boundary 
disintegration and maintenance. Disintegration began initially as a 
'blurring' within the tradition. Waterland's early discourse on Arian 
Subscription1 22 is instructive in this respect. Ostensibly the matter 
concerned the propriety or otherwise of Samuel Clarke's proposal that 
clerical assent could be accorded to the 'Public forms' of the Church 
(including creeds, Articles and liturgy) "whenever he [a cleric] can in 
any sense at all reconcile them with scripture",l2J 
Waterland considered that the introduction of an ambiguity here 
was a ploy to justify subscription by those of an Arian persuasion. The 
issue was thus a moral one, "not of the fundamentals of faith, but of 
the principles of moral honesty".l24 Waterland exposed the fraudulent 
nature of subscription in this 'new scheme' which disregarded the 
meaning of the public forms as originally intended by compilers and 
imposers in the light of the sixth Article of Religion. 
Waterland stressed that subscription was not "a term of lay-
communion but rather of ministerial responsibility",l25 a matter of 
'Church Trusts' not 'Church Communion', of 'not-admitting' to 
ministerial responsibility as opposed to 'ejecting' from ecclesiastial 
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communion. 12 6 The subscription issue was, in Waterland's mind, 
primarily a question of the inner purity of Church life. Church 
teachers should be morally responsible to lead the 'common folk' in the 
way of orthodoxy 'in the fundamentals of Christianity',l27 
Subscription in what Waterland regarded as the Arian sense was, he 
felt, a way of smuggling heretical notions concerning the doctrine of 
the Trinity into the Church in an improper way. The subscription issue 
became the focus for dispute over the doctrine of the Trinity. In this 
context there was simply no room for ambiguity in assent. What was at 
stake was "the honour of our most holy religion, and the security of 
Church and State. , • , ''. 12 B 
The subscription issue presented itself as one of purity concerning 
ministerial responsibility, however the more critical issue concerned 
the maintenance of the Church's institutional structures. This was 
inevitable given the view that, "The Doctrine of a co-eternal Trinity 
is really a fundamental Article, and such as our Church declares to be 
necessary to salvation",l29 This view later led Waterland to conclude 
in The Importance of the Doctrine of the Trinity, that Church communion 
ought to be refused to those who 'openly rejected' the fundamental 
doctrines of Christianity,l30 
The subscription issue had presented itself as an issue of inner 
ecclesial purity. Given Waterland's concern for securing institutional 
stability by strict clerical adherence to official formularies it was 
inevitable that the blurring in acceptable belief within a church 
would quickly develop into a more thoroughgoing problem of 
disintegration of the boundaries between true and false Church belief. 
The supposition was that boundaries operated as mechanisms for 
separating and dividing. 
The fundamental articles tradition was implicated quite directly 
in this insofar as the 'public forms' enshrined the fundamentals of the 
faith. Ambiguity in assent was but the first step in 
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disintegration of that faith. The demands of Church purity and unity, 
insofar as they were shaped by law-like conceptions of a Covenantal 
God, required subscription to certain fixed formulas of assent. Failure 
to achieve uniformity here would undermine any attempt to maintain 
boundaries for the Church. 
Boundary Maintenance: The Value of Covenant Sacraments 
As 'standing monuments' to the faith, covenant sacraments 
preservered the 'prime articles' of the Christian system. Thus, in the 
matter of 
discipline 
Baptism) Waterland considered that 
occurred when the doctrines 
confusion over Church 
of justification and 
regeneration were misunderstood. This was implied in Waterland's 
discourse on Regeneration,l3l He noted how the practice of infant 
baptism was brought into disrepute by those who urged people already 
baptised in infancy, to be born anew or to become regenerated. 1 3 2 Such 
teaching, often born of a passionate enthusiasm, could easily lead the 
people astray into a preoccupation with inward feelings and promptings, 
which were the forerunner of all kinds of strong delusions.lJJ 
Good sacramental practice indicated right holding to the 
fundamentals of the faith. Confusion over entry rites (Baptism) and 
rites of endurance (Eucharist) in the Church, blurred boundaries and 
destabilized the institution. Correct sacramental doctrine secured 
and preserved Church order and clarified the limits of acceptable 
belief and practice. 
Institutional Stability: Fundamentals as Covenant Securities 
The significance of the articles tradition as Church boundary 
markers was nowhere more clearly evident than in Waterland's "Discourse 
of Fundamentals". In this "Discourse" Waterland sought clarification 
of the terms of communion in response to the sense of confusion arising 
from the influence of Deism. 13 4 In this context the fundamental 
186 
VI: Waterland's Defence 
articles functioned as symbols of purity and danger. To hold to them in 
belief and practice was to remain within the covenant. To depart from 
the received tradition was to move into the region of danger and risk 
crossing the border into unchurch. Covenant law spelt out expectations 
for belief, worship and morals in a comprehensive manner. The 
boundary, for purposes of determining matters of church communion, was 
sharply defined. 
PART II THE FUNDAMENTALS RESTORED: The Nature of the Christian 
Covenant 
This Chapter has focussed on the fundamental articles tradition as 
it was implicated in Waterland's particular response to threatened 
ecclesial existence. This threat was observed to be intense, wide 
ranging, and important ecclesiologically. Water land's response 
indicated just how much discussion of fundamentals was developed in 
terms of oppositions. Increasing vigour in denial of orthodoxy 
generated stronger reassertion of the 'received' tradition. In this way 
of handling controversy the form of the fundamental articles tradition 
was derived from and determined by a theological dialectic which 
presupposed strong system conflict. 
The Form of the Fundamental Articles System 
The Presupposition: System Rivalry 
By the time Waterland wrote the 'system' concept had been adopted 
and developed by the European intellectual world. From the second half 
of the seventeenth century 'system', 
came to be construed as a particular approach to a certain subject 
a particular theory or doctrine about it as articulated in 
an organized complex of concordant hypothesis, a nexus 
veritatum. 1 35 
The use of the term 'system' in relation to complexes of competing 
doctrines provided the necessary background for the development of 
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system rivalry. Though this exposed the term to controversy and left 
it open to disrepute there is no doubt that the employment of the 
concept in precisely the above manner was central to Waterland's 
theological enterprise. His primary concern was with 'the whole system 
of the Christian religion',l3 6 though of course the nature of this 
system worked for the well being 'of the whole rational system',l37 In 
confuting the Deist Waterland could refer to Christianity as "the best 
and only complete system of morality that ever the world was blessed 
with. • ,"138 
Waterland wrote within an environment dominated by a multiplicity 
of systems both within Christianity ( e.g. Arian, Socinian, Calvinist, 
Roman) and without ( e.g. Pantheism, Atheism). Each system operated 
according to its own principles. The situation was one of contestl39 in 
which there could only be one winner. Different ideas unravelled into 
opposite systems,lto System rivalry was the presupposition of 
theological polemic. 
The lengthy Trinitarian controversy was resolved into a contest 
involving three systems; the Socinian, the Arian and the Catholic or 
ancient system. Waterland's particular task was to defend the 
Catholic system as the only one and true system.l4l Notwithstanding its 
heritage in Scripture and antiquity, it was a scheme superior to others 
by virtue of its simplicity, consistency and completeness,l 4Z Other 
rival systems were spurious, being the fabrications of the human 
imagination adrift from Scripture, tradition and right reason. In short, 
the Catholic system, i.e. traditional orthodoxy, was simply the 
received one. Others were newly created,l43 
System Structure: Covenant fundamentals 
The orthodox system had a particular structure and it was 
precisely in Waterland's attempt to identify the system's structural 
components that which gave it its own particular 
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significance in contrast to other systems - that the appeal to the 
fundamental articles tradition came into focus.l44 The system 
structure was expressed in terms of Christianity's fundamental 
articles. Drawing upon an earlier definition, Waterland defined a 
fundamental doctrine as 
a doctrine as is in strict sense of the essence of 
Christianity, without which the whole building and superstructure 
must fall; the belief of which is necessary to the very being of 
Christianity ,,,,145 
Waterland appeared to import considerable confusion into this 
definition when he elsewhere referred to fundamentals in 'religion or 
Christianity' as matters "so necessary to its being, or at least to its 
well-being, that it could not subsist, or maintain itself tolerably 
without it". 14 6 This attribution of 'existence' and 'perfection' in 
the same definition of fundamentals was interpeted a century later by 
Wi 11 iam Palmer as evidence of the problem of ambiguity and 
contradiction in fundamentals discussion.l47 For Waterland, the 
central issue was one of identifying 'the essentials of the Christian 
fabric or system'.l48 Elsewhere he had noted that an article's 
fundamentality could be guaged, 
according as it more or less affects the whole system of 
Christian religion, (as there is a difference between the 
beams and the rafters in a building), or as it is more or 
connected with the two great commandments, the love of God, 
the love of our neighbour,l49 
the 
main 
less 
and 
Accordingly, in "A Discourse of Fundamentals" Waterland, following 
in large measure the learned German Lutheran Samuel Pufendorf {1632-
94), developed the Christian system in terms of those fundamentals 
constitutive of the Christian covenant. For Waterland those doctrines 
and practices "intrinsical or essential to the Christian covenant are 
fundamental truths, and such as are plainly and directly subversive of 
it are fundamental errors",lSO 
Covenant requirements included: two parties (a divine founder and 
a respondent capable of being freely covenanted with); the agreement as 
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evidenced in sacred Scripture; a Divine mediator (Jesus Christ, very 
God and very man) through whose meritorious sacrifice, atonement and 
justification were achieved; covenant conditions, including repentance 
and a holy life; means to covenant fulfillment, including the two 
sacraments and the assistance of the Holy Spirit (in this context the 
co-eternal Trinity was deemed a fundamental doctrine); and finally, 
sanctions to bind the covenant, including the fundamental doctrines of 
a future state, resurrection, final judgement, heaven and hell. 
Insofar as this Christian Covenant was the one true system, it was 
axiomatic that it included those components necessary for its being and 
its perfection. A distinction here would threaten the completeness and 
consistency of the system, a consideration ignored by Palmer in his 
critique of Waterland's view. The designation 'non-fundamentals' or 
'extra-fundamentals' referred to those matters to do with faith, 
worship and morality extraneous to the covenant,l51 
The covenant motif was not only important in its own right, it 
also had high pragmatic value in providing a rather neat scheme within 
which the conventional doctrines of orthodoxy could be ordered and the 
message of redemption presented. In this scheme the doctrine of the 
Trinity was accorded a consequential position in the hierarchy of 
belief. This was rather odd considering the great energy Waterland had 
expended in defence of the doctrine. In terms of the logic of the 
covenant, it was invoked as an implicate of belief in the Holy Spirit 
who provided the means for covenantal obedience. This may have simply 
reflected a particular way of ordering articles within a covenantal 
approach to Christianity. However, the fact that the doctrine of the 
Trinity had been dislocated from initial statements identifying the 
need for a covenanting God, betrayed what was earlier referred to as an 
implicit monarchialism in Waterland's doctrine of God. 1 52 
Waterland's rule for determining fundamentals had affinities with 
other ways of resolving the question of fundamental articles. To 
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resolve an article's fundamentality according to its relation "with the 
general and comprehensive article of salvation by Christ'', or in terms 
of those doctrines necessary to God's love towards humankind and 
appropriate response to that love, or in terms of the "necessary 
connection which it has with the acts and functions of Christian life", 
were different ways of securing the same thing,l53 
A complete catalogue of fundamental articles was neither required 
nor practical in respect of particular individuals. 15 4 It seemed that 
the urge to quantify was born of the desire to develop a system 
structure adequate for distinguishing pure from impure belief systems. 
In this context what was important was firstly fixing a rule for 
determining the true form of Christianity and secondly, applying the 
rule for the stating of the faith. 
Certain rules for determining fundamentals were faulty because 
they could not spawn a genuine and complete Christian system. 
Waterland, in the second half of the "Discourse", identified ten such 
faulty rules: the definition of the churches, either primitive or 
Roman; the appeal to all Scripture truths; Scripture truths expressly 
taught; or Scripture truths expressly declared necessary; the rule of 
the Apostles I Creed; the appeal to the first two verses of Hebrews I ) 
-, 
Chapter Six; Locke's rule of belief that Jesus is the Messiah; 
universality of agreement among Christians; Herbert of Cherbury's rule 
of universality of agreement of the whole of mankind; and finally the 
rule that comprised fundamentals into the single article of the good 
life. All such rules were, in Waterland's view, faulty either by 
excess or defect. The application of such rules created significant 
system distortion. 
The matter was of more than theoretical importance. It had direct 
implications for the resolution of the terms of communion. Communion 
could be legitimately refused to those who did not hold to the 
fundamental articles of the faith that secured the covenant system. The 
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fundamental articles tradition was thus directly implicated with the 
identification of the boundaries between various rival systems. The 
Christian system, in its particular structure of fundamental doctrines, 
monitored the limits of inclusiveness in the Church. As such the 
articles tradition functioned as the theological guardian of the vitals 
of faith, morals and worship of the Christian covenant. The fundamental 
articles were the doctrinal symbols of purity and danger. 
In the history of fundamentals discussion Waterland's "Discourse" 
ranks as one of the most able and systematic treatments of the problem 
by an Anglican theologian.l 5 5 The general question of the truth and 
purity in faith, a question which had been discussed earlier by Laud, 
Chillingworth, Stillingfleet and others in relation to the Church of 
Rome and questions of infallibility, had now been developed by 
Waterland in response to major challenges to fundamental beliefs 
hitherto accepted by most parties in controversy,l56 Waterland's 
reflections were strengthened by his wide learning and intimate 
acquaintance with the history of the discussion among Continental 
Protestants as well as those of the Church of England. 
The "Discourse" drew together in a concentrated form the important 
theological work of his career. Indeed, from the perspective of the 
''Discourse", Waterland's writings on the Trinity and sacraments 
represented his own efforts to develop in more extended and particular 
ways arguments for the truth and importance of the orthodox system and 
its structure. In the light of the "Discourse" it was clear that 
Waterland's aim had been to demonstrate the superiority of the 
Christian system and to justify its fundamental articles. 
Waterland's Maximalism in Stating the Faith 
Waterland's discussion of fundamental articles identified him 
firmly as a maximiser of the tradition, particularly for example, in 
relation to the latitudinarian position espoused by John Locke. 
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Covenant requirements were quite extensive and specific, no doubt to 
counter point-for-point (so to speak) threats to the system. 
Significantly too, fundamentals discussion had been focussed entirely 
upon those things necessary for church communion. Waterland considered 
that the varying capacities of individuals made it impossible to fix a 
rule for determining necessary belief, let alone specifying a list of 
required beliefs. 
He had asserted, however, that "Fundamentals in their abstract 
view are of a fixed determined nature as much as Christianity itself 
is, and may be ascertained by plain unalterable rules". 157 This 
signified a heavy investment in clarifying correct belief and practice 
commensurate with institutional loyalty. Though even here Waterland, 
following Chillingworth and certain Continental Protestants, argued 
that it was 
not necessary to exhibit any complete catalogue either of 
fundamental truths or errors: it is sufficient that we have a 
certain rule to conduct by, whenever any question arises about 
church communion, heresy, schism, or the like,l58 
From an increasing plethora of rules for fundamentals, Waterland 
had identified what he felt provided 'a certain rule' for resolving 
fundamentals in the present and future. One implication was that the 
question of fundamental belief was an open-ended matter. Waterland's 
handling of the issue also suggested that those 'verities essential to 
the life of Christianity', were variable upwards in a cumulative 
fashion. This implicit maximalist position was, perhaps, the reason 
why Waterland counselled for caution in deciding whether an article 'be 
fundamental or otherwise'. 
Waterland's scheme of covenant fundamentals had been developed in 
an effort to expunge the Church of the contamination of faith 
associated with the drift into undifferentiated monotheism. This 
purification process was largely prosecuted in terms of negativities. 
It was a matter of exposing the faults in arguments critical of the 
tradition and of clearing the ground for the reassertion of what the 
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faith was thought to have been. What was reasserted was conventional 
orthodoxy in a comprehensive and quite particular form. The covenant 
motif provided an important strategy by which this could be achieved. 
Divine law was positive and non-negotiable. Obedience was the 
appropriate response. The covenant system, and by implication the 
fundamental articles tradition, operated as those means for the 
communication of Waterland's objectified and static conception of 
Divine reality. This larger framework generated some significant 
distortions for theological discourse generally and in consequence for 
Waterland's handling of the tradition of fundamental articles. This 
Chapter concludes with a brief assessment of the quality of 
Waterland's system of fundamental belief. 
System Quality: Further Assessments 
Purity and Contingency 
To secure the system against the intrusion of impurities and 
distortions Waterland's programme involved two key manoeuvres. Firstl~ 
the eighteenth century debate was systematically relocated into another 
age,l59 The modern enemies were none other than the Arians and 
Sabellians of the fourth century. By a selective use of the past and an 
appeal to the uncontroverted fact that the Arians of the fourth century 
were heretical, it was not difficult to unravel the outcome of the 
eighteenth century Trinitarian controversies in terms of the victory of 
the orthodox system. This greatly simplified the resolution of 
conflict. 
evidence, 
But 
neat 
it involved smooth renderings of 
solutions for diversity, 1 60 and 
certain patristic 
disregard for the 
different historical contexts involved. Indeed the supposition was that 
the system operated at a meta-historical level and as such it could 
easily be transferred and adapted to any particular historical context. 
Secondly, Waterland's apologetic entailed a particular view of how 
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'systems' operate. Michael Polanyi has argued that stable systems 
necessarily operate with an inherent circularity. Successive threats 
to the system are dealt with one at a time. On each occasion a 
challenge is contextualised by a much wider implicit framework of 
belief,l 61 As each assertion in the system is in turn doubted and 
consequently confirmed by circularity, the refutation of each 
consecutive doubt results in strengthening the fundamental convictions 
in the system. In this way challenges are internalised and resolved 
within the existing system. 
Related to this is a second aspect of stable systems by which the 
system is able to supply from its reserves successive elaborations of 
the system which are able to cover all conceivable contingencies. Both 
circularity and self-expansion are mechanisms that protect an existing 
system from threats. Both are complemented by the power of a stable 
system to deny to any rival conception the basis of its attack. These 
three aspects of a stable system are measures of its completeness but 
they are also measures of its closedness. 
Waterland's manner of argument evidenced the above features. 
Threats to the system were dealt with one at a time. The early 
writings on the Trinity and Christology involved long and tedious 
attention to certain theological queries, with each one being examined, 
defended and opposing views rebutted. The result was the vindication 
of the system which in consequence appeared to be stronger for the 
controversy.l62 The method suited an apologetic designed to negate 
threats. 
In Christianity Vindicated against Infidelity, Waterland countered 
the Deists' retreat to a natural religion shorn of its specifically 
Christian revelation. He developed an argument refined from the early 
apologists which proposed, 
that the Gentile world, before Christ came, had, at sundry times, 
and in divers manners, some beams of Divine light sent them from 
above, to help the dimness of the light of nature. 1 63 
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In this way the ground was cut from under infidelity which could not 
prove that 'natural light' was not informed by Divine revelation.l64 
In this case the system was able to cope with threat by drawing upon 
its own reserves to assimilate and thus defeat the counter proposal. 
The assumption was that communication between systems was impossible. 
Each system was exclusivist,l65 
Waterland's theological programme presupposed an enclosed non-
contingent system. This was the price of stability. The transferability 
of the system to any period of time - its great virtue for Waterland -
also meant that the system was unable to respond to contingency. The 
system was stable but potentially quite redundant. 
Options in a Closed System 
This system redundancy was evident in Waterland's apologetic as a 
problem of theological repetition. The fundamental articles tradition 
appeared locked in a system which could only operate by repeating 
itself. Some of the more particular features of this have already been 
identified: location of the richness of the faith at a 'mean' position 
given in its finishedness in a past epoch; the securing of this 'mean' 
by retrieval of a particular complex of faith language; a tight 
hierarchical system of belief unable to admit internal change, and a 
fundamentally defensive theological stance with a high focus on 
ecclesial boundary maintenance. 
To the extent that theological repetition was a product of an 
enclosed, non-contingent system, it was quite clear that the 
contingent and surprising novelty of history could not interact with 
the articles tradition. The force of this potentially damaging 
criticism was irrelevant given the basic presupposition of the system; 
that nothing genuinely new and surprising could arise in relation to 
the fundamentals of the faith. Every conceivable contingency had 
already been covered, at least potentially. 1 66 Furthermore, novelty 
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itself was a witness against the truth,l67 Similarly, what often 
appeared as new was simply 'an old exploded speculation',l68 To 
introduce linguistic innovations was ipso facto to reduce the faith,l69 
The danger was that new ideas would be smuggled in under cover of old 
terms,l 70 
This perspective greatly enhanced the status of the past which, in 
Waterland's case, was focussed on the first three centuries of 
Christian antiquity. 171 The supposition was that those ages closest to 
the source of revelation were the 'purest and best', the safest and 
most reliable. 172 Due reverence for the tradition protected one from 
endorsing arbitrary human opinions,l73 After all, Christianity was an 
ancient 'fact',l74 
Orthodoxy Reasserted: The Reductivist Trap 
The reassertive drive in Waterland's theology generated repetitive 
discourse. The problem was, however, that Waterland's apology for 
orthodoxy was hammered out in a particular context that could not fail 
to alter the nature of his apologetic. 
A Lockean rationalism provided the new background for eighteenth 
century theology, This generated in Waterland's discourse an uneasy 
alliance between the demands of the new rationalism and the claims of 
the received tradition. Waterland eschewed metaphysical speculations 
which only produced conflict. 175 Heretics had their origins here, and 
used metaphysics to avoid Scripture and 'facts'. 17 6 The Bible, said 
Waterland, "is our best metaphysics",l 77 
Yet it was more correctly a 1 false metaphysics' that Waterland 
wished to denounce,l78 Furthermore, his theology was indebted to a 
Locke an rationalism that deferred to 1 evidences' , weighed 
probabilities, and criticised opponents for their inability to provide 
'demonstrable proofs'. For Waterland faith ideally ought to depend on 
evidences179 and 'ultimately was built upon reason'. 18 0 
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Waterland's rationalism was repeatedly slanted in a conservative 
direction. Reason shone best where the ancient consensus prevailed,l81 
Reason, when truly allowed to have its sway, would direct one to the 
truth as manifest in Scripture and confirmed by antiquity. The result 
~as a rationalism tempered by the force of the tradition or, from 
another point of view, traditional orthodoxy rationalised. 
Waterland's repetition of the tradition was not and could not be a 
pure and clean repetition. To defend the articles of the faith he was 
necessarily led into what he regarded as the enemy territory of 
rationalist theology. The danger was that this new context would 
simply be 'smuggled in' to Waterland's system and remain for the most 
part undetected. The tradition was open to distortions from within and, 
given the nature of the system structure and its presuppositions 
(completeness, consistency, exclusivism), there was no way by which 
the system could be purified of alien elements. 
The 'received' tradition became, under the impact of the new 
rationalism, even more tightly secured, rigid and alienated from 
historical contingency. This was the result of a theology highly 
focussed on defence, preservation and security. In this context a 
subtle reversal occurred methodologically, contrary to faith's best 
instincts. The dynamic between the bond of believers with Christ and 
the tradition that expressed this bond was short-circuited: a one-way 
dynamic emerged in which the tradition formed faith but was no longer 
capable of being faith-formed. 
To the extent that Waterland's apologetic was funded by a 
conception of a simple logos- i.e. a static finished form - it was 
axiomatic that successful re-statement of the faith could only be 
achieved as theology distanced itself from contingency. The latter's 
contribution had to be minimalised. What resulted was a 'repetitive' 
mode of discourse which, as earlier suggested, was ultimately derived 
from a monarchial understanding of Divine reality which was in constant 
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danger of displacing the truth of God as Trinity,l82 
The particular way in which Waterland attempted to retrieve the 
fullness of the articles tradition ended up producing a conservative 
form of theological reductionism. Funding this reduction was a 
conception of reality in which God's action and presence was restricted 
to that of a giver of laws and a rewarder of obediential responses. In 
Waterland's case this stimulus-response framework was mediated through 
Christianity's covenant structure. 
Ideological Motivations 
In the light of the foregoing the motivation for Waterland's drive 
for purity of belief requires further consideration. In a context in 
which institutional cohesion was threatened by the disintegration of a 
pre-established orthodox consensus the desire for simple solutions had 
a powerful and beguiling appeal upon those responsible for the 
management of the Church. For a Church under threat and somewhat 
confused in areas quite central to its life the thrust towards 
simplicities was hard to resist. Against a background threat of an 
incipient subjectivizing of belief the desire for firm external 
authority structures was one way of keeping a control and check on 
institutional loyalty. The crisis in authority had to be dealt with 
cleanly and simply. 
This appeal to simplicity was implicit in some of Waterland's 
theological manoeuvres already identified: the relocation of the 
conflict into another period; smooth renderings of historical 
materials; the subtle blending of Patristic and Scripture traditions; 
and the vigorous way in which the stability of the theological system 
was maintained. These manoeuvres were designed to ensure an easy, 
natural and ready assent to the conventional forms of the faith. In 
this way conflict could be more easily managed. Church loyalties could 
be relatively easily determined by reference to certain self-evident 
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articles held in a particular way, i.e. according to the assumed 
unambiguous consensus of antiquity. 
When the fundamental articles tradition was implicated in the 
above way in the resolution of conflict, some potentially very 
unhealthy forms of church life could emerge. To identify the 
wholeness of the faith with the 'mean' of the received tradition 
implied a highly inclusive theological position: what was proposed for 
belief was what had hitherto been universally consented to as 
constituting the fundamentals of the Catholic faith. When this 
inclusivist ecclesiology was identified with a particular national 
church, in which uniformity and institutional loyalty had high focus, 
conditions emerged for the development of even tighter controls upon 
beliefs, and more intense oppositional and exclusivist ways of engaging 
in theological controversy. 
The Dissenting churches of Waterland's period were the most obvious 
victims for, as Waterland remarked, they "have no unlawful terms of 
communion imposed",lBJ There was nothing new in this attitude. It was 
the logic of a particular view of a national church. It was, however, a 
view which was unable to make sense of the ecclesial status of other 
communions on the same soil. John Locke had earlier felt the force of 
this exclusivist ecclesiology, remarking that the Established Church 
was nothing more than an 'Established National Sect',l84 
Waterland was faced not so much by traditional inter-church 
rivalry, as by the threat of widespread collapse of belief. In response 
he transferred an exclusivist church mentality into the region of 
competing belief systems. This did not render the more traditional 
divisions irrelevant but it did widen the scope for the application of 
exclusivist principles to newly emerging ecclesial groupings sprouting 
within established communions. This strategy was underpinned by what 
appeared to be a highly inclusivist construal of the fundamental 
articles tradition. However, a communion bonded by a universal and pure 
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faith could easily mask both an inflated sectarianism and an inability 
to respond to a burgeoning multiformity in religious belief. In this 
context, to state the fundamentals of the faith was to re-state and 
thus confirm the status quo. 
Conclusion 
Waterland's theological vision was limited by his conception of 
the task before him, orthodoxy by reassertion. An adequate statement of 
the truth of faith required something more than simply defence of its 
fundamental articles. A century later Samuel Taylor Coleridge 
perceptively remarked of both George Bull and Daniel Waterland; 
if the clear free intuition of the Truth had led them to the 
Article [of the Trinity], and not the Article to the defence of 
it as not proved to be false, how different would have been the 
result! Now we only feel the inconsistency of Arianism not the 
Truth of the doctrine attached,185 
In Coleridge's view such a negative defence of the truth of 
Christianity arose 
Because that great Truth, in which is contained all treasures 
and all possible knowledge was still opake even to Bull and 
Waterland - because the Idea itself - that Idea idearum, the one 
substratum Truth which is the Form, Measure, and involvement of 
all Truths, was never present to them in its entireness, Unity, 
and transparency,186 
The opacity of the doctrine arose, in Coleridge's view, because of 
Waterland's misunderstanding of the idea of the Trinity. For Waterland 
the Trinity was a conception 'above' comprehension rather than an idea 
"contra-distinguished from 'conceptions', as not properly above 
Comprehension, as alien from it",187 
Waterland's suspicions regarding the crisis of Christianity were 
sharp, even prophetic. His solution, however, was impotent to counter 
the rising tide of unbelief. In his restatement of the fundamental 
articles tradition theology ran into an extremely dangerous dead end. 
In this respect Waterland exposed his debt to Lockean rationalism which 
sought clear and distinct ideas developed in terms of the categories 
'above', 'according to' or 'contrary to' reason. What was sacrificed 
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was a wider notion of reason itself as the faculty through which the 
Trinity was not so much comprehended as apprehended,1BB 
Locke's quasi-mechanistic physiology of the understanding had 
reduced everything to stimulus and response. From Water land's 
perspective the stimulus or input was God's law-like communication of 
truth. Correspondence to this kind of communication had its 
theological form in Waterland's objectified logos realism. The 
dangerous rigidity and over-formalization this introduced into the 
fundamental articles tradition emerged in Waterland's development of 
Christianity's covenant system. 
Waterland's attempt to restore the integrity of orthodox belief 
only confirmed the impact of a new naturalist metaphysic which had few 
resources if any for the affirmation of the sacredness of the world by 
virtue of God's presence and action. Theologically it was not 
sufficient to indulge in strong statement of the faith on the 
supposition that all the necessary resources for such an effort could 
be gleaned from the tradition as such. In a sense this enterprise 
merely met rationalism on its own terms, the difference being that now 
the appeal to reason, evidences, and authorities was directed to the 
vindication of the tradition. More particularly, this approach 
gave warrant for the view that the God of faith was located in the 
tradition. Implied here was an answer to the problem of knowing where 
and how to look for God in the world. 
Waterland's effort drew out his own strengths as a scholar of the 
Christian tradition but also made it clear that a restorative 
theological programme could not generate theological renewal. This 
latter development would require a move through the tradition to the 
Trinitarian reality that funded it. The renewal of fundamental belief 
required a move from articles of faith to faith's own fundament. It is 
in this context that Daniel Waterland gives way to the mysticism of 
the High Church Anglican William Law. 
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FUNDAMENTAL ARTICLES RENEWED: 
The Mystical Theology Of William Law 
Introduction 
Daniel Waterland's attempt to restate orthodoxy exposed the barren 
nature of much of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century 
controversy between deist and divine.l This was evident in the manner 
of disputation over the doctrine of the Trinity. Here argument appeared 
to proceed on the basis that this doctrine was peculiar or special to 
Christianity and as such constituted the divide between deism and 
orthodoxy,2 Presupposed here was ''the sterile confrontation of natural 
and revealed religion". 3 
The problem was not so much that there might be other doctrinal 
differences between the two groups, but rather that the method of 
debate presupposed an atomising of the truths of revelation and a 
consequent dislocation of the articles of faith from other dimensions 
of Christian life. This development can be discerned in the early 
seventeenth century Anglican handling of the fundamental articles 
tradition. 4 By the end of the century such developments became 
symptomatic of deeper rifts between God and the world and between 
divine and human life. The inherited symbols of the Christian 
tradition had become opaque.s A universe understood sacramentally) in 
which it was supposed that nature, history and human life mediated 
God's presence had, in the course of seventeenth century developments 
in science and natural philosophy, given way to tight mechanistic 
conceptions of the universe.s Important in this latter development was 
the attempt to provide very general and simplified explanations of 
things, and eliminate unpredictability. Here, as shown in the study of 
Locke, the dimension of the transcendent receded from view. A sharp 
division in reality between the natural and supernatural was the logic 
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of such a development.7 
The tendency to compartmentalise and isolate doctrines pertaining 
to natural religion, as distinct from supernatural revelation, 
seriously undermined the inner coherence and dynamic of Christian 
theology. 8 Waterland had struggled unsuccessfully to restore this. 
Atomisation of the articles of faith and their disengagement from wider 
Christian life could be overcome only by a theological renewal won 
through a fresh reintegration and harmonisation of doctrine in relation 
to Christian discipleship. This would necessarily have to include 
those elements of religious experience - ''those, namely, which involve 
an acknowledgement of paradox, even of irrationality at the heart of 
things, certainly of transcendence or 'otherness'; of God not merely as 
deified Reason but as mysterium tremendum"9 - which eighteenth century 
Deism had ignored. From another point of view, what was required was 
an alternative way of holding and stating belief that would prove 
adequate to a re-animated and enlarged vision of godly human life. 
William Law's Response 
The response of the eighteenth century Anglican divine William 
Law - non-juror, moralist and mystic (1686-1761) - to this situation, 
was particularly interesting for the way he wove together a renewed 
stress on the redemptive activity of God immanent in the world, a moral 
rigour derived from an evangelical call to holiness of life, and a 
sense of wonder as the human response to God as 'All Love'. 
Law's renewed concentration upon God as 'soul-presence', vivifying 
interior human life and generating human capacity for love and 
obedience in the moral sphere, constituted a powerful response to the 
crisis of orthodoxy in early enlightenment thought. 10 In this respect 
Law's theology exemplified what Jaroslav Pelikan has called 'the 
affectional transposition of doctrine',ll In Law's case this 
eventually expressed itself in a form of ecclesial mysticism. In this 
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sense Law's mature theological position represented a radical 
development of his inherited High Church tradition. In Law's case this 
represented a move into rather than out of the tradition. Its 
radical nature arose from the sheer intensity of the move. Accordingly, 
La~'s theology represents an interesting example of how the strong 
theological realism traditionally presupposed in the operation of the 
fundamental articles tradition might be realised. 
Waterland's treatment of the articles of faith had been informed 
by a strong logos realism which presupposed an almost isomorphic 
correspondence between word and object. By contrastJ Law's later 
mystical theology operated with a quite different concept of truth. 
The objectification of the articles tradition implicit in Waterland's 
position had been displaced by what might be termed a 'soul-realism'. 
God· was most real as a dynamic interior presence,l2 This development 
in Law's theological pilgrimage involved a move from one concept of 
Christianity to another. A vigorous and highly embodied High Church 
ecclesial tradition gave way to a theological understanding of 
Christianity in which reality was reversed: God was most intensely and 
richly present in interiority. 
Implicit in this changed understanding of Christianit~' was a new 
way of understanding statements of faith in their form as fundamental 
articles. Articles no longer, as with Waterland, functioned as sacred 
deposits of truth but operated as a witness to God in interiority. 
To trace Law's move from fundamental articles to foundational reality 
or fundament is to uncover the dynamics of belief in the mystical life. 
More particularly, such an inquiry draws attention to the way in which 
the tradition of fundmental articles contributes to the formation and 
endurance of the one-in-Christ bond within the Christian mystical 
tradition.l3 
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Law's Interpreters 
The development of this analysis of Law's theology in terms of the 
theme of fundamental articles also brings into view a way of being 
Christian in the Church which has remained both alluring and 
controversial in the history of Christianity. The controversial nature 
of the mystical way of life is reflected in the sharply divided 
responses to La"· in modern Christian thought. In this respect a modern 
interpreter of Law, John Hoyle.$ has noted that Law's 
efforts at theological renewal were eclipsed by the more popular 
and traditional ideas preached by John Wesley, but are now 
bearing strange fruit in the age of the "death of God , H 
Hayles had in mind Law's affinity with the line of Pascal and 
Kierkegaard and modern existentialist theology, Law has also been 
considered a herald of Blake, of nineteenth century romanticism, the 
Oxford Movement, Thomas Erskine, F.D. Maurice, Schopenhauer, and 
Freud. 1 5 
In a recent lucid discussion of Law and 'inward religion' Gordon 
Rupp, though recognising his abiding importance for contemporary human 
life, has cautioned against trying to make Law too modern.l6 Such a 
comment is clearly aimed at those sympathetic to the mystical tradition 
represented by Law. In this regard one recalls Ralph Inge's analysis 
and recommendation of Law's theology, 17 Evelyn Underhill's extensive 
writings on mysticism,l8 and the work of other scholars who have done 
much to rehabilitate both the stature of Law as a spiritual writer and 
more generally the Christian mystical tradition,l9 
In Underhill's analysis of mysticism Law belonged to the symbolic, 
constructive, activistic line, in which strong emphasis was placed on 
regeneration.20 As such,Law was said to be "one of the most profound 
of English writers''. 21 Dean Inge, who had an extensive and scholarly 
knowledge of Christian mysticism and the English spiritual tradition, 
recommended Law as "one of the glories of Anglican theology'' ,22 to be 
read by those wishing to acquaint themselves with "the best that 
206 
VII: Renewal with Law 
Anglican theology has produced",23 The early twentieth century 
Methodist theologian Newton Flew, in a useful analysis of Law's 
theology, suggested that "Law is perhaps the greatest of all our 
English mystics". H This opinion was echoed by another fine earlr 
twentieth century commentator, Caroline Spurgeon, who identified Law as 
'our greatest prose mystic',2 5 More recent sympathetic interpreters of 
Law have pointed to the reforming and prophetic character of his 
theology, though their approbation of him has generally been more 
qualified. 26 There has been an attempt to situate Law more firmly 
within the Anglican spiritual and liturgical tradition with links, for 
example, to Lancelot Andrewes and Richard Hooker,27 
In the twentieth century another strand in the interpretation of 
~illiam Law has emerged, diametrically opposed to this sympatheic view. 
In this respect the somewhat whimsical remark of the renowned French 
Roman Catholic scholar Louis Bouyer, that in Law, Jacob Boehme's 
bizarre genius turned into "a very British kind of mild dottiness'',2 8 
seems to have stuck,2 9 More serious was the view proposed in 1963 by a 
scholar of Anglican spirituality, Martin Thornton, that with William 
Law "the true via media has collapsed",JO For Thornton, Law was a 
transitional figure, retaining certain traits of Caroline spirituality 
as an earnest moral and spiritual guide, disciplined and dutiful. In 
other respects Thornton considered him a marker for the post-Caroline 
disintegration succumbing to "acetical emphases and omissions which 
overthrew system synthesis, and balance",Jl John MoormQn, Anglican 
Bishop and scholar of Church history and liturgy, was more sympathetic 
to Law than Thornton, but appeared to view Law's later mystical 
writings as degenerate by comparison with his earlier ones,32 
Generally, those sympathetic to Law have remained insufficiently 
critical or have provided less than rigorous, though insightful, 
reflections on Law and his history,33 Those dismissive of Law's 
efforts show little evidence of genuine engagement with his thought. 34 
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A fuller and more critical theological appreciation of Law is required. 
In this respect Jaroslav Pelikan's suggestive discussion of the 
'affectional transposition of doctrine' in eighteenth century 
Christendom, as a response to the crisis of orthodoxy, offers a useful 
framework for treating Law's theology. Law's particular way of dealing 
with this crisis has been fleshed out further by John Hayles in a 
perceptive inquiry,35 
Hayles' brief study of the aesthetics of spiriruality in Thomas 
Ken, John Byrom and William Law, reveals that beneath Law's somewhat 
obscurantist and anachronistic symbolism there runs a powerful, 
creative and rich theological current, the full significance of which 
still remains to be uncovered. Hayles' study is primarily concerned 
with exploring the implications of these writers for the development of 
an aesthetic "radically different from those pre-romantic tendencies 
which were conditioned by the theories of Descartes, Malebranche and 
Locke'',36 Hoylesl concerns support the pertinent remark of A.M. 
Allchin, that the Anglican tradition of spirituality "has been much 
more intensively studied in departments of English Literature than in 
departments of Theology",37 Hoyle~ literary effort displays keen 
theological insight and suggests that a properly directed theological 
study of Law would pay rich dividends. 
In this case study Law's effort to renew the Christian tradition 
is traced in terms of his reconstruction of the fundamental articles 
tradition. His handling of this tradition illustrates what happens 
when the fundamentals apologetic is re-developed in terms of its 
founding reality or fundament. The nature and function ~of the 
fundamental articles tradition undergoes substantial modification as a 
course is charted back to the foundation of faith. In this way the 
distillation of the faith into fundamental articles is shown to belong 
to a much wider range of issues concerning both the dynamic of God in 
the world and personal life, and the emergence and endurance of the 
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Christian Church. 
Part One of this Chapter traces Law's pilgrimage from a fairly 
hardened and familiar ecclesiological position reminiscent of Laudian 
theology to a radical ecclesial mysticism. The displacement and 
subsequent reconstruction of the fundamental articles tradition, and 
its modified function in the dynamics of ecclesial formation, are 
plotted in relation to this movement of thought. In Part Two an 
assessment is made of the value of Law's contribution to the renewal of 
the fundamental articles tradition and the implications this might have 
for ecclesiological matters and the character of Christian theology. 
PART I FROM FUNDAMENTAL ARTICLES TO FUNDAMENT 
Phase One: High Church Traditionalism 
Law's entry into the arena of theological controversy was 
occasioned by the controversial Bishop of Bangor, Benjamin Hoadly 
(1676-1761) who, during the years 1716-1717, had vigorously attacked 
the Non-jurors and by implication the High Church party of the Church 
of England.3 8 Hoadly was a low churchman and supporter of the ruling 
Whig party. His provocative remarks concerning the freedom, power and 
legitimacy of the civil authority went hand in hand with a fervour in 
denouncing what he considered to be the pretentious claims to authority 
espoused by the High Church party. Hoadly's latitudinarian stance on 
matters theological and ecclesial was clear in his disparagement of the 
importance of church communion, sacramental ordinances and episcopal 
ordination. Ecclesiastical claims to a supernatural authority and 
power were a usurpation of that which rightly belonged only to God. 
Private judgement guided by unbiased reason was a more reliable guide 
to truth than tradition and dogma. 
Sincerity alone was sufficient for Hoadly as the touchstone of 
faith. God did not favour a person because he belonged to a particular 
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communion but because he had chosen that communion honestly. The entire 
question of particular communions was relativized by Hoadly's argument 
that Christ's Church was to be identified with that kingdom spoken of 
by Christ to Pilate -"My kingdom is not of this world" (John 18:36). 
Hoadly's remarks sparked off an intense controversy. Most 
churchmen interpreted his work as subversive of institutional 
Christianity. Law viewed Hoadly as one who had secularised the faith 
and in a response marked by its clarity, force and wit, Law quickly 
established himself as an able controversialist and vigorous apologist 
of High Church Anglicanism,l 9 His defence entailed the reassertion of 
a traditional Caroline method that accorded great weight to Scripture 
as interpreted by antiquity, with reason occupying a rightful but 
subservient position in the triad. 
For Law, Christ's Church on earth could not but be visible, 
despite the fact that those who were finally to be saved remained 
invisible. This was in accordance with article nineteen of the Articles 
of Religion which Hoadly, in Law's view, had denied. 
Since Christianity was a 'method of life necessary for salvation', 
external communion, which was one's profession of Christianity, was a 
necessity for "we can no other way appear to be Christians •••. ", 40 Law 
nicely captured the essence of his inherited tradition: "For Christ as 
truly comes to Christians in Institutions, as he came to the Jews in 
Person; and it is as dangerous to disregard him in the one Appearance, 
as in the other",41 
The highly embodied ecclesiology presupposed here was, in Law's 
mind, entirely dissolved by Hoadly's 'novel' doctrine of sincerity 
alone as the basis of God's favour,42 The criterion of sincerity gave 
no basis for differentiation between the merits of the competing 
visible and particular communions. Within Law's ecclesiology 'the 
whole question' turned on a right and safe choice in this regard.43 
To be in a particular communion was the way of being in the Church of 
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Christ; it implied, said Law 'our embracing Christianity .•.• ',44 
Hoadly's 'Universal Invisible Church', based on the criterion of 
sincerity alone, was in Law's view 'no church',45 Law could envisage 
an invisible Church but not in contrast to a visible Church. Members of 
the former were simply those who did not betray their external 
profession as distinct from members of the 'invisibly bad' Church who 
did.46 
The familiar Anglican appeal to fundamentals was here woven into 
a robust institutional view of the Church. Law recognised an 
obligation for Christians to be in communion with 'any sound part of 
the Church on earth'. 4 7 Law sided with those of the Laudian tradition 
who included the Church of Rome. Such a view may have invited the 
charge of 'popery' but this had to be accepted for, said Law, we 
are not for being such true Protestants, as to give up 
Apostles Creed, or lay aside the Sacraments, because they 
received by the Church of Rome,48 
the 
are 
The Laudian tradition in Anglicanism had invested great store by 
the appeal to the ancient and universally accepted Apostolic Creed as 
the locus classicus of the fundamental articles of the faith. 49 Behind 
this position lay the view that the breach with Rome was justified, not 
on the basis of a breach of fundamentals, but as a response to Rome's 
bur 
unlawful imposition of certain matters os saving belief~considered by 
the English Reformers as 'things indifferent',50 Law sided with those 
who defended the Reformation on the basis of its adherence to those 
doctrines and institutions of Christ and the ancient Apostolic 
Church. 51 Hoadly, by contrast, had left this 'objective' basis for 
the truth. His doctrine of sincerity aided by reason appeared to Law 
arbitrary and subjective. It was, in Law's view, a dangerous and 
unsafe way to determine the peculiar position of the Church of England 
in relation to other communions. Hoadly had disparaged the divinity of 
Christ,52 and overturned 'universally received doctrine',53 
A case in point was confirmation. Hoadly had said it was an 
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affront to God for a person to expect any grace from any hands but 
God's own. 5 4 Law interpreted this as a debasement of a fundamental part 
of Christ's religion, one of the first principles and 'primary Truths' 
of the doctrine of Christ, ''as much a Foundation-Doctrine, as the 
Resurrection of the Dead and Eternal Judgement •.. and received by every 
age",55 
Hoadly's disparagement of Episcopacy was a slightly more delicate 
matter. Law was prepared to assert its necessity according to 
Scripture. Hoadly had argued that it was only an apostolic practice 
and was therefore not binding. In response Law argued that permanent 
and binding apostolic practices could be distinguished from occasional 
and non-binding practices on the same basis that fundamental articles 
of faith were distinguished from lesser truths, and 'perpetual' 
doctrines were differentiated from 'occasional' doctrines,56 Such 
distinctions resulted from attention to the nature of doctrines, the 
tenor of Scripture and the sense of antiquity. Here was a well attested 
method for achieving an objectivity appropriate to faith, which gained 
its credibility from attending rightly to antiquity. In other words, 
the rule for discerning fundamental doctrines (Church credenda) was 
generally applicable to matters concerning agenda, in this case, 
Episcopacy, 
In fact, for Law, the practice of Episcopacy distinguished the 
Church of England from other Protestant communions. This was not a 
new position but had come into focus in the later part of the 
seventeenth century in England and had become associated with a High 
Church version of the doctrine of fundamentals. 5 7 
The first phase in Law's theology revealed a concept of truth in 
which reality was manifest in its highest form as it was embodied in 
the institutions and profession of ecclesia. A vigorous 'externality 
tradition' predominated: "Christianity i telf is a Matter of Fact only 
conveyed to us by historical Evidence"· 5 8 The fundamental articles of 
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the faith, the testimony of Scripture and tradition all belonged to the 
fabric of the institution, 
truth could be assessed. 
being measures against which loyalty to the 
Within this environment the process of 
ecclesial purification operated through vigorous reassertion of 
established institutional markers - creeds, rites and offices. The 
arid and static nature of this position became apparent to Law only as 
he began to search for more satisfying and dynamic ways of living a 
godly life within Christianity's institutional forms. 
Phase Two: The Transposition of Doctrine into Ethics 
In Law's Serious Call to a Del'out and Holy Life (1729)59 he 
explored the possibilities for dynamic Christianity within an inherited 
tradition, which included not only the Caroline divines, but 
also seventeenth century French spiritual writers. 60 His Serious Call 
was an attempt to refocus Christianity in piety, i.e. "a life given, or 
devoted, to God",61 Christianity, in its most real form, still 
concerned externals: "this alone is Christianity, a uniform, open, and 
visible practice of all these virtues .•• ",62 He had in mind humility, 
self denial, renunciation of the world, poverty of spirit and 'heavenly 
affection'. It was a call designed to undermine the formalism and 
barrenness of a 'polite age' in which, he noted, "we have so lived away 
the spirit ofdevotion ... ". 63 Itwasaseriouscall, forit was a 
challenge to live a life witnessing a return to God. 64 
It was a question for Law of what Christianity should look like 
anywhere and everywhere at all times. Law's answer was simple, it 
should appear as a life of regular uniform piety under God. 65 This 
call was a radical one for an age that made strong professions of 
Christianity on certain occasions but repeatedly betrayed those 
professions in its disregard for true devotion in ordinary life. The 
evangelical tenor was clear: "Either this piety, wisdom and devotion 
is to go through every way of life, and to extend to the use of 
213 
VII: Renewal with Law 
everything or it is to go through no part of life",66 
This was Christianity at the level of praxis. Doctrine was here 
transferred into the ethical mode,67 In an age in which world and 
Church had become inextricably meshed, renewal would be effected only 
by a true and radical devotion that penetrated life in its entirety. 
Accordingly, one held on to and participated in the doctrines of the 
gospel, and felt and truly believed them as one implemented them in 
practice. 
If, therefore, a man will so live, as to show that he feels and 
believes the most fundamental doctrines of Christianity, he must 
live above the world; this is the temper that must enable him to 
do the business of life, and yet live wholly unto God ••.. ss 
The implication was that a right holding on to the fundamental articles 
included an imperative to realize their truth in performance. But what 
doctrine was it in Law's mind that required realization in practice? 
Ethics: the Cruciform Pattern 
In the Serious Call the doctrine of the cross was central, for in 
it was focused the character of the true spirit of Christianity; a way 
of death and crucifixion to the world. This was the spirit of Christ, 
true Christianity,69 "The history of the Gospel is chiefly the history 
of Christ's conquest over the spirit of the world"·7° Only those that 
lived in that spirit were true Christians. Law perceived that the 
central doctrines were most properly held as they were manifest in 
practice. Thus Law suggested that "if the doctrines of Christianity 
were practised ••• it would be as easy a thing to know a Christian by his 
outward course of life, as it is now difficult to find anybody that 
lives it". 71 
Implicit in this evangelical call to perfection was an attempt by 
Law to develop a more refined correspondence between the life of piety 
and the presence and work of the Holy Spirit of God in human life,72 
Far from a reduction of the gospel to moralism, the Serious Call 
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indicated an attempt to recover the centrality of practice in the 
definition of Christianity. 7 3 ''This, and this alone, is Christianity; 
an universal holiness in every part of life ... ". 74 The Reformed 
n 
doctrine of justification by faith was here imman~ised in a life of 
righteousness, iS Moreover for Law, this righteousness of life was 
sharply Christocentric: 
We are to be like him [Christ] in Heart and Mind, to act by the 
same Rule, to look towards the same End, and to govern our lives 
by the same Spirit. This is an Imitation of Jesus Christ, which 
is as necessary to Salvation, as it is necessary to believe in 
his Name. This is the sole End of all the Counsels, Commands and 
Doctrines of Christ, to make us like himself,76 
To be formed in this way was to be an imitation of love itself. 
Law's concept of truth was still focussed upon emodiment in 
outward form. The locus of this embodiment had shifted, however, from 
institutional forms into the all-encompassing life of piety. The 
objectivities of faith in their form as fundamental articles had, 
through the transference of doctrine into ethics, recovered their 
directional significance for Christian life. 
The way of discipleship suggested in the Serious Call did 
implicate Law in a move towards interiority which would later 
intensify. Devotion did,after all>arise out of a life 'hid in Christ'. 
It was the inner intentions of the heart, orientated towards a God of 
infinite love and goodness, 77 that were embodied in the practice of 
piety. 
Phase Three: On the Edges of Interiority 
The Doctrine of Resignation 
Within the space of two years there appeared, in Law's Letters to 
a Lady, 1 8 a more definite move to the centre of the life of devotion. 
Here the spirit of Christianity was said to reside in the 'infant 
simplicity of resignation to God'.7 9 This was the essence of piety and 
it consisted in an "implicit faith and total resignation of ourselves 
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to the adorable Providence of God ... ",BO This was a 'state of mind' 
which 
covers all our imperfections, sanctifies all our endeavours, 
makes us holy without any holiness of our own, makes our 
weaknesses as serviceable to God as our strength, and renders us 
acceptable to God at the same time that we do nothing worthy of 
him.Bl 
Law's reader was enjoined to lay hold of this temper in such a way that 
everything could become ''fresh occasions, of committing yourself to God 
by a faith without bounds, a resignation without reserve''.~2 Such true 
devotion and piety of heart was for Law the way of finding, living-in 
and feeding from 'Divine Truths'. 
This way of piety was the sole guard against the dangers of 
adventurous human reasoning which, in its weakness, so easily succumbed 
to the temptation to set up as 'fundamental points' products of 
groundless imaginings,83 The way of resignation emerged here as the 
way through the uncertainties and fallibilities of human reason into 
the truth. Law was careful to acknowledge the element of struggle in 
the life of 'resignation'.84 
The God-directed Life 
This way of humility, faith and resignation to God was the means 
by which the mind was led into the 'truest deepest knowledge of the 
mysteries of God'. Hence Law's conclusion that ''the best knowledge of 
the mysteries of God gives the greatest height and strength to these 
virtues".85 He rightly perceived a natural reciprocity between the 
object of faith and the life of resignation. The object of faith 
nourished piety; piety was the means of tapping the vision. It was in 
this context that Law enjoined his reader to recognise that God was to 
be 'All in All', not just in the next life but in the present. To find 
God thus was to be 'full of the honour and glory of God.' Saint Paul-
for whom God was so 'All in All' - lived 'so out of himself', without 
regard for his own vulnerability, that he could have wished his own 
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destruction if God's glory had been thereby increased,86 Law 
understood, with great clarity, that the emergence of a creative and 
open self was a corollary of the fully conscious act of renunciation, 
rather than the annihilation of the ego. To live 'out of oneself' was 
to live in an enriched relation to God.8 7 Law had captured a far 
richer focus here: 
We must consider, that the Infinite Wisdom, Goodness, and 
Perfection of God, is the fathomless object of our faith and 
adoration and not of our comprehension ... ss 
Such a God was the object of our love and adoration simply because of 
what he was, ''the sole adorable Lord of all beings", a being of 
"infinitely infinite Goodness",89 Law referred to 'God's Extraordinary 
Goodness' as being always at hand. 
For Law then, resignation to a God who was 'All in All' was not a 
retreat into the self but entailed a dynamic orientation towards a rich 
and nourishing object of faith. Here was a strengthened focus on the 
way of being in the truth. It was a way of coming into relation with 
the God of the Christian tradition rather than, as with Daniel 
Waterland, retreating into strong restatement of what was thought to be 
the truth about the God of the tradition,90 
Terms of Communion 
The way of resignation offered a certainty far higher than that 
achievable by reason and learning,9 1 Nevertheless, the question of 
being in a particular external communion in which was preserved the 
'essence of religion' and 'sufficient aids' for essential piety, 
remained important.92 The inquiry into the whereabouts of 'a true 
Christian church' was a rational and important one. When the issue was 
between the Church of England and Rome, however, the matter Has 
altered. Both these communions already preserved 'the terms of 
salvation' and all that was of 'the essence of religion'. 93 
Given this state of affairs, to desire to leave the Church of 
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England for the Roman communion was to abdicate a higher piety for a 
lesser, an action born of human anxiety and failure to discern the 
Christian's true calling. It was falling prey to the temptation to 
seek for ''visible deeds, bonds, and securities which cannot satisfy an 
anxious spirit". 94 Law's method for finding the true Church in these 
circumstances was by means of a humility and resignation of the heart 
to God. This entailed acknowledgment in prayer of the divisions of the 
churches and the helplessness and inability of the individual to decide 
these matters. It included the recognition of a common bond, at least 
between the Church of England and Rome, of 'fundamental doctrines and 
institutions' agreeable to Scripture. Such a prayer ended with the 
hope that divisions in the Church would not separate the prayer from 
Christ,95 Such was the calling of true piety: to love the Church of 
Rome or Greece with the same strength as one loved the Church of 
England. 96 In this way one lived amidst the external divisions as 'a 
true member of the One Holy Church', free from schismatical passions, 
trusting to be received by God ''as truly of the same communion with all 
his saints, as if I had been a member of every particular church in 
which any of them lived",97 When the spirit of resignation to God led 
to this disposition one was, according to Law, 'in the best of 
churches'. 98 
The familiar embodied ecclesiology of the Bangorian Letters, 
though presupposed in the Letters to a Lady, was in the process of 
being displaced by an ecclesiology shaped by the dynamic of the pious 
life. This dynamic was not yet fully worked out, and to this extent the 
ecclesiological implications of this turn to piety remained unclear. 
Law's ecclesiology was in a transitional stage of development. 
In this respect Law's newly forming liberal sentiments remained 
restricted to the narrow band of Anglican-Roman Catholic relations. 
Here, Law was confident that the institutional markers of Christianity, 
i.e. the Apostolic Creed and episcopal order, sufficiently guaranteed 
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the ecclesial status of both communions. Accordingly,he could feel safe 
to explore that dynamic of piety which animated Christian life. In this 
way a life directed towards the love and goodness of God emerged as a 
contender for that ''rock to build your peace upon against which the 
gates of hell could not prevail''. 99 In such a life external supports 
for faith were done away with as one took hold of faith.100 Implicit 
in this was an uncompromising Christian discipleship quite at variance 
with the spirit of the age. 
Phase Four: Penetration to the Real 
Christianity Nominal and Real 
In Law's writings of the late 1730's his espousal of a more 
radical Christian life was taken up with greater intensity in the light 
of his reading of Jacob Boehme,lOl Law perceived two kinds of 
idolatries that afflicted the Church. In addition to the prevailing and 
direct idolatry of Deism, there was a species of idolatry that had 
arisen from within Christendom of those 
who, though receiving and professing the Religion of the Gospel, 
yet worship God not in Spirit and in Truth, but either in the 
Deadness of an outward form, or in a Pharisaical carnal Trust and 
Confidence in their own opinions and Doctrines.lOZ 
Such were the 'nominal', 'historical' or 'literal' Christians. They 
had only the 'name' of gospel mysteries, the 'image' of the truth. As 
regards the reality, ''the true life of the new birth, they oppose and 
reject as heartily as the Deist does the outward Form and Letter'', 103 
Both kinds of idolatry were destructive of the Christian faith. 
Both indicated a failure to appreciate the true nature of Christianity. 
For this reason the central truths of the faith were subverted. The 
rationalism of Deism had explained away such truths and the idolatry 
of the Church had impoverished the leading articles of the faith. The 
lack of depth of nominal Christianity led to a view of Scripture 
doctrines that allowed "more height and mystery in the expression than 
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in the thing itself'',lOt Thus Hoadly's doctrine of the Eucharist 
preserved the outward form of the sacrament but by implication entailed 
a repudiation of the 'whole salvation of the Gospel',l05 Dr. Trapp's 
strictures against 'enthusiasm' indicated his ignorance of the true 
nature of enthusiasm as the vivifying force, providing the capacity for 
good or ill in all persons. 10 6 The Deist's denial of the immortality 
of the soul left no reality in any article of salvation,l07 
In response, Law's efforts were directed to the defence of "the 
most essential, fundamental and joyful doctrines of the Gospel",l0 8 
Thus in 1737 he argued against Hoadly's sacramental doctrine, focussing 
upon the latter's restrictive and literalistic understanding of the 
words of institution. It was a matter which concerned the truth of 
faith. 
But what Mysteries or Doctrines of Christian Faith are to be 
acknowledged or confessed by the Words, the Form, and the Matter 
of it, and what are not, cannot be known from the bare Words of 
the Institution, but are to be learnt by that light which brought 
the Apostles and the Church after them into a true and full 
Knowledge of the fundamental Articles of the Christian Faith. 10 9 
Similarly his Appeal to all that Doubt (1740) was directed to all those 
who doubted or disbelieved the truths of the gospel. In the dispute 
with Dr. Trapp in 1740, Law responded to a common way of holding to the 
faith which, out of fear of 'enthusiasm', failed to own gospel truths. 
This happened, for example, when regeneration was reduced to the level 
of 'figurative expression',llO In a similar vein Law's work on 
Christian Regeneration was devoted to securing the importance of the 
new birth in Christ. This truth lay at the very heart of Christianity 
and constituted, in Law's mind, "the most solid, substantial edifying 
and glorious Article of the Christian Faith",lll 
Law's assessment of the situation presupposed a radical engagement 
in the controversy at the heart of the English Enlightenment between 
'inner light' and 'outward Enlightenment',ll2 So much of the 
controversy between deist and divine had operated at the level of 
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'outward Enlightenment' and to this extent it was impoverished by the 
sterility of Lockean philosophy,ll3 Some years later Law could 
summarise a generation of religious controversy thus: 
For I had frequently a Consciousness rising up within me, that the 
Debate was equally vain on both Sides, doing no more real Good to 
the one than to the other, not being able to imagine, that a Set 
of scholastic, logical Opinions about History, Facts, Doctrines, 
and Institutions of the Church, or a Set of logical Objections 
against them, were of any Significancy towards making the Soul of 
Man either an external Angel of Heaven, or an external Devil of 
Hell. 114 
This was nominal religion. As one interpreter of Law has noted, at 
this level there was "no difference between the Christian, with or 
without the Trinity, and the Mahometan",llS Law's approach was entirely 
different: 
I would not take the Method generally practised by the modern 
Defenders of Christianity. I would not attempt to show from 
Reason and Antiquity, the Necessity and Reasonableness of a 
Divine Revelation in general, or of the !rlosaic and Christian in 
particular. Nor enlarge upon the Arguments, the Credibility of 
the Gospel-History, the Reasonableness of its Creeds, 
Institutions, and Usages, or the Duty of Man to receive Things 
above, but not contrary to, his Reason. I would avoid all this, 
because it is wandering from the true Point in Question,llG 
The adoption of this traditional apologetic implied a failure to 
recognise "this great and decisive Truth, that Christianity is neither 
more nor less, than the Goodness of the Divine Life, Light and Love, 
living and working in my Soul ... ",l17 
On this account infidelity was present wherever the gospel had not 
been embraced with the heart with a corresponding dying to all that was 
earthly within and without,llB Accordingly, infidelity was compatible 
with "verbal Assents and Consents to everything that is recorded in the 
New Testament"; it did not matter whether the infidel was a "Professor 
of the Gospel, a Disciple of Zoraster, a Follower of Plato, a Jew, a 
Turk, or an Opposer of the Gospel-History",l19 
Law's defence of the gospel made redundant a whole range of 
modernist apologetics. The ground of argument was shifted from 
evidences and reasons to a basic distinction between real and nominal 
Christianity, between the spirit and the letter. Thus against 
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Warburton) Law's position was clear. One could either embrace 
Christianity as a 'sinner' or as a 'scholar'. The former way alone was 
taught by Christ: "To be a defender of Christianity, is to be a 
Defender of Christ, but none can defend Him ...... than so far as he is 
his follower" .120 Law desired to be pragmatic, his concern was to 
recapture and awaken true piety, to establish "real regenerate living 
members of the mystical body of Christ",l21 
The Significance of Jacob Boehme 
For Law the problem was not simply one of the correct statement 
of important doctrine but concerned appropriating the reality 
witnessed to in articles of faith. The revitalizing of piety would, he 
felt, arise only as this reality was brought into focus. This problem 
manifested itself for Law at the level of doctrine to the extent that 
the inner logic of the central articles of the faith had, under the 
force of the twofold idolatries of the age, become obscured, even lost. 
From Law's point of view, matters of faith and necessary doctrine were 
quite clear from Scripture. The crisis was for him of a different 
kind. It was a question of the rationale for such clear and plain 
'facts' of the faith. The question was simple, did revelation make 
sense? From this perspective it was a matter of communicating afresh 
the reality of Christianity. 
It was in this context that Law assimilated and deployed the 
mystical 
Law with 
theology of Jacob Boehme during the 1730's. Boehme provided 
a framework and strategy which enabled him to pursue his 
chief concerns,l22 Thus the lengthy discussions in the Appeal to all 
that Doubt, on creation, the origin of the soul, eternal and temporal 
nature, the angelic fall, the origins of good and evil, and on the 
theology of fire, all functioned for Law as a kind of clearing 
operation by means of which the 'true Ground of all the Doctrines of 
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the Gospel' were exposed, and the objections of Deists, Arians and 
Socinians "against the first Articles of our Faith dashed to 
pieces". 123 Law carefully and selectively wove Boehme's thought into 
his own emerging mystical theology. His expressed aim was to bring 
"light and clearness into all the Articles of the Christian Faith",I2 4 
The intention was to preserve the mystery in its very unfolding.tzs 
The fundamentals of faith were thus filtered through what often 
appeared a bizQrre, obscurantist and anachronistic symbolism,l2 6 
However Boehme's system exercised a powerful attraction for Law because 
in it Law discerned the reality of faith and found a critical stimulus 
for fresh communication of the truth of Christianity. 
Interior Reality 
The key feature of the works of the late 1730's was the 
completion, under the influence of Boehme, of that relocation of 
reality that had already begun, to some degree, in Law's earlier 
writings. The basis for Christianity was to be found in interiority. 
The turn inwards opened up both the wretchedness of humankind and the 
capacity for new life derived from the logos within, the originally 
given 'in-spoken Word of life',127 This presupposed the primacy of an 
'experimental' religion that operated beyond concerns for external 
evidences, authorities and facts, or rather relocated such criteria in 
inwardness. 
Law exhorted his reader to 
know the Place of your Religion, turn inwards, listen to the 
Voice of Grace, the Instinct of God that speaks and moves within 
you •... let your Heart pray to God .•• Your Heart wants nothing but 
God, and nothing but your Heart can receive him. This is the only 
Place and Seat of Religion, and of all communications between God 
and you. 1 28 
To turn inwards was to leave the outward world. The outward world was 
the region of the transitory, of burden, strife and deformity. It was 
the region of fallenness. Mankind's fall was into 'outwardness', a fall 
into vulnerability.129 Such a world had "the Nature of an Hospital, 
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where People only are, because they are distempered, and where no 
Happiness is sought for, but that of being healed, and made fit to 
1 eave it" . 1 3 o 
The Structure of Soul Realism 
Reality for Law conformed to a definite hierarchical structure. 
The highest reality was the life of the Holy Trinity. This divine 
glory was manifest in the realm of eternal nature - the spiritual world 
of the Kingdom of Heaven. The chaos that arose through the Angelic 
fall was checked by the creation of temporal nature, itself 'a gross 
outbirth' 131 of eternal nature. Into this temporality humankind was 
originally set in a 'paradisiacal' way, such that one could live in 
this world yet above it. This quality of earthly life was lost in the 
fall, and human beings became subject to the disorders and impurities 
of temporal nature; humankind fell into the 'outwardness' associated 
with this level of created order. 
Law attributed this fall to the operation of what might be termed 
a false imagination or curiosity,l32 He later described this: 
the Eye of his new unexperienced Understanding, beginning to 
cast a wandering Look into that which he was not, was by an 
unsuspected Subtlety, or Serpent, drawn into a Reasoning and 
Conjecturing about a certain Good and Evil, which were no Part 
of his own created State,l33 
It was not the power of reason and will as such - this was given by God 
in freedom but rather the failure of reason to allow itself to be 
properly directed, that caused the fall.l34 
The logic of this hierarchy of being was clear. If the fall was 
occasioned by a movement into outwardness, redemption required a 
movement back to that higher level of reality discerned inwardly. Thus 
for Law the outward world was "but a Glass or Representation of the 
inward ••. ". 135 The good and evil of the outward world was a 
manifestation of interior conflicts. Outward reality brought conviction 
of a lost perfection, protected from the terror that attended this, and 
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indicated the direction humankind must go if it was to return to its 
former glory. 136 As a person turned inward and recognised his or 
her true plight and called for mercy then, said Law, "the Fall and the 
Redemption kiss each other'' ,13 7 In this action the original divine-
human harmony was restored. 
Within this schema the soul-world became the focus of Law's 
concerns. This soul-world was the inner world through which one 
approached and found God. This was necessarily the case, for it was in 
the soul that the spark of eternity resided. The fall had not 
entirely extinguished that original life of God in the soul. A seed of 
the incarnation was present by virtue of God's 'inspoken' or 'ingrafted 
Word'.138 To turn inwards was to recognise this hope of salvation. 
The outward gospel associated with Christ's incarnation activated the 
inner gospel prepared in the human soul from eternity,139 Within this 
schema the outward gospel necessarily spoke of inward realities. 
Christ's incarnation took place within. The atonement was repeated 
within. This was the work of an inward saviour.140 This new birth 
was, in effect, a rebirth of the Son of God in the soul and constituted 
the beginning and end of salvation. This schema contained an implicit 
doctrine of perfection. Gospel Christianity exceeded original universal 
Christianity in that it opened up the possibility of, and called 
humankind to, angelic or glorified goodness,141 
For Law, the 'whole process of Christ' - his life of struggle and 
victory over this world, his death and resurrection - had an historical 
foundation,142 Christ's process became the believer's pattern,1 43 The 
life of Christ was immanentised in what Law called 'the true inward 
Christian',144 This focus on interiority, immanence and immediacy of 
communion 
existential 
were no 
"we thus know the Trinity in ourselves"l45 - gave an 
character to the economy of salvation. 
longer developed in terms of spacial 
Heaven and 
categories 
hell 
but 
existentially, as ways of being that were present within the soul.146 
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Central here was God's 'All in Allness', focussed in the Scripture 
passage from Acts 17 - ''in him we live and move and have our being". 
The human being's essential rootedness in such a Being meant that when 
God communicated with humans, "he can give us nothing but himself, nor 
any Degree of Salvation, but in such Degree as communicates something 
more of himself". 14 7 To receive and dwell in such divine life was to 
be caught up in the overflow of the goodness of God, focussed in Jesus 
Christ.14 8 To reject this kind of goodness was to reject "all the 
Goodness that the Divine Nature itself hath for us",149 Law pressed 
home in eloquent and forceful prose his argument against the 
attribution of wrath to the Deity, finding there only an ''infinite 
Fountain of Goodness, infinitely flowing forth in the Riches of his 
love upon all and every life",lSO The manner of the communication of 
this love was further specified in Law's depiction of God as an ''all-
speaking, all-working, all-illuminating Essence .... '',I51 
Apologetic Impact 
The move to interiority undercut the Deistic position which, in 
Law's view, was grounded upon the false notion that the human relation 
to God was of an 'outward' kind, necessarily distant and mechanical, 
analogous to the relation of a Prince to his subjects.I5 2 The turn 
inwards gave knowledge of the shallowness of 'nominal' Christianity. 
What was needed was a light to shine within and bring to birth a divine 
seeing before one could have any true and full knowledge of the 
doctrines of the faith. This was the light that arose with saving 
faith which Law characterised as a hunger, thirst and complete 'given-
overness' to the goodness and mercy of God in Christ Jesus. Such a 
faith signalled a leaving of the chains of this world. In such 
resignation to God one entered into the reality and truth of the 
Kingdom.I53 If the deist was ignorant of God and of how to find him, 
the nominal Christian knew nothing of how to hold on to God and to this 
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extent such a Christianity betrayed its own poverty. 
Doctrinal Reintegration 
For Law the turn inwards and resignation to God was the only 
adequate environment from which faithful theology could be achieved. 
Thus one spoke of the Trinity from a penitent heart. The alternative 
was to be lost in idle speculations which failed to see that the 
simplicity of the Trinity of God was "only revealed as a key, or 
Direction to the true Depths of that Regeneration, which is to be 
sought for from the triune Deity."l54 It was a matter of becoming 
'inwardly sensible' of the 'great truths' of the faith such that 
when a Man once truly knows, a11d feels these two Truths [Fall and 
Redemption], he may be said, truly to know, and feel so much of 
the Power of Christ brought to life in him,l55 
On this account articles of faith were not simply bare facts but 
means through which the reality of God was realised in human life. 
This was the burden of Law's argument against Hoadly. In his 
sacramental doctrine Hoadly, in Law's view, had shown a failure to 
understand that it was only when the Holy Trinity was made to shine in 
the heart, that a Christian came into a true and full knowledge of the 
fundamental articles of the Christian Faith,l56 True enthusiasm was 
thus 'possessing all that one believes',l57 
Law had achieved here a rapprochement between the interior form 
of faith and its linguistic expression. Articles of faith were properly 
related to their founding reality. In this process articles attained a 
proper secondary objectivity whereby they operated as a witness to the 
primary reality of God. 
Interiority as Ecclesial Inclusiveness 
Law's move to interiority significantly changed his earlier 
ecclesiology and developed further the liberalization already apparent 
in the Letters to a Lady. The divisions between Catholic and 
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Protestant now belonged to those who lived in outwardness. 15 8 The 
challenge was to achieve the true Catholic spirit. Law identified 
this as "a Communion of Saints in the Love of God and all 
Goodness", 159 which could not be learnt from the orthodoxy of 
particular churches. It was attained only through dying to self and all 
worldly views and entering into a pure love of God. To attain this was 
to "live in a divided part of the Church, without partaking of its 
Division". 160 
Such an achievement was based on three truths. Firstly, the 
primacy of universal love, which gave the whole strength of the heart 
to God and brought one into the perfection of love, taught that true 
orthodoxy could be found only in a pure, disinterested love of God. 
Secondly, the recognition that, in the divisions of Christendom, truth 
itself was divided and the true Catholic was only the one who had more 
of truth and less of error than was in any divided part. This truth 
taught one to live freely within the divisions and enabled one to 
become a real member of the holy Catholic Church. The third truth was 
the impartiality of God's justice. This was the basis upon which one 
could recognise and respect the truth wherever it was present and 
~hoever was its advocate. If a person had such a 'Catholic Spirit' it 
did not matter "where he has his outward Church''. 161 
In this Catholic spirit a Protestant and Papist "would not want 
half a Sheet of Paper to hold their Articles of Union, nor be half an 
Hour before they were of one Religion",l 62 Similarly, Law considered 
that through participation in the truth and light from above, 
Protestant and Catholic would "be as fully agreed about Gospel Truths, 
as they are in the Form of a Square and a Circle",l63 
Here was the vision of a purified Church. It was not a human 
creation but occurred as Christ was incarnated within. Ecclesiology 
was interiorized. The soul's communion with the Trinity was the one 
essential for blessedness of life,l64 Participation with other 
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Christians in the communion of saints was indirectly achieved through 
participation in God, the one from whom the true Catholic spirit 
proceeded and overflowed to others.l65 
What then of the outward Church, its forms, gospel ordinances and 
sacraments? Law had not abandoned them but they had been displaced: 
"All Wa.ys and Opinions, all Forms and Modes of Divine Worship, stand on 
the Outside of Religion'',l66 They were 'helps' to the Kingdom, to be 
considered as 'gates' or 'guides' to that 'inward life' where 
salvation, through the birth of the Son and renewal of Spirit in the 
soul, was begun and finished. 167 Outward forms functioned 'to keep up, 
and exercise and strengthen' that faith which arose out of the 
individual's communion with the Trinity in the 'Temple of the soul',l68 
Such outward forms were intended 
to raise us to such an habitual Faith and Dependence upon the 
light and holy Spirit of God, that by thus seeking and finding God 
in the Institutions of the Church, one may be habituated to seek 
him and find him ••. This is the Enthusiasm in which every good 
Christian ought to endeavour to live and die,l69 
In this ecclesial enthusiasm corporateness was recognised only 
indirectly through one's participation in God. The embodied 
ecclesiology that so characterised the Bangorian letters had been 
displaced, and with it the familiar appeal to the fundamentals of the 
faith, at least in so far as they determined the being of the Church 
and terms of communion. However, in this manoeuvre Law had greatly 
simplified the dynamics of ecclesial disruption. 
Phase Five: The Divine Superabundance 
Law's prolonged meditations within and from this new horizon of 
faith later initiated a fresh and final theological output in which the 
character of that inner reality was more intensely grasped and further 
unravelled. 
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God's Being: Love in Overflow 
Law's Spirit of Love (1752-1754)170 was an account of the vision 
of God he had earlier discovered and had subsequently lived from and 
meditated upon. Many of the themes of earlier works were again taken up 
with a more intense focus on the richness of faith's object. Law's 
spiritual vision was transfixed and nourished by a God who in himself 
"can be neither more nor less, nor anything else, but an eternal Will 
to all Goodness .. '',1 71 It was, in Law's view, more possible for the sun 
to give darkness than for God to give anything but goodness. This 
goodness, ,.·hich was 'the whole nature of God' was an "infinite 
Plenitude, or Fullness of Riches ••.. an UNIVERSAL ALL''. 17 2 The created 
order was that sphere in which the 'hidden Riches' of God might be 
manifest1 73 in order that 
boundless Love might have its Infinity of Height and Depth to 
dwell and work in. That it may come forth into outward Activity, 
and manifest its blessed Powers,,,17t 
The characteristic feature of such a spirit of love as Law found 
here was captured in the concept of overflow. Thus the spirit of love 
was eternal, unlimited and unbounded, an 'ever overflowing Ocean' of 
divine attributes, flowing as "streams breaking out of the Abyss of 
Universal Love'', a Trinity of Love for ever and ever giving forth all 
God's gifts giving "Life to all Nature and Creature",175 This was the 
spirit of love which, said Law, had only one desire, 'to propagate 
itself', seeking nothing 'but its own increase',1 76 
The dynamic of God's Being of love in overflow confronted all 
wrath, evil, hatred and opposition "only to overcome it with all its 
Blessings",l77 in such a way that "everything is as Oil to its 
Flame",l78 Law picked up an Irenaean theme here: this overflow was the 
means for the recapitulation of all things in God. The Spirit of love 
would not rest until all outward Nature had been 'rectified' and 
"brought back again into that glassy Sea of Unity and Purity, in which 
Saint John beheld the Throne of God in the Midst of it",l79 This was 
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the triumph of light and love. 
There was a simple centre to this theology of inwardness but it 
was a simplicity of concentrated richness, not of impoverishment. 
Law's soaring vision was capable of extensive unfolding. This was the 
logic of overflow, the reality of which gave new and surprising shape 
to familiar theological territories into which it intruded. 
The Logic of Overflow: Displacement of Wrath 
It was in this light that Law considered the attribution of wrath 
to God. This clearly was) for Law; an impossibility. Love alone was the 
eternal disposition of the Divine toward the creature. Were wrath 
supposed to be in God such a wrath, Law argued, would have had to be 
there eternally, since nothing new could begin in Him: "There must be 
either all or none, either no Possibility of Wrath, or no Possibility 
of its having any bounds'' ,180 When he proceeded to identify wrath as 
being synonymous with evil, Law had necessarily struck out on a quite 
different theological path. He located wrath in the creature, in its 
'emptiness', 'want', 'impoverishment' and self-imposed 'exile'. It was 
the result of the individual's loss of the power of the Spirit of 
love.l82 Wrath arose out of disorder. It was to be likened to a sore 
in the body that only erupted when the body was not in a right 
state. 183 
Law, employing much of Boehme's thought, attempted to manoeuvre 
his way through some of the intellectual difficulties this position 
produced. His view appeared to contradict many Scripture passages that 
attributed wrath to the Deity. The thrust of his argument was that the 
only experience of God available for human beings in their lostness 
living according to nature without the life of God - was an experience 
of God as consuming fire.l84 Yet God, argued Law, had no wrath in 
himself but continued to be one and the same "infinite Fountain of 
Goodness, infinitely flowing forth in the Riches of his Lol'e upon all 
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and every life",185 
The apprehension of God as overflowing love compelled Law to view 
human fallenness not as an occasion for the eruption of wrath in God, 
but for mercy. Such mercy did not represent something newly begun in 
God but rather a 'new and occasional' manifestation of that which God 
was eternally, a will to all goodness,l86 Such Divine mercy was 
captured for Law in the character of the good physician who, out of 
love and care for the patient, necessarily administered that which was 
unpalatable and severe in order to restore health. It was in this 
context that Law understood the vengeance of God as representing an 
injunction to hand all things over to the love of God ''to be healed by 
his Goodness" . l a 7 
An evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of Law's argument 
1s not at issue here. He had hardly solved the problem of the origin 
of evil. Moreover, within a framework in which God was conceived as the 
'All in All', this problem was clearly of high importance. In dealing 
with wrath as he had, however, Law had attempted to allow his speech 
about God to be ordered and directed by God himself. The form and 
content of thought was derived from and directed towards faith's 
foundation in the being of God. The doctrine of wrath was 
reconstituted in relation to Law's new vision of faith's founding 
reality. 
Atonement: From Forensic to Medical Categories 
more 
Such a 
truthful 
way of ordering speech about God resulted in a fresh 
recognition, in Law's view, of the atoning work 
and 
of 
Christ. A long established view had employed forensic categories, 
interpreting Christ's death as an offering paid to God to satisfy the 
just demands of his righteousness. Law, in common with the mystical 
tradition,188 moved in an entirely opposite direction. Forsaking the 
fabric of forensic terminology he re-orientated the traditional 
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Scripture categories for atonement (ransom, sacrifice, price, 
propitiation) towards the natural sphere of human life. Since this was 
where wrath and sin arose, this was where the redemptive categories 
belonged. Thus it was no longer God's righteousness that needed to be 
satisfied but humankind's original lost righteousness 
rightly belonged to his 'paradisiacal' natural humanity. 
that which 
The whole scheme of redemption was now seen to begin in the 
antecedent love of God who, in mercy, willed the perfection of 
humankind. This mercy had, in the fullness of time, been incarnated in 
Christ. He had lived victoriously in the spirit of love through the 
fallenness of human life. In this 'process' Christ had re-established, 
as the second and perfect Adam, that righteousness lost in the first 
Adam. Consequently Christ became the 'Common Father' 18 9 of all. He 
satisfied righteousness by fulfilling it. Redemption was neither an 
alteration of God's state nor a satisfaction of his righteousness, but 
rather a 'raising' of righteousness in humankind. 1 90 Christ given for 
us was "neither more nor less than Christ given into us". 1 91 
The atonement was an event not 'outside' but 'within' the human 
being. It operated by Christ's own life within the soul,192 Medical 
rather than forensic categories predominated. Christ was the good 
physician, the 'natural remedy',193 Christ eternally 'qualified' to be 
the redeemer, and 'actualized' this in the process of his incarnation 
and death,194 Christ brought perfection to the natural form and he 
achieved this in a natural way, by overcoming in his natural life all 
that the first Adam had lost. 
Overcoming Dualism: The Naturalness of Redemption 
Law believed that such a scheme of redemption was in accord with 
the requirements of the natural order of things. 19 5 There was no 
appeal here to some supernatural redemption being effected from without 
through some transaction between God and Christ. On this account 
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Christianity alone qualified as the one, true, 'natural religion'. It 
was a "religion that had everything in it that the natural state 
needed",l96 Yet such redemption still belonged to the region of 
mysteries, for although it happened entirely on the plane of the 
natural, it happened through the 'interposition' of God and achieved 
its purpose in a way that fallen humankind could not envisage,l 97 
The ground was thus, in Law's view, swept away from under the 
deist, who was justly critical of an unnatural scheme of redemption 
which imputed into the character of the Deity a wrath requiring 
appeasement. Such a view revealed an ignorance of the most fundamental 
doctrine of the gospel. 1 98 If held, it could easily become in some a 
pretext for licentiousness and infidelity, in others, a source of 
superstition and fear. Perhaps most importantly, such a view, by 
falsely transferring responsibility away from human beings to God, 
obscured the calling of the Christian to an absolute resignation to God 
and renunciation of the world,l99 In this way the demands of truth and 
piety were falsely ruptured. 
For Law "the whole Form and Manner of our Redemption comes wholly 
from the free, antecedent, infinite Love and Goodness of God towards 
fallen Man'',200 Law's intention was to allow this reality to inform and 
shape all human communication. Thus the doctrinal scheme of redemption 
had to be in praise of the truth of things, such that all was directed 
to making 'the Providence of God adorable'.201 
Breaking Double Predestinarianism 
As the logic of this stance was further unravelled, it filtered 
through the web of a doctrinal tradition. The familiar doctrines of 
election and reprobation underwent significant modification. Election 
and reprobation were no longer related to particular individuals or 
divisions of people, but rather referred to everyone as they were 
constituted according to their earthly and heavenly nature. A person, 
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according to his or her earthly nature, was reprobate. Election 
belonged to a person insofar as he or she had the heavenly seed of the 
Word of God. In this scheme of redemption, that which was elect was 
brought to full birth, that which was reprobated perished,202 This was 
Law's hermeneutical key to the Old Testament passages which spoke of 
the election of Abel, Isaac and Jacob and the reprobation of Cain, 
Ishmael and Esau. All that was said of them was 
only as they are figures of the earthly Nature, and heavenly seed 
in every Man. For nothing is reprobated in Cain, but that very 
same which is reprobated in Abel, viz., the earthly Nature; nor is 
anything elected in Jacob, but that very same which is elected in 
Esau viz., the heavenly Seed,203 
This fresh manner of understanding the traditional doctrines of 
election and reprobation represented the application of the logic of 
love as overflow. The Spirit of love had an appropriate and quite 
particular doctrinal form for Law. Overflow at the level of language 
cast the tradition in a new and arresting light. 
The Raising of Humanity 
The doctrine was not, however, the Spirit of love itself, 
Caution was needed lest one "only embrace the Shadow, instead of the 
substance"204 of that which one ought to have. Law's concern was that 
true piety might come to birth and be perfected in the human heart. The 
fall represented humankind as it failed to live out of the goodness of 
God. Redemption raised individuals to their true and natural form. This 
form was the form of the Trinity in the soul. It was present in an 
impoverished, though genuine way, in humankind. In the birth of the 
Spirit of love the true and real life of the 'soul' was manifest,20S 
Employing Boehme's symbolism Law spoke of the raising of the form 
as what happened to 'the man in the cave' as he was released from the 
bondage of the first three properties of nature by the firelight of the 
fourth property. This in turn became the occasion for a lifting of a 
person into the fifth property of nature, a 'new Region of light'.20 6 
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In this process there was both purification and exaltation, the prelude 
to the perfection of the Spirit of love,- first in fallen humanity, then 
in 'the whole material system'. 207 The goal for Law was the perfection 
of love which entailed the raising of the true form of everything to 
its proper state. Law explained this in terms of a movement through 
what Boehme had referred to as the seven properties of nature (the 
seventh being the highest ternarius Sanctus}. Law adapted Boehme's 
elaborate and obscure symbols relating to the seven properties of 
nature in order to reveal the dynamics by which godly human life 
occurred. The aim was thoroughly pragmatic, to show what was involved 
iri living in the Church, in the Spirit of Love,208 
Dynamics of the Experimental Way: The Godly Imagination 
True Christian discipleship could not be 'rationally apprehended' 
nor 'historically known' but was only 'experimentally found',209 Such 
a way could be dangerous, open to all kinds of wild excess and 
arbitrariness. Law considered these matters in The Spirit of Lo~'e and 
The l"t'ay to Dil'ine Knowledge ( 1752}. To find God experimentally was a 
matter of being rightly bonded to God. In Christian redemption this re-
bonding was achieved. A double movement was involved: from one side 
the heavenly divine life offered itself again to the 'inward' person; 
from the other side came a hope, faith and desire, a ''hungering, and 
thirsting, stretching after, and calling upon this Divine and Heavenly 
life",210 Thus the turn inward was simultaneously a movement of the 
heart to its centre in God and the emergence of that centre into the 
foreground of a person's willing, desiring and thinking. In this double 
turning the divine-human bond was actualized. 
Presupposed here was an original reciprocity between the Divine 
and human life which constituted the basis of interior apprehension of 
God. The turn inwards was not simply a retreat into subjectivism. Law 
recognised that there was a kind of turning inward which was nothing 
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more than a turn of the self to its own will and reason. This left a 
person prey to the power of their own imagination.211 True inwardness 
demanded a different orientation in which the will and desire were 
directed towards God. 
In this process Law did not intend to render human imagination 
of little consequence. As Law himself had stated, "In fdll, 
Imagination, and Desire, consists the Life, or fiery Driving of every 
intelligent Creature''. 212 As such, Law considered imagination and 
desire "the greatest reality we have •... the true Formers and Raisers of 
all that is real and solid in us. "213 The fall, it will be recalled, 
was not occasioned by the intrusion of imagination into human life, but 
more properly by a failure in its direction.214 Indeed, Law's view of 
an original 'paradisiacal' reciprocity between God and human life drew 
creative human capacity, particularly the God-directed imagination, 
into a vital link with the creative activity of God. A correspondence 
was presupposed. 
Our own Will, and desirous Imagination, when they work and create 
in us a settled Aversion, or fixed love of anything, resemble in 
some Degree, the Creating Power of God, which makes Things out of 
itself, or its own working Desire. And our Will, and working 
Imagination could not have the Power that it has now even after 
the Fall, but because it is a product, or Spark of that first 
Divine Will or Desire which is omnipotent,215 
For Law the imagination was at the centre of human creative 
capacity, giving shape and form to reality. The regeneration of this 
capacity was therefore critical for godly life. This suggests that a 
more qualified assessment of Law's supposed disparagement of reason is 
required,21 6 
The move inwards was not simply the pathway to right apprehension 
of God but also the means to a recovery of the lost or hidden, and true 
self. It was in fact the recovery of that holy humanity derived from 
Christ. What emerged in redemption was the beauty of God within as it 
was manifest in a person's 'heavenly will',217 This was not an 
arbitrary subjectivism but rather the recovery of a rightly formed and 
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animated subjectivity. Hence for Law, 
nothing is the Way to God, but our heart. God is nowhere else to 
be found; and the Heart itself cannot find Him, or be helped be 
any Thing else to find Him, but by its own Lol'e of Him, Faith in 
Him, Dependence upon Him, Resignation to Him, and Expectation of 
all from Him.21a 
Such, for Law1 was the 'simplicity of faith'. The turn inwards in 
patience, meekness, humility and resignation was a turn to Christ. It 
was thus simultaneously praise of God and conversion to God.219 In 
this simple turning the Spirit of prayer (which Law depicted as the 
desire of the soul turned to God) became the occasion for the 
celebration of the 'marriage feast'. Her~humankind entered into the 
highest state of union with God, referred to by Law as ''the BirthDay of 
the Spirit of Love in our Souls ... ". 22° The Spirit of Prayer and the 
Spirit of Love coalesced in resignation to God. The form of this 
meeting was the impress in the soul of the image and likeness of the 
holy Trinity. 
The apprehension of faith entailed both a right engagement of self 
with God (in other-directedness), and knowledge of the right self (the 
heavenly will). In faith's apprehension therefore there was a double 
and interrelated knowledge of God and self. What the self discovered 
was that its life and reality were derived from God. In this discovery 
the self was not annihilated but released from its own narrowness and 
rigidity. 221 
Law's achievement was to universalize the possibility of living 
as a Christian in the Church. The one simple way was not only 
absolutely necessary, it was also absolutely possible,222 and possibly 
irresistible,223 
Part II FUNDAMENTALS RENEWED: So•e Theological Di•ensions of the 
Mystical Way 
The Form of a Tradition: Doctrinal Considerations 
Law wrote out of the abundance of his heart. As a mystic he had 
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not abandoned himself to silence but was compelled to communicate his 
apprehension of God, "an all-speaking, all knowing, all-illuminating 
Being, out of whom we are born, and in whom we live, and move, and have 
our being'',22t Human speaking continued the communication of the 'in-
spoken' ~ord of God in creation and redemption. Renewal of human 
language was simply the logic of interior regeneration. Implicit here 
~<.·as a notion of God as a rich transformer of human life and 
thought. This view was quite different from John Locke's concern for 
the mechanism of human knowing in the light of God's transformation,225 
Law recognised that God's presence had implications for the form 
and content of theological discourse. Because Divine communication was 
not primarily a communication of information but a giving of God's 
being,22 6 apprehension of this reality remained genuine though 
incomplete. The vision of God was truly caught but only 'at a 
glance',22i The vision remained rich and consequently unfinished. 
As Law began to communicate his fresh understanding of truth the 
Christian tradition was re-appropriated in an unconventional manner. 
This has already been observed in Law's treatment of the doctrines of 
the love of God, wrath, atonement and predestination. HereJthe form and 
ordering of theology took its cue from the spiritual apprehension of 
God as 'all love'. All statements of faith were filtered through this 
fundamental vision. The 'affectional transposition of doctrine' in Law 
was thus derived from a renewed perception of divine reality as 
expressed in its appropriate doctrinal form.22a 
Presupposed in this was a fresh correspondence between Divine 
light and human enlightenment, in which the latter was understood as 
being derived and enlarged in creative response to the former. A 
correspondence of human life with the life of the Trinity was being 
sought. Law wrote: "We know the Trinity in ourselves",229 Here the 
possibility of a godly and wise human life was grounded in the 
original constitution of humanity in the image of God. In regeneration 
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or new birth, that original harmony of Divine and human life was 
reactivated. "The Mystery of Christ's Birth must be the Mystery of our 
Birth; we cannot be his Sons, but by having the Birth of his Life 
derived into us. "23° The perfection of this re-established harmony 
included the progressive removal of all oppositions between human and 
divine life. What was critical was the conforming of the human will to 
God's wi11.23l The earlier rigorous moral ethic of Law's Serious Call 
revealed itself as the outworking of an interior transformation. The 
drive to perfection was thus generated, sustained and fulfilled by the 
grace of God working within. In this sense Law's Serious Call could 
become a truly joyful call unto 'angelic goodness',232 
Doctrine of the Trinity: Revaluations 
In this scheme Law had developed an argument for revaluation of 
the Trinity. He had written: 
We thus know the Trinity in ourselves ..• Without this Knowledge, 
all the Scripture will be used as a dead letter, and formed only 
into a figurative, historical System of Things, that has no Ground 
in Nature; and learned Divines can only be learned in the 
Explication of Phrases, and verbal Distinctions .... but when it is 
known, that the triune Nature of God was brought forth in the 
Creation of Man, that it was lost in his Fall, that it is restored 
in his Redemption, a never-failing Light arises in all Scripture, 
from Genesis to Re·velation, 2 3 3 
In this view the Trinity could no longer be treated merely as a 
doctrine special or peculiar to Christianity. Rather, insofar as the 
Trinity was present and known within, it became the basis for all 
knowledge and enlightenment; the doctrine was grounded in nature as 
such: 
all this on Earth is only a Change or Alteration of something 
that was in Heaven: And Heaven itself is Nothing else but the 
first glorious Out-birth, the !tfajestic Manifestation, the beatific 
Visibility of the One God in trinity. And thus we find out, how 
this temporal nature is related to God; it is only a gross Out-
birth of that which is an Eternal Nature, or a blessed Heaven, and 
stands only in such a Degree of Distance from it, as Water does to 
Air. 234 
Temporal or outward Nature, including human existence - ''Every 
Creature is nothing else but Nature put into a certain Form of 
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existence" 235 - was thus a form derived from the Trinity itself. Nature 
mediated Trinitarian life, and conversely the Trinity was grounded in 
nature. This led Law to argue that 
nothing can be true in revealed Religion, but what has its 
Foundations in Nature; because a Religion coming from the God of 
Nature, can have no other End but to reform, and set right the 
Failings, Transgressions, and Violations of Nature.236 
This inner relation between temporal existence and the Trinity meant 
that 
the l~hole Christian Religion is built upon a Rock, and that Rock 
is Nature, and God will appear to be doing every Good to us, that 
the God of all Nature can possibly do.237 
In this way the barren confrontation of natural and revealed religion 
was displaced by the development of a dynamic view of the Trinity in 
materiality.238 From such a perspective the doctrine of the Trinity 
could no longer be treated as a speculative belief but was wholly 
practical for, 
it is revealed to us, to discover our high Original, and the 
Greatness of our Fall, to show us the deep and profound Operation 
of the triune God in the Recovery of the Divine Life in our Souls; 
that by the Means of this Mystery thus discovered, our Piety may 
be rightly directed, our Faith and Prayer have their proper 
Objects, that the Workings and Aspirings of our own Hearts may co-
operate, and correspond with that triune Life in the Deity, which 
is always desiring to manifest itself in us 239 
Thus the manifestation of the Trinity Father creating, Son 
regenerating and Holy Spirit sanctifying - was not for the purpose of 
speculation upon the 'metaphysical Distinctions of the Deity' but to 
reveal the way by which humankind might be restored in "that first 
Image of the Holy Trinity in which we were created".240 
It was in this context that the doctrine of regeneration assumed 
pivotal significance.241 It was by means of this doctrine that Law 
developed a rationale for Christianity. The new-birth pointed 
backwards into the eternal purposes of the Divine love, it embraced and 
overcame the fall, and was the catalyst for the final recapitulation of 
all things in the life of God. In this schema there was no place for a 
doctrine of the wrath of God. The atonement remained central but in a 
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new way. The traditional doctrines of election and reprobation were 
interpreted existentially. The familiar creedal affirmations marking 
the contours of the incarnation, (virgin birth, death, resurrection, 
ascension) were given a fresh context. As such they became part of a 
'process' encompassed within the horizon of the 'infinite antecedent 
love of God'. 24 2 The fundamentals of the faith were thus affirmed, but 
from a new perspective of faith. The doctrine of the Trinity was 
revealed as the presupposition of all reality, wholly practical and 
fully operational in raising the created order to its perfection.243 
The Simplicity of Faith 
"Simplicity was," said Law, "our finest intellectual power". 2H 
It was in this vein that he wrote in Christian Regeneration: 
To know no more, and to seek to know no more of our Salvation, 
than we can know by an implicit Faith, and absolute Resignation of 
ourselves to God in Christ Jesus, is the true sal'ing knowledge of 
Christ, and such as keeps us in the highest Degree of Fitness to 
receive perfect Salvation.2t5 
In the Spirit of Love resignation was identified as love, faith and 
dependence. These constituted 'full Articles of true Religion', since 
they carried salvation with them and witnessed a resignation of the 
self to the Divine Operation. In this way such articles were "a true 
and full Confession of the holy Trinity in Unity", since they implied a 
looking "wholly to the Father, as blessing us with the Operation of his 
own Word, and Spirit, so they truly confess, and worship the holy 
Trinity of God".H6 
This way of apprehending and dwelling in God required minimal 
explicit belief. When God the Father was affirmed as Creator, the Son 
as Regenerator and the Holy Spirit as Sanctifier, "then we are learned 
enough in this Mystery, and begin to know the Triune God in the same 
Manner in Time, that we shall know him in Eternity'',247 Law's focus 
was clear: minimal creedal affirmation, maximum heartfelt adoration. 
This was doctrine in the service of true piety. It offered a freedom 
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from 'Scholastic Speculations' and a preservation of the doctrine of 
the Trinity 'in its own Simplicity',248 
The simple richness of the faith was clearly shown in the outward 
form of the sacrament of Baptism, but only insofar as it signified the 
regeneration 
involved in 
of the Trinity inwardly,249 
the Baptismal confession was 
The 
not 
critical reduction 
an occasion for 
impoverishment of faith but denoted rather a way of affirming its 
fullness. 
The Dynamics of Communication: The Form of Articles 
In Law's expression of the faith a natural fluidity was apparent. 
At any one moment the faith could be captured with an economy of 
expression, yet such language remained full of meaning. The 'in-
breathed' log·os acted as a stimulant and releaser of speech. This 
revealed itself in Law's later writings in a form of communication that 
revelled in rich, extended, free-flowing discourse, unselfconsciously 
mirroring the creativity of God's own overflowing Spirit,2 5 0 A poetic 
quality emerged in his prose. It was, said Law, 'the style of 
love',25l 
In this context doctrine operated within a linguistic flux which 
oscillated between highly compressed statements of faith and the 
abundance of free-flowing speech. Here simplicity and plenitude in 
communication co-inhered: the latent richness of short statements of 
faith - God is love, 'Love is the Christ of God' - manifested itself in 
the wide ranging theological discourse spawned by such aphoristic 
forms,25 2 
Doctrine: Modified Objectivities 
Law's focus upon the primary reality of faith had made its impact 
upon his style of communication. It also was responsible for breaking 
conventional forms of doctrine which presupposed a strong one-to- one 
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correspondence between language and divine reality. What emerged was a 
modified objectivity in which statements of faith witnessed to and 
hence mediated the Divine-human interrelation. 
Matters of faith and necessary doctrines were still plain 
scriptural 'facts', but their objectivity was of a secondary order. 
Their proper function was as witness to the primary unifying divine 
reality. Thus the Scriptures belonged to those "Helps to an Holiness 
which they cannot give,,,"253 though they are "a true, outward, verbal 
Direction to the one only true Light, and Salvation of Man'',254 The 
written Word witnessed to Jesus who ''is alone that Word of God., ''255 
As such they were analogous to the 'office' and 'power' of John the 
Baptist's witness to the one true Light,256 In this renewed symbolic 
operation of language statements of faith moved beyond mere description 
to fulfill a transforming ethical function. Law's mystical theology 
evoked not only knowledge that the world was constituted in such a way 
but also a knowledge of how to live in the light of the new reality of 
faith,25 7 What was mediated was not just information but an enticement 
to godly life. 
The relation between doctrine and its fundament was analogous to 
the body-spirit relation. Body and Spirit were 'essentially distinct' 
"yet all that was in the Body, was from the Nature, Will and Working of 
its Spirit",258 The higher reality was the Spirit which manifested 
itself through the body as derived reality. The language of faith was 
in this same way a mediate form. It belonged to the 'shadow'. It was 
not the 'substance' but, precisely because it operated symbolically, 
"it carries us further than itself",259 Accordingly, Law could 
distinguish between the doctrine of the Spirit of love and the thing 
itself. It was a distinction aimed at ensuring a correct focus for 
piety. 
It was possible, however, to rejoice in doctrine. It participated 
in the 'delight' that truth brought, but only "as it calls forth the 
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Birth, and Growth, and Exercise" of the Spirit of Love,260 Law's goal 
was reality in its fullness and beauty. Statements of the truth of 
faith had significance only as there was ''a power of the supernatural 
light opening its endless Wonders in them",261 
The Function of a Tradition: Ecclesiological Re-orientations 
The relocation of reality in interiority resulted in a radical 
doctrine of the Church. The ecclesial bond was located within the 
believer. The bond was dynamic but remained elusive in terms of social 
existence. In Law's final work, An Address to the Clergy (1i61), he 
wrote: "Christ in us, or we in his Church, is the same Thing",262 In 
reply to the question about where to go to be in the true salvation-
Church, Law answered that a person ''need go nowhere ,, 263 This, he . 
stated, was 'the lrfystic Religion'. 
In A Serious Call Law had enjoined his readers to live ,, . ln the 
"-'Orld as in a holy temple of God",264 In his later works 'world' and 
'temple' had been relocated entirely in interiority where the heavenly 
Church dwelt. Similarly, schism in the Church was a matter of inner 
dispositions. The warning against living with 'schismatical passions' 
which he issued in Letters to a Lady in 1731 had intensified to the 
point that all divisions had their primary location in the heart. 
Spirit and Ethic of Love 
Yet for Law the outward practice of Christianity which had 
figured so prominently in his Serious Call remained. It became the 
mark of true social Christianity. Thus, in a letter written in 1756, 
he explored the nature of Church communion. The true Church could only 
be discerned by a 'turn inwards'. But Church communion was both 
internal and external, corresponding to 'inward truth' and 'outward 
sign' respectively. The Church as inward truth "is regeneration, or 
the life, Spirit and Power of Christ, quickened and brought to life, in 
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the soul". 265 Regeneration was the means by which the 'inward Church' 
or Kingdom of God was established within. The Church as 'outward sign' 
was the outward visible form or manner of life proper to inner 
regeneration. The Church was known and existed outwardly where the 
outward 'behaviour' of Christ was evident in the practice of religion. 
Christ's life provided the perfect form of life for the Church to 
imitate. True membership of the one Church required nothing more or 
less than "Conformity to and Union with the inward Spirit and outward 
Form of Christ's Life and Behaviour in this World",266 To live this 
life was to be in the 'highest perfection of Church unity', being 
inwardly united to Christ through the Spirit and outwardly exercising 
the life of Christ. "For what is Christianity, but that which Christ 
was while on Earth?",267 
Law identified three social evils that ran counter to the life of 
the Church; the love of acquiring riches, the taking of Oaths and the 
recourse to war,268 Implicit in this ethical mysticism was a critique 
of all earlier attempts at reformation which, in Law's view, had 
remained within the province of worldly wisdom and failed to generate a 
true outward spirit of Love.269 
Displacement of Confessionality 
To confessionalise the Church bond risked, in Law's view, 
displacement of that primary interior bond between the believer and 
Christ. Attempts to secure outward forms of Church bonding were a sign 
that the inner reality had been lost. Efforts to preserve Church unity 
through 'learning' and 'words' could not compensate for the new birth 
which constituted the real and original life of the Church.2 7 0 Law 
turned his attention to the more common view of the Church as an 
external society torn by divisions and quarrelling over doctrines. He 
pointed out that this was not the true form of the Church but a merely 
human externality. It had to be endured with patiently. A person was 
246 
VII: Renewal With Law 
responsible simply to ensure that he or she was inwardly a true 
worshipper,271 Law recognised wide limits of tolerance on external 
matters. Defects, mutilations and variations in baptismal practice and 
eucharistic doctrine were of no consequence. What was intended inwardly 
was not subject to human power, being entirely ''transacted between God 
and myself",2 7 2 All that was required was to love the 'inward Truth' 
intended. 
Assemblies of worship were not joined because of their purity but 
because of what was 'meant' and 'intended', for in spite of their 
'fallenness' Law said, "I reverence them, as the renerable Remains of 
all that, which once was and will I hope be again the Glory of Church 
Assemblies viz the Ministration of the Spirit, and not of the dead 
letter". 273 
Law saw two signs of hope for a renewed Church. Firstly, the 
increase in outward argument and division would reach a crisis in which 
the emptiness of all such strife would cause a re-orientation of the 
Church towards the inward truth of the Spirit. The second sign was 
already in evidence in those with whom Law identified; those who had 
already begun the search for mystical and spiritual instruction, who 
had discerned the inner voice, had 'turned inwards' and were even now 
being led from 
outward Shadows into the substantial ever enduring truth the 
everlasting Union of the Soul with God, as its only Good, through 
the Spirit and Nature of Christ truly formed and fully revealed in 
it •• ,274 
Religious opinions, doctrines, creeds and confessions often 
existed in a religious vacuum. In Law's view it was a constant danger 
to be lured into an attachment to an Augsburg Confession, a Council of 
Trent, Synod of Dart or Thirty-nine Articles. Confessionalism obscured 
a real knowledge of God. 
For had a man a hundred Articles, if they were anything else but a 
hundred Calls to a Christ come in the Spirit, to a God within him, 
as the only possible light, and Teacher of his Mind, it would be a 
hundred times better for him to be without them,275 
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From another point of view, Law was simply reiterating a point he had 
long held, that the fullness of truth was co-present in any particular 
article of faith.276 Attachment to 'Notions' about God indicated that 
a person was blind to the knowledge of God within.2 77 When the Church 
bond was confessionalised the believer was deflected away from the life 
in Christ. What was primary was the immediacy of God to human life. 
Articles of faith mediated this primary bond. 
Unfinished Agenda: The Public Nature of Belief 
In Law's m~stical theology a highly disembodied ecclesiological 
position emerged. Participation within the body of Christ upon earth 
was indirectly achieved through communion with God. 
The Church was one by its unity of faith. However this faith was 
held implicitly. Articles of faith were an 'outbirth' of an antecedent 
inner communion. The Church was one by virtue of the inner bond. 
Traditional ecclesial boundaries were shattered. The Church had a 
beginning in the Spirit but was difficult to discern in time and space. 
A problem remains as to why Law considered it necessary to turn 
inwards to find real Christianity. The mystic way represented the way 
of purifying the Church. This involved the disruption of all social 
and intellectual boundaries. In this sense ecclesial mysticism was a 
reforming and evangelical way, Law saw himself confronted with an 
insipid Church life which he considered generally apostate, professing 
Christianity but lacking the reality,27B He was acutely conscious of 
the growing vigour of the critique of religion developed by eighteenth 
century rationalism. Law sought the reality of faith beyond 
established institutions and rational religion. 
distant but immanent within the heart. 
This 'beyond' was not 
The mystic way was, however, a response to threatened existence. 
The inner bond provided a certainty and security that was only dimly 
reflected in any confessionalised form it might take. Law's method of 
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locating the divine life was thus a response to the environment of his 
time. It provided a way of stating anew the fundamentals of 
Trinitarian belief. 
The move into interiority was also costly. Law's handling of 
Christian faith was not simply a response to the beauty of the form of 
God but also to failed institutional Church life. The move to 
interiority offered a protected space where faith could be freed from 
the contamination of rationalism. In this context to state the 
fundamentals of the faith was to state the form of the interior life. 
What resulted was an unintentional de-socializing of belief. This was 
a concomitant feature of a ~eakened sense of Christianity's 
institutional form,279 It was no longer clear how, in Law's 
reconstitution of the fundamental articles tradition, Christian belief 
remained public and open to scrutiny. 
This problem was present in the very strategy by which Law sought 
to renew Christian life in the Church. His mystical theology was 
developed in relation to the individual. Law had argued that the human 
person was "a Microcosm of all this great outward World; that is of 
everything in it, 
all life was 
its Stars and Elements ,,,",280 
'in a hidden Birth' in 
This supposed that 
the individual. 
Accordingly, knowledge of the truth of human nature was also knowledge 
of the truth of everything. The individual was 'the little World'.28l 
The renewal of this little world initiated the perfection of all 
existence. 282 
Law's focus for the renewal of Christianity was personal 
interiority. This restriction made it difficult to give an adequate or 
direct account of the presence and action of God the Trinity in 
creation more generally, and particularly in more mundane human life 
and vocation. Law's strategy for renewal had displaced decadent 
institutional life. In overcoming the dualism implicit in the dichotomy 
between revealed and natural religion, and hence restoring sacredness 
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to the natural order, Law's mystical theology generated a dualism 
between the individual and the community,283 
With this restriction of the treatment of the articles of faith to 
personal interiority, Law significantly underplayed the social function 
of the fundamental articles tradition. Here the social function of 
belief had been transferred into particular ethical forms, through 
which new social bonding could arise that cut across traditional 
ecclesial boundaries. Positively, the attempt by Law to formulate a 
full Trinitarian faith constituted a responsive praise of God that 
witnessed to transformed human existence. The irony was that Law's 
Trinitarianism was only very indirectly able to generate renewed 
communal existence. Institutional renewal was implicitly perceived as 
an occurrence derived from personal regeneration. 
Law's strong Trinitarianism was insufficiently communal. What was 
offered was a truncated version of the true mystical form of the 
Church. A correspondence was established between human life and God 
which was unable to provide a positive account of God in society. 
Law's statement of the faith was determined by personal piety. The 
fundamental articles tradition could mediate only indirectly the 
communal life of the Trinity in the world and institutional life. 
Conclusion 
Law's quest for a purified 'Gospel Christianity' had been 
developed within the framework of the Christian mystical tradition. 
Here the focus was upon "an awakened Divine Life set up amongst 
Men",2B4 that appealed to what alone was "capable of being touched with 
these Offers of a new Life'', i.e, the human heart and conscience. This 
inner reawakening presupposed an opening of the human heart to the 
Spirit of love. A new covenant bond was formed. Law wrote: "as Gospel 
Christians, we belong to the new Covenant of the Holy Spirit ,, 2 8 5 
Such a Christianity was its own proof, "it can be proved from nothing 
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but itself; it wants neither Miracles, nor outward Witness; but, like 
the Sun, is only its own Discoverer",286 Law had attempted a radical 
refounding of Christianity. He had charted a course back to that 
fundament from which all reality flowed. 
In this process the tradition of fundamental articles had been 
reconstituted in terms of Christianity's founding reality. The only 
proper and legitimate affirmation of the doctrines of the Gospel was 
one that emanated from life renewed in the Spirit of God. What Law had 
offered was a fresh way of responding to God the Trinity. It was a 
way of believing that found its nourishment from God. In this context 
faith could not be reduced to notional assent to certain doctrines, 
adherence to the 'History of the Facts, Doctrines and Institutions of 
the Gospel', or appeals to Canons, Councils, Antiquity and ancient 
usages, for 
Faith is not a Notion, but a real, strong essential Hunger, 
an attracting, or magnetic Desire of Christ, which as it proceeds 
from a Seed of the Divine Nature in us, so it attracts and unites 
with its Like, it lays hold on Christ, puts on the Divine Nature, 
and in a living and real Manner, grows powerful over all Sins, and 
effectually works out our Salvation,287 
To state the fundamentals of such a faith was to witness to a 
correspondence of God's Being with human being, of Spirit and soul, of 
Wisdom and the wise: 
For the Truth of Christianity is the Spirit of God living and 
working in it; and where this Spirit is not the Life of it, there 
the outward Form is but like the outward Carcase of a departed 
Soul. 288 
In tracing the outworking of this truth in Law's theological pilgrimage 
and Christian discipleship, this study has uncovered the dynamics of 
an important and controversial strategy for renewal in the tradition of 
fundamental articles in modern theology. 
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FURTHER ATTEMPTS AT RECONSTITUTION OF THE TRADITION: 
So•e Post-Enlightenment Developments 
Whereas John Locke's philosophy had retained a strong, if crude 
realism, 1 the more thoroughgoing Kantian 'turn to the subject' 
presupposed a radical disjunction between phenomena and 'the-thing-in-
itself',2 Within the Kantian framework doctrine operated as a 
regulative ideal; a principle of systematization and unity, rather than 
for the extension of knowledge to objects beyond normal experience,3 
This presupposed the substitution of a dogmatic anthropomorphism with a 
symbolic anthropomorphism; a strategy designed, it seems, for excluding 
the presence of God from the world and human believing,4 
Within this context any viable affirmation of the articles of 
Christian faith would require a reassessment of the capacity of human 
beings for apprehension of God. In fact, the 'Romantic Enlightenment' 5 
of late eighteenth century Europe had devoted fresh attention to this 
matter, through a renewed emphasis upon experiential Christianity. This 
development was typified by Friedrich Schleiermacher6 (1768-1834) on 
the Continent, and in England by Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834),7 
The Illumination of Reason: Coleridge on Articles of Faith 
Through an appeal to the creative activity of the imaginative 
faculty and its counterpart 'Reason' - the organ of the 'supersensuous' 
- Coleridge sought to locate a capacity in human life for transcendence 
beyond a narrow Lockean sensationalism, which had limited human 
understanding to the reception and organization of sense experience. 8 
Thus, as a complement to reason as understanding, Coleridge spoke of a 
'Higher Reason', by which he intended to describe human beings in their 
capacity for the apprehension of supersensuous reality. In this sense 
Reason was 'the irradiative power representative of the infinite'. 9 
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The possibility for human communion with God was grounded in the logos 
of God which was present to man as such in 'Reason',lO In the proper 
use of reason and will human beings were raised to correspondence with 
the Being of God the Trinity,ll 
The focus for Coleridge was the imagination ''that combines and 
manifests the whole mind and expresses the truth and reason of ideas in 
a symbolic language grasped by the understanding",l2 In the 
imagination human capacity for God and God's animating presence for the 
individual coalesced, expanding faith and renewing the divine image in 
human life. 
communication 
The imagination thus represented a 
of the logos of God. 13 Implicit 
locus for the 
in Coleridge's 
development of 'Reason' and imagination was an intention to affirm a 
dynamic correspondence between human and Divine thinking and willing. 
Upon this basis articles of faith were reinstated with ontological, as 
opposed to merely regulative, significance. 14 Doctrine genuinely 
mediated, without exhausting, the truth to which it was directed, and 
in this way it was properly symbolic,lS 
Coleridge 
Christianity,l6 
emphasised the personal and practical nature of 
The truth that was apprehended was the truth of life 
as it was to be lived in relation to God. Articles of faith, on this 
account, both expressed and directed individuals to the truth of human 
existence. In response to two questions that might arise in relation 
to the tenets 'peculiar to Christianity', how can I comprehend this? 
and, how is this to be proved?, Coleridge could reply: "To the first 
question I should answer: Christianity is not a Theory, or a 
Speculation; but a life; - not a Philosophy of Life, but a Life and a 
living Process. To the second: TRY IT",l7 In this way the truth of 
Christianity was confirmed, not simply by reference to the intellect or 
external authority but in practice. The apprehension of truth involved 
a reciprocity between revelation and human experience,l 8 
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Articles of faith were to be understood from a practical, moral 
view. The doctrine of original sin concerned a 'mysterious Fact' of 
existence, and it had to be understood ''in the sense in which it alone 
is binding on faith". 19 The doctrine of election had to be 
understood in its relation to the human being.zo The issue here was to 
learn how to hold doctrines. The rational and safe way was to adhere to 
them practically and morally.Zl Coleridge's practical view had to do 
with 'facts' not 'systems': 
The Gospel is not a system of Theology, nor a syntagma of 
theoretical propositions .. , , But it is a history, a series of 
facts and events ..... most important doctrinal Truths; but still 
Facts and Declaration of Facts.ZZ 
In this practical view belief involved a threefold dynamic; will, 
understanding and love.2 3 Human subjectivity could not be reduced to 
certain rational and logical operations. To do this rendered one 
impotent to apprehend those articles most peculiar to Christianity. 2 4 
In this manner Coleridge was able to affirm Christian Trinitarian 
belief. Indeed, his Aids to Reflection (1825) had been offered in part 
as a defence of the 'peculiar' doctrines of Christianity. 25 Such 
".Mysteries are Reason, Reason in its highest form of Self-
affirmation",26 
The fact that these mysteries might be "not quite simple and what 
any plain body can understand at the first hearing",27 could not be a 
reason for rejecting them as 'fundamental articles'. 28 The mysteries of 
faith could not be "cut and squared for the comprehension of the 
understanding",29 Such 'Hinimifidianism' drew "religion down to the 
believer's intellect, instead of raising his intellect up to 
religion". 30 
Within Coleridge's fundamental conception of the unity of truth,Jl 
an ordered hierarchy of belief emerged. At a general level he could 
refer to 'the great fundamental truths' - the existence and attributes 
of God, and the life after death as the 'First Truths'32 or 
'articles', upon which the 'superstructure' of the gospel revelation 
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was raised. 33 Such articles were the 'ground-work of Christianity, and 
'essentials' in the faith, 
but not its characteristic and peculiar Doctrines: except indeed 
as they are confirmed, enlivened, realized and brought home to the 
whole being of man, head, heart and spirit, by the truths and 
influences of the Gospel,34 
Elsewhere he spoke of the articles essential before Christ,35 He 
included the doctrine of original sin as the ground of Christianity 
upon which the 'edifice' was raised;36 ''the great Constituent Article 
of the Faith in Christ, as the Remedy of the Disease - The Doctrine of 
Redemption",37 Doctrines preliminary to Redemption, such as original 
sin, secured an 'intelligibility of relation'38 for the structure of 
belief. It was only in the doctrine of redemption that such 
'preceeding' articles were 'realized',39 The 'entire Scheme of 
necessary Faith' came under the 'two heads' of original sin ('Sin 
Originate') and 'the doctrine of Redemption', in relation to which 
there were 'minor tenets of general belief' to be believed 'in a spirit 
worthy of these',40 
When Coleridge wanted to draw attention to those important beliefs 
directly connected with the gospel revelation he spoke of 'the peculiar 
and distinguishing fundamentals of Christianity', the 'especial 
constituents of Christianity',41 Doctrines peculiar to Christianity 
included: belief that the 'Means of Salvation' had been secured; 'the 
great Redemptive Act' of the incarnation of the Son of God in the 
person of Jesus Christ, his life, death and resurrection; belief in the 
t-
possibility of appro~ating this redemption by repentance and faith 
(including 'the aids' that render an effective faith and repentance 
themselves possible); belief in eternal life for the 'heirs of 
salvation'; belief in the 'awakening of the spirit' in believers and 
'communion of the spirit' with the Holy Spirit; belief in the 'gifts' 
and 'graces' of the Spirit manifest in a life of righteous works ('the 
appointed signs and evidences of our Faith'). Coleridge concluded: 
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"All these, together with the doctrine of the Fathers [of Judaism] re-
proclaimed in the everlasting Gospel, . " .. 2 we receive ...• He considered 
his list of articles of faith to be the common profession of 
Protestantism.-'3 It was clear, however, that he also envisaged the 
possibility of developing a genuinely ecumenical confession of 
"the whole Scheme of the Christian Faith, including all the 
Articles of Belief common to the Greek and Latin, the Roman and 
the Protestant Churches, with the threefold proof, that it is 
ideally, morally and historically true". H 
Within Coleridge's scheme of faith a certain fluidity emerged. 
~fixed in with the familiar and fairly rigid concept of fundamentals 
its references to foundations, groundwork, superstructures, edifices -
was a more dynamic view of doctrine, in which interconnections and 
relations were recognised.-'5 The doctrine of original sin gave 
to all the other mysteries of religion, a common basis, a 
connection of dependency, an intelligibility of relation, and 
total harmony, that supersede extrinsic proof.-'6 
Doctrinal interrelatedness was such that the doctrine of the Trinity 
and Incarnation ought to receive top priority. 47 Elsewhere he referred 
to the doctrine of redemption as constituting that article stantis vel 
cadentis Ecclesiae.-'8 The soteriological motif49 was embraced within a 
richer pattern of doctrine that intended to express the truth of human 
life in relation to God the Trinity.so 
Yet this organic and 'practical' view of doctrine could generate 
highly compressed statements of faith. Thus Coleridge offered his own 
short formula or rule for the determination of fundamental articles: 
In the strictest sense of essential, this alone is the essential 
in Christianity, that the same spirit should be growing in us 
which was in the fullness of all perfection in Christ Jesus. 
Whatever else is named essential is such because, and only as 
far as, it is instrumental to this, or evidently implied 
herein. 51 
Here, Coleridge's practical view emerged as a recommendation of the 
tradition of 'inward religion'. 5 2 The result was mysticism, a matter 
that Coleridge addressed in his conclusion to Aids to Reflection. In 
concluding thus Coleridge acknowledged his debt to William Law.s3 
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Coleridge revitalised the fundamental articles of faith from 
within, through a reintegration of the historical facts of Christianity 
with human experience. 54 This achievement was facilitated by a 
retrieval of the rich subjectivity of faith, which included emotional, 
intellectual and volitional elements. In this way he recovered the 
human capacity for reality in its fullness as given by God.ss 
Articles of faith operated as symbols of the confluence of two 
currents of human life. Revelation in Scripture and the common 
Reformation faith provided the objective current. Another related to 
the realities of human existence, the subjective current. The truth 
required by the latter was assured by the former. This resonance 
was expressed in the language of the mysteries of faith. To state these 
mysteries demonstrated a godly use of reason and will and thereby 
witnessed to a human capacity for transcendence,5 6 Perhaps equally 
important was Coleridge's recognition that articles of faith remained 
unfinished until confirmed in performance. 
Coleridge's inquiries into the nature of experiential Christianity 
had placed the fundamental articles of the faith within the dynamic 
of the Christian life. In this context the emphasis of the tradition 
was firmly related to its directional function in the Church. It was in 
ongoing Christian discipleship that the 'common-place truth' of the 
articles tradition could be restored to its 'uncommon lustre',57 
The 'Affectional Transposition': Charles Simeon on Gospel Truths 
From a somewhat different angle the directional thrust in 
Coleridge's handling of the fundamental articles was recovered by one 
of the leaders of the late eighteenth century evangelical revival in 
England, Charles Simeon (1759-1836),58 For Simeon, the famed preacher 
at Holy Trinity Cambridge for over half a century and inheritor of a 
rich evangelical tradition that included both Calvinist and Arminian 
strands, the focus of ecclesal life was conformity to the truth of the 
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Gospel through conversion and sanctification. As the truth was 
communicated through the preaching of the gospel, godly human life was 
generated and sustained. 
The gospel message of redemption by Christ was revealed in the 
Scriptures. In this respect it was incumbent upon Christians to 
discriminate wisely between matters of greater and lesser importance 
for salvation. Drawing upon St Paul's reference to foundations and 
superstructures, Simeon distinguished between those first principles of 
Christianity, to do with the great doctrines of salvation by grace 
through faith in Christ, and 'the deeper things of God',59 It ~as not 
so much a distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental doctrines 
but rather between the fundamental doctrines of the kerygma, and things 
of further perfection, such as the doctrine of predestination.6° 
The aim of such discrimination was not to disregard certain 
scripture truths that appeared to contradict others or did not fit with 
a particular system, but in order that all truth might be rightly 
proportioned. Simeon had in mind the tendency of the 'ultra 
evangelicals' to ignore all but the 'leading doctrines' of the 
scripture revelation,61 One had to rest content with the scripture 
system, remembering that the truth lay not in just one, nor in a 
confused mixture of two apparently contradictory truths, "but in the 
proper and seasonable application of them both",62 
For Simeon this meant that the truth was not in the middle nor in 
one extreme, but in both. The golden mean of Aristotle was to be 
discarded forSt Paul's 'strange notions' which entailed 
"oscillating (not vacillating) from pole to pole. Sometimes I am 
a high Calvinist, at other times a low Arminian, so that if 
extremes will please you, I am your man; only remember, it is not 
one extreme that we are to go to, but both extremes". 63 
At the heart here was Simeon's lively sense of paradox in Christianity 
which undermined all theological systems that threatened to displace 
the scripture system which was, 
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exact and dogmatical theologians are inclined to allow: and that 
as the wheels in a complicated machine may move in opposite 
directions and yet subserve one common end, so may truths 
apparently opposite be perfectly reconcilable with each other 
and equally subserve the purposes of God in the accomplishment 
of man's salvation.s~ 
This perspective gave Simeon a considerable freedom in expository 
preaching from the whole of Scripture, a fact demonstrated in his 
twent~·-one volumes of sermon 'outlines' drawn from throughout 
Scripture, and designed, as he argued in the Preface, as a supplement 
to the Book of Homilies of the Church of England. As an evangelical 
preacher the central message of the gospel was never lost sight of. 
Redemption in Christ was the centre. The doctrinal web which secured 
this constituted the fundamentals of the gospel which were plainly 
written in Scripture.ss 
What was fundamental could be articulated in a highly compressed 
form. Thus, in stating that Christ was 'the annointed Saviour of the 
world' and 'the King and Governor of all whom he saves' Simeon argued: 
This is the truth; this is the sum and substance of the Gospel: 
there is nothing connected with justification, sanctification, or 
the complete and everlasting salvation of mankind, which is not 
comprehended in this,66 
On the other hand, the essentials of evangelical religion could be 
stated in and developed from a variety of doctrines. 67 The doctrine of 
the Trinity was a 'fundamental article' and its denial and all 
doctrines dependent upon it - atonement, imputed righteousness, divine 
influences - could all be traced back to the fact that fallen humankind 
did not feel the need of the Divine Saviour.ss 
Simeon pointed to a way of holding the fundamental truths of faith 
that went beyond 'mere assent' and overcame a bare formalism: 
By the term, "believing", we are not to understand a mere assent 
given to any particular doctrine.... The faith intended in the 
text [Mk.16.15-16] is far more than acknowledgement of the truth 
of the Gospel; it is an approbation of it as excellent ••• Assent 
is an act of the understanding only: but true faith is a consent 
of the will also, with the full concurrence of our warmest 
affections: it is called in one place a "believing with the heart; 
and in another, a "believing with all the heart". In few words, 
faith is a new and living principle, whereby we are enabled to 
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rely upon the Lord Jesus Christ for all the ends and purposes for 
which he came into the world,69 
Simeon saw here the centre of true religion: the renovation of heart 
and life, the result of simple reliance upon Christ in faith. In 
believing the gospel doctrines one was enjoined to feel them 'with the 
full concurrence of our warmest affections'. 
This was a way of believing that enabled the evangelical Simeon to 
offer a wider vision for unity among Christians. He noted that, though 
there were differences in matters of inferior moment, 
yet in fundamental points such as our fall in Adam, our recovery 
by Christ, our renovation by the Spirit, the evil of sin, the 
beauty of holiness, the security of believers, and many other 
points connected with the spiritual life, there is no 
difference ... 7o 
Significant!~ he added: 
or if they differ a little in modes of expression when disputing 
for opinions, they agree perfectly when they come upon their knees 
before God; which shows that their differences are rather 
imaginary than real. 
Whilst it is likely that Simeon's closing comment is more hopeful than 
real, nevertheless his sentiments were clear: unity of faith was 
'learned by the heart rather than the head',71 
The key to this richer understanding of the dynamic of evangelical 
doctrine in the Church was the central role of the Holy Spirit in 
Simeon's theology,72 Gospel truths could simply 'abide in the mind' as 
any speculative subject might, though when they were 'applied to the 
soul' by the Spirit of God, "they produce a feeling corresponding with 
the truths themselves",73 Thus,in a sermon on "The Spirit of Vital 
Christianity"> Simeon spoke of the 'real character' of Christianity as 
being something 'infused into the soul' and 'exhibited in life', 
forming a person of 'energy',74 
Gospel truth was thus inseparable from Gospel piety. The bond was 
secured through the 'influence', as Simeon called it, of the Spirit. 
For Simeon the testimonium internum Spiritus Sancti was the corollary 
of justification by faith, and as a result it was the primary 
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confirmation to the Christian of the truth of Christianity, prophecy 
and miracles notwithstanding,75 
For Simeon, a faith rightly formed in its subjective mode in the 
believer was one that corresponded with the fundamental truths of the 
gospel. Priority was thus placed upon a godly practice of faith. 
Statements of belief required an 'affectional transposition', that 
was evident in heart-felt obedience to God. Even the deeper truths of 
faith (e.g. predestination) were legitimate only when they functioned 
to 'compose the mind' and 'to keep us steadfast in a time of need'. 
Simeon did not balk at extending the logic of this position to his 
understanding of the doctrine and liturgy of the Church. The Articles 
of Religion repudiated only those who 'denied some fundamental truth of 
Christianity'. Both Calvinist and Arminian met in the Articles of 
Religion. As for the Liturgy, "it comes nearer to inspiration than any 
book that ever was composed",76 and expressed "exactly what a broken 
hearted penitent before God would desire to express". Specifically, 
the General Confession was ''as beautiful, as just, as scriptural a 
summary of experimental religion as ever was penned .. ",77 Its words 
corresponded to the appropriate 'feelings' or 'necessities' of a 
penitent. 
another. 
Repeating the confession was one thing, feeling it quite 
Charges against the Liturgy of overformulation and coldness 
were repudiated by Simeon: 
the liturgy, and cast 
''All that is wanting is an heart suited to 
as it were into that mould",78 The Liturgy 
required a rightly formed inward disposition and was "intended and is 
calculated to produce tender seriousness, a meek devotion and a humble 
joy i.e. equally remote from the unmeaning coldness of a formalist; the 
self importance of a systematic dogmatist",79 
The liturgy provided the ideal place in which the truths of the 
gospel could be realised. In the liturgy even the deepest truths could 
be contemplated for illumination and believers could experience the 
sanctifying efficacy of such truths upon their hearts.so Institutional 
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religion had an inner form without which it was impoverished. 
Conversely, 
formularies. 
the piety of faith could be safely located in the 
This enabled Simeon to remain faithful both 
public 
to the 
preaching of the Gospel and to the Established Church. Against 
Dissenters and enthusiasts Simeon maintained that continuity in the 
Gospel was not inconsistent with loyalty to the national church. All 
that was required was a heart cast into the gospel mould, which he was 
confident could be discerned in the Church of England. 
For Simeon, Christianity took the form of an enlivened religious 
subjectivity shaped in relation to certain specific theological loci. 
The appropriation of evangelical truth involved an internalizing of 
doctrine. This occured through the action of the Holy Spirit, and an 
outer-directed movement in which the articles of salvation were 
transferred into godly human life. The context for this dynamic was the 
individual in the Church. 
Simeon's handling of fundamental articles countered the tendency 
of the tradition to become turned towards delineation of Church 
boundaries. This 
doctrines obtained 
tendency was 
a law-like 
apparent when certain evangelical 
status identifying commitments to 
Arminian or Calvinist systems. In Simeon's evangelicalism this was 
displaced by a more dynamic approach. Here the tradition operated with 
a directional quality, forming piety and enlivening Christian life and 
Church institutions. Simeon's practical focus on scripturally informed, 
experiential Christianity recovered the potential of his inherited 
evangelicalism. This development entailed important concerns for a 
strong apostolic ecclesiology. This was evident in the modern 
missionary thrust of the Anglican church, which owed a great deal to 
Simeon's Cambridge ministry in the early nineteenth century. 
Restating Orthodoxy: 'The School of Waterland' 
Simeon's and Coleridge's handling of the fundamental articles 
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tradition had not eclipsed a more conventional treatment of that 
tradition associated with the 'School of Waterland' 8 1 and the rational 
theology of William Paley (1743-1805). 8 2 Nineteenth century exponents 
of fundamentals discussion in the Waterland line largely ignored the 
issues addressed by Coleridge. An example of this was evident in 
William Van Mildert's (1765-1836) Bampton Lectures of 1814. 8 3 
Van Mildert noted that the question of what was fundamental 
remained an 'open inquiry'. The answer was to be sought in a more 
careful explanation of the Apostles' aphorism: other foundation can no 
one lay, than that is laid, which is Jesus Christ (1Cor 3:11),84 Van 
Mildert followed Waterland's earlier exposition of the fundamentals of 
the Christian covenant, but with the express addition of a reference to 
Christian Priesthood. By virtue of its necessity for sacramental 
validation and effect the Priesthood was said to be "interwoven into 
the very substance of Christianity, and inseparable from its general 
design''. 8 5 It was no doubt a puzzle for Van Mildert why Waterland had 
omitted this ordinance. Its omission appeared to injure "if not the 
system of Christianity itself, yet the mode which infinite Wisdom has 
ordained of carrying it into effect",86 
Van Mildert's development of Waterland's schema indicated a 
further shift from the quad to the quo in matters of faith (i.e. from 
the material constituents to the formal conditions),87 This 
development was implicit in William Palmer's later dismissal of the 
fundamentals tradition in his scholarly Treatise on the Church of 
Christ (1838). It appeared to provide a viable option to defend the 
fundamental articles of Christianity in an environment increasingly 
rationalistic and hostile to faith,88 
The Ecclesiological Perspective: New•an's Modification 
The fundamental incompatibility of the Coleridge 'minority 
tradition' and the objectivist stance represented by the 'Waterland 
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School', emerged in John Henry Newman's (1801-1890) handling of the 
fundamental articles tradition. Newman's deployment of the theory of 
fundamentals in his controversy with a French Abb~, 89 his subsequent 
development and modification of the theory in his Lectures on the 
Prophetical Office of the Church ( 183i), 90 and his eventual rejection 
of this tradition as a strategy for depicting the identity and 
continuity of Christianity91 has, in the wake of Vatican II, received 
careful attention from both Protestant and Roman Catholic 
theologians. 92 Insofar as these inquiries have not been directly 
concerned with the fundamental articles tradition Newman's handling of 
the tradition still awaits fuller analysis. In this respect a number of 
issues merit consideration. 
For Newman the fundamentals apologia provided a crucial 
theoretical underpinning for a highly embodied and static ecclesiology. 
This was evident in the way Newman deployed the tradition - "one of the 
most static versions of guaranteed external continuity"93 as a 
strategy in controversy with Rome: 
Both parties consider 'the faith' to be necessary to sa.ll'a.tion; 
but we say the faith is prior to the Church; they, the Church is 
prior to the faith.94 
In this view the fundamentals of the faith were contained in 
Scripture. In important doctrines, such as the Trinity, the 
fundamentals were often 'hidden under the text of scripture',9 5 
However the fundamentals of the faith had been explicitly and clearly 
witnessed to in the undivided Church of antiquity. Church unity was, 
m 
in Newan's view, a precondition for securing those fundamentals in 
which the Catholic Church was 'indefectible',96 Newman followed Laud's 
and Stillingfleet's view that the Apostolic creed, the Regula. Fidei of 
the ancient church, was a sufficient catalogue of fundamentals for 
church communion,97 
This retrospective unity in fundamentals with the Church of old 
was, for Newman and the tradition which he espoused, the only ground 
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for present and prospective unity,98 This was Newman's theory of 
fundamentals,99 What was peculiarly Anglican about it was not the 
continued preoccupation with the distinction between fundamental and 
non-fundamental articles the theological problem of fundamental 
articles was still relevant to Continental Protestantismloo - but 
rather its construal in a particularly static form. This was at 
variance with such earlier exponents of the tradition as Hooker and 
Chillingworth.lOl 
~onetheless, Newman identified his theory of fundamentals with the 
'received notion in the English school', and he stated 'its 
peculiarity' in graphic and highly significant language: 
[The doctrine of Fundamentals] supposes the Truth to be entirely 
objective and detached, not lying hid in the bosom of the Church 
as if one with her, clinging to her and (as it were) lost in her 
embrace, but as being sole and unapproachable as on the Cross or 
at the Resurrection, with the Church close by, but in the 
background!~(my italics) 
In Newman's passage from the Anglican to the Roman Church the analog~' 
of fundamentals with the cross and resurrection was displaced by a 
view of doctrine nestled 'in the bosom' of the Church. This move 
remained a puzzle to William Palmer, whose handling of the theory of 
fundamentals had led Newman to surmise that Palmer's ecclesiology was 
"the first real nearing to Romanism which has in principle been 
made" ,103 
Newman's controversial move to the Roman Church was intertwined 
with an equally controversial development of the theory of 
fundamentals. His change of allegiance was facilitated by his 
participation in, and development of, the Coleridge 'minority' 
tradition,l 0 4 Important to this tradition was the view that "the church 
manifests the presence of Christ sacramentally to the world",lOS 
According to this view language operated sacramentally, communicating 
the truth in rich symbolic form,lo6 
For Newman this conception of truth meant that revelation was a 
mystery, "a doctrine lying hid in language" ,107 It was a view highly 
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disruptive of the cruder realism of Newman's fundamentals apologetic. 
This was expressed initially in Newman's uncertainty over the precise 
constituents of his proposed 'Episcopal' and 'Prophetic' traditions,lO~ 
Later it emerged in his more finely developed unitary conception of 
Christian doctrine- as developed in the 1843 sermon on 'The Theory of 
Developments in Religious Doctrine' ,109 Finally, the challenge his 
tt 
sactrnental theory of language posed to his inherited theory of 
fundamentals was crystalised in his Essay on the De\·elopment of 
Christian Doctrine (1845). Here1 Newman spoke of the Catholic doctrines 
as 'members of one family', making up but 'one integral religion'. He 
argued: ''You must accept the whole or reject the whole'' ,11° 
In tracing the development of Christian doctrine Newman was 
tracing the history of the corporate consciousness of the Church as it 
had expressed itself through time in response to its apprehension of 
the oneness of God who was Trinity,lll This presupposed that doctrine 
did have a history, a characteristic that Newman's inherited theory of 
fundamentals could not, without danger, assimilate. 
If Christian doctrine did have a history, some organic concept of 
truth was necessary if doctrinal developments, as in the Roman Church, 
were not to be deemed illegitimate. By the time Newman had developed 
these ideas his change of ecclesial allegiance was all but secured; his 
Essay was simply 'an hypothesis to account for a difficulty' ,i.e.. "the 
apparent variation and growth in Christian doctrine and worship'',11 2 
The Via ;'rledia was an impossible idea and had been discarded. The 
uncovering of the dynamic of doctrine, language and idea, rendered the 
polemical thrust of the fundamentals apologetic impotent. 
At this stage a third issue arises. To what extent had Newman 
overturned the fundamental articles tradition?l 13 Certainly at one 
level he had rejected its hitherto strategic role in Church 
conflict.ll4 However the formal structure of the theory remained,l 1 5 
and perhaps more importantly, Newman's ordering of truth within its 
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fundamentally organic structure revealed a continued preoccupation with 
identifying hierarchical patterns.116 Thus the doctrine of the 
incarnation, albeit for 'conl'enienceof arrangements' (my italics), was 
referred to as the 'central doctrine',l17 In fact this doctrine 
provided the rationale for a variety of Roman developments and, as 
Stephen Sykes has noted, this singling out of the 'idea' of the 
incarnation has a parallel in the operation of Schleiermacher's concept 
of the 'essence of Christianity', as a principle of coherence,ll~ 
The irony of the Essay was that, in an attempt to justify the 
truth of Roman developments, Newman was involved in ordering a 'family' 
of doctrine in relation to one central doctrine. All doctrine proposed 
by an infallibly developing authority might be worthy of belief,119 and 
~ 
in this sense fundamental. Nonetheless, judgments could be made as to 
the relative importance of fundamental doctrines ,12 o 
In Newman what might be referred to as a core tradition endured 
within his organic concept of doctrine. Christianity remained 'based' 
on a creed.121 Furthermore, in the notes accompanying the 1877 edition 
of the Via Jfedia, Newman stated that the ''Creed contains the primary, 
rudimental articles, those which St. Paul calls the 'elementa exordii 
sermonum Dei'",l22 Such core belief, in this context, represented the 
first essentials in the order of explicit belief. Nevertheless, as 
demonstrated in his concern over the determination of Papal 
infallibility, Newman considered himself a minimiser not a 
maximiser. 1 23 
There was, it seems, an element of ambiguity in Newman's handling 
of the fundamentals tradition. This recalls the issue with which 
Coleridge himself attempted to grapple; the contribution of human 
subjectivity in belief. In Newman this problem was perceived pre-
eminently as a problem of the Church's explication of its corporate 
consciousness through history,l24 However Newman had a strong 
suspicion of the power of the 'illative' imagination. Its true and 
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false operations required some guarantee other than an assumption of 
self-authentication inherent in the symbolising process itself. Rather, 
for Newman, 
the guarantee is in fact given by the special subject-
matter: an infallibly guided Church. To interpet rightly is not 
a gift of the illative imagination working by itself ,,,125 
For Newman it was an issue of the proper placement of faith. The 
truth was only safely and fully held in the 'bosom' of the Church. Thus 
Stephen Prickett comments that for Newman, "the truth of Catholic 
belief is safeguarded by its own inner life as a whole",l26 In 
this respect it seems that the articles tradition required an ecclesial 
environment least unlike the primitive one,l2 7 a requirement satisfied 
for Newman by that church in which the development of truth was 
maximally secured by reference to an institutionalised infallible 
authority. 
Newman's finely tuned theological instinct concerning the ideal 
placement of faith in the Church both protected and endangered faith. 
That this was in fact the case emerged in the rather mechanical form of 
organic growth presupposed in the development of Christian doctrine,l28 
The implication of such a view of the development of doctrine was that 
the creative human potential to give new expression to truth, in 
response to new circumstances, was refused, or at least subjugated to 
an external authority to which individual responsibility was 
displaced. The strong dialectic of the fundamental articles tradition -
whereby the tradition not only formed the Christian in the truth but 
was itself 're-made' in the processl29 - was abated in the transfer of 
responsibility to the legitimating authorities of the Roman hierarchy. 
Such a move encouraged the suspicion that the dynamic of faith in 
history required some fixed and certain control be.vond contingency. 1 3° 
In this respect at least, Newman's handling of the fundamental articles 
tradition, in both its Anglican and Roman guise, was of a piece with 
the majority of his Anglican critics; a fact succinctly put by William 
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Archer Butler who argued that, "Christianity was born full-grown 
nothing could take His [God's] Dispensation bJ' surprise" 131 (my 
italics). Newman would not have disagreed with the sentiment, whilst 
departing radically from the conclusions Butler had drawn. 
God at the Centre: Maurice on Articles in Ecclesiality 
Generally speaking Newman's Anglican critics responded by the 
restatement of a tradition which he had already discarded,132 Their 
various efforts illustrated both the impotence and the possibilities 
offered by a fairly rigid conception of the fundamental articles 
tradition,l33 
A noteable exception to the general Anglican response came from 
Frederick Denison Maurice (1805-1872),134 His critique of Newman's 
Essay was all the more interesting because it indicated a further 
option for the reworking of fundamental articles of faith by one who 
shared with Newman the inheritance of the Coleridge 'common tradition'. 
For Maurice, this 'common tradition' operated according to the 
principle of 'development' and 'dialectic',135 In other words, the 
history of the divine-human inter-relation not only showed development 
towards organic wholeness, but also radical disruptive intrusions 
creative of a tension in human existence. 
In Maurice's view this dialectic, i.e. the principle of 
'disconfirmation',136 was missing from Newman's more mechanical 
understanding of the development of Chistian doctrine. Newman's 
'homogenous evolution' of doctrine was not able to take account of the 
ever emerging, rich and surprising variety of human life. The 
contingent could not genuinely contribute to the developmental 
process,l37 According to Maurice, Newman's particular form of organic 
development of doctrine had forfeited the very life of Christianity. 
The tensions and strivings for oneness could not be satisfied by assent 
to propositions or to Papal authority but only in that living and 
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personal centre of life - God the Trinity,l3B As Maurice had once 
written in a letter: "Men are crying after a Personal Centre'' ,139 
For Maurice the centre of reality was unequivocally personal, the 
very antithesis of mechanism. The latter generated 'systems' which 
excluded variety, spontenaity and openness to change. The former 
generated 'method', a 'principle of progression' by which one moved 
from the known to the unknown,l4o Maurice's personal and 
methodological focus seemed to be aimed at uncovering the very pre-
conditions for those experiences denied in the notion of system. 
Whereas for Newman truth had a developing doctrinal form, for 
Maurice Trinitarian personalism was ideally manifest in social form. 
The Church was a symbol of the godly social reality intended for the 
created order.l41 Implied here was a dynamic principle for renewal of 
structure and belief, an outflow from a self-giving centre. It was a 
rationale for mission and underpinned Maurice's commitment to renewal 
of the social order.l42 
This view had significant implications for the fundamental 
articles tradition. Insofar as the truth of faith operated maximally 
in the regions of personal integrity and social order, it was clear 
that the doctrinal tradition per se had suffered displacement. More 
particularly, the power of propositional systems of belief to mould 
Church identity and nourish division was subverted. The dogmatic 
principle, the recognition of the importance of opinions in religion, 
was displaced,l43 
Associated 
catholic creeds 
with this approach was a renewed concentration on 
of the early Church,l44 These creeds had 
the 
an 
objectivity the Apostolic creed was 'the absolute creed', not a 
symbol of 'our own choosing',l45 They confounded all systems, pre-
eminently because the creed had to do with a 'NAME' - the Trinitarian 
name of God. 1 46 The objective and personal dimensions of revelation 
were symbolized in the creed. Here, 
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The 'belief' is really lost in Him who is believed. The Faith 
goes out of the I into the object. It does not try to realise 
itself apart from the one or the other,l47 
Insofar as the creeds operated 'beneath all notions, opinions and 
precious beliefs',l48 they remained maximally accessible for all, 
regardless of intellect, social class or church party. As the 
universal symbol of humanity constituted in Christ, the ancient creedal 
faith represented a true social unifier.l49 
~Iaurice distinguished between the universal creeds and 
confessional articles. The former were 'professions of personal faith 
in God', the latter, such as the ThirtJ'-nine Articles of the Church of 
England, were 'merely intellectual propositions'. However the latter 
protected the English national church from private opinion, prevented 
it 'from sinking into a particular theological system' and thus 
witnessed to truths 'bigger than a system', i.e. the Trinitarian 
confession.lSO Maurice had found a way of affirming the fundamental 
articles of apostolic belief long extolled in Anglicanism. He had 
achieved this through a fresh recentering of the tradition such that: 
The doctrine that God has claimed us all in Christ as His son's, 
which seems to me the articulus stantis aut cadentis ecclesiae, 
where I use article not in its vulgar sense as importing that 
which is formal and dogmatic, but that which is necessary to the 
vitality and coherency of the body of Christ,151 
Fundamental articles were fundamental by virtue of their immediacy 
to Christianity's personal centre. As such they could never be merelJ' 
articles, but rather rich symbolic forms through which Divine life was 
mediated. In Maurice's opinion the course of Christian history, 
including Lutheranism and Calvinism, showed corruption through the 
development of systems of doctrine in which propositions had been 
substituted for living realities,152 To 'dig' beneath such 
developments generated a new ordering of doctrine. Some doctrines, such 
as the belief of everlasting punishment, had to be jettisoned,153 This 
matter was of no little cost to Maurice's professional life, 
precipitating as it did his dismissal from King's College, London. 
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Maurice's reworking of the fundamental articles tradition aimed at 
overcoming a rigid conventionalism in belief and restoring the inward 
life of faith. The tradition was repersonalized,l54 This was apparent 
in Maurice's understanding of the presence of God in social relations 
and institutional life. It was also evident in his focus upon the early 
creeds. In respect of the dogmas of faith theological reductionism ~as 
not so much a quantitative matter as a qualitative loss of the fullness 
of the truth symbolised in the brief ancient creeds. Such a loss was 
discerned in the displacement of the 'NAME' witnessed to in the creeds 
by an over-emphasis upon the propositions of belief. 
Ultimately, for Maurice, the Scriptures provided that abundant 
resource for godly human life,lSS What was richly dispersed in 
Scripture was concentrated in the ancient creedal forms. It was 
precisely at this point that Maurice significantly undermined the 
fundamental articles tradition. One was enjoined to 'dig' into the 
language of faith enshrined in the early creeds,lSG From the centre of 
faith one continually moved further into the centre. This 
methodological prescription offered little incentive for the systematic 
development of Christian belief and discipleship. The implication was 
that this latter constructive theological task was of secondary 
significance for being a Christian in the Church. 
Underlying Maurice's reticence for systematic statement of the 
faith, and his recommendation of the digging motif, was his fear of the 
conflict and division doctrinal dispute had generated. The only safe 
form of the articles tradition was the one that had been 'received'. In 
this respect the Scriptures and the ancient creeds were sufficient. 
Among other things, this stance revealed Maurice's own view that 
Christianity operated most interestingly and importantly not in 
doctrine but in social order. Hence, in The Kingdom of Christ Maurice 
could write of the English Reformation: 
Here the 
Christ, 
idea of the Church as a Spiritual Polity ruled over 
and consisting of all baptized persons, did, owing 
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various providential circumstances, supersede the notion of a 
Church, as a sect, maintaining certain options; or to speak more 
correctly, the dogmatical side of Christianity was here felt to be 
its accessory and subordinate side, and the ordinances, which were 
the manifestation of it as the law of our social and practical 
life, were considered its principle side,157 
It has been said of Maurice's Anglicanism that it was focussed on what 
was practically effective rather than what was theoretically true.l55 
To the extent that this was true the Church was denied an important 
means by which its common practices and institutional forms could be 
critically evaluated and nourished. Specifically, it was no longer 
clear how theology could recall the Church to the truth of its life as 
bestowed by God. 159 This problem in Maurice's position was reflected 
in his handling of the fundamental articles tradition. In his attempt 
to overcome the dangers of doctrinal conflict Maurice had placed a 
theoretical restriction on the range of the fundamental articles 
tradition. The presupposition was that the received tradition was a 
sufficient doctrinal monitor for current Church practices. The 
implication was that the tradition had been completed, that henceforth 
the theological task was simply to bring current practice into 
correspondence with the truth symbolised in the 'old' creeds. 
At this point Maurice's programme succumbed to the rather naive 
and dangerous view that the interconnections between the 'received' 
doctrinal tradition, its dispersal in the Scriptures, and contemporary 
Church life could, with a little 'digging', be exposed, and practice 
reformed accordingly. The process of making these linkages was urgent 
and difficult. It was also precisely the way in which the fundamental 
articles were reconstituted as truth-bearing tradition for the divine 
society,l6o The 'digging' motif and the emphasis upon the personal 
centre of faith indicated positive directional thrusts. However the 
potential dynamic implicit here was not fully realised. The tradition 
remained bounded by the provinciality of the ancient creeds. Maurice 
had argued for a God-centred ecclesiality but had forfeited an 
important means by which the truth at the centre could be communicated. 
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From the Mid-Nineteenth Century: Soae Trajectories 
It was axiomatic for Coleridge, Simeon, Newman and Maurice that 
believing per se constituted a true means of social cohesion. It was 
precisely their affirmation of this possibility that was reflected in 
their varied handling of the fundamental articles tradition. For 
Coleridge it was primarily a matter of uncovering the conditions for 
affirming the historic faith. For Simeon the tradition had a practical 
thrust with a focus on renewed religious subjectivity shaped in 
relation to evangelical doctrine. This was developed further by Newman 
in terms of the range of doctrinal truth believable in the church. It 
was precisely Maurice's restriction of the articles tradition that 
indicated his conviction that what was believed witnessed, not simply 
to personal opinions, but rather to the presence of the kingdom of God 
in society. In consequence, what was proposed for belief was offered 
upon the basis that such belief genuinely mediated the truth of God's 
relation to the world and that such belief could thus function as a 
true social unifier. 
These convictions had to be reaffirmed in a post-Enlightenment 
environment increasingly complex and unsympathetic to Christian faith. 
Answers to some of the important issues raised for Christian faith and 
practice, such as those of human subjectivity, the nature of God's 
presence in the world, the dynamic of truth in history and the 
possibilities for godly social life, have been implicit in the way in 
which the fundamental articles tradition has been handled, with varying 
degrees of success, in the variety of exponents of the tradition 
explored in this Chapter. 
The possibility that belief, and in this case Christian faith, 
could continue to operate as a genuine social unifier has remained 
relevant in the recent modern period. The prospect of finding common 
social meaning has also proved increasingly controversial. Post-
Enlightenment developments have threatened an inner deconstruction of 
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the basic articles of Christian belief,l61 This field is massive and 
only a few brief comments can be made here in order to indicate the 
general trajectory of issues relevant to the operation of the 
fundamental articles tradition in modern Anglicanism. 
Problems of Believing 
When historical biblical criticism challenged the scriptual basis 
of fundamentals, Charles Gore and the Lux .~fundi school attempted to 
assimilate criticism and to continue to defend the truth of all the 
articles of the creed,l62 However Gore's defence of the creedal 
doctrines, in particular the virgin birth and bodily resurrection of 
Christ, did not prevail over a more thoroughgoing 'symbolic' approach 
which appeared to offer a more flexible response to the problem of 
criticism than Gore's relatively objectivist stance. 163 This symbolic 
view became enshrined in the 1938 Report of the Doctrine Commision of 
the Church of England.l64 
One feature of the symbolic view of doctrine had important 
consequences for the articles tradition. This concerned the distinction 
made between the primary experiential base and its doctrinal 
formulations,lGS For William Sanday (1843-1920), this distinction took 
the form of continuity of thought and relati·vity of expression.l 6 6 
This 
the 
move was designed to counter the 'unalterable deposit' theory 
articles tradition. Sanday was a New Testament scholar. 
of 
His 
opponent, Norman Williams (1883-1943), was an able philosophical 
theologian who argued cogently for a more refined traditionalist 
stance. 1 67 Common to both theologians was an acknowledgement of a 
division in the creeds between 'metaphysical' and 'historical' truth. 
Controversy centered on the latter. Sanday wanted to treat this 
material more loosely and hence open to reinterpretation, whilst 
Williams proposed a more objectivist stance,l68 
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Earlier, Henry Major in The Gospel of Freedom (1912), had 
advocated something similar to Sanday. Major suggested that in treating 
historical dogmas it was important to distinguish between the essential 
and non-essential parts in the dogma. The essential part in the dogma 
of the resurrection was 
that Christ's personality survived death and that He, in some 
mysterious way, convinced His Apostles of that fact The way 
in which Christ survived death and the means by which He 
communicated the fact of His survival to His Apostles is not of 
the essence of the dogma ,,169 
It was more cut and dried with the virgin birth. This historical dogma 
was not essential for the doctrine of the incarnation. The rationalist 
undercurrent was clear; failure to make the correct distinctions in 
matters of faith might have the effect of "weakening the hold of the 
dogma as a whole on the minds of some of the more logical and 
thoughtful of our congregation",170 
Dean Inge saw clearly that what was at stake was a form of symbolic 
reductionism in the creedal articles, a development in which articles 
functioned as legal formularies for Church membership; a degradation of 
symbol into 'bare fact',17l The dangers of such a 'fixed point' theory 
of doctrine were also recognised among evangelical scholars.l72 
Symbolic reductionism, as Inge well knew, was no simple affair. 
The fate of the fundamental articles in the modern era seems tied 
up with how effectively theology can respond to the steady depreciation 
of the symbol richness of Christian belief,1 7 3 However, to state the 
case in this way is to move beyond the problems posed by biblical and 
historical criticism. It is a different matter altogether to 
reconstitute Christian belief from within a framework in which the 
fundamental articles of faith have, it seems, been reduced to a 
collection of important ideas without any clear reference to Divine 
reality. 174 In such an account articles of faith become self-
referencing and God can easily become the sum total of human values and 
opinions. This Feuerbachian scenario, a development of a Kantian 
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idealism, 175 was precisely what Newman, Maurice and Coleridge had, in 
their own ways, wrestled with over a century before. The fate of the 
fundamental articles tradition seems tied up with the way Christian 
theology can deal with this basic challenge to the tradition of 
theological realism,l76 
Bonding through Believing: Some Ecclesial Issues 
Being one in the truth presupposes a common agreement on the truth 
that bonds. Increasing social fragmentation, however, has ensured that 
the fundamental articles tradition, as a strategy for expressing and 
securing ecclesial oneness, has remained highly controversial in 
Anglicanism. 
Perhaps the most familiar context with which the tradition has 
been associated from the late nineteenth century has been directly 
ecclesiological. This is not surprising. The missionary thrust of the 
nineteenth century and the rapid expansion of Anglicanism into a world-
wide communion has generated a concomitant development of an Anglican 
ecclesiology unencumbered by the peculiarities of its national church 
status in England.l77 Within this larger and fecund context the 
multiform character of the one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church has 
emerged with fresh clarity and given birth to twentieth century 
ecumenism.l78 Thus, ironical!~ the missionary movement of the last 
century has generated new reflection on the scandal of ecclesial 
separateness. Being one Church has a new urgency as a gospel 
imperative: "That the world may believe that thou hast sent me" (John 
17:2lb). 
Within this context the long established Anglican appeal to 
certain enduring fundamentals of Christianity has been a persistent 
theme in Anglican ecumenism since the nineteenth century. 179 In 
Chapter One of this thesis some more recent examples of the 
fundamentals appeal in inter-church dialogue have been noted, including 
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the Chicago-Lambeth Quadrilateral. These efforts have a long Anglican 
heritage to draw upon, including the example of William Wake, for whom 
the fundamental articles apologia proved an important strategy for 
communication across divided communions,1SO 
This heritage was not lost on Charles Gore (1853-1932) who, during 
the Malines conferences in the 1920's proposed, as a basis for 
'corporate reconciliation' of Orthodox, Anglican and Roman Communions, 
''acceptance of those articles of faith which fall under the Vincentian 
Canon .•. ,"181 For Gore this meant the fundamental doctrines: 
Those which have always been held and believed in the Church in 
substance. There has been no development in the doctrine but only 
in the terminology,l82 
Gore cited Newman's later views as support! For his own part Gore 
included in his list 
not only the doctrine of the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation, but 
the doctrine of the Atonement and of the inspiration of 
Scripture, of the visible Catholic church, of the sacraments as 
real instruments of specific divine gifts, of the resurrection 
of the body, of the intermediate state, of the day of judgment, 
of heaven and hell,l83 
Later, when Gore addressed the 1927 World Conference on Faith and 
Order at Lausanne on the subject of 'The Church's Common Confession of 
Faith', his list of fundamental doctrines went no further than the 
Apostolic and Nicene creeds,l84 This strategy was followed by another 
Anglican, Arthur Headlam (1862-1947), for whom the distinction between 
fundamental and non-fundamental articles was at the basis of his 
proposals for Church reunion,lSS 
Another tradition within Anglican ecclesiology has continued in 
critical relation to this highly embodied form. This ecclesial 
mysticism, a feature of the later William Law, re-emerged in the early 
decades of the twentieth century in, among others, the writings of 
William Ralph Inge (1860-1954). Inge was, not surprisingly, critical 
of Gore's proposals for unity based on the creeds. It implied that 
Gore's 'party', "cannot take any step that would divide them from the 
whole Church and the whole Church no longer exists, it has long ago 
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been shivered into fragments'',186 
For Inge the problems of Church disunity could not be overcome by 
invoking an appeal to some retrospective unity in certain articles of 
faith. 18 7 Seeking agreements in external confessions of belief, though 
perhaps worthy, was impractical. 188 In any case Inge was concerned 
with transcending traditional divisions and narrow institutionalism. In 
quoting Ignatius of Antioch 'Wherever Christ Jesus is, there is the 
Catholic Church', Inge wanted to stress that followers of the mystical 
tradition " are 
never been 
members of an undivided Church; for Christendom 
divided in the chambers where good men pray 
has 
~d 
meditate",189 This was not a recipe for isolationism, but belonged to 
Inge's view that the mysticial tradition was rooted in the essential 
features of Christianity and its values,l90 Furthermore, it offered a 
way to live in the Church in its disunity, and was open to the creative 
capacity of the emerging scientific culture.l91 
As observed in the case study on William Law, the tradition 
represented by Inge is not without its problems. It is, however, a 
legitimate form of the fundamental articles tradition in Anglicanism. 
Furthermore, it remains an important witness to the potential for 
renewal of the articles tradition as the horizon is extended beyond 
conventional ecclesial and intellectual boundaries. 
Implicit in this present treatment of the tradition of fundamental 
articles has been the assumption that the truth of God is accessible, 
that it remains one in multiplicity, and that it ought to be able to 
operate as a bond of a society that is highly differentiated and 
increasingly complex,192 When such assumptions become subject to 
dispute, as they have in the twentieth century, one interesting and 
important consequence is a widening gulf between the deployment of the 
fundamental articles tradition as a practical strategy for inter-
ecclesial communication and bonding, and the attempt to reconstitute 
the tradition in relation to the major issues with which Christian 
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belief and discipleship have to wrestle. It seems that increasing 
institutional fragmentation has placed greater pressure to locate true 
social unifiers. Simple solutions to difficult problems too quick!~ 
commend themselves. In this context the articles tradition appears a 
ready candidate. As the history of the tradition clearly shows, this is 
as dangerous a procedure as it is a fruitful one to embark upon. 
The inquiry in Parts One, Two and Three,and in particular the case 
studies of Part Three, have attempted to show how the tradition of 
fundamental articles does in fact connect with a wide range of issues 
concerning belief and discipleship, and cannot, for this reason, be 
understood simply as a theme of practical ecumenism. This is not to 
underrate its importance in this latter field. Indeed, the inquiry has 
reYealed that disputation between churches over fundamental articles 
has repeatedly erupted because of the impact of differing conceptions 
of Christianity and the life it entails. 
Within the wider context of issues of Christian belief and 
discipleship, and social, intellectual and scientific life, it is clear 
that Yves Congar's claim, that the question of fundamental articles has 
become an article of Anglican ecclesiology, is somewhat short-sighted. 
The tradition is one which is genuinely shared. At a general level the 
tradition is an attempt to express the bond believers have in Christ in 
the world. Why and how this operation of the tradition is significant 
for Church and theology remains on the theological agenda of all 
churches, and therefore of the Anglican Church. Further clarification 
of the issues involved here requires a systematic development of the 
tradition of fundamental articles which draws upon the historical 
resources presented in Parts Two and Three of this study. This task is 
taken up in the final section of this thesis. 
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FUNDAMENTAL ARTICLES: The Logic of the Tradition 
Introduction 
Following a preliminary placement of the theme of fundamental 
articles within Anglicanism and Christianity more general!~ in Part 
One of this thesis, Part Two moved to the level of historical inquiry. 
The operation of the fundamentals tradition was traced through a number 
of phases in Anglican theology. The multiform and conflictive nature of 
Christianity provided the horizon against which this examination of the 
tradition was carried out. The tradition of fundamental articles was 
found to be an important and controversial strategy by which the 
identity and unity of the Church had been affirmed. 
The presupposition common to the many exponents of the tradition 
was that Christianity remained one thing in its multiple forms over 
time, and that this unity provided the basis and impulse for the 
practice of being one-in-Christ. It was precisely the viability of this 
presupposition, however, that raised such difficult problems for the 
determination and function of fundamental articles in the history of 
the tradition. Indeed, controversy over the unity of Christianity 
accounted for the variety of ways in which the tradition underwent 
modification for the purpose of articulating the one-in-Christ bond in 
the Church. These issues were explored in greater detail and brought 
into sharper focus through analysis of the theme of fundamental 
articles in the case studies in Part Three of the thesis. In 
particular, Part Three drew attention to the operation of the tradition 
within the wider framework of the dynamics of faith in the Church and 
society. 
Part Four of this study offers a more thoroughgoing systematic 
treatment of important issues that have emerged or are implicit in the 
examination of the tradition so far. For example, the study of 
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fundamental articles has revealed a dialectical relation between 
'directional' and 'boundary' concerns in the operation of the 
tradition. Renewal of the tradition usually involved a recapturing of 
this dialectic and overcoming the strong drive to skew the tradition in 
the direction of ecclesial boundary-making concerns. Clearly, both 
the directional and boundary concepts will be significant for 
tradition's institutional operation. These and related issues require 
closer attention, a move facilitated by a shift from an historical and 
case study approach to fuller systematic inquiry. 
The aim of this part of the thesis will be to explore what is 
important immediately and ultimately in fundamentals concern, to place 
the theme of fundamental articles within this larger framework, to 
identify interconnections, uncover presuppositions and point to areas 
of difficulty. What is being sought is not full explication of 
relevant issues but the development of a framework that enriches an 
understanding of the tradition in view. In this respect Part Four 
attempts to move beyond an understanding of the fundamental articles 
tradition that unnecessarily restricts its significance to a band of 
problem solving strategies more usually associated with the concerns of 
practical ecumenism. The aim, rather, is to clarify what is necessarily 
on the theological agenda in inquiry into the theme of fundamental 
articles in the Church. 
Part Four of the thesis comprises four Chapters in which the 
logic of the fundamental articles tradition is successively uncovered. 
In Chapter Nine the essential ecclesiality of the tradition and its 
relevance to the one-in-Christ bond is examined as an issue of the 
placement of the tradition. This discussion gives rise to two strands 
of inquiry. First, the theme is developed as a problem of the 
directional nature of the tradition. Here, issues concerning the 
impulse for the tradition (Chapter Ten), and communications (Chapter 
Eleven), are examined. A second major strand emerging from Chapter Nine 
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is treated in Chapter Twelve as the the problem of the social dynamics 
of the tradition. Here, the operation of the tradition is considered as 
a feature of ecclesia's institutionality as such. 
An important consequence of this approach is that the Anglican 
handling of the theme is placed within a more general ecclesiological 
framework. The methodology of Part Four leads to the development of 
some important perspectives on the tradition of fundamental articles in 
relation to ecclesiology and the nature and function of theology in the 
Church. 
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THE PLACEMENT OF THE TRADirtON: 
The Relevance of the Ecclesial Bond 
The question here is relatively simple: why and how is the concept 
of fundamental articles significant ecclesiologically? The course of 
this inquiry indicates that there are many practical reasons why people 
in the Church invoke an appeal to the fundamental articles of the 
faith. Yet this makes even more important an inquiry into the 
rationale that informs the practice of stating the faith in fundamental 
articles. From another point of view the question concerns the truth of 
Yves Congar's claim, that the question of fundamental articles has 
become an article of ecclesiology in Anglicanism,! 
Presupposition: The Ecclesiality of Christianity 
The logic of the ecclesiaJ n8ture of the fundamental articles of 
Christianity is first of all a question concerning the relationship 
between ecclesia and the nature of Christianity per se,l Within this 
admittedly complex issue at least three possibilities emerge. At one 
extreme a radical disjunction obtains, Church and Christianity remain 
in parallel, essentially unintegrated. This problem was perceived 
in the early nineteenth century by Friedrick Schleiermacher who, in 
depicting the antithesis between Protestantism and Catholicism, argued 
that 
the former makes the individual's relation to the Church 
dependent on his relation to Christ, while the latter 
contrariwise makes the individual's relation to Christ dependent 
on his relation to the Church,3 
In the context in which these remarks were uttered it is clear that, so 
far as Schleiermacher was concerned. both Protestant and Catholic 
conceptions contained disjunctive elements. Protestantism, whilst 
holding fast to the reference to Christ, might forfeit 'the Christian 
principle' by dissolving the communion; Roman Catholicism, whilst 
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was in danger of becoming un-Christian 
to Christ'.4 Only the 'spirit of 
in the Church prevented these Christianity' 
occurrQ.nces. The attempt to overcome this disjunctive conception 
assumes one of its most radical forms in an ecclesial mysticism, 
typified in this study by William Law. In this case both Christ and the 
Church coalesced in the heart of the believer. The danger here was an 
even more radical disjunction between spirit and matter.s 
A second option is to conceive the relationship between Church and 
Christianity generica.llJ~ According to this view Church is derived from 
a more general conception of Christianity. Generic categories open up a 
range of 
conception 
options. Thus the highly embodied and institutional 
of the Church as the 'extension of the incarnation' which 
carries on the work of Christ,s and a 'call type' ecclesiology, in 
which the Church comes into existence as people respond to the call of 
Christ in the Gospel, 7 both draw upon generic categories to depict the 
relationship between Church and Christianity. 
A third way of understanding the relation between the Church and 
Christianity might be depicted as a relation of co-inherence. Whereas 
the former conception (generic) easily fostered a simple cause-effect, 
quasi-mechanistic dynamic between Christianity and Church, 8 the co-
inherence conception overcomes the vestigial disjunctions present to 
varying degrees in the use of generic categories, Generic categories 
are not irrelevant but ultimately inadequate to this third way in which 
Church is conceived as the social form of Christianity. This notion is 
encapsulated in Karl Rahner's statement that 'a Christian has to be an 
ecclesial Christian'(my italics),9 
In this third conception of the relation between ecclesia and the 
nature of Christianity, a problem arises which is present but obscured 
in the two former conceptualizations of the relation. Precisely because 
of the high focus on sociality per se, the problem of excessively 
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individualistic and privatised notions of Christianity - what has been 
described as the contemporary 'peril' of ecclesialo - is inescapable. 
The American Lutheran theologian, Edward Farley, writes: 
Individualism, the contemporary form of the Church's repression 
of its ecclesial dimension, is so close to us, so very much a 
part of us that it is almost beyond thematization,ll 
The force of individualism can be discerned across a range of 
theological traditions and becomes evident in ''the omission of ecclesia 
in the formulation of the situation of faith and the pursuit of 
theological themes",l2 Farley argues that the phenomenon of 
individualism is a general one. A high focus on the institutionality 
of Christianity can simply mask the fact that "Face-to-face relation 
is displaced by the anonymity of the large and economically 
successful (non) congregation",lJ 
Against this background the attempt to provide a rationale for 
Church as the social form of Christianity remains urgent and difficult. 
There have been important contributions to the discussion, of which 
Schleiermacher's was an early and significant example. In the 
twentieth century Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906-1945) developed a view of 
the Church as 'Christ existing as the community',!~ The social form of 
Christianity was not a secondary matter but arose in (was given with) 
relationship with God: 
Communion with God exists only through Christ, but Christ is 
present only in His church, hence there is communion with God 
only in the church. This fact destroys every individualistic 
conception of the Church,15 
In this view relational categories have been important. 16 
Such endeavours indicate an attempt to identify those elements 
which justify true society. This has generated a conception pivotal 
to the entire enterprise: being with God is fundamentally 
interpersonal. With this category individualism appears to be 
overcome. An important task remains to show how the region of the 
interpersonal might cohere with or inter-relate with all that might be 
included in the sociality of being with God. The region of the 
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interpersonal may be too narrowly restricted to the extent that it is 
tied to a sociality developed out of redemption as such,l 7 
Recent!~ an attempt has been made to expand the region of the 
interpersonal by locating the sociality relevant to Christianity in the 
structure of creation as such.1 8 In this case redemption is not 
something fundamentally alien but is properly a 'reconstitution' of 
all that which is already present in creation,19 In this 
reconstitution the elements of 'created sociality' are changed 'from 
within what they are',20 Such a conception is ultimately to be 'traced 
to the logos of God operative in creation',21 Some of the insights 
associated with this view will be found relevant to the discussion in 
this Chapter on the nature of the ecclesial bond. 
It has been argued that a relation of co-inherence portrays most 
adequately the truth of the connection between ecclesia and the nature 
of Christianity: ecclesia is Christianity in its social form. 
Furthermore, attention has been drawn to the difficulty of identifying 
a fully social form of Christianity and to a possible way of achieving 
this by reference to 'created sociality'. The discussion suggests 
that the question of Christianity's social form is neither a secondary 
feature of Christianity, nor is it a settled matter in theology. 22 
Consideration of the ecclesiality of Christianity and the elements of 
its true sociality, raises the question of the nature of the ecclesia.l 
bond, as the locus for the operation of the fundamental articles 
tradition. 
The Locus of the Tradition: The Ecclesial Bond 
Consideration of the ecclesial nature of Christianity presupposed 
that Christianity's social form must necessily be included in any 
account of the fundamentals of Christianity. To the extent that this 
is not the case, the relationship between ecclesia and the nature of 
Christianity betrays individualist and hence sub-social 
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presuppositions. This results in a consequent failure to recognise 
ecclesia as the saving entity and include it in the formulation of the 
situation of faith and the pursuit of theological themes,2 3 This 
argu ment suggests the operation of a reflexive relation. w'hat is 
fundamental to ChristianitJ' has an ecclesial form: ecclesia is k'hat is 
stated in the fundamentals of Christianity. Thus the fundamentals of 
the ecclesial bond - those elements constitutive of the social form of 
Christianity are the fundamentals of Christianity, ecclesially 
considered. This reflexivity is implicit in Richard Hooker's 
statement: 
The visible Church of Jesus Christ is therefore one, in outward 
profession of those things[ one Lord, one Faith, one Baptism of 
initiation], which supernaturally appertain to the very essence 
of Christianity,,,24 
Here the ecclesial bond is the locus for what is fundamental to 
Christianity: what is of the 'very essence of Christianity' has an 
ecclesial form. 
To ask about the nature of the ecclesial bond is to inquire into 
those ways in which human beings are held together. Such an inquiry is 
difficult to pursue, for Church life is rich and diverse. This points 
to the fact that the Church is a highly complex social reality that 
resists simple thematization. At a general level, the ecclesial bond 
may be depicted as a one-in-Christ bond ('you are all one in Christ 
Jesus', Gal 3:28; cf. Col 3:11, John 17:11 & 22, Eph 2:14). A 
distinctly theological task is to determine how the one-in-Christ bond 
operates. Important here are questions concerning its basis, formation, 
endurance, expression and purpose. This suggests that the ecclesial 
bond is not a simple fact but complex and multidimensional, mirroring 
the vast range of ways by which human social bonds are formed and 
sustained. 
It is possible to identify different levels within the ecclesial 
bond. At a primary level (ontological) the one-in-Christ bond is 
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constituted 
generalized 
by God's own sociality. This can be depicted in a 
form as the forming and enlarging of social life 
highly 
by the 
presence of God in creation and redemption,25 The supposition here is 
that sociality has a transcendental basis; that the one-in-Christ bond 
is a way 'through which being displays itself',2 6 The proposal here is 
that God the Trinity is the primary unifier, the life giver of all that 
has, is or shall be. 
The question of how this primary unity is mediated, dra~s 
attention to the need to identify 'intermediate' categories for God's 
presence in the world. Daniel Hardy has identified at least five; 
place (or territoriality), politJ' (social organization; including 
institutionality, laws, customs, political leadership); economics 
(mediums of exchange, production and distribution); interpersonal 
relationships ( natural and 'spiritual' or friendship); communication 
(language, symbol and culture),27 These categories are by no means 
exhaustive,2 8 By and through these categories social formation is made 
possible and social bonding can be realized. 
But the ecclesial bond is a one-in-Christ bond; it is quite 
particular. How is it developed from the foregoing? Strictly speaking 
the ecclesial bond is not so much a different kind of category but 
depicts a way of being bonded within the above categories. Such 
intermediate categories constitute the fundamental perspectives through 
which the ecclesial bond is expressed and operates. The particularity 
of the ecclesial bond is that this bond expresses what being one-in-
Christ entails within the basic forms of human and created sociality. 
The presupposition here is that in Christ, God effected a 
reconstitution of the basic forms of social life. This reconstitution 
''is what forms from created sociality a truly redeemed sociality",29 
The issues raised in this Chapter are complex and only a brief 
sketch has been offered as to how an understanding of the nature and 
dynamic of the ecclesial bond might be developed. The argument of the 
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Chapter is now developed in relation to the concept of fundamental 
articles. 
The Task of the Tradition: Mediation of the Ecclesial Bond 
In terms of the intermediate categories previously identified 
it is clear that the doctrinal domain of Christianity (the domain of 
the fundamental articles concept) belongs to the general area of 
communications and specifically the region of the symboiic. 
From the above perspective doctrines - understood in their more 
general sense as pertaining to what is believed, taught and confessed 
in and by the Church 3o - have to do with the symbolically mediated 
forms of the ecclesial bond. Insofar as doctrine represents this bond 
in language, doctrine concerns the SJ'mbolic verbalizations of the 
ecclesial bond. Doctrine is thus a linguistic strategy for expressing 
the truth of ecclesia. In this respect David Tracy refers to the "genre 
'doctrine' •.... as a crucial 'corrective' genre to refine, formulate, 
clarify, and explicate certain central beliefs of the Christian 
community .. ",31 Furthermore, the region of the symbolic itself, and 
hence Christian doctrine, constitutes a primary intermediate category 
by which the ecclesial bond is mediated and communication thereby 
facilitated. Moreover, doctrine's symbolizing function gives it the 
capacity to render in language the truth of all the constituents of the 
ecclesial bond. Yet in performing this function the genre 'doctrine' 
evidences a quite particular category constitutive of that bond. 
This leads to a definition of fundamental doctrines as those 
theological statements in which the truth of the one-in-Christ bond 
receives determinate and concentrated form. In terms of Bernard 
Lonergan's identification of various types of doctrines, fundamental 
doctrines might be most naturally associated with what Lonergan calls 
'Church doctrines'. Though, from another point of view, Lonergan's 
discussion would seem more relevant to an understanding of the process 
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by which fundamental belief comes to form at different stages in the 
differentiation of human consciousness,32 An important conclusion of 
the above argument is that the articles tradition belongs to those 
intermediate forms through which the presence of God as primary social 
unifier is manifest. 
The mediational function of doctrine in its specialised form as 
fundamental articles has been already identified. This can be further 
clarified by considering the 'subjective' dimension of the symbolic 
element of the ecclesial bond. 
as primary unifier in the 
One effect of stating the truth of God 
one- in-Christ bond is to draw into ' 
consciousness what is already present and implicit for faith,3 3 In the 
process of symbolic verbalization the truth of Christianity is 
elucidated and made clear to consciousness. Symbolic objectification 
thus includes a subjectivity appropriate to faith seeking 
understanding. This suggests that in stating the doctrines of faith 
something is being added. This is true in the qualified sense that 
what is happening is enlargement of understanding of what is already 
present. What is thus added is not a secondary 'overlay' upon some 
primary reality,34 The danger here is of reducing the region of the 
symbolic to that of mere human artifact, merely cultural conventions 
for human communication.JS Doctrine's mediational function includes a 
necessary subjective mode in which understanding and communication 
occur. The supposition here is that in the forming of doctrine in the 
Church the one-in-Christ bond is actually enlarged and strengthened. 
Expressed in another way, the argument supposes that through the 
doctrinal form the primary reality of God is genuinely mediated. 
In terms of the argument of this Chapter stating the faith in 
fundamental articles is a deed of the Church; a strategy through which 
the constituents of the one-in-Christ bond are expressed in 
concentrated symbolic form. Accordingly, the appeal to fundamental 
articles provides a way of articulating an understanding of the Church 
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in relation to God and the world. What the truth might be in this 
regard, is stated in the fundamental articles. On this account doctrine 
represents an instance of God's action in the world, a determinate form 
of logos communication. Insofar that this communication brings to 
consciousness and enlarges understanding of the truth of God already 
present, the tradition of fundamental articles operates as a strategy 
to shape and strengthen the Church's bond in Christ. The kind of 
argument developed above provides what would seem to be the necessary 
minimum conditions for an adequate account of believing as a true 
social unifier.36 
In this Chapter a way of stating Christianity's fundamental 
articles has been proposed which does not treat as secondary the 
ecclesial nature of the tradition. This position finds some support in 
the persistent treatment in Anglicanism of the fundamental articles of 
Christianity in relation to the highly controversial issue of the terms 
of communion. 37 Furthermore, as observed in Chapter Three, identifying 
'a,greed communal belief' was an important constraint in the development 
of the concept of the purity of doctrine in the English Reformation. 35 
It might quite properly be argued that the fundamental articles 
tradition does not merely concern ecclesiology per se. Implicit in such 
a view is a loci method which tends to treat a range of themes in 
theology as separate units. Some of the issues this method raises for 
fundamental articles will be examined in the 'excursus' at the end of 
Chapter Eleven. At this stage, however, it is important to note that 
if the above objection is granted the priority of the social form 
of the truth of Christianity is displaced. The implication is that 
there are other important matters besides ecclesiology, and that some 
ranking is necessary here,39 This is not directly in question. 
HoweverJ an inevitable consequence of putting the issue in the above 
manner is that the ecclesiality of Christianity, in spite of vigorous 
attempts to rehabilitate it, is ultimately sacrificed to other more 
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central concerns.40 
The above issue needs to be 'put' in a different way. The 
question is more properly, how are the fundamental articles of 
Christianity to be stated from the perspective of the social form of 
truth? On this account the ecclesial nature of Christianity is more 
than mere context. 4 1 This is already implicit in the discussion of 
primary and secondary unifiers in the ecclesial bond. 
Minimally, what is implied here is a different way of 
appropriating theology's conventional themes and important doctrines. 
The suggestion is that the doctrines of God, salvation, the human 
person, church and creation, are capable of being treated in a manner 
which displays their ecclesial form. What this might involve remains as 
yet largely undetermined. It is explored a little further at the end 
of Chapter Eleven.42 What is being proposed here is a method that 
gives scope for a fresh reordering of fundamental doctrine. 
Conventional ways of stating what is important and assigning relative 
fundamentality are no longer normative for the articles tradition. 
The reference point is God in ecclesiality. The form of the fundamental 
articles tradition is derived from and interrelated to the nature and 
d3~amic of the one-in-Christ bond and all that this might include. 
This development of the ecclesiological significance of the 
tradition moves beyond the rather narrow confines of denominational 
pragmatics, a position implicit in Yves Congar's claim that the 
question of fundamental articles has become an article of ecclesiology 
in Anglicanism. The theme of fundamental articles can not be 
restricted to the ecclesiological concerns of one particular communion, 
but has relevance to all efforts to find and state the truth of God in 
ecclesiality. The preliminary placement of the fundamental articles 
tradition in Christianity proposed in this Chapter is developed in a 
number of directions in the three Chapters that follow. 
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THE DIRECTION OF THE TRADITION: 
The Problem of Capacity 
Chapter Nine offered a brief account of the placement of 
fundamental articles in Christianity. As a result a number of 
important issues emerged concerning the operation of the tradition as 
an intermediate form for the mediation of the ecclesial bond. Some of 
these issues concerning the nature of Christianity, strategies for 
communication and the significance of Christianity's institutional 
forms, were identified in a preliminary way in Chapter One of the 
thesis. 1 
These issues will be developed as the problem of the direction of 
the tradition's movement (Chapters Ten and Eleven) and the social 
dynamics of the tradition (Chapter Twelve). Directional concerns are 
pursued in this Chapter in terms of the question, what capacitates 
articles of faith? In this regard the contemporary problem of the loss 
or diminution of capacity provides the basis for an exploration of some 
possible ways of construing fundamental articles. This leads to 
consideration of the concept of fundament as the capacitator (or 
impulse) of the tradition. The concept of fundament is developed 
further in Chapter Eleven. Here the problem of directions is not 
considered in terms of impulse but as a process of communication. This 
view considers some important features of the tradition of fundamental 
articles as a communications system in which a structured response of 
faith is sought. A recurring sub-theme throughout both Chapters is 
the impact of the dialectic between doctrine and fundament upon the 
effort to state the faith in the form of fundamental articles. Chapter 
Eleven concludes with an important excursus on 
identifying the genre of regulative communication. 
the problem of 
The fundamental 
articles tradition is, in this way, located within a family 
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of strategies designed to communicate the faith. 
An exhaustive consideration of these issues is neither necessary 
nor possible here. The aim will be to identify relevant issues, point 
to their interconnections and clarify the framework for the operation 
of the tradition of fundamental articles examined in Parts One, Two and 
Three. 
Loss of Capacity 
for identifying the fundamentals of ~loti vat ions 
Christianity vary. In Chapter One it was proposed that ideally such 
an activity arises from and is informed by a concern for the truth 
present and witnessed to in the Church. 2 It was suggested that 
inquiry into the fundamentals of Christianity was pursued in the Church 
because it believed the truth of its life was accessible. Yet precisely 
because of the nature of the truth present, the Church found 
communication difficult to achieve. To cope with this difficulty 
strategies were developed in the Church to express the truth of its 
life in Christ. Furthermore, the Church considered this endeavour 
worthwhile insofar as it was fuelled by the conviction that the truth 
as given in Jesus Christ (Eph 4:21b) was the basis of its life and hope 
( 1 Cor 3: 11). 
It is precisely the supposition that concern for fundamentals 
indicates an orientation towards truth that has become problematic for 
theology in the 'post' or 'late modern' period of the twentieth 
century,3 Whilst truth finding should ideally motivate inquiry into 
what is fundamental in the Church, it has become unclear what the 
ecclesial bond witnesses to and is capacitated by, In other words, the 
assumption that the constituents of the ecclesial bond operate as 
intermediate forms of the presence of God, has become problematic. 
Specifically~ a question arises as to whether the fundamental articles 
of Christianity 'reach back' to, and in consequence mediate, the 
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primary reality of God present and witnessed to in the one-in-Christ 
bond. The question of truth in contemporary theology and hence the 
question of the truth of the fundamental articles tradition have become 
problems of ecclesia's 'reality reference'.4 
Specifically, the problem that now faces theology in the Church 
has been portrayed by Edward Farley as ''the loss or diminution of 
reality in contemporary Christendom'', 5 For various reasons it has 
become unclear in the Church whether and how its language, stories, 
symbols, rituals and doctrines refer to and thus mediate the reality of 
God. Uncertainty about this has provided the fertile ground for a 
debasement of ecclesia's forms to the extent that such forms are 
perceived as evidence of merely human interactions. One result is that 
it ceases to be entirely clear that those intermediate forms of 
ecclesial life - including the symbolic region in which doctrine is to 
be located - are orientated towards, and capacitated by, ecclesia's 
transcendental basis presupposed in its being one-in-Christ. Confusion 
here signals a retreat from the richer and primary bonding generated by 
God's presence in society: social bonding is understood as a human work 
but not so clearly as a godly one. 
A hitherto shared conviction that faith "witnesses to distinctive 
transcendent, human and historical realities",G has come under 
suspicion in recent years. Does faith apprehend any distinguishing 
realities? Could it be that there are no realities at all 
revealed in the language (including the testimony, the story telling, 
the liturgical expressions) of the historical faith; that faith 
involves no cognizing, no apprehensions at all? These suspicions have 
been fuelled by challenges of a Feuerbachian kind7 , and the 
relativing of the historical dimension of faith's references through 
historical criticism. These suspicions are not confined to academic 
thought but take their cue, argues Farley, from the sense of loss or 
diminution of reality reference apparent in Western Christendom. 8 
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As a consequence of this suspicion, the traditional disputes over 
theological method (criteriology) have been replaced by the prior 
problem of whether or not faith apprehends any distinctive realities at 
all; the problem beneath the problem of theological method. It is a 
question of the subject matter to which theology attends. Theology does 
have subject matter of a phenomenal kind which has empirical dimensions 
extending out of the past into the present cultus. However, the 
presence of distinctive cultic, linguistic and literary phenomena are 
at best 'vehicles' for the realities faith apprehends. Farley argues 
that ''If theology accedes to the total translation of its subject 
matter into these phenomena, it ceases to be theology". 9 
Even a cursory review of the origins, developments, persons, and 
events of Christianity reveals, according to Farley, 
a prevailing consensus that faith is directed to realities which 
are unreducible to the images, experiences or behaviours of this 
historical religion •.•... which transcends its own determinacy, 
representations and theology,lo 
Significant here is the reality loss or diminution spoken of by 
Farley. It results in a rapid implosion of faith's realities into the 
empirically describable content of faith (cultic behaviour, language 
games, self-understanding, historical essence). Theology is left with 
a 'vehicular' subject matter as its defining content. Believing in God 
turns into believing in believing in God! This is precisely the 
thoroughgoing subjectivizing alternative that Farley and others would 
want to resist, for it ultimately raises doubts about the subject 
matter of theology and faith,ll 
When the nature of the reality that ecclesial existence witnesses 
to becomes problematical, it is clear that this state of affairs will 
be reflected in the kind of status accorded to theology and by 
implication fundamental Christian beliefs. In this context doctrines 
are susceptible of being treated as simply collections of ideas 
conventionally considered to be important even if somewhat puzzling. 12 
These kinds of issues surfaced in the treatment of the fundamental 
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articles tradition in Chapter Eight. This led to the brief discussion 
of the problem of believing as a source of social cohesion in modern 
Christianity,l3 
The 'antidoctrinalism' 14 and 'antisymbolic' 15 mood of contemporary 
Christianity belongs to a much larger environment. Important in this 
wider framework is the loss of confidence in the possibility of finding 
common meaning and communal norms. This has arisen, in part at least, 
due to a deconstructivist and fragmented cultural and intellectual 
climate in which, among other things, the possibility of finding 
reality through language has been surrendered,16 This condition fuels 
the suspicion that Christian doctrine can no longer function as a 
witness to divine reality. This problem in Christian speech reveals 
itself as a particular instance of a more general loss of the sense of 
the presence of God. 
Identifying Capacity: The Impulse for Articles 
Uncertainty over the presence of God in the world and human 
society poses immense problems for the tradition of theological 
realism.l 7 Indeed, it raises quite sharply the question of whether a 
fully realist theological stance remains a possibility. The attempt to 
grapple with this issue can be observed in the development of some 
quite sophisticated responses for the handling of doctrine. These 
responses have important implications for the nature and function of 
the tradition of fundamental articles. A spectrum of options for the 
handling of articles of faith is found to be relevant within the 
tradition of theological realism. 
Conventional Objectivism 
One extremity evidences a conventional objectivism. This is 
characterised by a reassertion of a 'classical' propositional view of 
doctrine. It is underpinned by the assumption of a one-to-one 
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correspondence between word and object. George Lindbeck notes that the 
tendency of this view is to ''take a particular formulation of a 
doctrine (e.g. a particular description of the resurrection) as a truth 
claim with objective or ontological import .. ",18 
The projection of the classical view into the critical pluralism 
of late modernity easily falls prey to a naive realism,19 As 
ontological pure 'givens', articles of faith are sacralized. The 
result is that they are no longer able to function as witnesses to 
faith's central realities. Attention is transferred from what is 
primary to its mediate form. Divine reality is pressed into linguistic 
formulas that are unalterable and irreversible. This tendency was 
already observed in Chapter Eight of this thesis in the exchange 
between the two Anglican scholars, Norman Williams and William Sandy, 
in the second decade of this century.zo In conventional objectivism, 
articles of faith operate as linguistic controls upon sacred reality. 
The manoeuvre easily becomes skewed in the direction of theological 
boundary maintenance in the interests of institutional security. 
By investing too much weight in particular language forms this 
procedure reveals a misguided response to the problems of ecclesia's 
reality reference in contemporary culture. An important consequence of 
this view of the articles tradition is its inability to account for the 
complexities of doctrinal development. This fact was clearly shown in 
the general Anglican response to Newman's theory of development of 
doctrine,21 More significantly, the over-formalization of the 
tradition forfeits the intimedness and contingency of faith for an 
illusion of security. What is thus eliminated is the possibility of 
'surprise'. 2 2 An important presupposition here is that the purity of 
statements of faith are maximally achieved by extrapolation from 
historical contingency. 
Historical!~ an objectivist handling of the fundamental articles 
tradition in Anglicanism seems to have been associated with a drive to 
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eliminate the contribution of contingency and human subjectivity. 
Locke had recognised the dangers of fallible human ideas being imposed 
upon communities of faith. This had led to his highly reductivist 
proposals for the articles of faith, and brought into question the 
whole enterprise of systematic theology,23 Similarly, underlying 
Waterland's vigorous reassertion of the tradition in a tight and 
hardened form, was a desire to overcome the dangers of what he 
perceived as undisciplined rationality,2~ For nineteenth century 
exponents of the tradition, such as Newman and Maurice, the issue of 
human subjectivity was critical,25 William Palmer's critique of the 
fundamentals apologia was quite clearly associated with his fear of the 
contaminating effects of rationalism,26 This fear gives added 
significance to the heavy investment by Anglicans in their appeal to 
a pre-established and secure patristic consensus in fundamentals,2 7 
The Domain of Subjectivity 
As a counterpoise to conventional objectivism the other extremity 
of the theological spectrum locates the impulse for the articles 
tradition within the realm of human religious subjectivity. When 
correctly understood this tradition more properly belongs firmly within 
the spectrum. It has been developed with some subtlety and 
sophistication from the time of Schleiermacher, and has been identified 
by George Lindbeck as representing an experiential-expressivist theory 
of doctrine. 2 s 
Important in considering •t the fate of the articles tradition is 
the disjunction implied in this view between human experience as the 
bearer of divine reality and doctrine as human reflection; a secondary 
activity somewhat distanced from the realm of divine-human encounter. 29 
This notion opens up certain options within a realist framework which 
will be discussed below. However, an important point is that this 
particular 'interpretive' theory of doctrine30 can lead to a radical 
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distortion of doctrine's mediational and witnessing function. Insofar 
as the central doctrines of the theological tradition (e.g. 
Christology, Trinity) are considered to represent the impositions of 
fallible human interpretations of the life of Jesus, the articles of 
faith merely mediate human distortion. 31 It remains unclear how such 
reflections genuinely reflect the truth of God's presence. 
Articles and Autonomous Subjectivity 
The domain of subjectivity can be developed from an overtly 'anti-
realist' or 'instrumentalist' framework. Here 
religious language provides a useful, even uniquely useful, system 
of symbols which is action-guiding for the believer but [is] not 
to be taken as making reference to a cosmos-transcending being in 
the traditional sense,32 
In this situation articles of faith become identified as products of 
human activity derived from nothing more, it seems, than the 
profundities of human expectations. This development is exemplified in 
the writings of the Anglican Don Cupitt, for whom human beings are the 
creators of the many realities that are. 33 Within this context 
religious language offers symbolizations of the development of human 
consciousness and personhood34, God as such becomes a ''unifying symbol 
that eloquently personifies and represents to us everything that 
spirituality requires of us",35 Thus for Cupitt, Christianity is 
redeveloped as 'autonomous spiritual practice' with strong ethical 
implications,36 
Articles of faith no longer refer to an 'objective personal 
God',37 Cupitt suggests that "The old language is still used, but the 
modern believer should use it expressively rather than 
descriptively",38 There occurs here a radical implosion of the articles 
of faith into personal ideals. 39 A corollary of this sacralizing of 
the autonomy of human experience is a respiritualizing of the articles 
of faith. However their sacredness belongs to a fundamentally 
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individualist ethic.4o 
Both conventional objectivism and radicalized human subjectivity 
represent attempts to respond to the problem of God and human freedom 
in contemporary life. In terms of the articles tradition this leads, 
in the former case, to objectification of articles as an 
overcompensating response to unrestricted subjectivism.41 In the 
latter case1 articles of faith are emptied of any reference beyond one's 
personal ideals. This latter development signals an attempt to find 
release from what is perceived as a 'spiritually oppressive' God 'out 
there' blocking human 'attainment of full self-consciousness'. 4 2 
In both cases the articles tradition suffers damaging 
displacement. At one extreme articles of faith are so objectified that 
they are no longer able to witness to Divine reality. This is as 
distorting and dangerous as the displacement of the tradition into the 
region of human ideals. 
Moves within the theological spectrum are varied and 
sophisticated. Lindbeck's typology,43 though useful and provocative, 
seems unable to take adequate account of the subtlety and range of ways 
of handling doctrine within the categories he has identified. 4 4 The 
reference to a 'theological spectrum' provides at least a formal way of 
recognising the typological problem in relation to doctrine. It needs 
much more careful development than can be offered here. Its 
configuration will probably be quite complex. This Chapter has been 
concerned with the question, what capacitates the fundamental articles 
tradition? Two extreme positions, 'conventional objectivism' and 
'autonomous subjectivity', have been plotted. Within the spectrum there 
is a certain fluidity and overlap. 
A Qualified Realism 
In various ways the drive to state the faith belongs to a wider 
concern for theology's mediating function in relation to God, human 
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beings and the world. To the extent that this task is construed 
primarily as a problem of corresponding to revelation, the articles are 
implicated in the development of modified propositional views of 
doctrine. Naive realism is here eschewed in favour of more 
sophisticated theories of correspondence in which a 'real' relation is 
posited between what is really there and its linguistic forms. 
On this account articles of faith are generated out of what is given 
for faith to apprehend. 
Thus, for Karl Barth correspondence is derived from the action of 
God as Trinity. The articles tradition is a 'graced' response informed 
by an encounter with the work and activity of God in his Word. 
Accordingly the fundamental articles tradition ideally operates in 
dynamic relation with God's prevenient activity. 45 This basic position 
has been developed by the Scottish theologian T.F. Torrance, who speaks 
of existence-statements, "which refer to an objective reality above and 
beyond them, and which are true in terms of that reference'', 46 and 
coherence statements, "which have their truth in their inter-relations 
or with reference to a system of ideas '' 4 7 Theological statements 
are, for Torrance, of the first sort, 
they refer to the Being and Existence of God as the given 
reality they are derived from God, and have their truth 
from Him and not in themselves ••.• they arise a posteriori out 
of an actual encounter with objective reality, while the nature 
of that reality determines the kind and mode of empirical 
reference they involve.48 
This strong realism nevertheless avoids the trap of conventional 
objectivism. Theological statements 'have their truth from Him and not 
in themselves'(my italics). 
For Hans Urs Von Balthasar, corresponding to revelation involves 
aesthetic considerations. The mystery of Christianity has an inner 
form to be discerned by the light of faith as it attends to what is 
given.49 Christ constitutes the 'fundamental form•.so The visio 
Christi 'the material heart and centre of his theology'S! - is 
manifested in the 'transparency' of ecclesia's mediate forms which 
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receive their form from the form of Christ. 52 Thus 11 a person does not 
stake his life for one article of faith, but for Jesus Christ and his 
indivisible truth, which shines forth from each individual article 1',53 
These three theologians express, in their own ways, a common 
answer to the question of what capacitates the fundamental articles of 
faith. Such articles receive their nature from God. However, the 
correspondence implied here can never be isomorphic for it is a 
correspondence with God who is being in plenitude.s~ 
In this study of the fundamental articles tradition in Anglicanism 
this general line of approach has been found in Hooker5 5 drawing upon 
Aquinas,S 6 and later in the mystical theology of William Law. Important 
differences remain, not least being Law's radical interiorization of 
faith. At a deeper level, Law's understanding of doctrine was developed 
in relation to the dynamic of God as 'soul presence'. What was 
foundational, the life of the Trinity within, was witnessed to in the 
fundamental articles of the faith. Articles of faith represented a 
linguistic overflow of God's presence.s7 The correspondence was 
genuine but could be never isomorphic for doctrine operated as a 
response to the plenitude of God's own being. Insofar as articles of 
faith are capacitated from this source and directed towards this object 
they remain necessarily unfinished. The purity of the tradition is an 
essentially eschatological concept. 5B Accordingly, the articles 
tradition, within these options, is fundamentally a tradition open to 
criticism and revision,59 
Articles: The Experiential Ground 
Problems in the above view concern the contribution of contingency 
and human experience to the ongoing task of theology. This area 
remains contested. 60 It is, after all, human beings whose apprehension 
of the divine life receives expression in faith's formulations. Inquiry 
into articles of faith will, in some way, have to take account of human 
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experience as the field from within which the impulse to speak of God 
arises. However to put the issue in this way is to move towards the 
other end of the spectrum of theological realism. In contemporary 
theology this has been linked with the Kantian 'turn to the subject' 
and given classic expression in Protestantism in Friedrich 
Schleiermacher's analysis of religious subjectivity. Howeve~ this 
fundamentally experiential tradition in Christianity, in which personal 
religious experience has an important epistemolo~ical significance, has 
a long and rich history. 61 This larger tradition links Calvin's pietas 
(inward reverence and love) and Schleiermacher's pistis. 6 2 In both 
cases religious experience operated as a control on a doctrinal 
tradition's overreaching itself beyond the limits of experience into 
speculative theology. For Schleiermacher such a move was not so much 
sinful (as it was for Calvin) as simply unable to generate dogmatics 
which began in piety,63 
Articles: Piety Confessionalized 
Schleiermacher's point of departure, or rather radicalization of 
the articles tradition, was to be located in his programmatic refusal 
of the hitherto generally recognised cognitive element in revelation. 
Revelation was not 'originally and essentially doctrine' 64 but piety -
"a modification of feeling or immediate self-consciousness". 65 In 
Christianity piety was informed by the 'original impression' 66 of 
Christ the redeemer. The displacement of the cognitive element in 
religion undermined a Protestant doctrinal formalism. This move did 
not entail a rejection of the notion of fundamental articles but rather 
their displacement,67 Confessions remained important and necessary, 
though now priority was given to the spirit rather than the letter. 68 
What resulted was a modified appeal to fundamental articles of faith: 
since in the confessional documents, at least of the second stage, 
Reformed modes of presentation are directed against Lutheran, and 
vice versa, it must be admitted at the outset that only that part 
of the confessional documents in which they all agree can be 
305 
X: The Problem of Capacity 
really essential to Protestantism 69 
Schleiermacher did not elaborate further though the argument would not 
have been unfamiliar to early Anglican exponents of the fundamental 
articles tradition for whom a general Protestant consensus in faith was 
more important than fully defined belief.70 
Schleiermacher regarded Christian doctrine as "nothing but the 
expressions given to the Christian self-consciousness and its 
connexions". 71 This was not meant to give licence for arbitrary 
speculation: ''For there is an inner experience to which they [Christian 
dogmas] may all be traced: they rest upon a giren",12 The 'given' in 
this case not being equated with a specific quantifiable corpus of 
revelation but rather an inner relation to the redeemer,73 Hence, 
dogmatics had ''simply the fundamental inner fact of christian piety 
which it postulates". H Doctrines had ''their ultimate r gound so 
exclusively in the emotions of the religious self-consciousness that 
where these do not exist the doctrines cannot arise",75 Doctrine thus 
bore "witness to the determinations of the religious self-consciousness 
as inward certainty",76 Here, the articles tradition was reworked as 
an account of the Christian religious affections set forth in speech. 77 
Schleiermacher's handling of the problem of the 'whence' of 
doctrine was sophisticated and programmatic for a great deal of 
subsequent liberal Protestant theology. 78 For Schleiermacher, doctrine 
was 'derived' from only one 'source' the self-proclamation of 
Christ. 79 Its region of 'interest' was but one- the religious self-
consciousness.so Dogmatic propositions arose out of "logically ordered 
reflection upon the immediate utterances of the religious self-
consciousness",8l What was given for consciousness as such was the 
redeeming work of Christ inwardly appropriated. Doctrine was properly 
Christian only as it expressed this inner relation. The catalyst for 
the forming of doctrine was the 'impression' of the Redeemer. Doctrine 
represented a stage in the development of the self-awareness of 
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Christian piety. 82 The purpose of the continuing conceptualization of 
faith within a community was to filter out impure statements of 
Christian piety, i.e. those that were not directed to being in 
relation to the Redeemer.83 
It was clearly then not the case for Schleiermacher that articles 
of faith were simply arbitarily spun out of the human imagination. 
What was revealed, however, was at most indirectly referenced in 
doctrine. 84 Correspondence seemed to be as strong or weak as the 
consciousness of redemption as such. Reference operated within the 
limitations of the religious self-consciousness. An indirect 
disclosure of God was possible in the self's experience of self. This 
has led one commentator to identify here a form of 'relational knowing' 
rather than 'objective knowledge•.ss 
Perhaps an underlying difficulty with this approach was the 
failure of Schleiermacher to provide an adequate account of doctrine as 
response to God. By rejecting the region of the cognitive as a 
constituent of revelation it was difficult to see how doctrine could 
contribute to the enlargement of faith's apprehension of the Redeemer. 
What was lacking was a rationale for the truth of doctrine as pietJ' 
forming. 
in its 
Doctrine was rather piety formed. It witnessed to pietJ' and 
most highly refined conceptual forms doctrine 'guided the 
expressions of piety',86 Doctrine was primarily a response to piety and 
only indirectly a response to God,87 
Articles: The 'Affectional Transposition' 
Schleiermacher's approach did represent an important strategy for 
purifying the fundamental articles tradition from within, and 
represented, at a most general level, an example of what Jaroslav 
Pelikan calls the 'affectional transposition' of doctrine.88 This move 
had been important for those within Anglicanism attempting to break the 
rigidities of overformalised belief. In the early history of the 
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fundamentals tradition in Anglicanism this transposition of doctrine 
into the experiential and performative regions of Christian life can be 
detected in Chillingworth. He orientated the fundamental articles of 
faith towards a life of Christian integrity, realised in seeking and 
practising the truth,89 This ethical thrust became more pronounced in 
the writings of the later Caroline Divines such as Hammond and 
Taylor. 90 It was Taylor who said "A holy life 1dll make our belief 
holy",9 1 
Charles Simeon continued, in his own evangelical way, to exemplify 
this 'affectional transposition of doctrine',92 With William Law and 
Samuel Coleridge it was probably less an 'affectional transposition' 
and more "a new way of taking the believing self into the theological 
program'',93 This orientation has appealed to many Anglicans from the 
late nineteenth century who, in their anxiety to affirm the viability 
and security of agreed communal belief, have located the fundamentals 
of Christianity in the region of common religious experience. 94 
Within this general experiential domain important differences have 
obtained. They were exemplified in the nineteenth century in the two 
quite different strands represented by Schleiermacher and Coleridge. 
Thus in Coleridge, for whom a human being's total capacity for God 
included the cognitive faculty, articles of faith were not a secondary 
feature of being in relation to God, but were constitutive as such. A 
right affirmation of the Trinitarian articles of faith was nourishing 
and faith enlarging,95 
Articles as 'Response' 
Schleiermacher has been presented as an early modern example of 
how the articles tradition has been handled within the experiential-
expressivist mould. In the twentieth century the experiential tradition 
has generated and been enriched by important developments that have 
taken place in hermeneutics and understandings of human experience. 96 
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Such developments point to the fact that whatever is stated in the 
articles tradition must somehow be a response to the diversity of human 
engagements with the world and God. Doctrine cannot be without 
experience as its 'companion',97 
From the perspective of this inquiry into the impulse for the 
articles tradition a major issue relates to the 'quality of response' 
possible for a human subject who merely 'interprets' and 'reflects' 
upon experience. Response, in this case, easily assumes a passive 
quality which may not do justice to the creative ways in which human 
beings live in society in relation to God. 98 This suggests that the 
notion of articles as response ought not be reduced to the effort of 
'the solitary self-communicating self' but be understood as a form of 
communication emerging out of a fundamentally social activity in 
relation to God.99 In this latter view statements of faith would 
operate as witnesses to the truth of those common practices by which 
human beings were related to each other and God.1oo This view was 
implicit in the discussion in Chapter Nine of the relationship between 
the fundamental articles tradition and the ecclesial bond. 
Articles: From Experience to Rule 
Difficulties with the notion of a theological spectrum begin to 
emerge with the attempt to incorporate what has been more recently 
espoused in theological circles by George Lindbeck as the rule theory 
of doctrine,l 01 Lindbeck has developed this in relation to an 
understanding of religion as analogous to a 'cultural-linguistic 
system'. This view abandons the notion that the source of religion is 
in 'prior experience'. Instead, it stresses "the degree to which human 
experience is shaped, moulded, and in a sense constituted by cultural 
and linguistic forms",l02 Thus,to become religious "involves becoming 
skilled in the language, the symbol system of a given religion",l03 The 
supposition is that different religious systems "produce fundamentally 
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divergent depth experiences of what it is to be human",l04 The story 
and language of a religion is "the medium in which one moves, a set of 
skills that one employs in living one's life".l05 In this context 
doctrine functions as the abiding grammar which informs and shapes a 
community's faith and life.l06 
Within this functionalist or rule theory of doctrine, inquiry into 
the 'whence' of the community credenda ceases to be relevant. lor The 
inner rationale for those regulative rules which apparently constitute 
the source of unity throughout cultural and theological changesl 0& 
remains unclear. 
Another way to approach the issues raised here is to ask, what 
quality of response is implied in the rule theory of doctrine? The 
transposition of articles of faith into 'meta-linguistic rules' 
certainly modifies the nature of articles. Whilst articles might 
express the dynamics of communal life and purpose it is no longer clear 
whether their reference reaches back to the truth of God.109 By 
carving out a protected space for statements of faith rule theory 
confirms the loss or dimunition of reality reference in ecclesial life. 
Articles of faith loose their publicness,llO 
Nicholas Lash endorses Lindbeck's regulative theory in his own 
depiction of doctrine as 'protocol',lll Lash suggests that we 
'require' some such summary or regulative grammar as a means of 
protection and purification of communal thought and life against 
pressures from within and without which 
In 
incline us to opt for 'irrelation': to treat persons as things, 
and to bind the mystery of God into the It-world We 
require some 'set of protocols against idolatry', against the 
manifold forms of the illusion that the nature of God lies 
within our grasp,ll2 
Lash's view creedal declaration has an 'identity-sustaining 
function', and rules of discourse ideally function as 'the regulative 
pattern of the pedagogy of contemplative practice'.llJ 
When rule theory is developed in terms of its intrinsic necessity, 
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it is unclear how or why rules might arise except as response to the 
ever-present dangers of idolatry. This is legitimate and necessary but 
it is an essentially negatively informed rationale.ll~ Furthermore, a 
question arises as to why certain rules and not another. If certain 
rules have in fact fulfilled this function of ecclesial purity over 
time the urgency of the question is not thereby abated but merely 
intensified. 
Ultimately the question is whether rule theory is able to take 
cognizance of the strong realism it tacitly presumes but from which, 
publicly at least, it appears to retreat,ll5 Lindbeck's discussion of 
religious utterances obtaining a 'performative' ontological 
correspondence might end up leaving theology stranded in the region of 
semi-realism. 11 6 Ultimately, the truth of performance has to be judged 
not simply in relation to certain rules. If ecclesial practice is to 
express the transformative presence of God, then the rules informing 
such practice are more than mere rules, 
being in relation to God, and thus 
they concern people in society 
s q 
concern tran~errentals (those 
necessary notes of being) mediated in and through the one-in-Christ 
bond. 
In this Chapter various options have been identified for the 
handling of doctrine in relation to the impulse or capacitator of 
articles of faith in Christianity. In particular, the lack of 
consensus as regards the impulse for the tradition has uncovered what 
is problematic to theological discourse per se, and by implication, to 
the development of fundamental articles of faith. This problem 
concerns the notion of ecclesia's fundament or founding reality. 1 17 
Capacity as FUnda.ent 
In Chapter Nine the concept of 'fundament' was found relevant to 
the discussion of the primary and secondary (intermediate) unifiers of 
the ecclesial bond. The notion of fundament is a layered concept. In 
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its primary form it concerns God's own being. In its secondary form 
the concept of fundament concerns the forms of mediation of the one-in-
Christ bond. 
The variety of ways of understanding the impulse for the articles 
tradition contained implicit assumptions about the quality and dynamic 
of what was 'given' in ecclesia's fundament. The 'conventional 
objectivist' approach to articles of faith presupposed a concept of 
fundament as a static and finished form. 
In approaches to the articles tradition orientated to human 
subjectivity, it was unclear how the concept of fundament was developed 
in relation to the presence of God. A somewhat restricted notion of 
fundament emerged. This was not inevitable for, as already noted, the 
development of articles of faith in relation to experiential and 
practical concerns offered a way of recapturing the dynamic of God in 
human life. Schleiermacher certainly intended this, though in his case 
the dynamic of Christianity's fundament could easily become controlled 
by consciousness as such. For someone like Don Cupitt the notion of 
fundament appears co-terminous with the self-authenticatin~ individual. 
In more recent rule theory articles of faith are treated as the 
continuing grammar of faith that informs ecclesia's ongoing life. It 
is no longer clear how that life is energised in relation to the 
presence of God. It seems clear that some kind of interactive presence 
is presupposed. But it remains unclear what notion of fundament is 
relevant. Indeed the issue appears to be deliberately avoided,llB 
For Barth, Torrance and Von Balthasar the concept of fundament was 
related to the plenitude of God's own being. There are possibilities 
here, it would seem, for articles of faith to reflect a fuller and more 
dynamic logos realism. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, inquiry into the concept of fundament 
opens up a complex of problems for modern theology, amongst which the 
doctrine of God looms large. Here the questions are relatively simple: 
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what is the being of God? and, how is this being manifest? How these 
difficult and controversial questions are answered in modern theolo~y 
will be reflected in the future development of the form and content of 
the tradition of fundamental articles in Christianity. 
It has been suggested that the question of what capacitates the 
fundamental articles tradition is at heart a question of ecclesia's 
fundament. This was an important undercurrent to the case studies on 
Locke, Waterland and Law. Their handling of the fundamental articles 
theme was observed to be reflexively related to the nature and quality 
of that fundament implicit in their discourse,llq 
In the case of Locke the presence of God as the guarantor of 
reliable human judgements was foundational. Waterland's focus ~as a 
logos of God in the Tradition requiring obediential responses. For Law, 
the soul-presence of God the Trinity constituted the fundament of 
Christian reality. The impact of these quite different conceptions of 
how the foundation of reality was construed accounted for their varied 
handling of the fundamental articles tradition. 
By transferring the articles tradition into the region of merely 
human judgements, Locke's reconstructive effort was highly reductive 
with respect to the form and content of fundamental articles. 
Water land's overformalised logos realism was reflected in his 
codification of the fundamentals of the faith into the form of law-like 
statements. Law's dynamic interiorization of faith generated a rich, 
free-flowing articles tradition, somewhat removed from the public 
domain. 
The dialectic between articles of faith and their fundament will 
be developed further in Chapter Eleven as a problem of theology's 
communicative task. This signals a move from the problem of the 
impulse for articles to a consideration of their significance in the 
communication of the faith. 
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THE DIRECTION OF THE TRADITION: 
The Task of eo .. unications 
An important purpose of the tradition of fundamental articles in 
Anglicanism is to achieve good and efficient communication in the 
Church. The attempt to state what is maximally important for faith is 
therefore an attempt to transmit information. Information is 
understood here as knowledge of what matters.! This Chapter is 
concerned to identify those features of the transmission process 
relevant to the fundamentals tradition and by implication to 
theological discourse more generally. 
The Chapter begins by identifying the symbolic task of theology as 
one of structured response to its own fundament. It goes on to discuss 
the search for foundations, the appeal of simplicity, the emergence of 
hierarchy and the formation of a system, treating these as important 
features of the communication structure of theology. The relevance of 
this structure for the fundamental articles tradition is identified at 
key points by reference to the earlier historical analysis. The 
Chapter ends with an excursus on the genre of regulative communication 
in which fundamental articles are located within a variety of forms of 
theological communication. 
The Symbolic Process as Structured Response 
In Chapter Ten the directional thrust of the articles tradition 
was pursued as a question the origin and impulse for articles of faith. 
This inquiry brought into focus the key concept of fundament as the 
locus of the presuppositions about truth operating in the articles 
tradition. The dialectic between fundament and fundamental articles is 
developed in this Chapter as a problem of the dynamics of ecclesial 
communication. 
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In recent years there have been quite sophisticated developments 
by social 
theological 
clear that 
theorists in the field of communications theory,2 The 
implications have yet to be fully uncovered, though it is 
a theology of communications could make significant 
contributions to ecclesiological theory and practice,3 From this 
perspective the Church has been referred to as a 'community of critical 
communication' and as 'the sacrament of non-dominative communication',4 
This Chapter's interest in communications is rather narrowly 
focussed on the communicative structure of theology,5 The concern is 
with theology as a structured response of faith within which the 
tradition of fundamental articles can be placed. Specifically, the 
intention of the Chapter is to present some of the key moments in the 
development of this tradition in relation to that fundament or founding 
reality which capacitates the ecclesial bond and generates a structured 
response of faith. The focus is thus on important operations in the 
transmission of what is implicit in the one-in-Christ bond into 
explicit and determinate form, as instanced in the tradition of 
fundamental articles. 
At a general level this argument attempts, through analysis of the 
fundamental articles tradition, to understand statements of faith in 
terms of a concept of communication as "the transmission of energy in a 
form",6 Communication is not, on this account, a secondary matter but 
rather provides a medium through which faith is expanded and the true 
strength of the one-in-Christ bond is actualised in the Church. 
When communication is understood as a secondary, merely pragmatic 
task, this indicates a highly reductive understanding of theology as 
response. In this respect the identification of theology as a 'second 
order' operation, as 'reflection' or 'interpretation' upon what has 
been given, fuels the suspicion that the symbolic task is of secondary 
significance for ecclesial existence,7 Ultimately, such a view betrays 
a lack of confidence in the possibility of identifying a positive 
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rationale for theology in the Church.s 
The point here is that theology is not merely the product of 
reflection. This view mistakenly imputes a relation between theology 
and its fundament which presupposes not proximity but 'distance',9 
More correctly, theological discourse operates within a relation of 
proximity to what is given and is directed towards its appropriation at 
the level of language. The supposition here is that there is a 
fundamental form of relation between God and human beings which is not 
readily expressible. Doctrine 'grasps' this form, not at some 'remove', 
but from within this relation. That such grasping is inadequate or 
rather incomplete, is not simply a result of distortion caused by human 
refraction. Rather, incompleteness arises precisely because theology 
can only ever mediate with the same quality as those other intermediate 
categories for God's presence ( i.e. besides the linguistic region of 
the symbolic) identified in Chapter Nine. According!~ theological 
discourse offers genuine and unfinished communication.lO 
This argument suggests that the difficulty of achieving good 
communication in the Church occurs for two very positive and related 
reasons. Firstly, the complexity and richness of what is given for 
communication, i.e. that fundament of ecclesial existence. Secondly, 
the way in which the symbolic dimension actually operates; of 
directness in indirectness,ll Both contribute to the difficulties of 
the symbolic task and generate various strategies to order and 
facilitate communication. In what follows attention is paid to three 
such strategies relevant to the dynamics of communication and operative 
in the formation of the tradition of fundamental articles. 
The Search for Foundations 
The search for foundations has, historically at least, provided 
one important strategy initiating faith's attempt to deepen 
understanding of life in relation to God. The search for 
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has not been a peculiarly 
to identify certain secure 
foundations from which to develop a derivative superstructure of 
knowledge has been a general feature of Western philosophical and 
scientific endeavour. Its roots can be located in Classical culture 
operating on a Euclidean model of knowledge.l2 In the emerging 
experimental sciences of the seventeenth century the search for secure 
and certain foundations for knowledge intensified. This development 
contributed to the heavy preoccupation in the modern sciences with 
epistemological issues,13 
With the breakdown of Classical presuppositions concerning 
knowledge and its appropriation, the foundationalist strategy has been 
subjected to severe criticism14, and undergone sophisticated 
development.lS This debate has largely taken place in the sciences and 
particularly in the Philosophy of Science. The significance of the 
'foundationalist' 
identified. IS 
strategy in theology has only recently been 
The fundamental articles tradition has a rather obvious relevance 
to the issue of foundationalism. The notion of fundamental 
articles suggests that it is possible to identify a core of doctrinal 
truth expressible in certain secure propositions. In relation to such 
fundamental beliefs further truths represent a doctrinal superstructure 
evidencing varying degrees of closeness to the foundational truths. The 
structure of knowledge presupposed here is similar to an inverted 
pyramid. 
In this context the search for foundational truths - faith's 
axiomatic doctrinal substructure - offers the possibility of fixity, 
permanence and definiteness. Such features have been found useful in 
depicting the synchronic and diachronic unity of Christianity,l7 The 
foundationalist strategy is thus one kind of initial response to 
complexity. It represents a way of affirming oneness in multiplicity by 
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identifying the domain of common and uncontroverted belief. 
As observed in Chapter Four, this strategy became an important 
feature of Anglican theological method in the seventeenth century.lB 
The strength and quality of the superstructure of belief was judged by 
its degree of interwovenness with the 'primitives' or foundational 
articles, from which all subsequent belief proposed for acceptance was 
derived.l9 This methodology was associated with a more widespread 
drive for objectivity and security in matters of faith.20 This had an 
obvious appeal for Anglican apologists seeking to commend the authority 
of their communion, determined as it was by a commonly agreed and 
unalterable foundation of faith. The strategy thus provided a counter 
to a Roman and Protestant tendency to maximise required belief.21 
Not surprisingly, the concern to locate secure and common 
foundations for faith, when invoked in a context of post-Enlightenment 
relativism, is vulnerable to the same kinds of criticisms directed 
towards foundationalism per se. Included here is criticism of the 
assumption that self-evident axioms are simply there, available to be 
'read off' and/or intuited in some way; the difficulty of recognising 
the contribution made to knowledge by the superstructure spawned; 
problems of assimilation of what is new, surprising 
to the stability of knowledge; and threatening 
depicting the interrelation between the foundation and 
of knowledge. 
or potentially 
difficulties of 
superstructure 
In theology many of the main difficulties with foundationalism 
surface in the tendency of this strategy to overstabilize the dynamic 
of faith's response to God. What is perceived as foundational is fixed 
in quasi-sacralized forms which secure the foundation. As observed in 
Chapter Ten, this can result in a kind of 'conventional objectivism'.22 
These criticisms suggest that the foundationalist strategy in theology 
is both unsatisfactory and theologically distorted. The attempts by 
some 'post-liberal' theologians to pursue non-foundationalist 
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strategies may not, however, have overcome foundationalism but simply 
disguised a 'weak foundationalism' while avoiding the really pressing 
issue of the kind of foundation relevant to theological discourse.23 
Reinterpreting Foundations 
To retain a notion of foundations and explore strategies for 
identifying what is foundational a reconsideration of the concept of 
fundament in ecclesia is required. The matter has been 
carefully examined by the American theologian Ray Hart who suggests 
"The question of revelation as fundament is at bottom the question of 
the radicalization of the foundation of faith".24 Accordingly, Hart 
argues that 
Revelation as fundament refers first and foremost to that 
constitutive process whereby the what or substantive bearing of 
revelation is built up as the intentionality of human being in 
historical time. This constitutive process comprises an 
inseparably triadic movement; fundament refers to the already 
founded, to founding afresh, and to the yet to be founded. 
Revelation as fundament therefore founds human being on and in 
the co-inherence of the modes of historical time.25 
In this immensely important programmatic statement Hart highlights the 
dynamic of what is given as fundament. It is 'a triadic constitutive 
process' in which past, present and future are included. The given 
cannot be restricted to the 'already founded': 
Theology is thereby deprived of an all but congenital 
proclivity, viz., to be pathologically preoccupied with an 
archeology of its own primitive foundation.26 
Foreclosure of the dynamic of fundament is illegitimate for, 
no phase can gain exclusive ascendancy without arresting the 
movement as such. In classical theological terms, this movement 
[triadic] is the intention of interlacing the doctrines of 
creation, redemption, and eschatology,27 
This conceptualization of fundament is necessarily enmeshed in the 
historical and contingent. It is primarily 'interaction-event',28 
directed to "the expansion of our manhood toward wholeness of being",29 
For Hart, however, the 'very is-ness' of what is given as fundament, 
precisely because it is not an ontological 'fixity', "depends upon 
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(among other factors) our participation in them, upon our 
simultaneously active and passive existence as their inheritor".JO The 
human imagination is thus implicated in a constitutive manner in the 
triadic process relevant to fundament.Jl 
Hart's proposals offer one alternative way to construe ecclesia's 
fundament. One thing is clear: as soon as the ontological fixity of 
the 'object' is broken the search for foundations is considerably 
complicated. No longer can foundations be 'read off' from past texts; 
their security can no longer reside in a fixity and permanence that 
corresponds to the fixity of what is revealed for faith. Indeed, Hart's 
construal of foundations forbids the restriction of the language of 
faith's primary realities to pre-established formulas. If the search 
for foundations is to be directed to what is given, such a search will 
have to take cognizance of fundament as 'interaction-event' 
involving ongoing human responses to God,32 In this sense fundament 
remains unfinished, though such a fundament is not for this reason any 
less foundational. 
These remarks indicate that the foundationalist strategy presents 
a rather too static account of the kind of foundation relevant to 
faith. The search for foundations may be legitimate but the 
foundationalist strategy is ill equipped to discern the kind of 
foundations present in ecclesia. A more adequate hermeneutic of 
foundations is required; one that recognizes the 'intimedness' and 
contingent nature of that fundament constitutive of the one-in-Christ 
bond. Bernard Lonergan is thus right in arguing that foundations can no 
longer be construed in a 'simple manner', 'as a set of premisses, of 
logically first proportions'. He suggests that foundations have to be 
understood in a 'complex manner' pointing to 'what is first in any 
ordered set'. 3 3 
Precisely what this complexity might entail remains a 
controversial subject in theology. In this Chapter attention has been 
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drawn to the importance and difficulty of developing a true and full 
account of foundations for faith and theology. One implication of what 
has been said is that theology as response is response from within a 
relation to God. Here, fundament is what is present in this 
interrelation. 
The nature of this interrelation is difficult to specify. The 
reason is that in the Christian tradition the mediation of this 
relation is the mediation of plenitude, concentrated in Christ 
(Colossians 1:19, 2:9 -rJ 1lAjr•}JM1"fsfJ£..or?ros; John 10:10b -turcrrros), 
and experienced by humankind as God's superabundance of grace, faith 
and love (1 Timothy 1:14 -v1Uf£trAIOVtill"iV). It is this plenitude of 
being which has funded, among other things (e.g. the notion of God as 
mystery), a recurring Trinitarian conceptuality in the history of 
Christian theology. This kind of plenitude is richness in perfection; 
the maximal concentration of 'God's expanding perfection'.34 What is 
thus present in fundament as contingent interaction-event eludes all 
attempts to fully thematize. The foundationalist drive to achieve 
certainty and security can only succeed at the expense of impoverishing 
truth itself. For theology to remain self-critical such reductivism 
requires uncovering en route to a fuller statement of God's presence in 
the world. 
Fundamental Articles: Recovering the Dynamic 
The fundamental articles tradition is easily attuned to the 
foundationalist strategy, It happens in at least two major ways. When 
the tradition is sacralized through ovi-formalization in fixed 
linguistic forms, the fundamental articles operate autonomously, no 
longer in relation to their own fundament. This persistent strand in 
Anglicanism has been identified in the historical treatment in Parts 
Two and Three of this thesis,35 Something similar happens when the 
fundamental articles are relativised. In this case articles mediate 
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the flow in history of autonomous human consciousness.36 These forms of 
objectivism and relativism37 both represent a distortion of the one-in-
Christ bond, insofar as they either try to fix it in particular 
formulas or transpose it altogether into the region of consciousness. 
In both cases doctrine ceases to function as a genuine intermediate 
form through which the one-in-Christ bond is communicated. Its symbolic 
status is distorted either through excessive rigidity (as in doctrinal 
objectivism), or undisciplined looseness (as in religious utterances 
that have retreated into human self-referencing). Both occurrences 
misconstrue the nature of foundations. In the former, foundations 
assume a static form. 
altogether. 
In the latter they are dispensed with 
The above analysis suggests that what is stated as fundamental can 
only be so stated from within the continuing mesh of fundament in its 
historical contingency. From this perspective the drive to 
objectivity in the faith , an important and powerful current within the 
fundamental articles tradition, can be understood as a rejection of the 
dynamics of human understanding and imaginative capacity. These latter 
elements could not but represent a potentially dangerous destabilizing 
factor for the tradition. This problem was apparent in William Archer 
Butler's assertion, in response to Newman's Essay on Development, that 
nothing could take God's dispensation by surprise,38 Ultimately, to 
interpret the search for security as a search for a simple and 
immovable foundation39 betrays a fear of complexity, a fact poignantly 
exposed by Karl Barth,40 
The search for foundations has been an important strategy 
informing the development of theology as structured response to its own 
fundament. The dynamic relation between fundament and its 
expression in language complexify the search for foundations. 
Manoeuvres which negate this dynamic distort the true nature of 
the Church's bond in Christ. It seems that the quality of the 
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fundamental articles tradition will be judged according to the 
intensity of its engagement with its own fundament. 41 What is stated 
in the tradition ought ideally to evidence a genuine, and precisely 
because of this, unfinished rendering of the foundations of Christian 
life in the Church.42 
This inquiry into the search for foundations in Christianity 
clarifies an important regenerative force within the tradition of 
fundamental articles in Anglicanism. A recovery of the directional 
thrust of the articles tradition has been linked historically to a 
renewed integration of the fundamental articles in relation to the 
presence of God in ecclesiality. In the case studies in Part Three this 
renewal came to the fore most vividly in the later theology of William 
Law. For Law, the presence of the Trinitarian God who was 'All Love' 
generated interior renewal, animated the doctrines of redemption and 
broke the conventional form of the articles tradition. The dynamic of 
faith rediscovered by Law was identified in the concept of 'outflow' or 
'overflow'.43 Coleridge's understanding of the Trinitarian ground of 
all reality indicated his debt to this same tradition.44 Maurice's 
repersonalization of the creedal articles of faith expressed a similar 
concern to overcome formalism in belief.45 Simeon, from another angle, 
broke through the conventions of evangelicalism to a richer notion of 
the transformative presence of God.46 
In one sense the above examples indicated what kinds of manoeuvres 
for the renewal of the fundamentals tradition were possible within 
particular contexts and an inherited foundationalist framework. The 
above examples testified to the fact that foundations that are rooted 
in God are foundations with the capacity to continually disrupt what is 
stable and conventional in favour of fresh and surprising orderings of 
reality. This dynamic, exemplified in, but not restricted to the case 
of William Law's mystical theology, represented the logic of God's 
outward flow of love incarnate in Christ and continued in the 
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Spirit. Law's new understanding of the foundation of faith 
significantly modified his understanding and communication of the 
'received' view of fundamentals as regards content, order and style,4 7 
The Appeal of Simplicity 
The rich diversity of Christianity makes communications difficult 
and calls attention to the need to find economical and energy 
conserving means of communicating in the Church. Searching for 
foundations is one way of dealing with this. Implicit in this strategy 
is a concept of simplicity. Simplicity is one of the parameters 
traditionally invoked, whether consciously or not, as a criterion in 
the structuring of knowledge,48 One philosopher of science has 
perceptively noted that the desire for theories in science, "in large 
measure reduces to a desire for simplicity",49 The importance and 
elusiveness of the concept has received increasing attention by 
philosophers of science. Elliott Sober has remarked that 
diversity of our intuitions about simplicity is matched only by 
the tenacity with which these intuitions refuse to yield to 
formal characterization. Our intuitions seem unanimous in 
favour of sparse ontologies, smooth curves, homogeneous 
universes, invariant equations, and impoverished assumptions.so 
The same author notes that recent theorizing about simplicity is a 
'chaos of opinion'. Another philosopher, Mario Bunge, has 
referred to the 'myth' of simplicity. He argues that the concept, 
though useful at some stages in the structuring of knowledge, fails as 
a reliable criterion of truth and that the rule of simplicity boils 
down to 'minimize superfluities'.Sl In reaching this conclusion, 
however, Bunge gives considerable attention to the problem of the 
'complexity of simplicity',52 
Simplicity: Motives and Types 
A concept of simplicity is implicit in any form of critical 
reduction in theology. An exmple of this is the important discussion 
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in Protestantism of the 'essence of Christianity',53 Furthermore, 
this study of fundamental articles in Anglicanism suggests that this 
tradition is informed, tacitly at least, by some quite different 
notions of simplicity. It is possible to include here simplicities of 
a pragmatic kind. For example, catechesis requires simple and 
relatively uncomplicated presentations of the faith. In Anglicanism 
there has been a long history of the use of catechism for instruction 
'for children',54 The catechizing offers 
a way of bringing together the Church's double responsibility of 
teaching as clearly as possible basic tenets of Christian faith 
and life, and of doing so in a way which will awaken personal 
response in those who are taught.SS 
For such an important work the wisdom of simplicity was paramount. The 
Anglican divine. Lancelot Andrewes (1555-1626), 
/ 
in his Preface to A 
Pattern of Catechistical Doctrine stated: 
The duty of the catechist, or him that doth catechise, is to make 
his doctrine easy to enter, by giving it an edge and perspicuity 
of method.ss 
The demands of institutional loyalty and apologetic and polemical 
motives would also seem to require finely honed and relatively simple 
statements of faith,57 In considering the needs of worship and piety 
simplicities in the faith might also be important. This seemed to be 
the view of Hooker and Locke.ss 
Epistemological simplicities have also been relevant to the 
fundamental articles tradition. For example, in the seventeenth century 
debate over infallibilit~ it was important for Chillingworth and 
Stillingfleet to be able to appeal to those foundational articles of 
Christianity of which one could have greatest certainty,59 The 
ontological significance of simplicity has been reflected in a long 
running discussion in Christian theology, from the Patristic period 
through to medieval scholasticism, concerning the unity of God.so These 
examples draw attention to the possibility of a range of types of 
simplicity. 
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Motives for invoking simplicity seem to fall into three 
categories; the legitimate, ambiguous and illegitimate.sl The desire 
to disclose the primary units of discourse as an aid in analysis and 
clarification is legitimate. So too is the wish to increase 
systematicity of discourse, systematicity being an important feature of 
the structuring of knowledge per se. More ambiguous in nature is the 
desire to understand, which is often satisfied by an impoverishment of 
the subject and sacrifice of deeper truths. The region of the 
illegitimate is more controversial, though it would certainly seem to 
include a type of infallibilism whose motto is 'safety first', 
'security at any price'. 
Simplicity: Concentrated Complexity 
It would seem that the simplicity concept has important functions 
in theological discourse understood as a structured response to the 
complexity of faith. Primarily, the appeal to simplicity performs a 
concentrating function in relation to faith, though an ordering 
function is reflexively operating in this. Highly concentrated 
conceptual discourse presupposes selection and ordering in complexity. 
Yet such concentration also provides a heuristic for fresh ordering of 
material,62 
Simplicity, as concentration of complexity, is particularly 
important in the institutional context of ecclesia where basic 
instruction 
communication 
in the faith is valued. Furthermore, 
of the faith makes more plausible the 
simplicity in the 
claim that the 
Church is indeed one by virtue of its common profession. 63 Affirming 
oneness in multiplicity requires, at the level of doctrine, the wisdom 
of being simple in complexity. Adherence to a relatively concise and 
precise confession of faith becomes a measure of institutional loyalty. 
Considerations pertaining to institutional cohesion indicate that 
concentration of complexity has high pragmatic value for the 
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maintenance of the ecclesial bond, the success of the catechetical task 
and apologetic concerns. These matters that will be found relevant in 
the discussion in Chapter Twelve on institutionality. 
The concept of simplicity as concentrated complexity becomes 
problematic when theological concerns are disregarded and/or wrongly 
identified. The point here is that a utilitarian deployment of the 
simplicity concept involves the concomitant danger of suppressing 
meaning and introducing semantic ambiguity if not confusion. Linguistic 
concentrations have a latent complexity. This points to the fact that 
simplicities as such belong to a process directed towards the expansion 
of knowledge and understanding of faith,64 What has been referred to in 
the philosophy of science as the 'forced poverty of beginning'65 of 
every theory, can be understood in theology as the problem of the 
latent complexity of the discrimen. The discrimen represents 
"imaginative construals of the mode of the presence of God",66 
From this perspective the purpose of extended statement of the 
faith can be understood as the unravelling of the discrimen. In the 
course of this process concepts of simplicity may be invoked; to 
unravel complexities which obscure progress, to regain control of 
material and tighten coherence,67 
Simplicity is not an end in itself, but rather a recurring moment 
in theology's structured response. As such it operates as a parameter 
of understanding, useful at certain stages in the ordering and 
penetration of the complexity of faith. When simplicity is extolled as 
a virtue in itself it becomes merely a pseudonym for 'simplistic'. 
Simplicity as conceptual economy is thus a sign of transitoriness. The 
philosopher of science,Mario Bunge~interprets this transitoriness as 
falsity being superseded by a lesser falsity. In doing so he not only 
reverses the scholastic dictum, simplex sigillum veri ('simplicity is 
the seal of truth') into simplex sigillum falsi, he also raises the 
critical question of simplicity in relation to truth.sa 
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The Simplicity of God 
For the tradition of theolo~ical realism the issue here concerns 
the ontological significance of simplicity. The problem resides in the 
fact that increasing penetration of reality discloses increasingly 
higher degrees of complexity,6 9 It would seem that theology must 
divest itself of the concept of simplicity except as a purely pragmatic 
strategy. The supposition here is that simplicity cannot be predicated 
of the being of God. The appeal of simplicity ultimately raises for 
Christian theology a question of the truth of God's own being. 
The concept of God as pure simplicity has been a dominant feature 
of the doctrine of God from early in the Christian tradition. Karl 
Barth has disapprovingly noted that the "simplicity of the being of God 
has always been held to be the only true description of that being",iO 
In Barth's view the resolution of the nature of God into this one 
overriding concept became firmly established through the influence of 
nominalist philosophy. The result was that theological talk of God 
meant essentially, "only the simplicity of God and not the richness, at 
best the simplicity of riches, but at bottom only the simplicity",71 
Barth attempted a rehabilitation of the concept by interrelating 
simplicity and plenitude in his discussion of the perfections of God. 
He referred to simplicity and plenitude as the characteristic relations 
of the Lord of Glory.72 There was a co-inherence of concepts73; 
simplicity included the plenitude of God's perfections. 
Consideration of the divine attributes can but move in circles 
around the one but infinitely rich being of God whose simplicity 
is a.bunda.nce itself a.nd whose a.bunda.nce is simplicity itself,14(my 
italics) 
Consequently, for Barth, God's simplicity was not 'poverty': "On 
the contrary, God is one in the fullness of his deity and constant in 
its living vigour".75 In this way the doctrine of the Trinity, as 
plenitude in simplicity, wa.s the Christian doctrine of God.76 In the 
light of Barth's statement that "Everything else is only relatively 
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simple He [God] is absolutely simple the only being who is 
really one"77, it is possible to formulate a concept of God as a being 
of maximal economy, whose simplicity is concentration of plenitude. 
Communication of this kind of simplicity will clearly be a matter of 
great complexity which will require, at the level of language and 
thought, strategic simplifications of the kind already referred to en 
route to fuller communication. 
The Simplicity of Doctrine 
This brief discussion of simplicity is highly relevant to the 
truth of the tradition under review for it raises the question, what 
have we when we have fundamental articles? The argu:ment above 
suggests that the genre 'doctrine' has that quality of being a 
maximally economic and informative communication of truth. 78 It follows 
that fundamental articles are a specialized form in which the general 
character of doctrine receives its most focussed and determinate form 
as a maximal concentration of the truth of the ecclesial bond: an 
instance of doctrine being raised to its ideal form and operation. 
Such a perspective enriches, without negating, the pragmatic 
thrust of the tradition where demands of intelligibility, ease of 
learning, retention and institutional cohesion dominate. Specifically, 
it draws attention to the danger of 'simplistic' reductive moves which 
distort communication. 
This discussion suggests that the criterion of simplicity is a 
necessary though risky parameter to employ in theological 
communication. Doctrinal concentrations which are maximally economic in 
their informativeness are also subject to ossification when the truth 
stated in such concentrations is obscured. This can occur when 
simplicities of a pragmatic kind dominate or intrude into all areas of 
communication in the Church,79 This problem can be discerned in 
repetitive theological discourse. Such communication has few resources 
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to generate fresh speech in response to the reality of faith in its 
newly emerging contexts. 80 The latent complexity of what is maximally 
informative calls for and calls forth a symbolic process that remains 
essentially incomplete. 
From this perspective, the fundamental articles tradition is a 
strategy en route to the achievement of more comprehensive 
communication of the truth of ecclesia's one-in-Christness. The 
tradition of fundamental articles in Anglicanism is clearly indebted to 
the drive for theological compression. At this level the tradition has 
important affinities with the popular notion of the 'essence of 
Christianity'. This conceptual affinity is rooted in the concept of 
simplicity. The discussion of simplicity in this Chapter indicates 
that simplicity can operate in a reductionist way. This suggests 
that great care is required to avoid the reductivist strand in the 
'essence of Christianity' concept in theology,81 Richard Hooker's 
compression of faith, as evident in his appeal to the 'essence of 
Christianity' and the 'fundamental words' apologetic, showed that 
theological compression was not necessarily reductionist, but belonged 
to a teleological framework directed towards the perfection of the 
mystical body of Christ.B2 
John Locke 
The appeal of simplicity was most fully explored in the case study 
on John Locke in Chapter Five. At one level Locke's compression of the 
faith was a practical manoeuvre to take account of the different 
capacities of people, to find a firm basis for communal belief and 
overcome the destabilizing effect of theological controversy. 8 3 
It is equally clear that simplicity had an epistemological 
significance for Locke. The fundamentals of faith in which highest 
probability obtained were few indeed and generally sufficient for 
~ 
salvation. Simplicities of faith were those bel~s least contaminated 
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by human reason, and thus closest to the facts of revelation in 
Scripture.B4 In the text of Scripture, in which communication was 
maximally achieved, God had given what was 'clear plain and easy to 
understand'. 85 
communication. 
Here, simplicity operated as a 
It disallowed any fuller opening of the 
control on 
divine-human 
relation. Simplicity was no longer a strategy in a process leading to 
enlargement of faith but an end in itself. Locke's concept of 
simplicity was determined by a particularly restrictive notion of what 
was deemed to be intelligible. Ultimately, the richness of God's own 
simplicity was impoverished. This became apparent in Locke's silence 
over that mystery that was anything but 'plain, clear and easy to 
understand', i.e. the Trinity. By contrast, for William Law, God's 
Triune simplicity generated expanding and free-flowing communication.ss 
This discussion indicates that the appeal to simplicity is far 
from simple. The quality of the articles tradition will be impaired to 
the extent that its implicit appeal to simplicity is merely deployed 
for practical purposes, e.g. the delineation of the boundaries of 
faith and constructing checks on belief and institutional loyalty. 
The quality of the tradition will be raised as compressed statements 
of faith lead to expansion of the latent fullness of faith. 
The &.ergence of Hierarchy 
An important feature present in the ordering of complexity through 
a discriminating use of simplicities is what may be called the 
emergence of hierarchy. The reflexive relation that obtains between 
simplicity as concentration of complexities and the ordering function 
in theological communication has already been noted. Careful ordering, 
if it is to be epistemologically significant, will involve both a 
notion of simplicity and hierarchical structuring in a reflexive 
relation.B7 The appeal to simplicity and the emergence of hierarchy can 
be perhaps best understood as two complementary responses to 
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complexity. As a constituent of the 'architecture' of complexity 
hierarchy emerges as a means of reconciling the drive for simplicity 
with the recognition of the objectively complex structure of reality. 
Both substantive and pragmatic considerations are relevant here. 
The emergence of hierarchical structures can, at one level, be 
understood as a practical strategy by means of which sorting and 
ranking of the complexities of faith can be achieved for the purposes 
of understanding and communication. This preoccupation with 
identifying priorities for the purpose of communicating the more 
central matters of faith is an important feature of the tradition of 
fundamental articles. As indicated earlier this represents an important 
practical effort to disclose the intelligibility of the faith for 
teaching and apologetic purposes. 
To the extent that hierarchy emerges as a response to complexity 
per se, evidencing an attempt to assign relative values to complex 
phenomena, more substantive issues are involved. Indeed, such a 
development of hierarchy presupposes different levels within reality 
and the possibility of differentiation as such. 88 
From this perspective hierarchy in theology mediates, at the level 
of language, the richly differentiated form of God's presence in 
the world and human society. Hierarchy operates ideally as a strategy 
opposed to impoverishing reductions. The formation of hierarchy is 
designed to overcome abstraction and enable intelligent attentiveness 
and efficient penetration of the particular and complex. The purpose 
here is to identify and respond to the differentials in value and 
meaning present in reality. This suggests that the emergence of 
hierarchy in theological discourse evidences the power of selection and 
differentiation, and the wisdom to avoid what is trivial for an 
understanding of life,B9 
Hierarchy is thus what happens as theological discourse attempts 
to be formed from and give form to its own fundament.so This 
332 
XI: The Task of Communications 
perspective was important for the early development of the fundamental 
articles in relation to the notion of the foundation of faith,91 
Dimensions of Hierarchy 
The concept of hierarchy in theology might be more adequately 
developed from an understanding of the concept of hierarchy in the 
philosophy of science and General Systems Theory,92 Defining a complex 
system as "one made up of a large number of parts that intersect in a 
non-simple way",93 Herbert Simon noted that system complexity may be 
either disorganized or organized. He argued that complex systems 
organized hierarchically evolved more quickly than disorganized ones. 
Hierarchical systems were applicable in a variety of 
social, biological, physical, and symbolic. In 
areas 
each 
including 
case the 
hierarchical system was one composed of interrelated subsystems of 
hierarchic structure, the foundation being constituted by the most 
elementary subsystem. More specifically, the structure of the 
hierarchy could be identified according to the criterion of intensity 
of interaction between and among subsystems. Simon described the notion 
of a 'flat' hierarchy, where the ratio of the number of levels to the 
span (number of subsystems into which it was partitioned) was small. 
The same author referred to the concept of system redundancy. An un-
redundant system was one "where no aspect of the complex structure can 
be inferred from any other".94 Redundancy, when recognised, could be 
eliminated through simplification. 
Mario Bunge identified the central feature of hierarchy as the 
idea of dominance in which a 'one-way bossing' relation occurred,95 In 
his view very few 'hierarchies' were genuine ones since they lacked 
this feature. Bunge preferred to speak of 'levels'. He differentiated 
nine levels relevant to the sciences. His analysis offers a method of 
identifying different kinds of hierarchical structures. He identified 
'rank' hierarchies analogous to a 'staircase pyramid' in which 
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dependence was in one direction only. This was different from a layer 
analogous to geological stratification where the strata are arranged 
according to an order of emergence in time or logic. When such 
emergent layers were also rooted in lower levels retaining all the 
qualities of the latter, then the concept of rooted layer, after the 
manner of a telescopic system, was appropriate. A final level 
identified by Bunge referred to grades of being itself in which a 
movement from reality to experience to knowledge was envisaged. 
Hierarchy in the Articles Tradition 
The fundamental articles tradition, as it has conventionally 
operated in Anglicanism, accords most closely with Bunge's rank 
hierarchy, analogous to a staircase pyramid. The direction of movement 
is from foundational axioms to a dependent derivative superstructure. 
A system of 'one-way bossing' operates. Its virtue is security and 
fixity, though the intensity of interaction is minimal. Indeed, it is 
unclear how interaction takes place at all. This problem was evident 
in the difficulty exponents of the tradition had in developing notions 
of relative fundamentality, nearness to the foundation, additions to 
the foundation and degree of error in relation to the foundation. In 
the early seventeenth century these issues emerged, for example, in 
William Laud's controversy with the Jesuit John Fisher.96 In the 
nineteenth century the Anglican responses to Newman's Essay on 
Development encountered similar difficulties.9i 
To the extent that the derivative superstructure of faith was 
incapable of contributing new theological insights not already included 
in the base of the hierarchy, the rationale for ongoing theological 
development was effectively neutralized. This meant that beyond the 
base the hierarchy was strictly speaking unnecessary, i.e. non-
fundamental for faith. There were important theological reasons for 
this position. They had to do with an awareness of the dangers of over 
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doctrinalization in the faith, and an attempt by Anglicans to remain 
ecclesially inclusive. Such concerns exercised a limiting factor upon 
the emergence of more finely developed theological hierarchies.98 
However this approach could degenerate into 'redundant' discourse in 
which certain basic statements (albeit highly rich in content) were 
perpetuated 
contingent. 
by repetition without roots in the historical and 
This tendency was observed in Daniel Waterland's 
development of the tradition.99 
Hierarchy and Maurice's Vision of Theology 
Unsurprisingly, repetetive discourse could easily spawn a 'flat 
hierarchy' in which the endurance of simple bases masked a disorganized 
theological complexity. John Locke is a rather obvious example 
here.lOO F.D. Maurice's handling of the tradition is also relevant.lOl 
Maurice remained tightly centered on the 'old absolute creeds'. It was 
not that he eschewed any notion of hierarchy. On the contrary, he was 
willing to depart from more traditional views on eternal punishment.l02 
Furthermore, his attitude to the Articles of Religion indicated a 
structuring of belief where the Articles witnessed to truths 'bigger 
than a system',l03 Here, the superstructure of belief operated as a 
protective coating for the creedal profession. 
For Maurice, the hierarchicalization of belief was informed by a 
'digging' motif. Beginning from the centre of faith all energy was then 
directed to the further penetration of that centre. Yet the opening up 
of the primitives of faith was a risky business and ultimately, for 
Maurice, it was always on the brink of collapse back into repetition of 
the Trinitarian name. A more thoroughgoing systematic statement of the 
richness of the foundation, and the teasing out of a more comprehensive 
hierarchical structure of belief was continually thwarted. As argued 
earlier, Maurice transferred this kind of development into the region 
of personal and godly ecclesial order.104 
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From the point of view of theology as communication by means of a 
structured response of faith to its own fundament, Maurice's effort 
could not but appear antithetical to the entire enterprise. For 
Maurice, it seemed that ideal theological communication required a 
critical destructuring response. At best what could result from this 
orientation was an embryonic system characterised by 'flat hierarchies' 
and a great deal of latent and unorganized theological richness.lOS 
Grading Belief: Fundamental Articles or Hierarchy of Truths 
Grading of belief has always been important in the Anglican 
fundamentals tradition. In the case of Newman this remained so even as 
a Roman Catholic.106 When, at Vatican II, the concept of 'hierarchy of 
truths' was introduced,107 the implied structuring of faith seemed to 
provide a possible rapprochement with Protestantism. To invoke this 
concept, however, was immediately to open up a controversy with which 
Protestants have had four centuries of familiarity. 
The relation between 'hierarchy of truths' and the distinction 
between fundamental and non-fundamental beliefs remains unclear.l08 
The latter has certainly been associated in Protestantism with a 
critical and controversial reductionist thrust in Christian belief. 
Both concepts presuppose the formation of hierarchy in the faith. 
Furthermore, 
theologians 
recent arguments of ecumenically-minded Roman Catholic 
suggest that the fundamental articles tradition is not to 
be identified simply as an enumerative theological method.l 09 
Perhaps the difference between the concepts 'hierarchy of truths', 
and fundamental articles lies more in the direction of approach to a 
common issue. The former concept might indicate, from the Roman 
Catholic perspective, how a critical movement towards a fresh doctrinal 
harmony in faith may be recovered. In this respect, to invoke the 
notion of 'hierarchy of truths' would signal a shift from concern for 
the quo (the formal authority), to differentiation within the the quod 
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(the content) of faith.llO For Protestants, the latter conceptuality 
(fundamental articles) might indicate an attempt to identify the core 
doctrinal matrix from which all faithful communication emanates. 
From this perspective both conceptualities imply an emergent 
hierarchical structuring of faith informed by the truth of faith 
present and indwelt. Both appear vulnerable to the danger of mere 
enumeration of truths and boundary making concerns.lll Both have the 
potential to raise the quality of theological communication. This 
could happen when the hierarchical structures generated genuinely open 
up the rootedness of ecclesial life in the presence and action of God 
in the world. This recalls the earlier comment, that hierarchy is what 
happens as theological discourse attempts to be formed from and give 
form to its own fundament. 
Perhaps, in the final analysis, it is not a question of either 
'fundamental articles' or 'hierarchy of truths' but rather a question 
of the quality of the vision which predominates in quite specific 
ecclesiological contexts. Where this vision moves beyond traditional 
boundaries, evidencing a disciplined openness to God's presence in all 
things, then the use of either concept can improve communication and 
provide direction in the Church. 
Theological Hierarchy: Emergent and Unfinished 
In terms of the discussion so far it is possible to specify three 
important features of theological hierarchy. Firstly, insofar as the 
hierarchical structure of theology is a way of expressing the nature of 
theology's fundament per se, the articles hierarchy is clearly a 
derived hierarchy. Secondly, precisely because of its derived status, 
the development of hierarchical structure will necessarily include an 
inner flexibility. Such a flexibility recognises that the ordering of 
faithisalways being formed afresh in the meshing of Divine and 
contingent reality. Finally, this argument suggests that hierarchial 
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forms of belief have an ongoing emergent quality in correspondence with 
the dynamic of Christian life in the world. Dietrich Ritschl has 
remarked in connection with this, that there can be "no final 
hierarchy, no unchanging 'mobile' can be discovered". 11 Z The point is, 
there will probably be a great range of (perhaps infinite) possible 
hierarchical forms through which faith can be stated,ll3 
Theological hierarchy is thus a derived, emergent, and therefore 
unfinished structure of faith. These remarks raise as many questions 
as they answer. The task here is simply to identify some of the 
important issues in the concept of hierarchy and its relevance to the 
operation of the fundamental articles tradition. In this respect 
certain dangers have been identified; problems of direction, i.e. 'one-
way bossing'; 'flat' hierarchies and redundant communication. The 
significance of fundament for the consideration of hierarchy has also 
been raised. Attention has also been drawn to the derived, emergent and 
unfinished nature of hierarchically structured communication. 
Grading of belief has been an important means by which Anglicanism 
has attempted to achieve an ecclesiality which is both inclusive and 
pure. Such grading implies an awareness of the dangers for ecclesia's 
institutionality of a maximalist tendency in faith that easily obscures 
what is important. This was linked in early Anglicanism with a notion 
of purity in doctrine which sought a balanced harmony in faith 
commensurate with the ideal of social, political and ecclesial 
unity,ll4 Simple grading of belief has thus been an important strategy 
for solving the problems of divided ecclesial bodies. 115 This brief 
analysis suggests, however, that the tradition can be beneficial at a 
practical level only as it is developed afresh and deployed with 
wisdom for the directing and deepening of Church life in relation to 
God's presence. 
The Foraation of a Syste• 
The search for foundations, the appeal to simplicity and the 
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emergence of hierarchy are component features of the fundamental 
articles tradition as a communications system. The mediation of the 
potentially limitless range of ecclesial faith generates the formation 
of a communication system. Ideally developed, such a system expresses 
the true form of the one-in-Christ bond. 
The relevance of systems analysis to religion has been recognised 
within Anglicanism, however the matter awaits further specification and 
clarification in relation to the symbolic region of doctrine.ll6 The 
history of the fundamental articles tradition evidences an ambivalence 
towards theological system as such: on the one hand antipathy (e.g. 
John Locke and F.D. Maurice), on the other hand, strong recommendation 
of quite particular systems of faith (e.g. Daniel Waterland),ll7 
The tradition of fundamental Articles in Anglicanism might in fact 
be understood as a recurring strategy to break the power of system 
domination. This domination could be discerned in an excessive 
formalizing and ordering of the faith. The Anglican fundamentals 
apology, particularly with its heavy patristic orientation was, as 
earlier argued, one way of countering this problem,ll8 
The appeal to fundamental articles could, however, just as easily 
provide a theoretical underpinning for quite particular and exclusivist 
eccle$ial systems. In Chapter Four it was argued that this happened at 
the time of the Restoration,ll9 Later it was exemplified in 
Waterland's handling of the subject, though it was present to varying 
degrees in most of the major exponents of the tradition from the time 
of Hooker. This suggests that the tradition represents a vital 
component sub-system in a larger ecclesial system. The fundamental 
articles tradition is thus a communications system whose placement 
within a larger ecclesial system, perhaps skewed by certain ideological 
presuppositions, gives vital clues to the operational significance 
of the sub-system. 
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Open and Closed Systems 
The critical issue is thus not whether the tradition evidences 
system features as such.120 Rathe~ it is focussed on the kind of 
communications system implicit in the operation of the tradition. At 
this level the question concerns the openness or closedness of a 
system. A closed system may be defined as, 
a subsystem which, in reality or by definition, is not in an 
essential relation of feedback to an environment. Any feedback 
relationships between variables are strictly internal to the 
system, or better still, this feedback .•. has nothing to do with 
the matching or fitting of the system to the environment, or of 
the environment to the system,l21 
The feedback referred to here may be called 'pseudo-feedback'. 
Such a system is unable to use and incorporate new information. It is 
'information tight' or 'closed'. In this respect, Thomas Torrance 
has depicted a closed system as one evidencing a rigid axiomatic 
structure which "copes only with what can be logically derived from 
what we already know and cannot cope with what is utterly new",l22 
By contrast, open systems are in relation to their 'environment', 
without which they cannot survive and upon which they depend for their 
own development. Such systems are capable of using and incorporating 
new information which controls and directs the system's energy. 123 
Open information systems, 
are essentially those which are capable of constructing, or are 
required to construct, within certain constraints, their own 
relation to an environment, once they have decided it is 'other' 
than themselves,l24 
This constructive task is developed from the recognition of 
an irreducible indeterminacy or openness in our conception and 
description of reality, corresponding to the indeterminate 
nature of its objectivity which, while accessible to our rational 
inquiry, reaches far beyond what we can overtake in our 
comprehension and formalization.125 
This combination of objectivity and indeterminacy calls for controlled 
openness 126 characterised by a 
flexible axiomatic method directed by a heuristic VlSlon, in which 
there takes place a constant adaptation of the structure of our 
knowing to the structure of what we seek to know.127 
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This has affinities with what Michael Polanyi has called the 'fiduciary 
framework' of knowledge. Important here is the revisability of the 
framework in terms of its fundamental beliefs which fund the discovery 
and integration of new truth but which nevertheless remain resistant to 
complete formalization,lZB 
The Fundamental Articles System: Locke, Waterland and Law 
The case studies in Part Three indicated the different ways in 
which the fundamental articles tradition operated within a system 
framework. Locke's reductivist proposals were fuelled by an antipathy 
to prevailing tight dogmatic systems of theology. He sought something 
freer and more inclusive but his strategy resulted in a dismantling of 
the articles tradition. For Locke, systems of theology were fallible 
human constructions, quite inadequate for securing communal bonds. 
The only safe system for Locke was a 'simple' one. Here the 
question of a system's openness or closedness was developed in terms of 
its relative complexity. Increasing complexification of structure 
implied, for Locke, lower probabilities of truth. When transferred 
into theology this meant that the Christian faith was, in the interests 
of purity of belief, condemned to remain in a highly dispersed and 
disorganized system,l29 This was the result of the application in 
theology of his own closed epistemological system. 
Daniel Waterland's response to this kind of manoeuvre entailed a 
vigorous reassertion of received orthodoxy concerning fundamental 
articles. A highly bounded, closed information system resulted,l30 The 
lines between orthodoxy and heresy were sharply drawn. Waterland's 
system operated at a meta-historical level; it was not environment 
specific,l31 It was singularly unable to incorporate new information. 
The system was self-regulating and relied on 'pseudo-feedback'. This 
functioned to maintain a pre-determined goal, i.e. the securing of the 
'received' tradition. In this context the 'environment' could only 
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appear as a threat and a potential source of contamination. 
William Law's interiorization of the articles of faith disengaged 
the tradition from tight rationalistic theological systems. A strong 
dynamic interrelation between Divine and human life was restored. This 
presupposed a full opening of the system to its environment, conceived 
as the presence of God in interiority. This new ecclesial environment 
found expression in Law's mystical theology. A theological system 
emerged capacitated by the plenitude of God's own being,l32 
Law's promising start was hampered by the very means by which it 
had begun. The focus upon interiority ignored the larger social and 
corporate environment within which a believer lived and was 
nourished,l33 This was reflected in the inability of Law's mystical 
theology to give an adequate account of human relationality with other 
persons in the society of the Church. Relational life was only 
indirectly given through participation in God's own life. An 
interesting and renewing development of the fundamentals system emerged 
somewhat closed from public scrutiny. 
To the extent that the fundamental articles tradition evidences 
system repetition, failure to cope with new contingencies, suppression 
of complexity, and resistance to reformation or public scrutiny, it 
operates as a closed or 'congealed system',l34 Such systems remain 
inadequately related to their environment. The tradition operates as 
an open system to the extent that it evidences a capacity for revision 
and reordering in the community of faith, elimination of repet_i tion, 
and the ability to respond to new and surprising contingencies. Such a 
'stable open system' does not imply loss of objectivity or rejection of 
its inherited form, but it does mean that the tradition is subject to 
reconstitution in terms of its own fundament,l35 
This inquiry into the fundamental articles tradition as a problem 
of communications has identified important features operative in 
the formation of a system of communication the search for 
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foundations, the appeal of simplicity, and the emergence of hierarchy. 
Furthermore, the Chapter has uncovered something of the dialectic 
operating between fundament and fundamental articles. In the 
communication of that which capacitates the articles tradition, a 
structured response of faith emerges. The inquiry into the directional 
movement of the fundamental articles tradition - its impulse (Chapter 
Ten) and communicative structure (Chapter Eleven) - has drawn attention 
to the important dynamic of the tradition in the life of faith in the 
Church and theology. The one-in-Christ bond mediated through the 
tradition provides the impulse and guidance for the reconstitution of 
fundamental articles of faith in the community of the Church. 
Reference to the community of faith as the locus of the 
tradition adds a further dimension to the dynamic relevant to its 
operation. The social dynamics of fundamental articles, a matter that 
surfaced in the discussion of the ecclesial bond in Chapter Nine, 
clearly requires consideration. This matter will be pursued in Chapter 
Twelve as the question of the institutional significance of ecclesia 
and its relation to fundamental articles of faith. 
Excursus: The Genre of Regulative co .. unication 
Relevant, though somewhat tangential to the discussion of 
fundamental articles as an issue of communications, is the problem of 
identifying fundamental articles within the genre of regulative 
communication. This matter was briefly alluded to in Chapter One where 
attention was drawn to the lack of "a comprehensive theory of 
theological statements in present theology",l36 The matter is complex, 
and unsurprisingly remains unresolved. In terms of this study what is 
required is an answer to the question: what kind of communication do 
fundamental articles represent? 
The 'Articles' Genre 
At one level the problem is identifying fundamental articles 
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within the range of possible forms of linguistic communication. This 
variety includes aphorism, metaphor, parable, narrative, creed, 
articles and extended discourse. At one end of 
possibilities aphoristic discourse can be located. 
this spectrum of 
Coleridge's Aids to 
Reflection belongs to this category,l 3 7 Aphorisms are nugget-like, 
highly compressed linguistic forms. Somewhat less compressed in form 
is parabolic discourse which narrates.l38 As addressing speech, 
parable is 'discovering language', opening up new life possibilities 
for those addressed.l39 In the field of modern theology Kierkegaard's 
deployment of parabolic discourse is indicative of its force and 
poignancy. 140 
The narrrative form of discourse admits of extension 
parabolic 
telling of 
story: "The thought of God can be thought 
a story ...• If thinking wants to think God, 
only 
then 
beyond 
as the 
it must 
endeavour to tell stories",l41 Narrative can provide the raw material 
for more discursive theological programmes, a fact exemplified pre-
eminantly this century in the writings of Karl Barth.l42 However this 
development signals a movement towards the other end of the linguistic 
spectrum characterised by highly developed systematic manoeuvres and 
extensive unravelling of theology's subject matter. Inclusiveness here 
is achieved extensively rather than by compression. Paul Tillich' s 
systematic theology is an example of this kind of discourse. 143 
Within this continuum the genre of articles represents a highly 
compressed linguistic form. As such, articles offer maximally economic 
communication of information. Such high conceptual generalisation 
operates as both summary of narrative and as a catalyst for extended 
discourse. 
The existence of a variety of Confessional documents and short 
formulas of faith indicates that the application of the articles 
nomenclature is somewhat fluid. Articles of faith may be predicated of 
the Apostles' Creed. In this case such articles express the faith in 
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its 'concentrated centre' and in this way they can be said to state 
'the fundamental truths of Christian faith',l44 The Thirty-nine 
Articles of Religion in Anglicanism can be understood as a series of 
extended propositions on the faith. Other sixteenth century confessions 
are somewhat longer Articles documents but not as extensive as, for 
example, the seventeenth century Westminster Confession.l45 
The Barmen Declaration of 1934 is an important modern example of 
articles construction.l 46 Karl Rahner's proposals for short formulas 
of faith also belong to this discussion of the articles genre.147 So 
too is the World Council of Churches statement of the basis of its 
faith,14B The 1982 Lima statement on Baptism, Eucharist and Ministry, 
though of a more discursive nature, is nonetheless, in method of 
presentation, not unlike earlier Articles documents.149 
It is tempting to identify the articles motif with the Loci method 
in theology. This view has some etymological justification: 'article' 
being derived from artus, and from arcto. Here 'article' signifies 
members of the body closely joined together, as the joints of the 
fingers closely cohere. The concept includes the idea of a whole as it 
is constituted by its various parts. Accordingly, the concept 
collectively may signify a whole head of doctrine and distributively it 
may apply to any assertion or enunciation which constitutes a part of 
Christian doctrine. Thus articles of faith may be applicable both to 
doctrine as it is divided into heads or theological loci, and the 
theses under separate heads of doctrine,lSO 
To identify the articles tradition with the loci method may simply 
be continuing a tradition of theological communication that is no 
longer helpful. The loci method presupposes a pre-given unity which is 
then displayed through compartmentalizing of the faith according to 
various articles or heads of doctrine. An interconnection is presumed, 
however the accent is on the autonomy of isolated and well rehearsed 
themes. The loci method has a tendency towards a closed theological 
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system. In this respect Dietrich Risch! has noted that the method 
"makes it possible to slip from one sub-theme to another and thus 
ultimately excludes the possibility of carrying through a theological 
discourse",151 
An alternative conceptual framework for the articles tradition 
might be possible. It might be the case that there are an infinite 
number of perspectives from which and through which a comprehensive 
view of Christianity could be displayed.152 Here, if there is a loci 
method, it operates intensively. Accordingly, articles represent 
concentration points en route to the fuller uncovering of Christianity 
from the particular perspective chosen, e.g. ecclesiology, cosmology. 
Thus the short programmatic statements (theses) that lace Barth's 
Church Dogmatics, operate as concentration points for extended 
discussions. In this sense, they represent the successive opening of 
articles of faith according to the logic of Barth's particular 
Trinitarian perspective. This construal of the articles tradition 
implies that there may be myriad ways of communicating what is 
fundamental in Christianity. Furthermore, what is said to be 
fundamental will be communicated differently as it is expressed from 
differing perspectives. 
In this alternative view articles continue to operate as 
concentrated conceptual generalizations. It is equally clear, however, 
that in this framework the articles tradition is capable of immense 
variety in communication. The goal here is comprehensively integrated 
conceptualization. The supposition is that there is no one fixed form 
for the presentation of Christianity in its rational form. 
Basic State•ents in Theology 
Consideration of the articles genre raises the question of what 
the designation fundamental articles might mean. At one level the term 
might apply to that particular perspective through which Christianity 
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was being treated. What might be important here is to identify those 
perspectives that were relevant and important to be interrogated 
theologically, given a particular historical context. For example, the 
Reformers of the sixteenth century found, in the doctine of 
justification by faith, a means of critically reappropriating the 
Christian tradition. Today this might be achieved, for example, 
through the doctrine of the Church. 
Fundamental articles have been traditionally identified with those 
foundational beliefs either for salvation and/or the being of a Church. 
The latter usually meant beliefs necessary for Church communion, or it 
might mean, as for Waterland, beliefs constitutive of the Christian 
system of faith. Other beliefs could be designated non-fundamental, 
non-essential, adiaphora, or elements making for the perfection of 
belief. 
Recently, however, Dietrich Ritschl has proposed an alternative to 
the usual method of distinguishing between central and peripheral, 
important and unimportant: 
Better than a generalizing distinction and a 
from a fictitious static overall system, 
peripheral themes or doctrinal principles, 
noted from various parts of the church as 
between what is 'of lasting importance' and 
urgency'.l 53 
division, starting 
into central and 
is one that can be 
they actually are, 
what is 'of momentary 
Ritschl highlights the interrelatedness of these two categories: 
we recognise what is urgent only from insight into what is of 
lasting importance - though we owe the occasion for this insight 
each time to confrontation with what is of momentary urgency.l54 
It seems that, from Ritschl's viewpoint, the two categories can in fact 
converge "at the focal point of the hierarchy of all that is of 
momentary urgency",l55 This creative proposal simply begs the question 
of how to decide what was worthy of the designation 'lasting 
importance'. Ritschl alludes to the doctrine of the Trinity, though 
later ecclesiological concerns related to the doctrine of election 
assume a central significance. The matter is clearly ripe for 
347 
XI: The Problem of Communications 
exploration. In terms of the discussion in Chapter Nine, matters of 
lasting importance have already been specified formally as those which 
express most economically ecclesia's one-in-Christ bond.1ss What might 
be included here would be stated in the fundamental articles of faith. 
Fundamental articles evidence an attempt to give linguistic form 
to what is of lasting importance in the ecclesial bond. As already 
observed, however, this is an ongoing task given the dynamic and 
ultimately unformalisable character of ecclesia's fundament. A question 
arises here concerning the deployment in modern theology of conceptual 
apparatus, other than fundamental articles, that are designed to 
uncover and communicate ecclesial reality. 
The Scottish Reformed theologian, Thomas Torrance, has devoted 
special effort to elucidate for science and theology the significance 
of 'ultimate beliefs',l57 Torrance argues that such beliefs have a 
normative character and a 'directive' function and as such affect the 
'entire scope and shape' of human inquiry.l58 Such beliefs usually go 
unnoticed, buried deep in the framework of knowing. Attempts to 
formulate them remain essentially unfinished,l59 
According to the German Lutheran systematician, Dietrich Ritschl, 
a major task for genuinely ecumenical theology is the tracking down of 
the 'regulative statements' of Christianity; those mechanisms which 
ensure that thought and language can be examined and guided,l60 For 
Ritschl, it seems that regulative statements operate at different 
levels. He refers to them as 'implicit axioms'. He has in mind their 
internal ordering function for Christian thinking and acting. As such, 
regulative statements are more akin to ideals or principles embedded in 
ecclesial life ('behind everyday language'), and necessarily resistent 
to direct focus and thematization. 
Regulative statements can also be formulated in language. 
Accordingly, doctrine can be understood as 'complexes of regulative 
statements',l61 Furthermore, Ritschl identifies what he considers the 
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most central statement in all theology, "that Israel has been elected 
by Y H W H and that the church of Jews and Gentiles has been elected in 
Jesus Christ",162 as permitting and providing "a basis for fundamental 
regulative statements in theology"(my italics) ,163 Ritschl seeks a 
binding ecumenical theology: "at least of a fundamental theology of 
minimal statements capable of achieving consensus to the maximum 
extent'' ,164 
The Canadian Jesuit scholar Bernard Lonergan has developed a 
notion of 'foundations' in theology in which what is first ". lS the 
immanent and operative set of norms that guides each forward step in 
the process".I65 The discriminations that occur in foundations between 
truth and error (the dialectic) operate as a principle of selection in 
the more determinate context of doctrines. Such discriminations are 
"not doctrines but the horizon within which the meaning of doctrines 
can be apprehended".166 
Doctrines are derived from and depend upon such foundational 
discriminations, the latter functioning as criteria in doctrinal 
formulation for deciding between alternatives. Doctrine "is a set of 
meanings and values"167 that informs an individual and a community's 
living, knowing and doing. In Lonergan's view, what is formulated in 
'Church doctrine' derives its intelligibility from,168 and bodies forth 
in language, those 'immanent and operative set of norms' that guide 
each forward step of ecclesia's 'ongoing developing reality'. Doctrines 
belong to that 'descent' from the unity of a grounding horizon which is 
not properly a deduction but rather "a succession of transpositions to 
ever more determinate contexts",169 In this view 'Church doctrine' 
represents that more determinate context for ecclesia's immanent 
guiding norms. 
The American Lutheran theologian Ronald Thiemann deals with the 
same issues as Torrance, Ritschl and Lonergan in his deployment of what 
he terms 'background convictions',170 Such convictions are 
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background beliefs within the logic of Christian faith. 
of Thiemann's argument is to offer a 'holistic 
justification'l 71 for what he regards as that belief central and 
constitutive for Christian identity, i.e. belief in God's prevenience. 
The conviction of the truth of this belief ought to frame that 
thinking and living which claims allegience to the Christian 
tradition.172 
Thiemann proposes a 'meta rule' for the control of the development 
of doctrine and virtue: "Let all Christian interpretation proceed in a 
manner which recognises the absolute primacy of God's promising 
grace". 173 The rationale for this belief is found in its necessity for 
the coherence of those uncontroverted beliefs and practices of the 
Christian community. It can be argued that Thiemann has failed to 
provide a satisfactory answer to the problem of the whence of 
background convictions.l74 It is equally clear, however, that they are 
intended to operate in a way that corresponds to Ritschl's regulative 
statements. 
This discussion of basic statements in theology points to the fact 
that the notion of fundamental articles belongs to a family of concepts 
employed to deal with the dynamic inherent in the forming and reforming 
of that Christian doctrine constitutive of the ecclesial bond. Thus 
the search for 'regulative statements' (Ritschl), the uncovering of 
'ultimate beliefs' (Torrance), the grounding of 'Church doctrine' 
(Lonergan), and the establishment of 'background convictions' 
(Thiemann), signify operations through which the 'unnoticed', 
'implicit', 'immanent', and 'background' dimensions of faith, receive 
linguistic conceptual form. It is thus accurate to speak of 
fundamental articles and its cognates. This suggests that when 
fundamental articles are not being spoken about other conceptual 
apparatus may be performing similar kinds of communicative operations 
for the purpose of mediating the one-in-Christ bond. 
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THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF FUNDAMENTAL ARTICLES: 
The Significance of Ecclesia as Institution 
A second major strand relevant to the theme of fundamental 
articles concerns the significance of Christianity's social form for 
the operation of the articles tradition. In Chapter Nine ecclesia was 
identified as the social form of Christianity. As such the ecclesial 
bond represented the locus of the fundamentals tradition. To state the 
fundamentals of Christianity was to state the truth of being one-in-
Christ. The task of the articles tradition was to mediate this bond~ 
What has yet to be determined more precisely are the ways in which the 
very ecclesiality of faith contributes to the form and function of the 
tradition of fundamental articles. Reflexively this implies 
consideration of the ways in which the articles tradition contributes 
to Christianity's ideal social form. Stating the fundamentals of the 
faith is conditioned by the fact that this activity occurs in the 
Church. From another point of view the Church's own life and mission is 
conditioned by its attempt to express the truth of its life in the 
tradition of fundamental articles. It is this interrelationship 
between faith and Church that is explored in this Chapter as a question 
of the social dynamics of fundamental articles. 
This matter is considered initially in terms of the significance 
of institutionality for ecclesial existence. This provides the basis 
for the development of the fundamental articles tradition as a strategy 
for truth guardianship in institutionality. This strategy highlights 
the importance of the tradition as an ecclesial deed. The Chapter 
concludes with a consideration of the contribution of the tradition to 
the problem of the identity and continuity of the Church. 
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Ecclesia as Institution 
Hitherto the concept of ecclesia has been employed somewhat 
loosely to refer to Christianity in its social form. In further 
specifying this form a range of general categories have been 
identified, i.e. place, polity, economics, interpersonal relationships, 
and communications. In Chapter Nine these categories were proposed as 
constitutive of social life as created and redeemed by God. It is this 
sociality which takes form in and through that concrete, historical and 
particular form called the ecclesial community. Accordingly, Karl Barth 
has stated: "If the ecclesia exists visibly, this means that it exists 
in a form." 2 Barth identified the ecclesial community as "the earthly-
historical form of His [Jesus Christ] existence". 3 Ecclesial existence 
has a more concrete empirical form as it exists as institution.4 In 
this respect 'Church' can be defined as "a comprehensive term for the 
social and institutional carrier of Christianity".5 While Church as 
institutional form, and ecclesial community co-inhere, the penetration 
is never complete. Ecclesia's institutionality is a form through which 
ecclesial existence is both manifest yet unperfected. 
Church, as institutional form of Christianity, is significant 
insofar as it is the locus of redeemed sociality, i.e. as it genuinely 
mediates ecclesial existence. 6 As ecclesia is Christianity in its 
social form, so institutionality renders ecclesia as a determinate, 
empirical, social form. 
Institutionality: A Form of Organized Complexity 
Within the field of sociology and religion the subject of 
institutionality has been developed with some degree of sophistication, 
though problems to do with definition, and institutional dynamic and 
function, remain controversial and unresolved.7 An enduring conviction 
is, however, that institutionality appears to be a feature of man5 
life as such: "He may modify the existing institutions, but he cannot 
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escape from the confines of his own institutionality",8 Exactly why 
this should be the case remains unclear though the sociologist Niklas 
Luhmann has argued that 
The formation of any society depends first of all on a 
transformation of undefined complexity and contingency into 
defined or at least definable - in other words, on a definition of 
the world or at least a guarantee of its definability,9 
An important consequence of this 'guarantee of definability' is 
that it offers "a possibility of increasing complexity and contingency 
and so making tolerable a higher degree of uncertainty and security",lO 
On this account institutionality is the way human society co-ordinates 
and integrates itself, and thus copes with its own developing 
complexity,ll 
On this account, institutionality appears necessary if not 
inevitable, offering a safe and secure environment where the expanding 
complexities of existence can be ordered, personal needs met, 
disappointments endured, and human capacity for achievement fostered.12 
This suggests a theory of law in institutions which draws attention to 
the way in which institutional rules function as guarantors of personal 
and communal safety by removal or containment of excessive risk and 
danger,l3 It is a rationale that is echoed in Edward Farley's comment 
that the primary function of institutionalization is "to integrate and 
thereby order potentially threatening activities and interpersonal 
relations into the larger society",l4 Farley notes that in this process 
the institutionalized activity "gains perpetuation over time, usually 
bridging several generations'',15 
The Ecclesial Context 
These remarks have an obvious relevance for the community of 
ecclesia as 'a specific form of corporate existence',16 The 
implementation and endurance of its purposes have to be achieved in 
conditions of high social complexity. In particular, Luhmann's positive 
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functional approach helps to explain both the drive towards and the 
indispensQble status of institutionality as an appropriate social form 
of ecclesial existence.l7 
This positive appraisal of ecclesia's institutionality provides a 
corrective to less adequate and more distorted views within Protestant 
theology which have tended to regard the emergence of Christianity's 
institutional forms as evidence of a regression from a previously ideal 
form of life. The familiar enough routinization of a previously 
spontaneous spirit-led communal life is perceived to effect a 
regrettable loss of an ideal 'pneumatic anarchism', a process leading 
to the suppression or even extinction of the Spirit,l8 Such a view 
presented a romanticised Protestant ideal which has endured with 
greater or lesser intensity,l9 
Among other things, Protestant antipathy towards ecclesia's 
institutionality evidenced a reaction to excessive claims made by Roman 
Catholicism for the institution of the Church.20 In the latter's 
incipient tendency towards institutional 'sacralization'21, means were 
transformed into ends and thus absolutized,22 This distorting 
development was present in a variety of ecclesial traditions. It 
entailed "the exchange of ecclesia for a closed and provincial 
religious community",23 
The problem of institutionality for theology can no longer be 
developed properly from the perspective of ecclesiological allegiance. 
Rather, a theology of institutions requires development in terms of the 
contemporary form of the Church's repression of its ecclesial dimension 
individualism,24 The 'spirit of anti-institutionalism'25 of modern 
society generates both a lack of confidence in and even disdain for 
institutional life, and ironically, an increasing drive to 
institutional sacralization. This latter development is evidenced in 
an ecclesial exclusivism in which "individual piety and religious 
experiences replace collective memory" and "provincial space and 
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concern for fellowship replaces the space perpetually drawing in the 
stranger". 2 6 In an increasingly fragmented culture, the alienated 
individual's drive for security overreaches itself. This occurs most 
obviously by rejection of all authority structures. It can also occur 
by a retreat into social structures. In this latter case private 
personal security is fostered in direct proportion to the capacity of 
the institution to enforce uniformity and suppress individual 
differences. Institutional tyranny masks the insecurities of alienated 
individualism.27 
Ecclesia as Ideal Institutionality 
Against this background it would seem that any adequate 
theological view of institutionality would have to take account of both 
its indispensibility and its relativity. This task is crystalized in 
the qestion of what kind of institution ecclesia is. Luhmann's 
functionalist approach draws attention to the need for meaning and 
security, and the dynamic of complexity as important motivations for 
institutionalization. This overcomes much of the negativity associated 
with institutionality. 
Ecclesia, as institutional mediation of complexity, informs the 
earlier discussion of the ecclesial bond and its constituents. That 
which is complexively present in ecclesia's one-in-Christ bond - those 
various intermediate forms of God's presence that are constitutive of 
ecclesia - receive form, order and determinacy in institutionality. On 
this account institutionality is significant for ecclesia as that 
concrete form in which the inner complexity of godly human life - i.e. 
life as it is given reference to God - is organised, integrated and 
thus stabilized. On this account ecclesia's institutionality emerges 
as the economy of godly life in concrete historical form. 
Theologically, the above conception includes but moves beyond the 
merely pragmatic level, where the concern is restricted to organising 
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things for other purposes. The pragmatic view is inadequate 
theologically because it is the one-in-Christ bond that receives 
determinate and concrete form in institutionality. God's own rich 
sociality is that which ideally informs ecclesia's institutional form, 
opening up new possibilities for human life from within institutional 
life. In this way institutionality functions for ecclesia as the place 
where apprehensions of what it means to be one-in-Christ can arise and 
a new and richer kind of social life can form and expand. This higher 
form of life embraces but is not reduced to the level of individualism. 
It requires, but does not remain at the level of institutionality, 
moving ideally within this form to the level of mediation of a higher 
form of human community in which is manifest the creating and redeeming 
work of God in Christ. Institutionality is not, on this account, simply 
the context for faith. Rather it is the concrete historical form in 
which the full scope of godly human life can express itself and expand 
under the direction of its own inner life in Christ.28 
In Chapter Nine the task of the tradition of fundamental articles 
was identified as one of mediation of the ecclesial bond. The present 
discussion indicates that this bond has a necessary institutional form. 
The articles tradition is unavoidably a feature of ecclesia's 
institutionality as such. Moreover, the foregoing perspective gives 
rise to a reflexive relation. In institutionality, the truth of the 
one-in-Christ bond receives determinate form: institutionality is that 
particular form in which the ecclesial community embodies and maintains 
its concern for truth. This leads to a consideration of the fundamental 
articles tradition as a means through which an institution exercises 
truth guardianship. 
The Tradition's Task: Truth Guardianship 
Ecclesia's institutionali ty evidences a high degree of 
differentiation and development indicative of the diverse ways in which 
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the community of faith attempts to organise, express and guard its 
truth concerns. A component in this differentiation is the symbolic or 
communicative region through which the institution expresses the truth 
of its life in language. These forms may be specific (e.g. liturgy, 
story, creed, confession) as well as more general theological 
discourse. Insofar as the fundamental articles tradition belongs to he 
symbolic region of ecclesia it is part of that complex institutional 
structure of truth guardianship. This truth guardianship function is 
implicit in Niklas Luhmann's depiction of the emergence of the 
religious dogmatic system. 
The religious system must be differentiated not only on the 
obvious level of visibly sacral, ritual action, but also on the 
level of interpretations of meaning. In other words, it must have 
developed a special view of the world as a whole and be capable of 
communicating it. A dogmatic system may then arise to control and 
co-ordinate these interpretations which sanctifies particular 
concepts, key interpretations and combinations of ideas, and at 
the same time, by generalizing them, gives them sufficient 
flexibility to deal with events in the world, its own texts and 
religious experiences.29 
Luhmann's analysis suggests that truth guardianship involves 
control and co-ordination of meaning. This occurs through theological 
generalizing that is comprehensively theoretical rather than 
abstract. 30 This includes, according to Luhmann, an inbuilt 
flexibility of response to contingency. Such a view coheres with the 
earlier discussion in Chapter Eleven of the fundamentals tradition in 
relation to the concepts of fundament, foundations, simplicity, 
hierarchy and system. The difference is that now, however, the 
institutional dimension of this discussion provides the hermeneutical 
perspective. 
Dynamics of Truth Guardianship 
Institutional truth guardianship through the dogmatic system 
involves complex interconnections at the symbolic level. The discussion 
in Chapter Eleven, in particular as it concerned hierarchy in theology, 
focussed on the importance of differentiating the relative truth value 
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of doctrines. In this Chapter, where the context is institutionality, 
attention shifts to the way in which doctrine functions to guard the 
truth concerns of the Church. Specifically, it may be useful to 
identify different functional operations within a community's doctrinal 
structure. Relevant here is the notion of 'governing doctrines'. 
Rules for Fundamentals: 'Governing Doctrines' 
In this respect the philosopher of religion William Christian, in 
his investigation of doctrines of religious communities,31 has drawn 
attention to the rather complex system by which a community's primary 
doctrines are developed and maintained. Christian's inquiry focusses 
on a community's 'governing doctrines', those principles and rules 
which communities build into their bodies of doctrines: 
As a community enters upon its teaching activities, and especially 
as it reflects on its body of doctrines, it comes to hold and 
teach doctrines of another sort also. Along with its doctrines 
about the setting of human life and the conduct of life in that 
setting, a community works out principles and rules to govern the 
formation and development of its body of doctrines. These norms 
are doctrines about its doctrines; they are the communities' 
governing doctrines,32 
Primary and governing doctrines are contrasted thus: 
We would say that the primary doctrines of a community, 
together, are what the community has to say to the world. 
could say, by way of contrast, that a community's norms 
doctrines, taken together, are what the community has to 
itself about its doctrines.33 
taken 
And we 
for its 
say to 
Christian's analysis leads him to investigate types of governing 
doctrines that yield rules for authenticity, derivation, ordering, 
consistency, and rules for judgements of 'alien claims'. He draws an 
analogy with the legal system which develops 'rules of recognition' by 
which a society identifies its primary rules. Such rules determine 
primary rules of obligation though such rules of recognition": incline 
a decision one way, though not conclusively, and they survive intact 
when they do not prevail",34 
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Governing Doctrines in Anglicanism 
Christian's analysis uncovers part of the operational machinery 
which monitors 
Specifically, 
principles and 
and informs the development of the dogmatic system. 
it highlights the interconnectedness of a variety of 
terminology associated with the fundamental articles 
tradition 
concepts 
as it has operated in Anglicanism. 
rule of faith, Vincenti an 
quinquesaecularis (agreement of the first 
Important here are the 
canon and 
councils). 
consensus 
These are 
examples of 
fundamental 
governing doctrines informing Anglican construals of the 
articles tradition. These concepts instance governing 
doctrines which guide the selection process by which proposals for what 
is considered fundamental can be made. What is significant about the 
governing doctrines identified above is their essentially conservative 
orientation; governing doctrines not so much for the advancement of the 
tradition but its preservation.35 
Such governing doctrines belong to a larger complex of doctrines 
in Anglicanism concerning rules for the achievement of consensus in 
what Christian terms 'primary belief'. Evidence of this larger complex 
of governing doctrines can be discerned in the Thirty-nine Articles of 
Religion. In Article VI, 'Of the Sufficiency of the Holy Scriptures for 
salvation', a number of governing doctrines are present. Thus there is 
a governing doctrine for deriving doctrines.36 Article VI states that 
authentic sources for the community's primary doctrines are to be 
gleaned from the stated list of canonical books and not from the books 
of the Apocrypha as listed which, 
life and instruction of manners; 
"the church doth read for example of 
but yet doth it not apply them to 
establish any doctrine". Another governing doctrine in Article VI 
concerns limits on the scope of primary doctrines. In this respect the 
article recognises that its primary doctrines are designed for a life 
unto salvation. The implication is that there may be other truths and 
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right courses of action which a community is not bound to teach.37 
Implicit in much Anglican controversy over fundamental articles 
has been a continuing dispute over the identification and application 
of governing doctrines. In Chapter Three, in discussing the 
development of a notion of common doctrine climaxed in the sixteenth 
century in the Articles of Religion, the inclusion of 'a controlling 
heuristic recommendation within the Articles of Religion' was 
noted. This referred to a 'particular dynamic among the co-ordinates 
of ecclesial authority' - Scripture, the inherited dogmatic tradition, 
General Councils, and the authority of the Church militant.JB In terms 
of the present discussion, this achievement represented a clarification 
of governing doctrines in Anglicanism. 
As the history of fundamentals discussion indicates, this early 
settlement did not foreclose the question of the content of the 
faith. 39 Furthermore, it soon became apparent that there existed a 
certain flexibility within the web of governing doctrines. For 
Chillingworth and the latitudinarian strand, the authority of General 
Councils and the inherited dogmatic tradition were not as determinative 
for developing fundamental belief as reason applied to the reading and 
hearing of Scripture.40 By contrast, the Tractarian focus upon 
tradition as the filter for fundamentals, for example in Newman and 
Palmer,41 showed how governing doctrines could be skewed towards the 
past, thereby avoiding the pitfalls of rationalism and supportive of a 
drive for the autonomy of Church and State. 
Waterland, in his "Discourse of Fundamentals", identified at least 
fourteen rules for the determination of fundamental articles, ten 
faulty, four correct.42 According to the nineteenth century Anglican 
theologian, James Mozley, rules could be either 'intrinsic' (i.e. 
informal criteria) or 'external'.43 Most of the rules identified by 
Waterland were of the latter kind, though the plethora of rules had led 
this eminent divine to comment that there were "almost as many 
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different rules for determining fundamentals as there are different 
sects or parties ... ". 44 Mozley recognised that "No rule has been laid 
down for determining Fundamentals that will bear a strictly logical 
test of adequacy". 45 In Mozley's opinion, the Roman rule only tested 
ecclesiastical obedience. The Protestant Scripture principle governed 
what was not to be considered fundamental. The rule of St. Vincent 
(quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus) rested on no logical basis 
since "no valid reason can be given why some things not necessary to be 
believed may not yet in matter of fact have been universally believed 
in the first ages of the church",-16 
The question of governing doctrines in Anglicanism has remained 
controversial belonging, as it does, to the larger issue of Anglican 
methodology,47 At one level this concern presupposes that consensus in 
rules leads to agreement in the determination of the faith.48 
Furthermore, such methodological concerns draw attention to the 
importance of achieving right direction in ecclesial matters of faith 
and order. However the exercise may also provide a rather useful 
strategy to cope with burgeoning pluriformity in doctrinal matters, 
i.e. a way of legitimizing diversity in actual belief and/or of 
avoiding discussion of the content of theology. 49 At this level 
excessive preoccupation with governing doctrines may actually deflect a 
community from more rigorous theological discourse and self-
criticism.so 
Fundamentals: Foundational, Operational and Practical Aspects 
Perhaps part of the above problem might be uncertainty about the 
relationship between governing doctrines and what Christian calls a 
community's primary doctrines. Christian is not particularly helpful 
here. Primary doctrines for Christian are 'what the community has to 
say to the world'. These doctrines are not his concern. Neither are 
'practical' doctrines, such as the duty of love toward God and 
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neighbour. 51 
The analysis of the fundamental articles tradition in Anglicanism 
suggests, however, a more refined differentiation in doctrine. 
Governing doctrines function in relation to doctrine in its 
foundational, operational and practical aspects.S2 The history of the 
tradition would seem to give some warrant for the above 
differentiation. 
In respect of operational doctrines, it was noted in Chapter Three 
how, for Hooker, the doctrine of justification by faith, whilst it did 
not belong to the 'few fundamental words', nevertheless was the 
criterion by which a Church's right holding to the 'foundation' of 
faith could be determined. In Hooker's view the Roman doctrine of 
'double justice' overthrew the foundation 'indirectly',53 
In Chapter Two it was suggested that Luther's focus on the 
justification of the sinner before God was the means whereby the 
dogmatic tradition was reappropriated. In this sense the doctrine of 
justification functioned operationally as the reactivator of 
traditional dogma. This view seems to be endorsed in recent Anglican-
Lutheran dialogue where it is stated: 
One important and newly recognised way to understand the Lutheran 
reformation confession of 'justification by faith' is that it is 
not so much a new or additional doctrine, but rather it is an 
instruction to pastors about how they are to preach and teach the 
Christ of the ancient classic doctrines so that Christ is 
therefore received by faith, not by some inappropriate response 
(e.g.'works'),S4 
In William Law, the doctrine of regeneration was the means for his 
reaffirmation of Trinitarian and Christological dogma, albeit with 
certain important modifications.ss 
Doctrine, in its practical view, has been equally important in the 
history of fundamental articles discussion in Anglicanism. For 
Chillingworth, what was believed had "influence upon our lives, as 
every essential doctrine of Christianity hath",S6 In Hammond's 
exposition of fundamentals a strong orientation was observed towards 
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the superstructure of piety spawned by the foundational doctrines.5 7 
Here, holding to the fundamentals of the faith was a practical matter 
pertaining to righteousness of life. Hammond's intention had been to 
recover that fuller dimension of the moral life which represented the 
actualisation of fundamental belief. The doctrine of justification was 
displaced in this particular re-orientation to sacramental life and the 
practice of piety,58 
Implicit in the development of the concept of the 'conditional 
covenant' in later seventeenth century Anglicanism, was the idea that 
Christian discipleship could not be reduced to mere assent to certain 
beliefs, but included a strong moral component,59 This practical view 
of doctrine was important for John Locke.so For Charles Simeon the 
godly practice of faith in the light of the Gospel was paramount.61 
There is a certain artificiality in the above schema. The 
differentiation of function is not so much according to type of 
doctrine but rather depiction of important doctrine from particular 
perspectives,62 Operational doctrine might be understood as initiating 
the process of opening what is foundational in Christianity. Doctrine 
in its operational mode admits of great variety. In this respect 
Jaroslav Pelikan has suggested that the doctrine of the Church has 
become "the bearer of the whole of the Christian message for the 
twentieth century, as well as the recapitulation of the entire 
doctrinal tradition from the preceding centuries" (my italics),63 
In this section it as been suggested that an institution's 
maintenance of its concern for truth occurs at the level of doctrine, 
through a fourfold structure. Specifically, guardianship of truth in 
its specialised form as fundamental articles is a guardianship that 
attends to what is foundational for faith. This focus is informed by 
and presupposes certain governing doctrines that require uncovering and 
clarification in the interests of rightly directed and self-critical 
theological discourse. Furthermore, proper orientation to foundations 
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involves a hermeneutical renewal of the Christian faith effected by the 
emergence of variable and critical operational doctrines. This 
functional structure of doctrine has its issue at the level of 
practical doctrine as it is transferred into a community's discipleship 
in righteousness and truth. 
Insofar as truth guardianship is a purpose and task of ecclesia's 
institutional life, it is axiomatic that the results of engagement in 
this task constitute a work done in and by the Church. As a result, it 
is the case that truth guardianship generates certain ecclesial deeds. 
The having of fundamental articles is evidence of one such deed. 
Consequently, there arises the question of the institutional 
significance of this particular deed. 
The Tradition as Ecclesial Deed 
Institutionality, it seems, is a creative process for which human 
beings are responsible. Institutions are not merely there to be 
encountered. 64 Accordingly, discussion of truth guardianship requires 
deepening to take account of the dynamics of institutionality. Indeed, 
William Christian recognises that the relationship between a 
community's governing and primary doctrines "reminds us that a 
community has an active and important part to play in the formation and 
development of its body of doctrines'',65 From this perspective the 
development of a structure of truth guardianship, as instanced in the 
fundamental articles tradition, belongs to a dynamic process, the 
outcome of which are ecclesial deeds. 
Ecclesial Deeds: From Implicit to Explicit Form 
The having of fundamental articles is evidence of the work of the 
Church expressing the one-in-Christ bond in determinate form. There is 
an important dynamic here which corresponds to the earlier discussion 
of the tradition as a problem of communications. At one level the 
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ecclesial bond is constituted by that range of ways in which human 
beings are held together as freshly understood by reference to God. 
This has been previously identified in terms of those intermediate 
forms through which the activity of God is mediated. The form of this 
godward reference is complex and resistant to thematization. 
The ecclesial bond may operate by an inner form appropriate to 
faith, e.g. the kingdom of God is in the midst of you, Luke 17:21. 
Here, the accent is upon God's transformation of human existence by 
virtue of his presence in the inner life of the individual or, what is 
more likely, by virtue of his presence confronting the human social 
world with the claims of the Kingdom of God.66 A focus on faith's 
inner form may result in Christianity being presented as a kind of 
transubjective consciousness. In this case people are bonded by a 
transformed intentionality towards God and others which, in the case of 
Edward Farley, focuses on the new status of the stranger in ecclesial 
life,67 A strong ethical form of the ecclesial bond is presented in 
Bonhoeffer's Sanctorum Communio. Here, people are held together by what 
they do and how they do it,68 
In institutions, however, the ways in which the ecclesial bond 
operates undergoes modification. The one-in-Christ bond receives more 
determinate institutional forms. Indeed, institutionality may be 
referred to as that form of ecclesial community in which social bonding 
by reference to God is fixed in forms designed to secure what is common 
to all. In this context the fundamental articles tradition represents 
an externalization and confessionalization of the one-in-Christ bond. 
In this development, what is fundamental to the bond assumes the 
form of an ecclesial deed. This involves a transposition in which that 
which was formative of community now appears as the product of a 
community. Guardianship of truth is thus achieved institutionally 
through a process in which the implicit and undefined richness of being 
in relation to God in the world is rendered in a determinate form. 
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In the discussion of the directional dynamic of the fundamental 
articles tradition, the emergence of fundamental articles was discussed 
as a problem of communication. Recognition of the institutional nature 
of the tradition locates the issue of communication within the wider 
framework of the truth guardianship function of the Church. 
Specifically, an institutional requirement for truth guardianship 
entails manoeuvres in which the complexities of faith are rendered in 
determinate forms for the achievement of institutional stability. The 
externalization of the ecclesial bond implied here is not necessarily a 
retrograde step. Positively, it may be considered an energy saving 
strategy enabling a strengthening of the ecclesial bond through more 
efficient and higher quality communication of information (knowledge 
that matters) in an institution,69 
Furthermore, it seems that insofar as memory is essential to the 
ecclesial community there will be a thrust within the institution 
towards 'visible' forms in which the community's remembering of Jesus 
Christ can endure as corporate p~blic expression.70 The fundamental 
articles tradition belongs to this matrix of remembering and evidences 
an earnest on behalf of the institution to take its communal memory 
seriously. As such, the tradition operates as a focus for the Church's 
identity. In this way the tradition, in its confessional and creedal 
forms, can exercise an integrative function, offering signs of mutual 
recognition within a community.71 A corollary of this is that the 
tradition can also function as a barometer of institutional loyalty. 
The tradition thus operates in two directions, offering a focus 
for institutional unity and a marker for the delineation of boundaries. 
As institutional unifier it can function as an authorized sign of 
institutional purity and loyalty. As boundary marker it indicates the 
borders between safety and danger in institutional commitments,72 
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Bonding Through Believing 
Implicit in the functioning of fundamental articles as outlined 
above is a notion of simplicity. As noted in Chapter Eleven, the appeal 
of simplicity has an important pragmatic value for communicating 
unambiguously the centre and boundary of communally normative belief. 
An obvious case here is the need for catechesis in the Christian 
community. 73 The presupposition here is that believing per se is an 
important source of institutional cohesion. This is by no means self 
evident, nor can it be taken for granted. Indeed, it is precisely this 
assumption which has come under suspicion in modern Christianity. Its 
roots have been discerned in the Lockean distinction between knowledge 
and faith: 
How well-grounded and great soever the assurance of faith may be 
wherewith it is received: but faith it is still and not knowledge; 
persuasion and not certainty. This is the highest the nature of 
things will permit us to go in matters of revealed religion, which 
are therefore called matters of faith; a persuasion of our own 
minds, short of knowledge, is the result that determines us in 
such truths,74 
Michael Polanyi's comment on this passage is apposite: 
Belief is here no longer a higher power that reveals to us 
knowledge lying beyond the range of observation and reason, but a 
mere personal acceptance which falls short of empirical and 
rational demonstrability,75 
Polanyi goes on to observe: 
Belief was so thoroughly discredited that, apart from specially 
privileged opportunities, such as may be still granted to the 
holding and profession of religious beliefs, modern man lost his 
capacity to accept any explicit statement as his own belief. 
All belief was reduced to the status of subjectivity: to that 
of an imperfection by which knowledge fell short of universality 
(my italics),76 
The discussion in Chapters Eight and Ten of the study on the fate 
of the fundamental articles tradition in the modern period indicates 
that religious believing has lost any privileged position it may ever 
have held. In this context believing is reduced to a purely self 
referencing affair. What one believes is understood as the result of 
one's personal choices.77 Such a way of handling Christian belief can 
367 
XI I: Significance of Institutional i t.~t· 
simply mask an attempt to displace and marginalise a claim about how 
Christian doctrine ha~ traditionally worked,78 
The reduction of believing to an issue of personal choice is 
highlighted when people argue about matters of belief as though God 
were not present, that what was believed was merely a matter of 
personal choice, albeit one arrived at through critical effort. 79 God 
himself is not present in such believing but is rather the product of a 
certain kind of believing. Under these conditions it would seem that 
believing per se as a source of social unity has been abandoned.so 
Where believing has become a matter of convenience, it is no longer 
relevant for ecclesia's institutional cohesion, i.e. for the practice 
of being one. 
In the above context, the fundamental beliefs professed in 
ecclesia no longer function as primary unifiers of the institution, 
i.e. as mediating the truth of God's presence and action, but have 
become merely human unifiers, i.e. simply what people think. Confidence 
in believing as such, as a source of institutional cohesion, can hardly 
be sustained from this highly impoverished position. In Chapter Eight, 
precisely this kind of development has been noted in the more recent 
history of the operation of the fundamental articles in Anglicanism.Bl 
Ultimately, this is not simply a problem of Christian belief and its 
primary articles but concerns the status of any and every potential 
intermediate form for the truth of God.B2 
The possibility of institutional cohesion through commonality of 
belief has been one of the driving forces behind the operation of the 
fundamental articles tradition from its emergence in the reformation 
period of the sixteenth century. It was a motivation undergirded by 
the affirmation of the oneness of Christianity. As the history of the 
tradition indicates, this conviction became problematic in the post-
Reformation divisions of the Church. The drive of particular 
communions to remain genuinely inclusive in belief, has evidenced 
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itself in the way the tradition has been flexibly developed in a wider 
view (e.g. Hooker and Locke) compared to a narrower construction 
typified by Waterland. The desire for a global form of faith that 
included the particularities of various denominational allegiences has 
persisted in Anglicanism despite the fact that consensus in belief has 
remained elusive.83 
Consensus in Fundamentals 
Minimally, the persistence of such a motivating ideal indicates a 
refusal to abandon believing as a source of social cohesion. It is 
evidently a deed worth pursuing. This supposes that it remains possible 
to identify communal belief that has authority as 'normative 
doctrine'. 94 Communal bonding through believing minimally entails 
commitment to the achieving of consensus. Exactly how such consensus 
ought to be construed is controversial. More traditional approaches 
have held consensus to be necessary and worth pursuing. More recent 
approaches treat consensus "only as another empirical variable and as 
such see it to be of a limited necessity'',85 
Even within the former approach important differences obtained. 
Thus, as observed in Chapter Two, consensus did not entail for Erasmus 
comprehensive agreement,86 Rather, the concept was construed 
minimally, orientated to the past (the few primitives of the faith) and 
open for further future determination. Implied here was a recognition 
of a differential between s actual and ideal conensus. The drive for a 
more comprehensively defined and imposed communal faith as, for 
example, in Roman Catholicism at the Council of Trent and among certain 
Continental Protestants at the Synod of Dort, bespoke a tendency to 
maximize agreement in the faith.B7 
In the complexities of modern society Luhmann has pointed out that 
"there cannot even be a fully adequate experience of the concrete 
richness of meaning let alone a full consensus".88 Luhmann's view 
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suggests that discussion over consensus in terms of maxima or minima of 
acceptable belief has to be balanced by an approach which focuses on 
anticipations of consensus,89 In this situation it would be presumed, 
without initial explicit agreement, that a minimum of 'belief 
expectations' finds general agreement. Such a view would see the 
function of the institution depending less on the 'creation', than on 
the 'economy' of consensus,90 In this context any 'given' consensus 
would only be realised in an emergent way, and this process would be 
facilitated by economical distribution and communication of an actual 
minimal expanding agreement. 
Fundamentals: Unfinished Consensus 
In Anglicanism the consensus ideal has endured. Indeed, it seems 
that the Anglican handling of the fundamental articles tradition 
implies commitment to a qualified or dialectical concept of 
consensus.91 Here, what seems to be important is that a healthy 
institutional approach to consensus requires a recognition of the 
disjunction between actual and ideal consensus. In this sense consensus 
in fundamental belief is an eschatological concept, a view implicit in 
the discussion of the resolution of communal norms for faith in the 
sixteenth century English reformation,92 
This view of consensus could be discerned in the doctrinal 
adiaphorism in the Thirty-nine Articles of Religion,93 It was implicit 
in the strong directional thrust of the Thirty-nine Articles. Full 
definition was observed to be incompatible with the essential 
ecclesiality of the Christian faith. This feature was highlighted in 
Hooker's handling of the tradition,94 It appeared in the theology of 
Edward Stillingfleet, John Locke and F.D. Maurice.9 5 
In Chapter Eight it was noted that the above notion of consensus 
has been severely challenged by developments which appeared to render 
any talk of achieving an actual communal consensus in belief highly 
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problematic. What is abundantly clear from the deployment of the 
consensus concept in Anglicanism from the time of Hooker, is the 
essential unfinishedness of the quest for 'normative belief', a view 
implicit in the Thirt.v-nine Articles of Religion. 
The attempt to state the articles of faith remains, in 
Anglicanism, a deed in process. This has not always been so obviously 
the case. To the extent that a minimalist doctrinal consensus was 
identified with a fixed consensus from the past (e.g. as in Maurice), 
the dynamic of the articles tradition was suppressed. The commitment 
to a dialectical view of consensus was effectively undermined. In 
Maurice's concern for a practical ecclesiology he had wisely cautioned 
against over definition and systematizing of the faith. This caution 
could also lead to an unjustified closure of the question of consensus, 
and by implication of the scope of the fundamental articles. 96 
The Boundary-Direction Dialectic 
Throughout this inquiry the premature closure of the forming of 
belief was evidenced when the articles tradition was skewed towards 
boundary-making concerns in the Church. This invariably represented a 
hardening of the tradition and loss of dynamic, a feature that began in 
the early seventeenth century with Richard Field, in his concern to 
define 'right believers'.97 It intensified in William Laud and was 
firmly entrenched by the time Daniel Waterland entered into 
fundamentals discussion,9B In Chapter Eight the re-emergence of this 
'boundary delineation' strand was observed in the nineteenth century in 
William Van Mildert, John Henry Newman, William Palmer, F.D. Maurice 
and later in Charles Gore. 
Renewal of the tradition was invariably accompanied by a 
recapturing of the directional thrust, of which Richard Hooker was the 
classic early exponent. In Chapter 
-11- ... 
Four 11 wos discerned in 
Chillingworth's concern for the integrity of the believer. It was 
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implicit in Hammond's practical view of fundamentals. It re-emerged 
with new clarity in the case study on William Law. Law provides a 
classic example of a strategy by which a theologian moves from a heavy 
investment in ecclesial boundary concerns to an enriched understanding 
of dynamic Christian reality. Coleridge and Simeon, from their own 
perspectives, stood in this tradition, as did Maurice, to the extent 
that renewal was transferred out of doctrine into other concerns. 
Implicit in the directional view of the fundamental articles 
tradition is a recognition of its unfinishedness. This suggests a 
directional-boundary dialectic. To the extent that this dialectic is 
allowed to operate, the articles tradition retains a dynamic in which 
the ideal of 'normative doctrine' is pursued as an ecclesial 
imperative. It remains a deed awaiting completion. Presupposed here is 
a genuine, even if provisional, consensus in faith. 
Reference to a 'genuine provisional consensus' raises questions of 
vital concern for the endurance of the institutional form of 
Christianity. Specifically, it raises two questions. How may ecclesial 
endurance in time and space be understood on the supposition of a 
consensus in matters of fundamental belief which remains unfinished? A 
second question necessarily follows. How does the fundamental articles 
tradition contribute to the continuity of ecclesial identity? 
Ecclesial Endurance: The Dynaaics of Restabili~ation in the Truth 
It has been argued that the fundamental articles tradition is a 
strategy developed by the institution of the Church for the exercise of 
responsible truth guardianship. This perspective has been deepened by 
an appreciation of the dynamic involved in the formation of the 
tradition as an ecclesial deed expressive of the inner form of the 
ecclesial bond. Such a deed contributesto institutional cohesion, self-
understanding, economy of communication and ongoing discipleship in the 
truth. 
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The Logic of Reconstitution of Fundamentals 
Recognition that this dynamic has a history which belongs to the 
contingent history of ecclesia as such, further complexifies the 
operation of the fundamental articles tradition. The problem can be 
stated in the following way. Fidelity of the institution to its truth 
guardianship responsibility necessitates a continued reconstitution of 
the fundamental articles tradition. In terms of the discussion in 
Chapters Ten and Eleven, this reconstitution can be understood as 
ongoing response for the achievement of communication. From the 
perspective of institutionality, reconstitution of the tradition is a 
necessary moment in the institution's effort to restabilize itself. 
Insofar as the history of institutionality can be understood as an 
attempt by human beings to cope with ever expanding complexity in life 
and thought, of transforming the indefinable into definable form, the 
drive for institutional stability remains an ongoing and unfinished 
task. Ecclesial endurance is achieved in successful institutional 
restabilization. 
Those deeds through which ecclesia's institutionality achieves 
stability remain ongoing and essentially unfinished. If the 
institution is to endure as an organiser of expanding complexity for 
the purpose of nourishing godly human life, its deeds will necessarily 
have to be reconstituted in order to assimilate the new and changing 
environment of institutionality. Indeed, the perspective offered here 
suggests that institutionality is that environment in an organized 
form. 
Earlier the fundamental articles tradition was noted as a 
component in ecclesia's institutionalized 'remembering of Jesus 
Christ'. Insofar as this remembering is historically contingent, that 
'vehicle of social duration' through which the institution guards the 
truth of its memory will have to be capable of reconstitution. The 
fundamental articles tradition as ecclesial deed, can not be however, 
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simply repeated. To merely repeat the deed entails both a rejection of 
its contingent status, a concomitant sacralizing of a past particular 
statement of faith, and thus an expression of the institution's 
infidelity to its guardianship of the truth. 
A major problem arises as to how reconstitution of faith actually 
operates. This leads into the highly controversial and unresolved area 
of doctrinal development. With increasing recognition in theology of 
the fact of doctrinal development, a simple theory of reconstitution by 
repetition of a fixed unalterable deposit, received certain 
modifications. From the time of Newman's Essay on the Development of 
Doctrine, these modifications have continued to endure in various 
sophisticated forms,99 The matter is admittedly complex. The concern 
here is not with doctrinal development per se. Rather, the question is 
how the fundamental articles tradition contributes to the ecclesial 
institution's impetus towards restabilization, and the achievement of 
its truth guardianship function. In other words the concern is to 
identify how ecclesia's memory is secured institutionally. 
The Doctrinalization Process 
The process by which the articles of faith are implicated in 
ecclesia's impetus towards restabilization is illuminated in Edward 
Farley's analysis of doctrinalization. This is defined as "the 
community1s reflective discernment of the linkage between its symbols 
and world structures",lOO Farley points out that doctrinalization 
is not simply conceptualization, that is, translation into 
conceptual form; rather it is discernment of and expression of 
the connection between symbolic content and world structure.lOl 
Doctrinalization is a linking activity that presupposes a 
distinction between the 'subterranean' language of story and image, 
synonymous for Farley with symbol,102 and the cosmologized language 
"which dominates the everyday world of the cultus",103 Story "is the 
linguistic unit most proper to ecclesia",104 However, in that 
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ecclesia's story is the witness to "a redemptive alteration of human 
existence made possible by a redeemer and certain events in space and 
time", ecclesia's story cannot be reduced to "a quasi-existential 
vehicle of expressing segments of one's own autobiography". The story 
abounds in images, i.e. "the mode in which content is present prior to 
its translation into definitions",lOS 
Specifically, Farley refers to 'constitutive'106 images through 
which the community orientation to redemptive existence is focussed. 
Such images are not 'reflectively produced' but simply guide the 
everyday activities of the community. As such they express situations 
rather than describe entities. They are 'fact' like in content 
expressing entities in "a certain relation, situation or with certain 
features".l07 Images "represent the mode of presentation of content 
rather than the object", such that one believes through images not in 
them. Finally, images are interrelated insofar as their 'receptacle' is 
the paradigm story, the unity of which such images reflect. This 
story unity has its own depth as a story in which insight into the 
world and redemption is present. This gives a rich unity to ecclesia's 
constitutive imagery. 
Farley notes that story and its images "occur in conjunction with 
more complex linguistic entities"lOB apologetic and theological 
accretions, customs, taboos, cultic expressions, creeds, doctrines -
all of which constitute the "more visible everyday world linguistic 
strata". The rationale for the development of language beyond story 
and imagery is located by Farley in the problem of contemporaneity: 
The problem of contemporaneity occurs because 
lag between insights, experiences, customs, 
which arise and function at one time and the 
of world-views, cultures and languages,109 
of the inevitable 
and institutions 
perpetual changes 
Farley argues that the received tradition "whose basal form is story 
and image"llO would be a "mere puzzle, an atavistic residue which had 
lost all reference to reality" if the 'lag' was absolute. The 'lag' is 
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overcome as the tradition "finds retranslation into the world-view, 
language, and day-to-day activities of the present". 
At the heart of the rationale for retranslation is the fact that 
essential to ecclesial existence is the "rejection of every provincial 
and restricted condition of God's presence",lll There is thus an inner 
theological rationale for ecclesial retranslation, an inbuilt drive for 
its story and image to achieve contemporaneity. 
In translation the tradition is integrated into the dominant 
'world picture', a cosmologizing of the story and its images occurs, 
and is further integrated into institutional structures for the 
purposes of achieving ecclesial endurance in time and space. Myth is 
what results from the cosmologizing translation. Myth is not the most 
original layer of religious imagery but "the product of an attempt to 
translate such into the inclusive and objective world-view of a given 
age",112 Doctrine is what happens when, in response to the 
requirements of truth and knowledge, the 'image-myth amalgam' receives 
conceptualization. This then functions as a criteria for institutional 
loyalty. 113 
Farley observes that such translations are always occurring, 
sometimes rapidly, more often slowly and subtly. Though rather 
crucially he notes that the requirements of contemporaneity generate 
two processes which work against each other: 
Story and image are always in search of a myth, a way of being 
cosmologized into the objective consensus of an age and its world-
picture. As this consensus breaks down, the pressure from 
story and image is toward demythologization,ll4 
A consequence is that doctrinalization is ambiguous: "it can both 
defend or criticize anachronostic myth",llS 
It is clear in Farley's account that story and image have a 
certain priority. It is equally clear, however, that without 
doctrinalization there is no linkage between story and image, and 
contemporaneity. Thus it might be said that the relativity of 
doctrinalization is precisely its freedom to mediate God's ongoing 
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creative and redemptive activity in contingency. 
The doctrinalization process is further developed by Farley in 
Ecclesial Reflection. Important here is the dipolar structure of 
ecclesial process which includes both a transformative (adaptive and 
innovative) pole and "that through which the transforming occurs, the 
traditional, the remembered".ll6 The retention of the past in the 
ecclesial community includes past doctrinalizations which have the 
character of an institution's 'linguistic sedimentations'.ll7 Such 
sedimentations are evidence of ecclesia's ongoing creative attempts to 
identify the truth of contemporaneity,ll8 Doctrinalization is thus 
ideally the outcome of living interpretation.ll9 Fidelity to this is 
fundamentally a reconstitutive activity,l20 This fails when the 
'tradition pole' is isolated from the 'transformation pole'. This 
failure evidences itself in the ecclesial community's focus on 
maintenance and preservation of the tradition which has become an 
object of faith.121 Freedom for reconstitution (i.e. ongoing 
doctrinalization) is present as the tradition 
functions more as the lens through which contemporaneity is 
experienced, in which realities and dimensions hitherto not 
grasped come into view.l22 
Thus ideally, tradition endures "as something through which the ever-
changing situations of the world are experienced".123 
For tradition to operate in the above way, successive 
hermeneutical disengagements of doctrines and symbols are required,124 
Doctrinalization is thus a process of making, breaking and remaking. 
Tradition, in this view, is not merely a 'generation-bridging vehicle' 
which impinges as 'burden' or 'idol'. Rather, by virtue of the 
'intrinsic reality reference' of living interpretation (i.e. the 
possibility of sedimented disclosures transcending the merely 
occasional or situational truth) tradition can genuinely function in 
the ongoing doctrinalization process,l25 
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In Farley's analysis of doctrinalization the complex process of 
theological judgement is uncovered. His analsis clarifies the way in 
which the fundamental articles tradition is reconstituted. This 
reconstituting of faith is the way in which the tradition contributes 
to the restabilization of ecclesia's institutional form. Reconstitution 
involves a fresh appropriation of contemporary world view(sl, 
sedimented tradition and ongoing redemptive experience. In this 
process of doctrinalization the fundamentals of ecclesial existence 
come to form in new statements of faith. Because these are deeds of 
ecclesia they belong to the structure of its institutional life and 
contribute to its emerging form. 
Continuity in Fundamentals: The Institutional Perspective 
The argument outlined above suggests that doctrinalization is a 
synthetic activity in which God's redemptive activity in 
contemporaneity is disclosed through linguistic forms. In the 
theological judgements implied here an ordering of faith occurs. This 
receives concrete determinate form as it is institutionalized. The 
fundamental articles tradition is an example of this activity in the 
Church. As a feature of ecclesia's institutionality as such, the 
tradition operates as an agent of restabilization, albeit of a 
provisional kind. In this way the tradition provides testimony that 
the ongoing task of transforming the undefined into defined has 
continued to take place. 
The foregoing helps to clarify the contribution of the fundamental 
articles tradition to the problem of identity and continuity in 
Christianity. It is only as the tradition undergoes doctrinalization 
that the tradition evidences a linkage of fidelity to its own earlier 
deeds. The tradition is properly a deed-in-process. Its co-ordinates 
are multidimensional. Continuity and identity cannot be construed 
simply. Such reductionism is evidenced when the fundamental articles 
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tradition is used to secure continuity with what is thought to have 
been a past ecclesial identity. Reductionism is also apparent when the 
tradition is radically relativised through disregard of Christianity's 
'sedimented tradition'. Both are false manoeuvres expressive of human 
desire to be simple and to escape complexity,l26 
When the tradition is distorted through objectification or 
relativization it is indicative of a falsely stabilized institution, 
either through neglect of contemporaneity or rejection of its own 
history. In the former stability is overreached,l27 in the latter it 
is underachieved. 
Continuity and identity are correlative to successful ongoing 
institutional restabilization,l2S The fundamental articles tradition 
does not secure a guarantee of continuity with th~ past but rather 
embodies ecclesia's emergent continuity with past and present in 
relation to the presence and activity of God. 
As a means for the practice of being one church bonded in Christ 
through time and space, the tradition can evidence no more than the 
genuine unfinishedness and unfinished genuineness, that attends any 
intermediate form for the presence of God in created and redeemed life. 
In the attempt to state the faith of the Church, the tradition of 
fundamental articles ideally offers an 'echo of the Godhead'l29 in a 
determinate form. 
Christ 'realises' 
A strategy thus emerges by which the ecclesia of 
the truth of its life and keeps this truth 
circulating in the community, and on the Church's theological agenda. 
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This thesis has examined the tradition of fundamental articles in 
Christianity. The Anglican treatment of this theme has provided the 
focus for an inquiry that has examined a range of issues concerning the 
purposes of stating the faith in Christianity. 
By the development and use of a multilevel approach in the thesis, 
more general theological issues related to stating the faith have been 
uncovered within the discussion of a quite particular theme in a 
specific ecclesial tradition. In this way the particular studies of 
fundamental articles have been situated within a wider and richer 
theological horizon. As a result the thesis has provided a hermeneutic 
of the Anglican treatment of the tradition of fundamental articles. An 
equally important corollary of this has been that the inquiry into 
fundamental articles has clarified what might be involved in the effort 
to state the faith. 
long 
the 
Historically, the thesis has shown that in Anglicanism there is a 
and continuing engagement with the attempt to state the faith in 
form of fundamental articles. At this level it is right to speak 
of a tradition of fundamental articles. 
What has proved particularly interesting is the variety of ways 
in which this tradition has developed and operated in different and 
similar contexts. In this respect the thesis has uncovered important 
aspects of the history, dynamic and rationale of the fundamental 
articles tradition as a strategy for affirming the unity and identity 
of Christianity. One result has been a clearer understanding of the 
particular contribution of the tradition to the formation and endurance 
of ecclesial life. One consequence is that this study has developed and 
clarified the Anglican treatment of the fundamental articles tradition 
in Christianity beyond what has hitherto been the case. 
The inquiry into the Angli~~n handling of fundamental articles 
has, however, provided its own contribution to an understanding of the 
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purposes of stating the faith. The early history of reformation 
Anglicanism highlighted the way in which Christian belief was secured 
in a genuine and unfinished form that required ongoing responsible 
human participation. Implicit here was an ecclesiology which assumed 
authority in the Church to proclaim the gospel faith, not so much for 
the purposes of determining a set of correct beliefs or placing a check 
on over- or under-definition in belief, as for directing an ecclesial 
communion in its practice of being one-in-Christ. As observed in Parts 
One, Two and Three of this thesis, this particular operation of the 
tradition in Anglicanism has remained an important feature of what, on 
any account, has been a most varied and conflictual tradition in 
theology. Fundamentals discussion in Anglicanism represents a 
continuing and by no means settled way of unravelling a host of 
critical issues in theology and of maintaining such issues in 
circulation in the Church. 
More widely, however, this thesis has interpreted the tradition 
of fundamental articles in relation to the dynamics relevant to 
ecclesial faith and practice in Christianity. It has emerged that what 
is agreed upon, believed together and proclaimed as a community of 
faith, has functioned less as a set of correct beliefs requiring assent 
and more as a medium through which the truth of the Church's common 
practices - worship, discipleship, organisation, witness - could be 
realised. 
In this respect the case studies in Part Three of the thesis 
revealed a variety of different ways of determining and deploying the 
fundamental articles tradition for stating and securing the truth of 
common practice as informed by and directed to God. The thesis has, in 
this way, drawn attention to the need for a fuller inquiry and 
specification of the interrelationship between worship, belief and 
discipleship in Christianity. The thesis could be profitably developed 
in this direction. 
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In Part Three the study was developed in relation to a range of 
issues relevant to ecclesiology and the doctrine of God. What emerged 
in this discussion of a varietv of attempts to state the faith was the 
fact that the theme of fundamental articles represented an important 
medium for engagement with, and expression of, a Christian Trinitarian 
theology. Fundamental articles discussion represented a continuing 
dialogue within Trinitarianism, albeit construed in different ways. The 
case studies afforded a means by which this recurring Trinitarian 
conception of Christianity, its forms and presuppositions, was able to 
be drawn more sharply into focus, 
ecclesiological themes. 
particularly in relation to 
Here, for example, issues to do with the terms of ecclesial 
communion were developed out of the differing understandings of the 
presence and action of God. The dynamics operating here were reflected 
in the quite different ways in which the fundamental articles tradition 
functioned in relation to the issue of terms of communion. 
Consequently, the case studies of Part Three illustrated how the 
variety of attempts to state fundamental articles in Christianity 
evidenced differing understandings of God in ecclesiality. 
In Part Four important issues implicit in fundamentals discussion 
in Parts One, Two and Three received fuller systematic development. 
In this respect, the Anglican focus was opened up into a more general 
treatment of the inner logic of the attempt to state the faith as it 
came to form in the fundamentals tradition. 
Part Four represented a more sustained effort to uncover the 
fully ecclesial dimensions of stating the faith. A reflexive relation 
was posited. What was fundamental to Christianity had an ecclesial 
form: ecclesia was what was expressed in the fundamentals of 
Christianity. 
Stating ecclesial fundamentals raised issues concerning the 
impulse and formation of the articles tradition. An argument was 
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developed to show how doctrine generally and in its specialised form as 
fundamental articles mediated, by drawing into determinate form, the 
truth of the one-in-Christ bond. Stating the faith was observed to be 
a fully ecclesial effort which was considerably complexified in 
modernity against the background of an increasingly anti-realist stance 
in matters theological. 
In Part Four treatment of fundamental articles embraced but moved 
beyond practical concerns for the furthering of Church unity. The 
discussion opened up into an inquiry into the task, problems and 
function of communicating the faith in contemporary Christianity. 
Attention was thus directed to the dynamics of the inner structure of 
theology as evidenced in the formation of the fundamental articles 
tradition. Relevant here was the search for foundations, the appeal of 
simplicity, the emergence of hierarchy, all of which contributed to the 
formation of a system of communication. 
These features of the tradition were shown to have a particularly 
important function in relation to Christianity's institutional 
existence. It was argued that institutionality was a form through 
which the complexity of God's relation to created and social life was 
organised. The fundamentals tradition evidenced one strategy for the 
ordering of the truth of God in ecclesiality. In this way the attempt 
to state the faith contributed to the ideal functioning of ecclesia's 
institutionality. 
Presupposed in fundamentals discussion was a desire to offer 
normative statements of faith. Essential to this enterprise was the 
development of criteria for judgement as to the quality of the 
statements made. This criteriological concern was implicit throughout 
the thesis and emerged repeatedly in the discussion of the dialectic 
inherent in the fundamental articles tradition between boundary and 
directional concerns in stating the faith. 
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The demands of institutionality encouraged delineation of 
boundaries for acceptable belief. Excessive concern for definition in 
the interests of fixing boundaries for acceptable belief and securing 
institutional stability, betrayed an incipient formalism in faith and 
easily ignored the directional thrust of saving Christian belief. Where 
discussion of fundamental articles was reduced to the level of boundary 
concerns, it was evidence of a misunderstanding of ecclesia's 
institutionality as such. 
Where directional concerns came more clearly into focus the 
articles tradition in Christianity functioned as a form through which 
the plenitude of God's own being as present and active in creation and 
godly human life could be expressed. As such, the articles tradition 
could contribute to the enlargement of faith and the realization of the 
strength of ecclesia's one-in-Christ bond. 
Recovery of directional concerns in theolo~y and Christian 
discipleship has been identified and traced in the treatment of 
fundamental articles in Christianity. In this way the tradition has 
operated as a monitor of the relative health of ecclesial vision. 
Strong directional concerns were found not to obliterate boundary 
making activities, however they significantly modified how boundaries 
ought to be conceived and operate. Boundaries could no longer operate 
as barriers to communication, i.e. as strategies for exclusion, 
oppositions or even bases for communication with other different 
communions. Rather, boundaries were ideally to be viewed as 
facilitators of communication; the necessary preconditions for further 
enlargement of understanding, harmony and perfection of ecclesial life. 
For such a way of construing boundaries fundamental articles were 
not beliefs set over against other beliefs of lesser importance, or 
even particular articles opposed to other beliefs considered by other 
communions as fundamental. Rather, such statements of faith mediated, 
by drawing into concentrated conceptual form, the truth of the one-in-
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Christ bond. Accordingly, the quality of theological engagement with 
the fundamental articles tradition will be judged by the intensity with 
which the dialectic between directional and boundary concerns is 
allowed maximal operation. 
Implicit in the direction-boundary dialectic was the supposition 
that the truth of ecclesial realitv, as expressed in the tradition of 
fundamental articles, had the quality of an unfinished genuineness and a 
genuine unfinishedness. This arose because the direction-boundary 
dialectic mirrored the dynamic between fundamental articles and 
fundament or ecclesia's founding reality. This latter dialectic 
provided the impulse for fresh attempts to state the truth of faith. In 
doing so it evidenced an inbuilt drive in theology for the 
reconstituting of the boundaries of faith. 
This was found to be particularly important for Christianity's 
institutional forms. Here, the capacity of institutional life to 
successfully organize expanding complexity required an ongoing 
restabilization in the truth. Recognition of the genuine though 
unfinished status of the fundamental articles tradition kept open the 
possibility of a continuing fidelity of the Church's institutional life 
to its own truth. 
The above considerations point to the contingent status of faith 
and its expressions. How contingency ought to be dealt with 
theologically remains on the agenda of any future Christian theology. 
A variety of strategies are possible. Locke, Waterland and Law 
represented three. None proved successful, but all showed how 
important an issue contingency was. These three exponents of the 
fundamental articles tradition operated in the context of Enlightenment 
rationalism and all three wrestled with the problem of retrieving a 
fully sacramental understanding of the universe. This problem remains 
on the theological agenda of the Church. In this respect, Locke's 
approach, of attending to the particularity of the natural world and 
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human society as that environ in which the presence and action of God 
is to be discerned, still beckons theology and constitutes a worthy and 
urgent task for the tradition of fundamental articles. 
A rationale thus emerges for a more intensive and discerning 
engagement with the fundamental articles tradition in Christianity. 
This requires a discussion which includes but moves beyond immediate 
issues of ecclesial pragmatics and attempts to open up, articulate and 
keep circulating in the Church issues concerning the truth of God's 
presence in the world. From this perspective, stating the faith reveals 
itself as a means and a form through which God's creating and redeeming 
love is witnessed to. In this continuing witness theology contributes 
to the ongoing mission of the Church. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF CHRISTIANITY: Perspectives On a 
The.e in Conteaporary Anglicanisa 
1. From Herbert Thorndike (1598-1672), Principles of Christian 
Truth, Bk.I chap.22, sec.2.; cited in J.B. Mozley, A Review of the 
Baptismal Controversy (1865) [London: Longmans, Green & Co., 
1895]' 1. 
2. See e. g. the art. by Stephen Sykes, "The Fundamentals of 
Christianity" in S. W. Sykes and J. Booty eds., The Stud.v of 
Anglicanism (London & Philadelphia: SPCK & Fortress Press, 1988), 
231 - 245. Hereafter Sykes, Fundamentals. 
3. At a general level the use of fundamentals language has no 
necessary technical connotation. It is a useful means of 
communicating certain intentions which might be equally well 
conveyed by other terms, e.g. essentials or essence. Thus 
reference to 'fundamentals' may simply be a useful publishing 
device to arouse interest and indicate a work of general 
accessibility. Where the word appears in. works .of theology 
it indicates an introduction to what 1s considered most 
important; for example, G.S. Spinks, The Fundamentals of Religious 
Belief (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1961); A.C. Baird, Christian 
Fundamentals: A Modern Apology for the Apostles Creed (Edinburgh: 
T & T Clark, 1926); or C.A. Briggs, The FUndamental Christian 
Faith: The Origin, History and Interpretion of the Apostles' and 
Nicene Creed (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1913). Even at this level 
fundamentals concern will usually involve some kind of 
simplification process. This in turn requires an ordering of 
priorities in which epistemological issues may be relevant. 
Stephen Sykes' discussion of the use of 'essence' language is 
relevant here; see Stephen Sykes, The Identity of Christianity: 
Theologians and the Essence of Christianity from Schleiermacher to 
Barth (London: SPCK, 1984), 220-230. As the dynamics of 
fundamentals discussion are uncovered, some complex operations 
become apparent. The matter is significantly complicated by the 
nature of the subject under inquiry. 
4. In fundamentals concern an intention to identify the truth of 
the subject in question is being expressed. Moreover, a strategy 
is also implied as to how that truth might be found. In this way 
fundamentals inquiry is properly part of a heuristic process. 
Fundamentals concern presupposes both commitment to the reality in 
question and the presence of some clues, derived from that 
reality, that anticipate and propel the movement towards it. The 
dynamics of the heuristic process, and the framework of commitment 
which it operates in, have received careful and insightful 
analysis by Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Critical Philosophy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983). See 
his index for references to 'heuristic'. In something as richly 
complex as Christianity it is clear that fundamentals inquiry will 
belong to a sophisticated and ongoing heuristic process. 
The aim here is deeper understanding of the truth already 
indwelt and affirmed in Christian faith. 
5. See the brief but useful discussion of truth in theology in Edward 
Farley, Ecclesial Reflection: An Anatomy of Theological Method 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982), chap. 13. Farley argues 
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that "If faith has to do with realities, and if its language is 
reality bearing, this suggests that truth intention is immanent in 
faith itself ...... Faith experiences in its own peculiar mode the 
way things are. And this is the primary ground for the truth 
question being unavoidable in theology and why every dimension of 
theological reflection occurs under the propulsion of the question 
of truth", 302. Farley also argues that "the concern for truth in 
the ecclesial community cannot be described as simply early 
Christianity's flirtation with and marriage to Hellenism, 
philosophy and gnosis", 301. Rather, "Concern for truth, born in 
faith itself, is a feature of theology as such ... ", 301. Cf. 
Coleridge's remark: "He who begins by loving Christianity better 
than Truth, will proceed by loving his own Sect or Church better 
than Christianity, and end in loving himself better than all", 
see Aids to Reflection, moral and religious aphorism XXV. 
6. As Stephen Sykes points out: "A specific characteristic does not 
need to be a unique characteristic. What is specific to 
Anglicanism does not have to be a unique characteristic". See 
Stephen Sykes, The Integrity of Anglicanism (London & Oxford: 
Mowbrays, 1978), 67. Hereafter Sykes, Integrity. 
7. See e.g. the essay by Paul Elmer More, "The Spirit of Anglicanism" 
in P.E. More and F.L. Cross eds., Anglicanism: the Thought and 
Practice of the Church of England, illustrated from the religious 
literature of the seventeenth century (London: SPCK, 1935), esp. 
sec. IV of More's essay. See also Henry McAdoo, The Spirit of 
Anglicanism: A Survey of Anglican Theological Method in the 
seventeenth Century (London: A & C Black, 1965). The author notes 
that in seventeenth century Anglicanism the distinction between 
necessary things and things of a lighter consequence more remote 
from the foundation became "so much a part of theological method 
.•. that it is almost taken for granted", 228. Elsewhere he states 
that "it is the interplay of the idea of continuity with the 
finality of fundamentals which is one of the characteristic 
aspects of the spirit of Anglicanism", 377. The diversity of the 
period was contained within a shared method which was itself "the 
outcome and expression of a deep seated conviction as to what 
constitutes fundamentals", 349. In linking fundamentals concern to 
what McAdoo considers a specificly Anglican methodology he has 
ensured that fundamentals discussion remains highly controversial 
in Anglicanism. See Sykes, Integrity, chaps. 1 and 5. See also 
the first four articles in M.D. Bryant ed., The Future of Anglican 
Theology, Toronto Studies in Theology XVII (New York & Toronto: 
Edwin Mellen Press,1984). 
The significance of the distinction between fundamentals and 
non-fundamentals for the Reformation in England has been 
recognized by the historian Geoffrey Elton, Reform and 
Reformation: England 1509-1558 (London: Edward Arnold, 1977), esp. 
chap. 7 on the discussion of the ideas of Thomas Starkey. See also 
Stephen Sykes' essay, " Anglicanism and Protestantism" in S.W. 
Sykes ed., England and Germany: Studies in Theological Diplomacy 
(Frankfurt am Main und Bern: Peter D. Lang, 1982), where the 
author points to the above distinction as a leading characteristic 
of the Anglican Reformation understood "as a continuously self-
modifying process", 117. Cf. the discussion by Tom Wright, 
"Doctrine Declared" in Believing in the Church: The Corporate 
Nature of Faith, A Report by the Doctrine Commission of the Church 
of England ( London: SPCK, 1981), 108-141. 
8. See Sykes, Fundamentals, 232ff. This matter will be treated more 
fully later in this chapter. 
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9. See the examples cited by Yves Congar in Diversity and Communion, 
trans. J. Bowden (1982, French; ET, London: SCM, 1984). Congar 
states that "one could make a list of evidence establishing that 
from the seventeenth century to our day Catholics have recognized 
the validity of the expression 'fundamental articles'", 118. 
Congar's subsequent list includes ten important Roman theologians 
who "have recognized that there is a place for the category of 
'fundamental articles'", 119. 
10. See e.g. Otto Weber, Foundations of Dogmatics, 2 vols., trans. 
D.L. Guder (Grand Rapids, Michigan: W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1981-
83), vol.I: 112-127, and esp. vol.II: 544ff. 
11. The importance of the theological problem of fundamental 
articles for Continental Protestantism will be more fully 
discussed later. For the moment refer to the discussion in 
Congar, Diversity and Communion, 107-118; Robert D. Preus, The 
Theology of Post-Reformation Lutheranism (London: Concordia, 
1970), 143-154. For more detailed information consult Ulrich 
Valeske, Hierachia Veritatum: Theologiegeschichtlich Hintergrunde 
und mogliche Konsequenzen eines Hinweises im 'O'kumenism us dekret 
des II. Vatikanischen Konzils zum zwischenkirchlichen Gesprach 
(Munich: Claudius Verlag, 1968), chap.3, "Das Problem dei 
Fundamentalartikel in der Theologiegeschichte der nichtromischen 
kirchen". 
12. Congar, Diversity and Communion, 119; but particularly Congar's 
Tradition and Traditions (London: Burns & Oates, 1966), "Excursus 
B, Scripture and the 'Truths Necessary for Salvation'", 508-519; 
see also idem, "On the 'Hierarchia Veritatum'" in D. Neiman and 
M. Schatkin eds., The Heritage of the Early Church: Essays in 
Honour of G. Florovsky (Orientalia Christiana Analecta, no. 195; 
Rome, 1973). 
13. Refer to discussion below on the controversial status of the 
tradition pp.15-21. 
14. The move into articles per se is familiar enough, but the 
legitimacy and significance of focussing on either truths 
necessary for salvation or articles constitutive for the existence 
of the Church has not always been appreciated. In the mid 
seventeenth century Edward Stillingfleet (1635-1699) in A Rational 
Account of the Grounds of Protestant Religion (1664), 
distinguished between those things necessary to the salvation of 
persons as such in their individual capacities, and those things 
"necessary to be owned for salvation, by Christian societies, or 
as the bonds and conditions of ecclesiastical communion". 
Stillingfleet went on to claim that "The want of understanding 
this distinction of the necessity of things has caused most of the 
perplexities and confusions in this controversy of fundamentals". 
The apologetic motive is important here. In Stillingfleet's mind 
the Roman Church had obscured this distinction and thereby fell 
into the fatal error of attempting to prescribe the limits of 
faith necessary for an individual's salvation. See Stillingfleet's 
Works, 6 vols. (London1 1709-10), vol.IV: 48. The importance of 
Stillingfleet's distinction was not lost on John Henry Newman in 
his Lectures on the Prophetical Office of the Church Viewed 
Relatively to Romanism and Popular Protestantism (London: 1837), 
esp. lecture IX "On The Essentials of the Gospel". Newman 
reissued this work as a Roman Catholic with a new preface and 
notes, The Via Media of the Church of England (London: Basil 
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Montague Pickering, 1877), vol.I. 
15. For a recent example of this see Henry R. McAdoo, The Unity of 
Anglicanism: Catholic and Reformed (Wilton, Connecticut: 
Morehouse-Barlow Co., Inc, 1983), lecture II. On the 
relationship between faith and church order see the important work 
by Arthur Michael Ramsey, The Gospel and the Catholic Church 
(London, New York, & Toronto: Longmans, Green & Co., 1936). 
Drawing upon new insights from biblical theology, Ramsey argued 
that the central reality of the Gospel - redemption won by Christ 
through the cross and resurrection - was generically related to 
the doctrine of the Church: "Of this redemption the Church is the 
utterance and its order is an expression", 229. Faith and order 
were not separate. The latter was the institutionally structured 
form of the former; the gospel objectified in social form, 57. It 
was an important attempt to develop a rationale for Episcopal 
government as 'of the esse of the universal Church', that 
necessary ministerial structural form of redemptive faith. Within 
this context the traditional distinction in Anglicanism between 
faith and order was considerably complicated in respect of 
fundamentals discussion. 
16. The distinction between the credenda and agenda, the latter 
belonging to the mutable laws of church government, was certainly 
an important feature of Richard Hooker's ecclesiology. This 
emerged in Book Three, Of The Laws Of Ecclesiactical Polity (1594) 
where Hooker developed the distinction between things necessary 
and things accessory according to the image of a path which, 
despite the possibility of its uppermost face being constituted of 
gravel, grass or stone, or in fact of being overgrown with 
brambles and thorns, nevertheless remained a path (bk.III, 
chap.3, para.3). Hooker's point was that matters of polity and/or 
Roman additions to the faith, belonged to the 'accessories'. The 
necessaries included the articles of Christian faith and the 
sacraments of the Church of Christ. For a useful discussion of 
Hooker in relation to the more vexed issue of episcopacy see the 
art. by Richard A. Norris, "Episcopacy" in Sykes and Booty eds., 
The Study of Anglicanism, 296-309. 
17. For example, cf. above en.15 and chap.4 (pp.102f) of this thesis. 
Sykes, Integrity (83-86), shows how a particular doctrine of 
episcopacy can subtly overthrow a more tradi tiona! Anglican 
fundamentals apologetic. For further background see also S.W. 
Sykes and S.W. Gilley, "'No Bishop, No Church!' The Tractarian 
impact on Anglicanism" in G. Rowell ed., Tradition Renewed: The 
Oxford Movement Conference Papers (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 
1986), chap.8. The problem of the status of questions of church 
order in the fundamentals apologetic had its roots much earlier in 
the tradition and is evident in the Act of Uniformity (1662), one 
result of which was to elevate subtly the practice of episcopacy 
from the region of adiaphora (things different) to a form 
integral to the Catholic church. On this see Sykes, "Anglicanism 
and Protestantism", 120ff. Sykes' remarks find confirmation in 
the writings of the lay theologian Henry Dodwell (1641-1711) who, 
in defending non-juror Bishops in 1692, wrote "If there be degrees 
of fundamentals, I should think the fundamentals concerning the 
Church as a society to be of the greatest consequence, and 
therefore fundamental in the highest degree ..•.•.• So that in 
order to keeping these other fundamentals, the Church as a society 
is supposed antecedently as a condition that alone can qualify her 
for having such a trust committed to her ••• ". The cornerstone of 
the Church as a society was, for Dodwell, the bishop. To be a non-
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episcopal Christian was to be an enemy of Catholicity, of 
episcopacy and the rule of tradition deriving from Christ. The 
above quotation [ from Dodwell's Vindication of the Deprived 
Bishops (1692), 31 ], is cited and discussed by George H. Tavard, 
The Quest for Catholicity: A Study in Anglicanism (London: Burns & 
Oates, 1963}, 90-93. The whole matter of church order in relation 
to fundamentals discussion remains highly controversial, if not 
confused. 
18. From the early nineteenth century at least, Anglicans appear to 
have quite self-consciously spoken of 'the doctrine of 
fundamentals'. Certainly Newman the Anglican did, regarding it as 
central to the theory of the via media. See e.g. his 1938 
essay, "Palmer's View of Faith And Unity" in Essays Critical and 
Historical, 2 vols. 5th ed. (London: Pickering & Co, 1881), vol.I: 
204, and 209ff. There is no doubt that for Newman the doctrine 
of fundamentals was the theoretical foundation of the via media of 
Anglicanism. William Palmer ( of Worcester College, Oxford} took 
a different view and rejected "The Doctrine of Fundamentals". 
See, A Treatise on the Church of Christ, 2 vols. (London: J G & F 
Rivington, 1838), vol.I, chap.5, appendix. Newman considered that 
Palmer had thereby disowned the via media 'as Anglicans generally 
understand it'. In this respect see the notes added by Newman as a 
Roman Catholic at the end of his essay on Palmer. Earlier writings 
on the subject discourse on the problem of fundamentals, without 
talking about a 'doctrine' or 'theory'. However the apologetic 
motive remains important. See e.g. the Anglican theologian Daniel 
Waterland's (1683-1740) "A Discourse of Fundamentals" in The Works 
of the Rev. Daniel Waterland, 6 vols. (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1843), vol.V: 73-104. 
In more recent times the Anglican fundamentals apologia has 
been variously referred to as 'the theory of fundamentals', 'the 
fundamental articles tradition', and "the 'fundamental articles' 
apologia". See Stephen Sykes, "Authority in The Church of 
England" in P. Eaton ed., The Trial of Faith ( Sussex: Churchman 
Pub., 1988), chap.2; idem, Fundamentals, 242; idem, Identity, 106, 
257; also his art. " Anglicanism and the Anglican Doctrine of the 
Church" in J. Robert Wright ed., Quadrilateral At One Hundred: 
Essays on the Centenary of the Chicago-Lambeth Quadrilateral 
1886/88- 1986/88 (Oxford: Mowbrays, 1988), 160. 
19. See e.g. J.R. Wright, "Anglicanism, Ecclesia Anglicana, and 
Anglican: An Essay on Terminology" in Sykes and Booty eds., The 
Study of Anglicanism, 424-29. Wright identifies John Macquarrie, 
Henry McAdoo and the late Stephen Neill as contemporary exponents 
of the 'no special doctrines' claim, which Wright also finds 
enshrined in the Report to the Lambeth Conference of 1930 on "The 
Anglican Communion". Cf. the discussion on Hensley Henson on 'no 
special doctrines' by T. Wright, "Doctrine Declared", 109f, 125. 
Sykes, "Anglicanism and the Anglican Doctrine of the Church", 
cites as another example of the 'no special doctrines' claim, 
J.w.c. Wand, 157ff. 
The 'no special doctrine' claim was implicit in the 
theology of one of the most important exponents of Anglican 
ecclesiology in the early twentieth century, A.C. Headlam. Headlam 
proposed church reunion upon, among other things, adherence to the 
'fundamental beliefs' enshrined in the Apostles and Nicene creeds. 
In this respect Headlam wrote "We want to be Christians and if the 
Church is Christian it is sufficient". The corollary of this 
Anglican approach to fundamentals is that what is special to 
Christendom is special to Anglicanism and no more. See A.C. 
Headlam, Christian Unity (London: SCM, 1930), chap.2; and p.51 for 
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quotation. Cf., The Doctrine of the Church and Christian Reunion, 
the Bampton Lectures 1920 (London: John Murray, 1920), esp.122, 
206, 228-240, 280-283. 
20. See esp. Sykes', "Anglicanism and the Anglican Doctrine of the 
Church", where the author seeks to expose the fallaciousness of 
the thesis that Anglicans have no special doctrines of their own; 
in other words that Anglicans simply share in what is fundamental 
to the Church universal. Sykes argues that "The NSD [non special 
doctrines] claim and the Anglican attempt to identify fundamentals 
belong to the same world of discourse", 159. In fact the argument 
about fundamentals or NSD is shown to be a form of apologetic 
highly characteristic of Anglicanism and moreover one that has 
exerted a powerful influence upon Anglican self-understanding in 
relation to the Universal Church. Sykes shows how the NSD claim 
implies a quite special doctrine of the Church not shared by other 
communions. Fundamentals discussion thus remains highly 
significant in Anglican ecclesiology. 
21. That the oneness of the Church is the proper framework for 
fundamentals discussion will become clear as this thesis surveys 
the history of the discussion in Anglicanism (Part Two), examines 
the theme through case studies (Part Three) and inquires into the 
logic of this discussion (Part Four). It is clear from Sykes' 
discussion in Identity on "The Unity of Christianity", chap.10, 
that fundamentals discussion in Anglicanism has been inextricably 
enmeshed in the problem of affirming the oneness of Christianity. 
22. Bonds of Affection, Proceedings of the Anglican Consultative 
Council- 6 (London: Anglican Consultative Council, 1984), 70-75. 
Cf. discussion of the Quadrilateral in The Truth Shall Make You 
Free, The Lambeth Conference 1988 (London: Anglican Consultative 
Council, 1988), 136-140. 
23. Sykes, Fundamentals, 232. 
24. The Lambeth Conference 1968 (London: Anglican Consultative 
Council, 1968), 140. Commenting on this notion of 
comprehensiveness Sykes, Fundamentals, notes that "Reports to the 
Conference carry only the authority of those by whom it was 
approved, in this case some one-third of the assembled bishops," 
243. 
25. See below 15-25. 
26. The logic of this position is developed in chap.12 of this thesis 
as a problem of institutional restabilization in the truth. 
27. See (a) Doctrine in the Church of England, The Report of the 
Commission on Christian Doctrine Appointed by the Archbishops of 
Canterbury and York in 1922 (pub., 1938; rep. with new intro. by 
G.W.H. Lampe; London: SPCK, 1982). 
(b) Christian Believing: The Nature of the Christian Faith 
and its Expression in Holy Scripture and Creeds, A Report by The 
Doctrine Commission of the Church of England (London: SPCK, 
1976). 
(c) Believing in the Church: The Corporate Nature of Faith, 
A Report by the Doctrine Commission of the Church of England 
(London: SPCK, 1981). 
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28. The introduction of a particular and highly idiosyncratic 
understanding of symbolic truth that "Statements affirming 
particular facts may be found to have value as pictorial 
expressions of spiritual truths, even though the supposed facts 
themselves did not actually happen" - was a dangerous manoeuvre. 
It also demonstrated how amenable the fundamentals tradition was 
to changing content, and furthermore how important it was felt 
that this tradition, with its Anglican focus on the Creeds, be 
assented to in a form as inclusive as possible. Cf. the 
Commission's brief to investigate "how far it is possible to 
remove or diminish existing differences", 19. The American 
theologian, Paul Tillich, has pointed to the dangers involved in 
such a view of symbols noting that "some theological movements, 
such as Protestant Hegelianism and Catholic modernism, have 
interpreted religious language symbolically in order to dissolve 
its realistic meaning and to weaken its seriousness, its power, 
and its spiritual impact". See Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, 
combined vol. (Digswell Place, Welwyn: James Nisbet & Co. Ltd, 
1968), vol. I: 267. 
29. Thus in this report there were forty-two pages on 
statement and one hundred and fourteen pages of signed 
or individual essays! 
an agreed 
appendices 
30. See esp. the essay in the Report by Anthony Thiselton, 
"Knowledge, Myth and Corporate Memory". The author's discussion 
of "instruments for the transmission and institutionalization of 
its corporate knowledge" (53), is clearly relevant to the 
tradition under discussion which has, in the course of Anglican 
history at least, been an important agent in the interpretation of 
the identity and continuity of Christianity in its institutional 
form. For further see chap.12 of this thesis. 
31. The Nature of Christian Belief: A Statement and Exposition by 
the House of Bishops of the General Synod of the Church of England 
(London: Church House Pub., 1986). 
32. Ibid., para.14. 
33. The present reference can be found in the Malta Report as 
reprinted in ARCIC The Final Report (London: SPCK & CTS, 1982), 
110. Cf. Congar, Diversity and Communion, for full text relevant 
to 'hierarchy' of truths, 126. 
34. This comment was made in the Elucidation (1979) of The Statement 
(1971) on Eucharistic Doctrine, in ARCIC The Final Report, 24. 
35. See The Statement {1973) on Ministry and Ordination in The Final 
Report, 38; and cf. Elucidation (1979) in The Final Report, 44. 
36. Salvation and the Church (1987): An Agreed Statement by the 
Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission ARCIC II, with 
commentary and study guide by M. Cecily Boulding OP and Timothy 
Bradshaw (London: Church House Pub. & CTS, 1989). This reference, 
para.32 of statement. 
37. Harding Meyer, "Fundamental Difference- Fundamental Consensus", 
Midstream XXV (1986): 247-259, links the notion of 'fundamental 
consensus' with the Anglican-Roman Catholic references to 
'substantial agreement', 248. 
38. Salvation and the Church, para.32. 
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39. See The Statement (1976) on Authority in the Church in The Final 
Report, 62. 
40. Ibid. I 63. 
41. See Elucidation (1981) on Authority in the Church in The Final 
Report, 71. 
42. The Final Report, 65. 
43. See The Statement (1981) on Authority in the Church in The Final 
Report, 96. 
44. Ibid. Interestingly this is precisely what seems to be 
envisaged by the Roman Catholic theologians Heinrich Fries and 
Karl Rahner in Unity of the Churches: An Actual Possibility [1983 
German pub.; trans. R.C. & E.W. Gritsch (Philadelphia & New York: 
Fortress Press & Paulist, 1985)], See esp. the second of their 
eight theses for the future one church and the commentary on it, 
25-41. 
The American Lutheran theologian George Lindbeck comments 
that Rahner and Fries' proposals are an eloquent exposition of an 
ecclesial model for unity- 'a communion of communions' -which 
underlies the Anglican-Roman Catholic dialogue. See his essay, 
"The Church" in Geoffrey Wainwright ed., Keeping The Faith: 
Essays to Mark the Centenary of Lux Mundi (London: SPCK, 1989), 
201. 
45. In Anglican-Orthodox Dialogue The Moscow Agreed Statement 1976 
(London: SPCK, 1977), sec 4, "The Authority of the Councils", 
para.14, it is noted that "Anglican members, while accepting the 
dogmatic decrees of the fifth, sixth, and seventh Councils, have 
long been accustomed to lay more emphasis on the first four, and 
believe that the concept of 'an order or "hierarchy" of truths' 
can usefully be applied to the decisions of the Councils. The 
Orthodox members find this concept to be in conflict with the 
unity of the faith as a whole, though they recognise gradations of 
importance in matters of practice". This position is reiterated in 
Anglican-Orthodox Dialogue The Dublin Agreed Statement 1984 
(London: SPCK, 1985), para. 105. 
The Anglican attempt to accord a differential authority to 
certain Church Councils of the early church is related to an 
Anglican conception of the fundamentals of the faith. Orthodox 
members resist Anglican handling of the authority of councils 
precisely because they are out of sympathy with the contrast 
between fundamentals and non-fundamentals in matters of faith. 
The Anglican appeal to a 'hierarchy' within conciliar decisions 
was rightly discerned by Orthodox members as being in conflict 
with their view of the unity of the faith. The Orthodox reaction 
is understandable given their vigorous rejection of the 
fundamental articles tradition of Protestantism. Consult Congar, 
Diversity and Communion, 120. 
46. Particularly relevant here are the following: Anglican-Lutheran 
Dialogue, The Report of the Anglican-Lutheran European Regional 
Commission, Helsinki, 1982 (London: SPCK, 1983); Anglican-Lutheran 
Relations, Report of the Anglican-Lutheran Joint Working Group, 
Cold Ash, 1983 (London & Geneva: Anglican Consultative Council & 
Lutheran World Federation, 1983); The Niagara Report, Report of 
the Anglican-Lutheran Consultation on Episcope 1987 (London & 
Geneva: Anglican Consultative Council & Lutheran World Federation, 
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1988); God's Reign And Our Unity, The Report of the Anglican-
Reformed International Commission 1981-1984 (London & Edinburgh: 
SPCK & The Saint Andrew Press, 1984); and On The Way To Visible 
Unity, Meissen, 1988 (London: Church House Pub., 1988). 
47. The Niagara Report, para.72 and generally para.60-72. 
48. Ibid., 71; cf. Helsinki, 1982 report, para.62-63. 
49. God's Reign and Our Unity, esp. para. 39-46. 
50. Meissen, 1988, para.8. 
51. Ibid., para.15(ii). 
52. Ibid., para.17A(i). 
53. Thus in Anglican-Lutheran dialogue it seems that 'full 
Communion', as opposed to 'closer fellowship' and 'mutual 
recognition' of ministries, can emerge only as Anglicans modify 
their doctrine of the historic episcopate, given the unwillingness 
of Lutherans to accept that their own ministry remains defective 
until the time when it enters into an existing line of episcopal 
succession. See Anglican-Lutheran Dialogue, Helsinki, 1982, para. 
43 and Appendix two, para.79-87. In the Preface to The Niagara 
Report, there is a recognition that the issue of episcope is "the 
chief remaining obstacle to full communion between Anglicans and 
Lutherans". The report recognises that the 'office of episcope' -
the ministry of pastoral leadership, co-operation and oversight, 
para.7 operates in both communions (para.55, 56, 59 & 75). 
Furthermore, a subtle change is introduced into one Anglican view 
of episcopacy when it is stated that, in the light of study of the 
New Testament, it is "unthinkable for us to isolate ordination at 
the hands of someone in linear succession to the apostles as the 
sole criterion of faithfulness to the apostolic commission 
the burden of proof has passed to those who would argue otherwise" 
(para.20; cf. para.54 and esp. para.94). One result is that "the 
ordained ministry is no longer an issue which need divide our two 
Churches" (para.59; cf. 71). With the Lutherans it seems the issue 
is now one of mapping out the important practical details to 
implement full communion (para.81-116). Significantly Anglicans 
are said to be "free to do this both by grace and power of the 
Holy Spirit and because such action [canonical rev1s1on for 
reordering their relationships with Lutherans] does not mean 
surrender of the gift of the historic episcopate"(para.94). 
In Anglican-Reformed dialogue it is stated that both 
comunions 'define themselves in different ways'; in relation to 
confessions (Reformed) and Liturgy (Anglican) (para.7). This 
difference "is expressive of a deep divergence in the ways in 
which the two churches understand themselves". More specifically, 
as regards ministry and ordination to ministry, the two communions 
are divided because "of different views about the role of the 
continuity of ordination in signifying and safeguarding unity" 
(para.87). In this respect Anglicans are said to preserve "this 
continuity or succession through episcopal ordination; in the 
Reformed tradition it is preserved through ministerial ordination" 
(my italics; para.89). Overcoming separation requires, it seems, 
unambiguous acknowledgement of the reality of God's gift of 
ministry to the churches and "that the continuity of succession in 
ordination with the undivided Church is - so far as lies in our 
power - visibly restored and maintained" (para.90). The report 
makes certain practical suggestions to assist this process, 
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(para.112-119). The implication of this dialogue is that Anglican 
and reformed 'patterns of oversight' can be reconciled (para.9). 
In Anglican, Lutheran and Reformed discussions at Meissen 
(1988) it was acknowledged "that personal and collegial oversight 
(episkope) is embodied and exercised in our churches in a variety 
of forms, episcopal and non-episcopal, as a visible sign of the 
Church's unity and continuity in apostolic life, mission and 
ministry" ( para.17A(iv)]. The sticking point for 'full, visible 
unity' still turns on a particular form of episkope - 'episcopal 
succession' - being made "a necessary condition for 'full, visible 
unity'" (para.16). However, nowhere in the Meissen statement does 
there appear any further elaboration of what 'episcopal 
succession' or 'historic episcopate' might include. 
These conversations make it abundantly clear that for 
Anglicans a particular form of episcopy and the doctrine(s) of its 
practice significantly intrude into all efforts towards unity with 
other Protestant churches of the Reformation. Implicit in the 
Anglican handling of fundamentals issues is the view that faith 
and order cannot be neatly separated but have to be addressed 
together. The question is whether Anglicans fully appreciate the 
logic of their own position. For example, from this Anglican 
perspective, a reticence to move to full communion because of a 
perceived lack in another church's ministry ought to raise 
questions for Anglicans about the fullness of the gospel present 
in that communion. This would not only be unwelcome but probably 
theologically unsound. However if this matter was faced Anglicans 
would have to confront some of the contradictions present in their 
own handling of what is deemed to be essential to being a 
Christian in the Church. 
54. See above en.19, 20, 54. Cf. Sykes, Integrity, chap.6 "Anglicans 
and the Theology of the Church", esp. 83ff. 
55. This is not to deny what is obvious; that there is a long 
history of attempts to expound an Anglican theology. These 
attempts have too often been vitiated by a lack of self criticism 
in respect of its apologetic strategies, to which the appeal to 
fundamentals is quite central. For further discussion of this 
general problem in Anglicanism consult: Sykes, Integrity; Bryant 
ed., The Future of Anglican Theology, esp. the pertinent comments 
by W. Taylor Stevenson on method and dialectic in his 
contribution, "Is There a Characteristic Anglican Theology?",15-
26. 
56. See e.g. Sykes, Fundamentals; 
Fundamentals". 
Water land, "A Discourse of 
57. See e.g. above en.17 and en.53. and relevant discussion in the 
text above. 
58. Congar, "On the 'Hierarchia Veritatum'", 414. 
59. Valeske, Hierarchia Veritatum. 
60. Ibid., chap.3. 
61. Thus in a sixty-four page chapter 
problem in Protestantism, Valeska 
information on selected Anglican 
Richard Hooker, Joseph Hall, John 
Dury, Richard Baxter, John Locke, 
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Davenant, William Laud, John 
Daniel Waterland, and William 
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Wake (137-141; cf. 157 on Lambeth Quadrilateral). 
62. Congar, Tradition and Traditions, 508-519. 
63. Congar, Diversity and Communion, identifies a context in Church 
and dogmatics, an Erasmian context, Lutheran orthodoxy, and 
Anglicanism (109-118). 
64. Ibid., 116. 
65. See Congar, ibid., 212, for a useful bibliography on the idea of 
the 'hierarchy of truths'. Congar cites an early article on the 
subject by George Tavard, '"Hierarchia Veri tatum': A preliminary 
investigation", Theological Studies XXXII (1971): 278-289. Tavard 
recognised that the concept of hierarchia veritatum had "analogous 
conceptions in Anglican and perhaps in Protestant thought", 289. 
He was referring to the Anglican distinction between fundamentals 
and non-fundamentals, 282. 
66. See A. Dulles, "Paths to Doctrinal Agreement: Ten Theses", 
Theological Studies XLVII (1986): 32-47. 
67. See esp. G.H. Joyce, art. "Fundamental Articles" in Catholic 
Encyclopedia (New York: 1913), Vol. IV: 319-321. Joyce's article 
is important for two reasons. Firstly, it is one of the few 
Dictionary articles (the only Roman Catholic one) of any 
substantial length (approx 2,500 words) devoted to the subject of 
fundamental articles in English. Secondly, it contains some 
interesting information on the Anglican tradition, including a 
reference to the otherwise forgotten and important work (for its 
detailed documentation of scholastic sources in respect of 
fundamental articles) by the Laudian divine, Christopher Potter. 
Potter's debate with Edward Knott, S.J., was later continued by 
William Chillingworth (1602-44) in his celebrated work The 
Religion of Protestants (1637), in which discussion over the 
fundamentals of Christianity figured prominently (see pp.98f, 
106f of this thesis). See also the reasonably comprehensive and 
still useful treatment provided by A. Tanqueray, art. "Articles 
fondamentaux (systeme des)" in Dictionaire de Theologie Catholique 
3 vols. (Paris, 1923), vol.I: 2025-35. 
68. See: M.E. Williams, art. "Fundamental Articles", New Catholic 
Encyclopedia (Washington: McGraw Hill, 1967), vol.VI: 222; art. 
"Fundamental Articles" in Karl Rahner and Herbert Vorgrimler eds., 
Concise Theological Dictionary, 2nd. ed., (London: Burns & Oates, 
1983}, 183; Karl Rahner, art. 'Dogma' in Karl Rahner ed., 
Encyclopedia of Theology: A Concise Sacramentum Mundi (London: 
Burns & Oates, 1975), esp. Part I(c) 'Division of Dogmas'; also a 
slightly older but useful article (in the light of the more recent 
interest in 'hierarchy of truths') is Yves Congar, art., "Articles 
Fondamentaux", Catholicisme (Paris, 1948), vol.I: 882f. 
69. A quite detailed and useful late nineteenth century discussion 
of the development of the problem of fundamental articles, with 
particular emphasis on the Continental Lutheran context, can be 
found in A. Schmidt, art. "Fundamentalartikel", Kirchenlexikon 
(Freiburg, 1886), Vol.IV: 2120-2137. Consult also: D. Schaff, 
art. "Fundamental Doctrines of Christianity" in The New Schaff 
Hertzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge (New York, 1909), 
vol.IV: 410-13; art. "Fundamentals" in J. McClintock and J. 
Strong eds., Encyclopedia of Biblical Theological and 
Ecclesiastical Literature, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1883), 
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vol.III: 693-94. For more recent treatments consult: F.W. 
Kantzenbach, art. "Fundamental Articles" in J. Bodensieck ed., 
The Encyclopedia of the Lutheran Church (Minneapolis & Minnesota: 
Augsburg Pub., 1965), vol. II: 893-895; art. "Fundamental 
Doctrines" in E. L. Lueker ed., Lutheran Encyclopedia, rev. ed., 
(London & StLouis: Concordia, 1975), 319-320; W. Joest, art. 
"Fundamentalartikel" in Theologische Realenzyklopiidie (Berlin and 
New York, 1983), vol.XI: 727-32. 
70. A good recent introduction to the fundamental articles discussion 
in Lutheranism can be found in Preus, The Theology of Post-
Reformation Lutheranism, esp. 142-154 and index, for references to 
'articles of faith' and 'fundamental articles'. From the Reformed 
side see the helpful analysis by G.C. Berkouwer, The Church 
trans. J.E. Davison (1970-72 Dutch; Grand Rapids, Michigan: 
W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1976), chap.ll "Apostolic Confession". 
See also Heinrich Schmidt, Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical 
Lutheran Church (1889), 3rd, ed. rev. and trans. C.A. Hay and 
H.E. Jacobs (Mineapolis, Minniesota; Augsburg Pub. House, 1961 
rep.), chap.5 "Concerning the Articles of Faith and the Symbol of 
the Church", 92-102. A more recent and stimulating discussion of 
fundamental articles in the ecumenical context can be found in 
F.W. Kantzenbach, "Das Theologische Problem der 
Fundamentalartikel", Lutherische Monatshefte I, December 1962, 
542-47. The author proposed a movement beyond mere confessional 
texts towards a renewed testimony to the gospel story in its 
wholeness. In this context fundamental articles were no longer 
simply construed as an assemblage of well-defined dogmatical 
statements, but rather they had a focussing and directional 
function leading the Church, not to understanding 'more', but to a 
more deeper understanding of its basic commitments. Kantzenbach's 
article is the original and slightly longer version of the article 
he contributed to The Encyclopedia of the Lutheran Church. For an 
extensive bibliography of German discussion of fundamental 
articles consult Valeske, Hierarchia Veritatum. 
71. Even the English articles by Schaff and, McClintock and Strong, 
which make some reference to the Anglican situation, have at best 
only a limited usefulness. 
72. From the early seventeenth century, beginning with the careful 
work of the Lutheran theologian Nicholas Hunnius (1585-1643), the 
fundamental articles apologetic was developed to a high degree of 
prec1s1on and elaborateness in seventeenth century Lutheran 
scholasticism. See esp. Preus, The Theology of Post-Reformation 
Lutheranism; Kantzenbach, "Problem der Fundamentalartikel"; 
Schmidt, "Fundamentalartikel"; and Sykes, Fundamentals, 236. This 
development in Lutheranism is not surprising given the importance 
historically attached to doctrinal purity. See above en.10. 
73. This issue 
Kantzenbach. 
is discussed in the articles by Schmidt and 
74. Kantzenbach, "Fundamental Doctrines", refers to the efforts of 
Lutheran theologians to intergrate an 'organic' understanding of 
doctrine into traditional discussion of fundamental articles. F. 
Philippi developed a distinction between 'undeveloped original' 
fundamental articles and 'developed secondary' fundamental 
articles. This led to the conclusion that all were fundamental, 
differing only in form or rank. Kantzenbach concluded: "The end 
of the whole discussion was resignation: the quest for a real 
distinction between fundamentals and non-fundamentals, between the 
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confession of faith and its theological elaboration, was given 
up", 894. 
75. See esp. J. Lecler S.J., Toleration and the Reformation, 2 vols. 
(London & New York: Longmans & Assoc. Press, 1960); R. Rouse and 
S. Neill, eds., A History of the Ecumenical Movement 1517- 1948, 
3rd. ed. (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1986). Esp. essays by 
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sense, "for it flows from founts recognised in the light of a 
higher science, namely God's very own which He shares with the 
blessed" (Ia. I, a.2). In this context articles of faith were 
theology's first principles revealed by God. However it was 
precisely here that the issue of the placement of articles 
became crucial for Aquinas. Since Christian theology had the 
character of "an imprint on us of God's own knowledge, which is 
the single and simple vision of everything" (Ia. I, a.3ad2), it is 
clear that for Thomas articles of faith operated as the medium 
rather than the terminus of faith. Articles of faith "although 
the proximate principle or origin of theological discourse, are 
not the first principium or fount, but well up from the deeper and 
more mysterious cleaving to God himself in faith, which itself is 
a sharing in God's own knowledge given to the blessed in Christ" 
(para.34 Appendix 6 of vol.I of Blackfriars ed. Cf. Ia.I,a.2; 2a. 
2ae. I,a.5). God himself was the prima veritas the first 
truth. Faith was properly the power to adhere to the first truth 
(2a. 2ae. I,a.1). The assent of faith terminated in the articles 
of faith "only so far as they have some reference to God" (2a. 
2ae. I,a.1). Thus the articles of faith in the creed were the term 
of the believer'~ act but "such an act does not have a proposition 
as its term but a reality" (2a. 2ae. I,a.2ad2). Articles of faith 
had their origin and telos in God. Faith, in the form of articles, 
constituted a form of the vision of God (2a. 2ae. I,a.2ad3). 
27. See 2a.2ae. I,a. 6ad1: "Among its [Faith's] objects there are 
those that faith regards for their own sake; there are others that 
faith regards not for themselves but only for their relationship 
to other objects ••• ". Thomas regularly employed a distinction 
between truths direct and indirect, primary and secondary, 
original and deduced. See: Valeska, Hierarchia Veritatum 70-82; 
410 
II: Endnotes 
Congar, Diversity and Communion, 131f; idem "On the 'Hierarchia 
Veritatum'", 411f. The first category of truths the prime 
credibilia - were analogous with the first principles of science. 
Consequently "all the articles of faith are implicit in certain 
primary ones, namely that God exists and that he has providence 
over man's salvation. For the truth that God is includes 
everything that we believe to exist eternally in God and that will 
comprise our beatitude. Faith in God's providence comprises all 
those things that God arranges in history for man's salvation and 
that make up our way towards beatitude. As to the remaining 
articles; some are implicit in others, e.g. faith in the 
Redemption implies Christ's incarnation and Passion and all 
related matters" (2a.2ae.I,a.7). Indirect credibilia- the second 
category of truths - included historical references in Scripture, 
i.e. points of belief proposed "not for their own value but as 
making known the first kind of truths" (2a.2ae.I,a.6ad1). There 
was, said Thomas, "no reason to match articles of faith to such 
details". Indirect credibilia also included those expressions 
related to actual articles of faith, i.e. antecedents and 
consequents such as the reliability of Scripture (See 
2a.2ae.11,a.2; and cf. para.15 Appendix 9, vol.I Blackfriars ed.). 
28. 2a.2ae.I,a.8; and cf.2a.2ae.I,a.6. It would appear that some 
flexibility on the number of articles relating to the majesty of 
the Godhead and the mystery of Christ's humanity was possible. 
It depended on the ways in which theologians might arrange them. 
Also a number of truths of faith could be included within one 
article. 
29. 2a.2ae.I.a.9. Persson, Sacra Doctrina, notes that for Thomas 
"What is given in the creed is a summary of what scripture means 
when it is correctly interpreted. Since the articles of faith, 
articuli fidei, and the canonical scriptures are identical in 
content when they are seen in this way, anything that may be said 
of the one can also apply to the other - hence Thomas can state 
that the articles of the creed, which constitute the principia of 
theology, have been given immediate a Deo per revelationem 
(directly from God through revelation)", 59. Cf. Ia.I.a.5 ad2. 
30. Recent Roman Catholic proposals concerning the idea of a 
hierarchy of truths makes Aquinas' discussion of the nature and 
ordering of the truths of faith particularly important. 
31. J. R. Lerch, art. "Ecclesiology" in New Catholic Encyclopedia, 
vol. V: 34, notes that "The reality of the Church was first lived 
for many centuries before it became a direct object of systematic 
theological investigation, and so ecclesiology as a particular 
branch of theology appeared somewhat late in the history of the 
Church". Lerch, in common with other commentators, argues that 
this development occurred as a corollary of the various ecclesial 
crises of the fourteenth century. Pelikan, CT, III: 269, notes 
that "the twelfth century summarized the full scope of the 
medieval doctrine of the church more effectively than the 
thirteenth did; on the other hand, it was only in the fourteenth 
century that the doctrine began to develop". Pelikan notes that 
the first treatise on the Church by James of Viterbo appeared in 
1301-1302, to be followed almost immediately by Giles of Rome and 
John of Paris. For further information on the development of the 
doctrine of the Church consult: Congar, art. "Ecclesiology" in The 
Encyclopedia of Religion (Mircea Eliade ed-in-chief; New York: 
Macmillan & Free Press, 1977), III: 480-489, including 
bibliography; Lawlor, "Church II", New Catholic Encyclopedia, III: 
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684-693; and especially the well documented and comprehensive 
treatment provided by Brian Gogan, The Common Corps of 
Christendom: Ecclesiological Themes in the Writings of Sir Thomas 
More, Studies in the History of Christian Thought XXV (Leiden: E. 
J. Brill, 1982), chap.1 "The Course of Medieval Ecclesiology". 
32. For a general discussion refer to Pelikan, CT, IV, chap.2. 
More particularly see Frantisek Graus, "The Crisis of the Middle 
Ages and the Hussites" trans. J.J. Heaney in Steven E. Ozment ed., 
The Reformation in Medieval Perspective (Chicago: Quadrangle 
Books, 1971), 76-103. Graus sets the breakdown of church unity 
within a larger social crisis of symbols of security. See further 
Heiko Oberman, The Dawn of the Reformation: Essays in Late 
Medieval and Early Reformation Thought (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 
1986), chaps.1 and 2. 
33. See Pelikan, CT, IV, chap.1, "Doctrinal Pluralism in the 
Later Middle Ages". Cf. Oberman, The Dawn of the Reformation, 
where, in chap.1, the author develops his thesis of 'the pregnant 
plurality of fourteenth-century thought', 1. 
34. Pelikan, CT, IV: 68. 
35. Ibid. I 69ff. 
36. The final breach between Greek and Latin Christendom is usually 
assigned to the year 1054. In fact attempts at reconciliation 
were made by the Councils of Lyons (1274), and Florence (1438-
1439). These attempts were ultimately unsuccessful. See further 
Pelikan, CT, II: 270-280; II: 76-79. 
37. See Graus, "The Crisis of the Middle Ages and the Hussites"; 
Pelikan, CT, IV: 76ff. 
38. Pelikan, CT, IV: 79. 
39. Ibid., vol. IV: 71. 
40. Pelikan, CT, III: 230. 
41. This feature of early Christianity has already been referred to. 
Diversity in Christianity was not a patristic development but was 
present from the beginnings of the Christian Church. See J.D.G. 
Dunn, Unity and Diversity in the New Testament: An Inquiry into 
the Character of Earliest Christianity (London: SCM, 1977). The 
reasons for this feature of Christianity have been explored by 
Sykes, Identity, in terms of the dialectic between the traditions 
of 'inwardness' and 'externality'. 
42. The range and sophistication of ecclesiological responses to the 
ecclesial crises leading up to the sixteenth century has been ably 
examined by the Lutheran theologian Scott H. Hendrix, "In Quest 
of the Vera Ecclesia: The Crises of Late Medieval Ecclesiology", 
Viator: Medieval and Renaissance Studies VII(1976): 347-378. 
43. Ecclesial oneness is the theological presupposition of the search 
for the true church. Hendrix's failure to take account of this 
inter-relationship results in a not wholly satisfactory approach 
to Luther's ecclesiological concerns, a matter to be taken up 
later in this section. 
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44. The tendency from the fourteenth century to list truths of faith 
is discussed by George Tavard, Holy Writ or Holy Church: The 
Crisis of the Protestant Reformation (Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 1978) chaps.3 and 4; Congar, Tradition and 
Traditions, 95ff, 511ff; Gogan, The Common Corps of Christendom, 
chap.1 esp. 35f. 
45. See Hendrix, Vera Ecclesia, 358f; Tavard, Holy Writ, 29f. 
46. Cited in Tavard, Holy Writ, 30ff. 
47. For Wycliffe see Tavard, ibid., 37,40f; Congar, Tradition and 
Traditions, 512. For the categorising of truths see Tavard, 
Holy Writ, 30-37; Congar, Tradition and Traditions, 511f. 
48. Hendrix, Vera Ecclesia, 361. 
49. Ibid., 362-364. Cf. the discussion of Ockham's ecclesiology in 
Brian Tierney, Origins of Papal Infallibility 1150-1350, Studies 
in the History of Christian Thought VI (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1972), 
206-210; J. Morrall, "Ockham and Ecclesiology", Medieval Studies 
Presented to Aubrey Gwynn S.J., J.A. Watt et al. eds. (Dublin: 
Colm 0Lochlainn,1961), 481-491. 
50. Ockham's displacement of the authority of the institution 
in matters of faith, and his relocation of criteria for articles 
in the understanding, represented an important strategy by which 
the anxieties generated by nominalist thought could be 
alleviated. It was now the individual who had to take 
responsibility for assent to articles proposed for belief. One 
result was that faith could easily be privatised. It also meant 
that anxiety over disagreements in faith could no longer be 
solved by attempts to enforce uniformity or invoke some pre-given 
unity in truth. Another consequence of such developments was a 
gradual pruning of the range of communal belief deemed necessary 
for salvation. Both these implications of Ockham's handling of the 
faith can be traced in John Locke's reconstruction of the 
fundamental articles tradition. For reference to the influence of 
nominalism or 'particularism' in Locke see chap.5, p.117 and 148 
of this thesis. 
51. Hendrix, Vera Ecclesia, 365-370, discusses the variety of 
conciliarist ecclesiologies. In doing so he pays particular 
attention to what he calls Jean Gerson's (1363-1429) 'semen-
ecclesiology'. Consult also the discussion on this issue in 
Tavard, Holy Writ, chaps.3 and 4; Gogan, The Common Corps of 
Christendom, chap.1. 
52. Whilst this feature of the articles tradition is clearly 
implicit in the discussions of the 'truths of faith' in Tavard, 
Gogan, Hendrix and Congar, it can only be fully recognised as 
the ecclesiological contexts are brought more sharply into view. 
Hendrix achieves most success here. However the problem of the 
placement of the articles tradition within differing 
ecclesiological contexts is hinted at by Congar in Tradition and 
Traditions. He notes that Ockham, in enumerating his five 
categories of 'Catholic Truths', "was no longer speaking in terms 
of necessity for salvation, but merely in terms of an obligation 
to give, or freedom to withhold, one's assent, quibus non licet 
Christianis aliter dissentire", 512. It is not surprising then 
that Congar notes that "The notion of fundamental articles plays 
only a secondary and limited role in a rather technical sphere in 
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Catholic theology", 518. 
53. See Congar, "On the 'Hierarchia Veritatum'", 413ff. 
54. Thus Pelikan, CT, IV: 312-313, refers to Nicholas of Cusas' 
'trinitarian universalism' and notes that in Cusa's 
'Reconciliation between the World Religions' [De pace fidei] "his 
doctrine of catholic concordance found its counterpart in a quest 
for the concord of religions'', For further comment on Cusa see 
Pelikan, ibid., IV: 64-68, 98-103, 312-313; Lecler, Toleration and 
the Reformation, I: 107-110. 
55. See Lecler, Toleration and the Reformation, 110. 
56. See e.g. Gogan, The Common Corps of Christendom, 60-63. 
57. See Pelikan, CT, IV: 72-85. 
58. Ibid., 59-68. 
59. See chapters 16 and 18 on metaphysics and theories of knowledge in 
C.B. Schmitt general ed., The Cambridge History of Renaissance 
Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), esp. 
584, 596, 672-680. Cf.also Pelikan, CT, IV: 79. 
60. Thus Hendrix in Vera Ecclesia, makes the point that the 
ecclesiology of the Hussite movement could be absorbed within the 
Roman Church, whilst Luther's could not (374-376). 
61. See e.g. R.H. Bainton, "Erasmus and the Wesen des Christentums" 
in G. Muller and W. Zeller eds., Glaube Geist Geschichte: 
Festschrift fur Ernst Benz (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1967), 200-206; 
Lecler, Toleration and the Reformation, I: 114-133. 
62. This issue is illuminated in an insightful article by J.K. 
McConica "Erasmus and the Grammar of Consent" in J. Coppens ed., 
Scrinium Erasmianum, 2 vols.(Leiden: E.J. Brill,1969), II: 77-99. 
See also Gogan, The Common Corps of Christendom, 365-370 for 
discussion of Erasmus on 'consensus'. 
63. McConica, "Erasmus and the Grammar of Consent", 96. 
64. Ibid. I 88f. 
65. Ibid. I 89f. 
66. Ibid., 97f. 
67. This matter is controversial and it is not a debate that can be 
developed here, though it is worth noting that Hendrix, in Vera 
Ecclesia, is anxious to avoid the charge that Luther was guilty of 
a subjectivist and individualist faith. Hendrix argues that 
"ecclesiological concerns were at the centre of his theological 
development", 376f. This view is derived from Luther's consistent 
stress on "the dependence of the church on the word of Scripture 
and the definition of the church by that word". The importance of 
the Church as creatura verbi divini for Luther (and Calvin) has 
been recently argued by Christoph Schwobel, "The Creature of the 
Word: Recovering the Ecclesiology of the Reformers" in C. E. ·Gunton 
and D.W. Hardy eds. On Being the Church: Essays on the Christian 
Community 'Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1989), 110-155. Schwobel's 
thesis is that Luther's theology should be interpreted from the 
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fundamentally asymmetrical relationship of opus Dei and opus 
hominum. The Church is constituted by God's action not by human 
action. Here it seems that the field of human agency is one of 
response construed primarily in personalist terms. "The identity 
of the content of the revelation of God in Christ which is 
authenticated by the spirit for many people in many different 
historical situations and cultural contexts constitutes the unity 
of the Church", 127. The human community of witness is made 
possible by God's action which "creates the certainty which makes 
faith possible ... This certainty has to be understood as personal 
certainty, because it is created by the authentification of the 
Gospel of Christ for the individual believer", 131. Schwebel goes 
on to argue that in the forgiveness of sins God reconstitutes the 
relationship between God and man not only in respect of 'human 
personhood' 'but also' in respect of 'our created sociality as 
redeemed sociality'. However Schwobel's neat attempt to argue for 
a more fully social ecclesiology in Luther does not pay sufficient 
attention to the dynamic entailed in the movement from 
reconstitution of human personhood to ecclesial community. 
68. This reconstitution of the oneness of man and God in Christ had 
consequences for the social form of the Church; a fact that became 
increasingly obvious with the course of the reform. Cf. Schwebel, 
"The Creature of the Word", 116-121. 
69. Thus Pelikan, CT, IV: 156ff, rejects Harnack's contention that 
with Luther "the old dogmatic Christianity was abolished", arguing 
instead for Luther's fundamental 'reappropriation' of the dogmatic 
Christianity of Nicea and Chalcedon. The theological form of this 
reappropriation was the doctrine of justification by faith. 
70. Ibid., IV: 155-167. Cf. also Valeske, Hierarchia Veritatum, 108; 
and the discussion by Sykes on Luther and the centre of 
theology, Identity, 225, 320f. Notwithstanding the disagreement 
among Luther commentators on this issue, Sykes notes that "when 
Luther wants a critical criterion for other doctrines, especially 
in ecclesiology, he deploys justification by faith" (321 n.31). 
Note also Pelikan, CT, IV: 176, who refers to the Augsburg 
Confession, in which the doctrine of the ministry 'follows' the 
doctrine of justification. 
71. See e. g. F, W. Kantzenbach, "Problem der Fundamentalartikel", 546, 
who argues that Luther was not interested in an organically 
jointed system but in the qualitative organic wholeness of the 
Gospel - "der qualitativ - organischen Ganzheit des Evangelicems". 
Cf. B J, Verkamp, The Indifferent Mean: Adiaphorism in the English 
Reformation to 1554 (Athens, Ohio, Detroit, Michigan: Ohio & Wayne 
State University Presses, 1977), 96 and 109 n.18. 
72. Verkamp, The Indifferent Mean, 96, 110 n.20 & n.25. 
73. Ibid., 96, 110 n.23. 
74. Melancthon had an understanding of Church as a 'School', in which 
the latter image "stood for a doctrinal continuity that is real, 
historical and observable, like the visible aspect of the Church, 
yet visible not by institutions but by the process of teaching the 
Word". SeeP. Fraenkel, Testimonia Patrum: The Function of the 
Patristic Argument in the Theology of Philip Melancthon (Geneva, 
1961), 133f and chap.3 generally. Importantly Fraenkel points out 
that for Melancthon this development offered one option to renew 
the Church given the failure of the ecclesiastical institution. 
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75. See Weber, Foundations of Dogmatics II: 544ff; F. Hildebrandt, 
Melancthon: Alien or Ally? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1946), 27-33. Congar, Diversity and Communion, argues that 
Melancthon "betrayed Luther's insight by making faith a doctrine: 
Fundamentum intelligit (Paulus) articulos fidei, hoc est summam 
doctrinae christianae et doctrinam de beneficus Christi, 'Paul 
understands by foundation the articles of faith, that is the sum 
of Christian doctrine and the doctrine of the benefits of 
Christ'", 114. 
76. See e.g. John T. McNeill, Unitive Protestantism (London: Epworth 
Press, 1964), chap.4; Hildebrandt, Melancthon: Alien or Ally?, 
27-33, 78-98. 
77. On 'adiaphorism' in Melancthon see Hildebrandt, Melancthon: 
Alien or Ally?, 78-98. On Melancthon's appeal to the early church 
see P. Fraenkel, Testimonia Patrum. 
78. Thus the Catholic humanist George Cassander proposed a notion of 
'fundamental points' in his plan for the peace of Christendom in 
1561. His interest was not so much to conciliate all the 
differences between Protestants and Catholics but to focus on 
the essentials which he identified with the Apostolic Creed. 
"The whole Christ", he wrote, "is both Body and Head. One is 
only severed from the Head by a doctrine which is false and 
contrary to Scripture concerning Christ, our Head. One is 
separated from the body, that is, the Church, only by the loss of 
charity, and in no way by some diversity in rites and opinions" 
(Lecler, Toleration and the Reformation, I: 273). Thus for 
Cassander, "Every Church which is based on the true and Apostolic 
doctrine as contained in the brief Symbol of Faith, and which is 
not separated from the communion with other Churches by a wicked 
schism, I regard as the true Church, a member of the true Church 
and of the Catholic Church of Christ. And I say this not only of 
the Western Churches but also of the Eastern ones" (Lecler, 
ibid.). Cassander's formulation was an anticipation of what later 
became a popular theory of the fundamental articles, particularly 
among the ecumenically-minded of the seventeenth century. For 
further information on Cassander and his contemporaries see 
Lecler, I: 261-276. 
79. In 1554 Melancthon referred to the three marks of the true Church: 
"1. Agreement in the doctrine of the pure gospel, that is , in 
fundamentals, 11. proper use of the sacraments, 111. obedience 
owed, next to the gospel itself, to the ministry". See Paul D.L. 
Avis, The Church in the Theology of the Reformers (London: 
Marshall Morgan & Scott, 1981), 27. The new mark of the Church 
here was discipline however the definition of the pure gospel has 
also been further specified by reference to 'fundamentals'. 
80. See e.g. Brian Gerrish, The Old Protestantism and the New: Essays 
on the Reformation Heritage (Chicago, Edinburgh: University of 
Chicago Press, T & T Clark, 1982), chap.12. 
81. Ibid., and cf. Calvin's statement: "the schools 
the parents of all heresies, have deprived us of 
faith, which lies at the root of all godliness", 
the Christian Religion (1562 ed.) Bk.III, chap.15, 
of the Sorbonne, 
justification by 
Institutes of 
para.7. 
82. Schwebel, "The Creature of the Word", 138, notes the new 
problem confronting Calvin, i.e. of consolidating the Reformed 
community in relation to the radical wing of the Reformation. Cf. 
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Weber, Foundations of Dogmatics, II: 544ff, where the author 
discusses the Lutheran stress on 'pure doctrine' over against the 
Reformed emphasis on the 'pure Church', the differences being 
derived from different construals of the relationship between the 
Church visible and invisible. 
83. See e.g. Avis, The Church in the Theology of the Reformers, 
29-35, 40-43; T. F. Torrance, Kingdom and Church: A Study in the 
Theology of the Reformation (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1956), 
chap.4, wherein the author notes that, "In contrast to Luther 
Calvin laid greater emphasis upon the ecclesia externa sive 
visibilis. The Kingdom of Christ consists not only in the Gospel, 
not only in the hidden community of believers, but in the 
historical communication of the Gospel, and the building up of the 
Church on earth by human agency (humanitus)", 148. 
84. Torrance, Kingdom and Church, 154. 
85. Pelikan, CT, IV: 4. 
86. Calvin's most developed formulation appears in the Christian 
Institutes (1562), bk.IV, chap.l, para.12. Congar, Diversity and 
Communion (110), notes that this text is a straight quotation from 
the text of chap. 4 of the 1536 edition of the Institutes. Cf. 
also Institutes, bk.I, chap.13, para.21; bk.III, chap.5, para. 9. 
See also Verkamp, The Indifferent Mean, 96. 
87. Torrance, Kingdom and Church, 63. 
88. Ibid., 164. Cf. W. Nijenhuis, Ecclesia Reformats: Studies on the 
Reformation (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1972), on the concept of 
tolerance in Calvin, esp. in relation to the need for unity 
(chap. 6). 
89. Torrance, Kingdom and Church, 90-164 esp. 148f. See also 
McNeill, Unitive Protestantism, esp. chap.5. 
90. Torrance, Kingdom and Church, 73-89; McNeill, Unitive 
Protestantism, chap.4. 
91. It is right to speak of this tradition as an 'emergent' strategy 
to secure unity for, as W. Nijenhuis, Ecclesia Reformats, 
observes, "In the beginning of the Reformation the multiplicity 
of confessions did not necessarily indicate any 
confessionalistic narrow-mindedness but on the contrary may be 
taken as a sign of a certain ecumenical openness", 113. Cf. 
Weber, Foundations of Dogmatics, I: 114. 
92. See e.g. Pelikan, CT, IV: 274-289. 
93. See e. g. Congar, "On the Hierarchia Veritatum", 415ff. 
94. Ibid.; also Congar, Tradition and Traditions, 518f. 
95. One of the central themes of Hendrix's Vera Ecclesia is the 
ecclesiological variety of late medieval theology, a variety which 
intensified rather than diminished during the sixteenth century 
reformation. 
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1. William P. Haugaard, "From the Reformation to the Eighteenth 
Century" in Sykes & Booty eds., The Study of Anglicanism, 6. 
2. Ibid., 9 C.f. the comments of Oliver O'Donovan: "The Tudor 
Church has exercised the most profoundly formative role in 
determining what Anglicanism is ever since, in all its 
varieties, has been and now is. Each century has left its stamp 
on us; but the sixteenth century has determined the shape of the 
whole". See On the Thirty-Nine Articles: A Conversation with Tudor 
Christianity (Exeter: Paternoster Press, 1986), 12. 
3. Haugaard, "Reformation to the Eighteenth Century", 10. 
4. This judgement of Owen Chadwick [ The Reformation. The Pelican 
History of the Church, vol.3 (Penguin Books, 1964, 1978), 97.] is 
cited and endorsed by Schwobel,"The Creature of the Word", 112. 
5. Schwebel, ibid, claims that the precedence of legal over 
religious reformation "established a pattern in which 
ecclesiological issues were primarily treated as questions about 
polity and church-order and only then as questions about the 
nature and mission of the Church", 112. This contributed to a 
concentration "more on the problem of authority in the Church 
than on the primary question of the authority on which the 
Church is founded", 113. The author cites in support an article 
by RobertS. Paul, "'A Way to Wyn Them': Ecclesiology and Religion 
in the English Reformation" in B. A. Gerrish and R. Benedetto 
eds., Reformation Perennis: Essays on Calvin and the Reformation. 
In Honor of Ford Lewis Battles, Pittsburgh Theological Monograph 
Series XXXII (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: The Pickwick Press, 1981), 
103. Schwobel's endorsement of the 'political' character of the 
English Reformation, and his subsequent comments on authority, 
are too simplistic and do not cohere with the ecclesiological 
tradition associated with Richard Hooker as examined in this 
chapter. 
6. Haugaard, "Reformation to the Eighteenth Century", 10. 
7. See e.g. O'Donovan, On the Thirty-Nine Articles, 99ff. 
8. Haugaard, "Reformation to the Eighteenth Century", 18. 
9. See e.g. Sykes "Anglicanism and Protestantism", 118; O'Donovan, 
On the Thirty-Nine Articles, 14; A.G. Dickens, The English 
Reformation, rev. ed. (London, Glasgow: Collins, 1967), chap. 14; 
G. Elton, Reform and Reformation, esp. chap.7 on Thomas Starkey. 
10. See Carl S. Meyer, "Melancthon's Influence on English Thought in 
the Sixteenth Century", Miscellanes Historiae Ecclesiasticae 
(1967), vol.II: 163-185; James Kelsey McConica, English Humanists 
and Reformation Politics Under Henry VIII and Edward VI (Oxford; 
Clarendon Press, 1965), esp. chap.2. 
11. See the careful 
early stages of 
Indifferent Mean. 
analysis of the concept of adiaphora in 
the English Reformation by Verkamp, 
12. Haugaard, "Reformation to the Eighteenth Century", 6f. 
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13. Christopher Haigh, "The Recent Historiography of the English 
Reformation", The Historical Journal XXV/4 (1982): 995-1007. 
14. Dickens, The English Reformation, 262. 
15. Ibid. , 186ff, 264. 
16. Ibid., 336. 
17. See John B. Webster, " Ministry and Priesthood" in Sykes & Booty 
eds., The Study of Anglicanism. 
18. Consult: C. Hardwick, A History of the Articles of Religion 
(Cambridge: Deighton, Bell & Co., 1859); William P. Haugaard, 
Elizabeth and the English Reformation: The Struggle for a Stable 
Settlement of Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1968), chaps.! and 6; Articles by Peter Toon, ''The Articles and 
Homilies", and James Hartin, "Catechisms", in Sykes & Booty eds. 
The Study of Anglicanism; Charles Lloyd ed., Formularies of Faith 
1536-1543 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1825). 
19. For the various attempts at Canon Law revision see Haugaard, 
Elizabeth and the English Reformation, 17-18, 56-57, 70, 169-170, 
255-6, 278, 282 n.1. 
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98f and 101-104, where the author refers to Tillotson, 
Stillingfleet, and particularly Isaac Barrow (1630-1677). 
106. This position would later become central for John Locke's (1632-
1704) discussion of faith and reason in Book IV of his Essay 
concerning Human Understanding (1690). See chap.5 of this thesis. 
107. Religion of Protestants, 120, 130, 142 and his preface. 
108. Ibid., 121. 
109. Ibid., 125. 
110. Ibid., 125-134. 
111. Ibid., 134. 
112. See Shapiro, Probability and Certainty, 94-104. 
113. A Rational Account, 199. 
114. Ibid. 
115. Ibid., 200. 
116. Ibid. 
117. See chap.1 of this thesis p.14 and en.72. 
118. Andrewes wrote: "One canon reduced to writing by God himself, 
two testaments, three creeds, four general councils, five 
centuries, and the series of fathers in that period - the 
centuries that is, before Constantine, and two after, determine 
the boundary of our faith" ( McAdoo, The Spirit of Anglicanism, 
320). 
119. In Laud's A Relation of a Conference, he wrote, "for to believe 
the Scripture and the Creeds, to believe these in the sense of the 
ancient primitive Church, to receive the four great General 
Councils, so much magnified by antiquity, to believe all points of 
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doctrine, generally received as fundamental in the Church of 
Christ, is a faith in which to live and die cannot but give 
salvation", 379. See also Bull' s Defence of the Nicene Faith 
(1685) [The Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology; Oxford, 1855]. 
The implication of both these works was that the faith of the 
primitive church in the fundamentals was sufficient and secure. 
120. This had been detailed by the French Reformed patristic scholar 
Jean Daille (1594-1670), On the Use of the Fathers (French, 1632; 
English, 1651); refer The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian 
Church. 
121. See Shapiro, Probability and Certainty, 109. 
122. Religion of Protestants, 136. Cf. his comments on the creed 
which, according to the ancient Fathers contained a sufficient 
summary of the fundamentals - 'a matter very probable but not 
absolutely certain'. Though Chillingworth still wished to 
recognise the authority of the Fathers (177), he looked forward to 
future consensus in the faith and he thus hesitated to offer a 
final catalogue of fundamentals for fear that this might prejudice 
this possibility. A past consensus could not be determinative for 
him. See Robert R. Orr, Reason and Authority: The Thought of 
William Chillingworth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), chap.5 esp. 
138f. 
123. A Rational Account, 55. 
124. Religion of Protestants, 140. 
125. Cf. Orr, Reason and Authority, 169. 
126. Ibid., 130, where Orr notes that schism was so serious a 
matter to Chillingworth that doctrinal disagreement could not 
justify it. For Chillingworth "intellectual freedom rather than 
liberty of action" was uppermost. One had a moral duty to 
maintain a single cohesive society, a precondition for both 
intellectual and moral freedoms. 
127. See The Miscellaneous Theological 
(Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology, 
vol. II : 65-189. 
Works of Henry Hammond 
4, 1847-1850) 3 vols. in 
128. In a modern 
Anglicanism 
(Manchester: 
simply notes 
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work by John W. Packer, The 
1643-1660 with special reference 
University of Manchester Press, 
the publication of the work 
contents or significance. 
129. Of Fund8.1Dentals, 70f. 
130. Ibid., 74. 
131. Ibid., 98-116. 
132. Ibid., 90. 
Transformation of 
to Henry H8.1Dmond 
1969), the author 
(38), but nowhere 
133. The discussion relevant to the superstructure of piety 
indirectly concerned the first ten chapters and was directly 
addressed as the subject of the last nine chapters. In all, 72 
of the 120 page publication concerned the issue of the 
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superstructure of piety. 
134. Of Fundamentals, 123. 
135. Ibid., 146. 
136. See A Discourse of the Liberty of Prophesying in R. Heber ed. The 
Whole Works of the Right Rev. Jeremy Taylor, D.D., 15 vols. 
(London, 1822), vol.VIII: 218. 
137. See e.g. ibid., vol.VII: 496ff. 
138. See e.g. Gilbert Burnet's, Exposition of the Thirty-Nine 
Articles (1699), where the subject of fundamentals was treated in 
the course of his exposition of article XIX, 'Of the Church'. See 
esp. pp.241-247. Interestingly the subject of fundamentals was 
raised in Burnet's exposition of article VI, 'On the Sufficiency 
of Holy Scriptures for Salvation', but again the discussion 
resolves itself into the ecclesial question of the basis of the 
broken communion between the Roman Church and Protestants, 99ff. 
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THE LATER HISTORY OF THE TRADITION 
Selected Case Studies 
CHAPTER FIVE: LOCKE'S RECONSTRUCTION OF THE TRADITION 
1. See Sykes, Identity, 194. 
2. Unless otherwise indicated references to Locke in this 
are in respect of The Works of John Locke, 10 vols., 
Churchill & Manship, tenth ed. 1 1801). Cited as Works, 
by volume and page, e.g. Works V:6. 
chapter 
(London: 
followed 
(a) Locke advocated religious freedom. See his three Letters 
concerning Toleration (Works VI); and also J. T. Moore, "Locke on 
Assent and Toleration", Journal of Religion LVI I I ( Jan. 1978): 
330-336. 
(b) The subject that provoked .4n Essay concerning Human 
Understanding (1690) concerned, according to his friend James 
Tyrrell, 'the Principles of morality and revealed Religion' (see 
Nidditch ed. of the Essay, xix). Peter H. Nidditch's ed. of 
Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1975) is hereafter cited in the text as Essay, and in 
endnotes in the form: bk. chap. para., i.e. IV.1.1. Recent 
commentators have argued that the Essay had, as one of its aims, 
an inquiry into epistemology that would secure the foundation of 
religion. See John W. Yolton, John Locke and the Way of Ideas 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1956), 117; J.C. Biddle, 
"Locke's Critique of Innate Principles and Toland's Deism", 
Journal of the History of Ideas XXXVII ( July-Sept. 1976): 411-
417. 
(c) Locke's treatise on The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695) 
expounded his theological views in relation to the doctrine of 
justification. Towards the end of that work Locke commented that 
"justification" was "the subject of this present treatise"; see 
Works VII: 158. The publication of this work was followed by two 
vindications: A Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity 
From Mr. Edwards' Reflections (London, 1695); A Second 
Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity (London, 1697). 
See Works VI I . 
(d) Locke published a lengthy debate with the Bishop of Worcester, 
Edward Stillingfleet, over the theological sigificance of the 
Essay. Locke wrote two letters to Stillingfleet and gave replies 
to Stillingfleet's rejoinders to his letters. See A letter to the 
Right Rev. Edward Lord Bishop of Worcester, concerning some 
Passages relating to Mr. Locke's Essay of Human Understanding, in 
a late Discourse of his Lordship's in Vindication of the Trinity 
(London, 1696); Mr. Locke's Reply to the Bishop of Worcester's 
Answer to his Letter ••. (London, 1697); An Answer to Remarks upon 
an Essay concerning Human Understanding (London,1697); Mr. Locke's 
Reply to the Right Reverend The Lord Bishop of Worcester's Answer 
to his Second Letter (London, 1698). See Works IV. 
(e) Locke's latter days were spent in biblical studies. See A 
Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul to the Galatians, 
Corinthians, Romans, Ephesians, To which is Prefix'd, An Essay For 
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the Understanding of St. Paul's Epistles by Consulting St. Paul 
Himself (London, 1705-1707), See Works, VIII. Also see A 
Discourse of Miracles (1702), Works IX: 256-265. 
3. From Locke's Of the Conduct of the Understanding, Works IV: 166 
and cited in John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 259. 
4. Yolton, Locke and the Way of Ideas, esp. chap.5. 
5. Especially helpful here is the survey of relevant literature 
presented by Dewey D. Wallace, Jr., "Socinianism, Justification by 
Faith, and the sources of John Locke's The Reasonableness of 
Christianity", Journal of the History of Ideas XLV (Jan-
Mar. 1984): 49-66. The same author concludes that "He [Locke] was 
a major and influential, if not very original, formulator of the 
Latitudinarian and later 'rational Christian' interpretation of 
Christian revelation", 66. See also Biddle, "Locke's Critique of 
Innate Principles", 411-422; Samuel C. Pearson, Jr., "The Religion 
of John Locke and the character of His Thought", Journal of 
Religion LVIII (July 1978): 244-262; Merwyn S. Johnson, Locke on 
Freedom: An incisive study of the thought of John Locke (Austin, 
Texas: Best Printing Co., 1977), 
6. Thus Basil Willey states "Locke's main object in writing this 
treatise [The Reasonableness of Christianity] seems to have been 
to show how few and how simple the credal demands made upon us by 
Christianity, and how consonant with 'natural revelation' were its 
moral injunctions". The Seventeenth-Century: Background Studies 
in the thought of the age in relation to poetry and religion 
(London: ARC Paperbacks, 1986 ed.), 255. Cf. Emile Brehier, The 
Seventeenth Century (Chicago & London: University of Chicago 
Press, 1966), who notes that in The Reasonableness of Christianity 
Locke, "reduced all of the essential dogmas of Christianity to 
that which can be demonstrated by reason", 274. 
7. See Dunn, Political Thought of John Locke, 11-26, 
lays down the basis of his reinterpretation of 
following form: "one of the central expository 
throughout this book is the intimate dependence of 
high proportion of Locke's arguments for 
intelligibility, let alone plausibility, on 
theological commitments" (preface XI). 
245-261. Dunn 
Locke in the 
points made 
an extremely 
their very 
a series of 
8. See David C. Snyder, "Faith and Reason in Locke's Essay'', Journal 
of the History of Ideas XLVII (April-June, 1986): 197-213, for a 
survey of recent discussions on these matters. Snyder notes that 
where comments have not been perfunctory, interpretations of Locke 
on faith and reason 'differ wildly'. Thus Ashcraft maintains that 
Locke's views on faith and reason, whilst not adequate, remain 
coherent [R. Ashcraft, "Faith and Knowledge in Locke's Philosophy" 
in John Yolton ed. John Locke: Problems and Perspectives 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 194-223]. This 
view is challenged by Paul Helm who contends that Locke's views 
are confused and contradictory ["Locke on Faith and Knowledge", 
Philosophical Quarterly (1973) XXIII: 52-66]. Snyder argues for 
Locke's modification of an Aquinas 'complementarist' view of the 
relation between faith and reason where faith "adds to reason but 
the two operate in different spheres", 199. For Aquinas faith was 
assumed but room had to be made for reason. Locke reversed this in 
response to the process of secularization. Snyder concludes that 
Locke "was not quite the consistently Christian thinker that he 
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wished to be", 213. More recently S.N. Williams in "John Locke on 
the Status of Faith", Scottish Journal of Theology XL (1987): 591-
606, has offered a qualified defence of Locke against the charge 
of subjectivism in belief. Williams points to Locke's intention 
"to seek for religious belief a status that permits it to 
apprehend cognitively what reason cannot apprehend and to do so on 
unimpeachably rational grounds offered in terms of epistemological 
principles and their application", 605. 
9. See Johnson, Locke on Freedom, 12. 
10. See esp. Johnson, ibid . , chap. 7 "Full Freedom - The Relation to 
God"; W. Spellman, John Locke and the Problem of Depravity 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); Wallace "Socinianism, and Locke 
on Christianity". Johnson and Wallace differ markedly in their 
assessment of Locke's doctrine of justification, the former 
pointing to Locke's debt to the Reformed tradition for his 
understanding of justification, the latter regarding Locke's 
doctrines of justification and atonement as radical departures 
from Reformation Protestantism. See Johnson, 150-153, and 
Wallace, 56f. 
11. See Wallace, "Socianism and Locke on Christinaity," 50; Pearson, 
"The Religion of John Locke", esp.244, 248, 256. Biddle, "Locke's 
Critique of Innate Principles and Toland's Deism", argues that 
Locke "sought in the Essay to establish traditional revelation as 
the primary guide in that proper science and business of mankind, 
morality and religion", 417. Ashcraft, "Faith and Knowledge in 
Locke's Philosophy", shows a similar sympathy for Locke arguing 
that the apologetic task, begun in the Essay, was completed in The 
Reasonableness of Christianity (see 194, 198, 202, 218-19). 
Johnson, Locke on Freedom, goes so far as to claim that Locke's 
Christological doctrine anticipates nineteenth and twentieth 
century developments respecting the humanity of Christ and thereby 
does not 'eliminate' but give a new foundation to the doctrine of 
the Trinity, 150f. Locke is thus identified as a forerunner of 
Karl Barth ( 165 en.21)! 
12. The chief fault of modern contextual studies of Locke is that they 
fail to move beyond the level of historical inquiry in their 
assessments of Locke's theological views. Perhaps the one recent 
exception is Johnson, though he seems more interested in linking 
Locke to earlier Reformed theology. As a result there are a 
number of useful studies outlining how Locke's views were 
apologetical but we have few clues upon which to decide whether 
his programme was successful or unsuccessful and why. 
13. Thus e.g. Willey, The Seventeenth-Century Background, in chap.1 
"The Rejection of Scholasticism" writes: "Interest was now 
directed to the how, the manner of causation, not its why, its 
final cause", 11f. For other useful background material consult; 
G.R. Cragg, From Puritanism to the Age of Reason (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1950), chap.6; W. von Leyden, 
Seventeenth-Century Metaphysics (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. 
Ltd., 1968), esp. chap.2. 
14. See esp. Henry G. von Leeuwen, The Problem of Certainty in English 
Thought, 1630-1690 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), chap.5. 
15. Richard Rorty in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1980), chap.3, traces the 'epistemological turn' 
taken by Descartes in the seventeenth century, and its important 
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development in Locke's theory of knowledge. 
16. See e.g. Anders Wedberg, A History of Philosophy: The Modern Age 
to Romantlcism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), part one, "The 
Mechanistic World View in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries". Cf. R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of Nature (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1945), 3-9 and 93-112 more generally. 
17. Collingwood, ibid., 5. 
18. Cf. Francis Oakley, "Christian Theology and the Newtonian Science: 
The Rise of the Concept of the Laws of Nature", Church History 
XXX (1961): 433-457, who argues that the revival by late 
thirteenth century nominalist theologians of the semitic idea of 
an omnipotent Creator-God as an explanation for a new simplified 
view of nature provided the theological resources for the 
seventeenth century mechanistic physics (see 449f). 
19. For example, the doctrine of innate ideas functioned as a hitherto 
assumed internal ordering mechanism which offered the possibility 
of finding meaning in the world. The doctrine assumed that the 
meaning and truth of things was implicit in whatever was 
discovered and it was able to be ordered in relation to certain 
enduring principles. The doctrine in short supposed the operation 
of a set of meta-principles in terms of which all contingency 
could be understood. See en.52. 
20. See Wallace, "Socinianism and Locke on Christianity". 
21. This 'particularism' was fundamental for Locke. Thus he began his 
discussion of general terms in the Essay, III.3.1, with the 
statement "All Things, that exist, being Particulars ... ''. He 
returned to the theme in III.3.11. This particularism linked 
Locke to a nominalist tradition in philosophy which, as will 
be argued in section three of this chapter, was a crucial 
determinative factor in Locke's handling of the fundamental 
articles tradition. See further J.R. Milton, "John Locke and the 
Nominalist Tradition" in R. Brandt ed., John Locke Symposium 
Wolfenbuttel 1979 (Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1981), 
128-145. 
22. Willey, The Seventeenth-Century Background, 10-14. 
23. Ibid., 13. 
24. See Nidditch ed., 7. 
25. !.1.2. 
26. Ibid. 
27. Truth in its fullest extent was likened by Locke to a "vast Ocean 
of Being" (I.1.7). It was precisely this richness and depth which 
posed a danger to humankind who, without due regard for their own 
capacities, ventured beyond "a quiet and secure Possession of 
Truths, that most concern'd us ••. " into those depths which were 
"beyond their capacities",(ibid). The Essay was designed, in part 
at least, as a check to the overconfidences of man. 
28. "If we will disbelieve everything, because we cannot certainly know 
all things: we shall do much - what as wisely as he, who would not 
use his legs, but sit still and perish, because he had no Wings to 
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fly" (I.1.5). The sceptical spirit left one without hope, the 
overconfident zealot lived with much false hope. There was little 
difference insofar as both positions provided fertile ground for 
the generation of high social conflict without the hope of 
peaceful resolution. 
29. !.1.7. 
30. "Our Business here, is not to know all things, but those which 
concern our Conduct. If we can find out those Measures, whereby a 
rational Creature put in that State, which Man is in, in this 
World, may, and ought to govern his Opinions, and Actions 
depending thereon, we need not be troubled, that some other things 
escape our Knowledge" (I.1.6). 
31. See Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, who cites Kant's 
remark concerning "the physiology of the human understanding of 
the celebrated Mr. Locke", 138. 
32. I.l. 7. 
33. See above en.21. 
34. See e.g. II.1.24, where Locke referred to ideas of reflection as 
"the Impressions that are made on our Senses by outward Objects, 
that are extrinsical to the mind". In the receiving of 
impressions of 'outward Objects' the understanding is passive, 
"the mind is forced to receive the Impressions; and cannot avoid 
the perception of those Ideas that are annexed to them" ( 11.1.25; 
cf. 1!.9.1). 
35. II.1.2. The concept of experience was invoked by Locke as an 
answer to the question of the whence of the minds 'materials of 
Reason and Knowledge'. 
36. I I.l. 3. 
37. 11.6.1. 
38. II.1.4. 
39. II.1.4. 
40. 11.1.2. 
41. 1.1.8. 
42. Ibid. 
43. II.1.23. 
44. I 1.1. 24. 
45. Cf., 1!.9.1, where Locke referred to perception as being "the 
first faculty of the Mind, exercised about our Ideas; so it is the 
first and simplest Idea we have from Reflection ... ". 
46. See !.1.2. 
47. 1.4.23. 
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48. For Locke it was a question of being responsible for what 
knowledge one had. Given the origin of such knowledge this 
responsibility could only be properly exercised as one attended to 
the concrete and particular. This was to recognise what Locke 
could describe as "the first Capacity of Humane Intellect" wherein 
it was "fitted to receive the Impressions made on it" (II.1.24). 
This was 'the first step' one made towards the discovery of 
anything. To be thus responsible was akin to what Locke elsewhere 
referred to as "the principle exercise of Freedom" where one was 
enjoined to "stand still, open the eyes, look about .... " 
(II.21.67). 
49. II.1.25. 
50. See Lorenz Kruger, "The Concept of Experience in John Locke" in R. 
Brandt ed., John Locke Symposium Wolfenbuttel 1979, (Berlin & New 
York: Walter de Gruyter, 1981), 75 and 74-89 generally. 
51. Thus the goodness of a thing had its beginning in the pleasure and 
pain that accompanied experience. "It has therefore pleased our 
Wise Creator, to annex to several Objects, and to the Ideas which 
we receive from them, as also to several of our thoughts, a 
concomitant pleasure ... "(II.7.3). Pleasure and pain were present 
in sensation as a means to the directing of human beings along one 
course and not another. Direction towards the good began at this 
level. The fact that pleasure and pain had been so 'blended 
together' "in all the things that environ and affect us" (11.7.5), 
intensified the human drive towards the highest and purest good. 
52. The theory of innateness was for Locke, and a number of others 
before him, fatally flawed as a way of knowledge for science, 
morality and society. Locke carefully brought together in a 
sustained and focussed way the earlier attacks on the doctrine of 
innate ideas. His own vehement rejection of the doctrine was 
directly related to his empiricist position. Locke considered 
that the doctrine of innateness undermined any attempt to take 
contingency seriously. The theory of innateness supposed the mind 
to be 'imprinted' with certain foundational ideas from which could 
be derived human knowledge and moral order. Such "native beams of 
light"(I.2.27) provided "infallible certainties"(I.3.13) from 
which could be deduced equally certain conclusions. 
The theory not only made it easy to bypass the particular, it 
systematically thwarted efforts to reach the particularities of 
experience. Any such attempt was unnecessary because the 
foundational ideas were already delivered neat and formed prior to 
observation and experience. Innateness provided a way of coming 
to and managing experience but experience itself could not 
contribute to the generation of the ideas of the mind. In this way 
the doctrine of innate ideas demonstrated a basically negative 
disposition towards the whole notion of discovery as the expansion 
of human knowledge through careful attention to the structure of 
the created order. The enterprise of science was thus 
impoverished. 
In the sphere of conduct and morality the theory was largely 
vacuous since the rules or principles it proposed offered little 
guidance at the level of human action (I.3.18). At the level of 
society the doctrine provided, at least tacitly, a justification 
for the confident affirmations of many contrary op1n1ons among 
people which, remarked Locke, "great numbers are ready at any time 
to seal with their blood" (I.3.27). 
See Yolton, Locke and the Way of Ideas, chap.2, for a survey 
of the doctrine of innate knowledge prior to 1688. Locke was 
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aware of the modified version of the doctrine (as opposed to the 
naive form). This 'dispositional' theory claimed, said Yolton, 
"not that men were born with completed ideas and principles of 
morality but only that knowledge was implicit in the soul and 
merely required experience to elicit awareness of it," 39f. Locke 
apparently did not wish to dispute this, "he only wished to point 
out that in this form the theory claimed so little that it no 
longer merited the name 'innate'," 53. 
53. Locke discussed and classified the varieties of complex ideas in 
II.12-23. In II.12.1, Locke observed the transition from the 
'passive' mind in receipt of simple ideas from sensation and 
reflection, to "The Acts of the Mind wherein it exerts its Power 
over its simple Ideas,,", Furthermore "In this faculty of 
repeating and joining together its Ideas, the Mind has great power 
in varying and multiplying the Objects of its Thoughts, infinitely 
beyond what Sensation or Reflection furnished it with " 
(II.12.2). 
54. The image of the mind as a mirror was important for Locke. See 
II.1.25 & IV.2.6. The possibility of the mind's infinite 
mirroring and refraction of ideas is the supposition of Locke's 
recognition of the infinite number and endless variety of complex 
ideas that 'entertain the Thoughts of Men' (II.12.3). For further 
see Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, chap.3. 
55. Thus the idea one had of 'the incomprehensible supreme Being' was 
'made up' of simple ideas from reflection such that: "having from 
what we experiment in our selves, got the Ideas of Exisitence and 
Duration; of Knowledge and Power; of Pleasure and Happiness; and 
of several other qualities and Powers,,,, when we would frame an 
Idea the most suitable we can to the supreme Being, we enlarge 
every one of these with our Idea of Infinity; and so putting them 
together, make our complex Idea of God" (II.23.33). This was the 
way in which said Locke "we frame the best Idea of him our Minds 
are capable of" (II.23.34). This complex idea of God was the only 
kind of idea human beings could frame, notwithstanding the 
simplicity to be attributed to God's own essence of which nothing 
could be known (II.23.35). 
56. II.23.19. 
57. IV.l.l. 
58. IV.2. 
59. IV.2.1. 
60. Ibid. 
61. IV.2.2.2-6, esp. 
obtained through 
reflection. 
para.6, on the increasing dimness of knowledge 
discursive reasoning involving successive 
62. For this knowledge humans possessed evidence: "For I ask anyone, 
Whether he be not invincibly conscious to himself of a different 
Perception, when he looks on the Sun by day, and thinks on it by 
night " (IV.2-14). To be so 'invincibly conscious' was not a 
matter of faith or opinion. Locke's realism could not countenance 
such a sceptical alternative. 
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63. See IV.3.22-31. Locke's realism had widened the field over which 
knowledge could be won to include the category of real existence 
as well as relations between ideas. This same realism was also 
responsible for his rather sceptical view of the extent of 
possible knowledge. "When we consider the vast distance of the 
known and visible parts of the World, and the Reasons we have to 
think, that what lies within our Ken, is but a small part of the 
immense Universe, we shall then discover an huge Abyss of 
Ignorance" (IV.3.24). For further discussion see R.I. Aaron, John 
Locke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 231-237. 
64. The phrase appears in IV.3.23. Within Locke's schema the 
progressive restriction on the extent of knowledge could be 
attributed firstly, to the absence of any ideas at all, and 
secondly to the lack of clear and adequate ideas and finally to 
the inability of the human mind to make the proper connections 
between its ideas. 
65. Mathematical ideas, being of a relational kind, were necessarily 
real and adequate to the object intended (the ideas were their own 
archetypes). Within this field the possibilities for knowledge, 
through intuitive and demonstrative operations, appeared limitless 
(IV.3.18). Here demonstration depended 'not upon the sense'. It 
had the character of pure deduction with an apparent absence of 
inductive element. There was a certain irony here; the richness 
and purity of mathematical knowledge obtained for Locke precisely 
because this discipline operated at a distance from the world of 
external fact to which it was only tenuously related. Cf; 
IV.3.19; IV.4.13; IV.11.6, and discussion by Aaron, John Locke, 
233. 
66. IV.3.6. For Locke, sensitive knowledge related to existence only 
in its particularity (IV.11.13). Furthermore it only extended "as 
far as the present testimony of our Senses and no 
farther" (IV.11.9). Beyond this the nature of sensitive knowledge 
as knowledge was a little unclear. In Book II he had 
distinguished within the material world between primary and 
secondary qualities of substances; the latter representing "Powers 
to produce various sensations in us by their Primary Qualities" 
(II.8.10). Primary qualities were 'resemblances' of objects, 
however ideas produced by secondary qualities, had no resemblance 
to the objects at all. "There is nothing like our Ideas, existing 
in the Bodies themselves. They are in the Bodies, we denominate 
from them, only a power to produce those Sensations in us " 
(II.18.15). Whatever insights human beings had into the structure 
of things could be obtained only through attention to the way 
objects appeared to people by virtue of the operation of those 
powers produced by an object's secondary qualities (IV.3.10). 
In terms of raw knowledge, as it was considered in Book IV in 
relation to sensitive knowledge, the above conclusion was meagre 
indeed. Through observation one could point to certain operational 
laws 'that we know not' and of which only an 'experimental 
Knowledge' was discoverable. Locke was not optimistic. "From all 
which 'tis easy to perceive, what a darkness we are involved in, 
how little 'tis of Being, and the things that are, that we are 
capable to know" (IV.3.29). The pathway to knowledge via 
particular experience was necessarily indirect and required 
trained observation, meticulous examination and restrained 
conclusions. This was basically Locke's recipe for the method of 
natural philosophy. 
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85. IV.19.4. 
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94. IV.16.14. 
95. IV.18.2. 
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97. IV.18.5. 
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99. Ibid. 
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corresponds to what Snyder in " Faith and Reason in Locke's Essay" 
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validity of propositions of faith (which give, from this 
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belief, 206. 
101. IV.15.3 and IV.19.13. 
102. IV.16.13. 
103. IV.19.16. 
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Scripture as "an outward sign, of a mark of revelation". 90f. 
105. Yolton, ibid. 
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Reasonableness of Christianity. For further see T. Kato, "The 
Reasonableness in the Historical Light of the Essay" in The Locke 
Newsletter XII (1981): 45-59. Cf. Williams, "Locke on Faith", 
604f. 
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115. IV.19.14. 
116. R of C, 5. 
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120. Ibid., 102. 
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See Johnson, Locke on Freedom, 148. 
R of C, 16f. 
Ibid. I 5. 
Ibid. I 9. 
Ibid. I 20. 
Ibid. I 120. 
Spellman, Locke on Depravity, shows how Locke developed 
Reasonableness of Christianity from his associations with 
Dutch Remonstrant, Philippus van Limborch and the translator 
merchant William Popple. See 125-136. 
his 
the 
and 
128. ~These two, faith and repentence, i.e. believing Jesus to be the 
Messiah, and a good life, are the indispensible conditions of the 
new covenant, to be performed by all those who would obtain 
eternal life~, R of C, 104. 
129. Cf. Wallace, ~socianism and Locke on Christianity~, who notes: 
"The prominence of covenantal thinking in Puritan and Calvinist 
thought has long been a common place, but their view of the 
covenant always included the explanation that it was God's grace 
which enabled his elect to fulfill the terms of the covenant .... 
The emergence and prominence of a truly conditional covenant 
theology among later seventeenth-century Anglicans, however, has 
been given less attention than it deserves", 47. 
130. For Locke that which was most reliable and close to reality 
accorded with that which was given. The 'facts' were the given. 
Interpretation of the 'facts' was a second order exercise carried 
out by fallible human beings. The facts were intelligible in and 
of themselves insofar as they were identified with the literal or 
historical sense, Here fact and meaning implode. See further on 
this Hans W. Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics (New Haven & 
London: Yale University Press, 1974), 75-123. 
131. R of C, 157. 
132. Ibid. I 32f. 
133. Ibid., 146. 
134. Ibid., 33f. Later on Locke took some pains to indicate the reason 
for Jesus' reserve concerning the messianic claim. The true marks 
of Messiahship - purity of life , miracles, his conformity to all 
the preconditions concerning him - clearly showed his status. The 
absence of any direct declarations by Jesus to the above enabled 
him to live out this Messianic life in a full and complete way 
until the time of his death. To have proclaimed publically his 
Messiahship would have meant running the risk of being confused 
with false Jewish notions of Messiahship which would have 
prematurely cut short his mission at the hands of Roman 
authorities. His Messiahship, to remain pure, had to be clear to 
the Jews but in such a way as to protect him from the Roman 
authorities. See R of C, 81f. 
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Works, vol. V. 
170. Ibid., 276. 
171. Ibid. 
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raise the problem of Locke's theory of universals. Aaron, John 
Locke, has identified three different strands to Locke's theory of 
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representative capacity, (b) that in which consists the common 
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sense of the economy of salvation. It was in this sense a 
particular event which 'stood for' other particular events [sense 
(a)]. However, included within this affirmation was of course the 
supposition of belief in One God (Hebrews 6: 1-2). It also 
included what Locke later referred to as the concomitant articles 
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176. Spellman, ibid, 1 171. 
177. See Locke's Works IV: 110, 95. 
178. Ibid., 230. 
179. Ibid. I 338. 
180. Ibid. 
181. Ibid. I 154, 338, 477. 
182. Ibid., 305, 311. 
183. Ibid., 197. 
184. Ibid., 198. 
185. Ibid., 197. 
186. Ibid., 96. 
187. Ibid. 
188. Ibid., 114. 
189. Ibid., 303. 
447 
V: Endnotes 
190. Ibid., 324. 
191. Ibid., 343. 
192. Ibid., 348. 
193. Ibid., 275, 334. 
194. See Yolton, Locke and the Way of Ideas, 10, 140. 
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investment in the foundation-superstructure analogy encouraged 
this atomizing view of statements of faith (chap.4 p.95-97). Henry 
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overmuch (1740); An Appeal to all that Doubt, or Disbelieve the 
Truths of the gospel, whether They be Deists, Arians, Socinians, 
or Nominal Christians. In which the true Grounds and reasons of 
the whole Christian Faith and Life are plainly and fully 
demonstrated (1740); Some Animadversions upon Dr. Trapp's late 
Reply (1740). For Law's engagement with Jacob Boehme consult: 
Walker, William Law, chap.10; Rupp, Religion in England, 232-240. 
Rupp (234) points to Law's digression in his attack upon Hoadly's 
eucharistic doctrine [Demonstration of Fundamental Errors (1737)], 
as the first real indication of Law's new preoccupation with 
Boehme and the mystical tradition. In Animadversions upon Dr. 
Trapp (1740), Law expressly acknowledged his debt to Boehme and 
the whole mystical tradition, V: 204f. 
102. Animadversions upon Dr. Trapp, VI: 206. 
103. Ibid.; cf. Christian Regeneration, V: 167f. 
104. Ibid., 160. 
105. Demonstration of Fundamental Errors, V: 131. 
106. In Animadversions upon Dr. Trapp, Law articulated a doctrine of 
enthusiasm as "the common Condition of human life in all its 
States, our prevailing Fire of Life", V:199. Atheists were 'dark 
Enthusiasts' but 'enthusiasm' was also operating where "a worldly 
Spirit, the Schools, Criticism, and Controversy have so dried, and 
deadened every Thing [in Scripture] into an outward Letter and 
figurative Expression", 205. It was clear from Law's argument 
that he felt Dr. Trapp belonged to this latter category of 
enthusiasm. 
107. An Appeal to all that Doubt, VI: 92. 
108. Animadversions upon Dr. Trapp, VI: 203. 
109. Demonstration of Fundamental Errors, V: 11. Law's point was that 
a 'bare' literalistic understanding of the words of institution 
rendered unintelligible the 'chief articles' of salvation. 
110. Answer to Dr. Trapp's Discourse, VI: 19; cf. Animadversions upon 
Dr. Trapp, VI: 200. 
111. Ibid., 19. 
112. See Hoyle, The Edges of Augustanism, chap.7. 
113. Hoyle, ibid., states that "Byrom and Law belong to the few outside 
the French Enlightenment who felt the full force of Locke's 
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philosophy", 87. 
114. See, The Way to Divine Knowledge: Being several Dialogues between 
Humanus, Academicus, Rusticus and Theophilus (1752), VII: 153. 
115. Hoyle, The Edges of .4ugustanism, 101. 
116. The Way to Divine Knowledge, VII: 150. 
117. Ibid., 153. 
118. Ibid. I 151. 
119. Ibid., 152. 
120. A Short but Sufficient Confutation of the Reverend Dr. Warburton's 
Projected Defence (As he calls it) of Christianity, in his Divine 
Legation of Moses (1757), VIII: 212. 
121. Animadversions upon Dr. Trapp, VI: 204. 
122. The relationship between the thought of Law and Boehme has been 
discussed by most commentators on Law. Talon, William Law, points 
out that Law had an "intense need both of mystical knowledge and 
intellectual certainty, and was in quest of a 'system' which could 
answer at once the desires of his heart and the demands of his 
mind", 59. Boehme satisfied this need; however Talon notes Law's 
selective use of Boehme, 61ff. There is a suggestion implicit in 
Rupp's recent useful discussion of the subject, that the theme of 
'energy' was a vital link between Law and Boehme. See Religion 
in England, 234. Hoyle, The Edges of Augustanism, notes that "the 
structure of Law's thought depended on his interpretation of Jacob 
Boehme. From the German mystic Law felt he could derive a 
scientifically based ideology", 83. Importantly Hoyle points to 
Law's philosophy as being "primarily derived from Boehme, as an 
instrument to sharpen his critique of latitudinarianism", though 
he goes on to note that this philosophy "became in Law's hands a 
vision of life as well as a method of reasoning", 115. 
Austin, in his introduction to Law in The Classics of Western 
Spirituality sums up thus: "The general sense of commentaries on 
their [Law and Boehme] relationship would have it that Law selects 
from Boehme, omits the too esoteric, and gives a simplified 
version of the system; and I think this by and large true", 26. 
However Austin makes the pertinent observation that "the doctrine 
of Boehme, chiefly, when stripped of its alchemy and theosophy, is 
good Evangelical Protestant mysticism", 26. Austin concludes that 
in his judgement "Law professed and felt an indebtedness and a 
reverence for Boehme which was partly adventitious, and he 
attributed to Boehme much which he had already read in the earlier 
mystics but was earlier not ready to accept - his 'pride of the 
intellect', his logic powers, and his sheer English common sense 
had first to give way", 26. Law, for his part, though more than 
ready to acknowledge his debt to Boehme, was his 'own carver', 
unwilling to write upon a subject until he 'could call it my own'. 
See Animadversions upon Dr. Trapp, VI: 204; and Demonstration of 
Fundamental Errors, V: 100. 
123. Christian Regeneration, V: 136. 
124. This was how Law, in his later work, The Spirit of Love, expressed 
his intention in the Appeal to all that Doubt. See VIII: 77. 
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125. Christian Regeneration, V: 155 
126. Law's adoption of Boehme's early seventeenth century alchemic 
symbolism made it almost inevitable that his work would be 
misunderstood. See Underhill, Mysticism, for a discussion of 
Boehme's alchemic conceptuality (140-148, 263, 469-472). Underhill 
refers to the triumph in the eighteenth century of the activist 
stream in mysticism as the Quietist movement faded. This in part 
accounts for the renewed interest in Boehme, whose difficult and 
obscure mystical vocabulary had by then also become antiquated. 
See also Rupp, Religion in England, 239f. Hoyle, The Edges of 
Augustanism, notes Law's anachronistic philosophy, and observes 
that his "militant and systematic thought has many advanced 
features which belie its surface obscurantism", 3. In this 
respect Hoyle later argues that the perpetuation by Law of a pre-
Enlightenment structure for supporting the existence of an inward 
ground or imagination - i.e. by interpreting as metaphysical 
realties the microscopic correspondences of the previous century -
gave rise to a dynamic theory of the 'little world of man' which 
prefigured Blake's later development of the concept of energy. See 
144f. 
127. Appeal to all that Doubt, VI: 90. Law thus concluded "Therefore, 
0 Man! look well to thyself, and see what Birth thou art bringing 
forth, what Nature is growing up in Thee ... ", 106. Consideration 
of the working of one's will exposed the evil within and led to 
the cry for mercy and regeneration in Christ. In an important 
sense Law's focus on interiority marked him out as a theologian of 
the consciousness as such. Thus Flew, The Idea of Perfection, 
states that Law "owes his influence primarily to his appeal to the 
conscience of mankind", 293. Hoyle, The Edges of Augustanism, 
observes: "The substitution of 'inward light' for 'the spacious 
firmament', is of the essence of Byrom and Law's critique of the 
religious consciousness of the English Enlightenment", 101. Cf. 
Christian Regeneration, V: 152: "Repentance is but a kind of 
Table-Talk, till we see so much of the Deformity of our inward 
Nature"; Demonstration of Fundamental Errors, V: 103. 
128. Demonstration of Fundamental Errors, V: 94. 
129. Christian Regeneration, V: 144. 
130. Ibid., 143. 
131. Appeal to all that Doubt, VI: 67, 117. 
132. See Spurgeon, "William Law and the Mystics", 319; Flew, The Idea 
of Perfection, 306. Cf. Christian Regeneration, V: 144. 
133. The Way to Divine Knowledge, VII: 171. 
134. See e.g. Appeal to all that Doubt, where Law refers to thinking, 
willing and desire as qualities which in and of themselves are 
good. The problem arises when such qualities become separated and 
disunited: "And thus that some Strength and Quality, which in 
Creatures making a right use of their own Will, or Self-motion, 
becomes their Goodness and Perfection, doth in Creatures making a 
wrong Use of their Will, become their evil and mischievous 
Nature", VI: 68. It is thus a matter of the right use and 
direction of human capacities for reason, imagination and will. 
135. Christian Regeneration, V: 172. 
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136. Ibid., 140ff. 
137. The Way to Divine Knowledge, VII: 180. 
138. See e.g. Christian Regeneration, V: 165; Appeal to all that Doubt, 
VI: 90, 103. 
139. Demonstration of Fundamental Errors, V:76; Christian Regeneration, 
V: 145. Cf. The Way to Divine Knowledge, VII: 181f. 
140. Christian Regeneration, Y:156; cf. Demonstration of Fundamental 
Errors, V: 74f. 
141. See e.g. The Way to Divine Knowledge, VII: 181; cf. Flew, The Idea 
of Perfection, 307. 
142. Law developed the notion of the 'process' of Christ in relation to 
the economy of salvation. See Appeal to all that Doubt, VI: 144f, 
149; The Way to Divine Knowledge, VII: 200; The Spirit of Love, 
VIII: 82-90, 145, 251. The historicity of the events involved in 
this process - birth, life, death, resurrection, ascension - was 
simply assumed. Law was concerned to look beyond such facts to 
their significance for human participation in the life of God. For 
further see Underhill, Mysticism, 118ff. Cf. Rupp, Religion in 
England, who argues that Law's attention to the 'Christ process' 
indicated a failure to attend to the true humanity of Christ, 237. 
Rupp's point is fair, but Law's originality ought not to be 
lost sight of. The presupposition of the 'Christ process' was, for 
Law, Christ's taking upon himself 'the Life of fallen Nature'. 
Furthermore, the overcoming of his sufferings and entitlement to 
be the saviour "could only consist in his acting in, and with a 
Spirit suitable to the first created State of perfect Man; that 
is, He must in his Spirit be as much above all Good and Evil of 
this fallen World, as the first Man was", VIII: 88. What then 
seems to mark the 'process' is Christ's "living wholly and solely 
to God". Presupposed here is the operation of the Holy Spirit. 
What law seems to have been pushing towards was a spirit-centred 
anthropology, though the context is the necessity of the 
sufferings of Christ in fallen humanity. The Holy Spirit is the 
raiser of humanity, of which Christ was the prototype. 
143. This was implicit in Law's emphasis on Christian discipleship as 
an imitation of Christ's life. See above pp.215 and en.76. Cf. 
Appeal to all that Doubt, VI: 144f. Later in Of Justification by 
Faith and Works. A Dialogue between a Methodist and a Churchman 
(1760), the concepts of imitation and 'process' were nicely 
linked: "Nothing brings Death upon the old Man, but that one self-
denying Process of Christ; Nothing gives life to the new Man, but 
the one Spirit of Christ born in it. This is the Gospel-Language 
from the Beginning to the End", IX: 251. 
144. Christian Regeneration, V: 163. 
145. Demonstration of Fundamental Errors, V: 82. 
146. "Now as this Hell, Serpent, Worm, and Death, are all within us, 
rising up in the Forms and Essences of our fallen Soul; so our 
Redeemer, or Regenerator, whatever it be, must be also equally 
within us, and spring up from as great a Depth in our Nature". 
Christian Regeneration, V: 154, and generally 152-156. 
147. Demonstration of Fundamental Errors, V: 87. 
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148. Appeal to all that Doubt, VI: 105. 
149. Christian Regeneration, V: 142. 
150. Appeal to all that Doubt, VI: 128. 
151. Ibid., 47. 
152. Ibid., 140. 
153. Christian Regeneration, V: 152. 
154. Appeal to all that Doubt, VI: 83. 
155. Christian Regeneration, V: 161f. 
156. Demonstration of Fundamental Errors, V: 11. 
157. Animadversions upon Dr. Trapp, VI: 200. 
158. Ibid., 169. 
159. Ibid., 184. 
160. Ibid. 
161. Ibid., 186. 
162. Ibid., 183. 
163. Ibid., 169. 
164. Appeal to all that Doubt, VI: 83. 
165. Ibid.; cf. Animadversions upon Dr. Trapp, VI: 200. 
166. Ibid., 23. 
167. Ibid. 
168. Animadversions upon Dr. Trapp, VI: 201. 
169. Ibid. 
170. The Spirit of Love, VI II: 1-133. 
171. Ibid., 1-2. 
172. Ibid., 61. 
173. Ibid., 35. 
174. Ibid., 10. 
175. Ibid., 35. 
176. Ibid., 4. 
177. Ibid., 5. 
178. Ibid., 4. 
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179. Ibid. I 9. 
180. Ibid. I 37. 
181. Ibid. I 42. 
182. Ibid. I 42f, 55. 
183. Ibid. I 39. 
184. Ibid. I 55. 
185. Ibid. 
186. Ibid. I 36. 
187. Ibid. I 66. 
188. See Warren's introduction to William Law in The Classics of 
Western Spirituality, 30. 
189. The Spirit of Love, VIII: 89f; cf. Appeal to all that Doubt, VI: 
148. 
190. Ibid. I 76, 78. 
191. Ibid. I 74. 
192. Ibid., 74f. 
193. Ibid. I 80, 84. 
194. Ibid. I 96. 
195. Ibid. I 83. 
196. Ibid. I 91. 
197. Ibid. I 92. 
198. Appeal to all that Doubt, VI: 149. 
199. The Spirit of Love, VIII: 81. 
200. Ibid., 85. 
201. Ibid. I 83. 
202. Ibid., 101. 
203. Ibid. I 103. 
204. Ibid., 100. 
205. Ibid. I 10. 
206. Ibid., 27 and more generally 22-31, for Law's discussion of the 
seven properties of nature in relation to the action of the Spirit 
of Love. "The Spirit of Love is a Spirit of Nature and Life •• ", 
23. For further see Walker, William Law, 102f, 190f, 195. 
207. Ibid., 21. 
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208. Thus Law's purpose in employing the Boehmean notion of the 
properties of nature was to uncover the dynamics by which godly 
human life was generated from within ungodliness, i.e. from within 
rather than outside of human nature. See The Spirit of Love, 
VIII: 24, on the property of 'fire'. In more modern terms Law is 
concerned with the dynamics of existential transformation. To 
point to the confusions and logical difficulties of the structure 
of the properties is surely to miss the point. See Walker, 
William Law, 239. 
209. The Way to Divine Knowledge, VII: 262. 
210. Ibid., 190. 
211. Thus in The Spirit of Love, Law argued that Deism was false, a 
"fanatic Product of pure Imagination •.•.. because it quite 
disregards the Nature of Things, stands wholly upon a supernatural 
Ground" going above and contrary to the 'Powers of Nature', VIII: 
93; cf. Appeal to all that Doubt: "If thou turnest in towards 
thyself, to live to thyself, to be happy in the Workings of an own 
Will, .... [thou] canst only have such a Life, Spirit and Blessing 
from God, as a Thistle has from the Sun", VI: 62. 
Furthermore, Law refused to make too strict a division between 
reason and imagination stating that the latter "signifies no 
distinct faculty from our reason, but only reason acting upon our 
own ideas". The Case of Reason or Natural Religion, Fairly and 
Fully Stated. In Answer to a Book, entitled, Christianity as old 
as the Creation, II: 133. 
212. Animadversions upon Dr. Trapp, VI: 197. 
213. Appeal to all that Doubt, VI: 134. 
214. See above p.224. 
215. Appeal to all that Doubt, VI: 72. 
216. See the important discussion of Law's development of imagination 
and reason in Hoyle, The Edges of Augustanism, chap.12. Talon, 
William Law, notes Law's disparagement of reason but suggests that 
Coleridge's 'Reason' and Law's 'sensibility of the soul' or 'light 
of his heart', differ more in verbal expression than the reality 
they stand for, 26ff. See Demonstration of Fundamental Errors, V: 
115-118. Law was clearly moving towards the rehabilitation of a 
fuller notion of reason which derived its visionary capacity from 
God himself. 
217. The Way to Divine Knowledge, VII: 218. 
218. The Spirit of Love, VIII: 128. 
219. Ibid. I 125ff. 
220. Ibid. I 131. 
221. This is how Grant, Mysticism in the Western Tradition (93), 
interprets the self and ego in Law and Boethius. 
222. The Spirit of Love, VIII: 132. 
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223. Thus in Christian Regeneration, Law writes : "I will grant you all 
that you can suppose, of the Goodness of God, and that no Creature 
will be finally lost, but what Infinite Love cannot save", V: 158. 
224. Animadversions upon Dr. Trapp, VI: 197. 
225. In chap.5 of this thesis, it was argued that Locke's way of 
knowledge presupposed that human beings gave form to truth without 
themselves being truth formed; see e.g. 119, 158f. 
226. A favourite passage of Law was Acts 17.28: "In him we live and 
move and have our Being". God's 'all-in-allness' meant for Law 
"that he can give us nothing but himself, nor any Degree of 
Salvation, but in such Degree as he communicates something more of 
himself". See Demonstration of Fundamental Errors, V: 87. 
227. See esp. The Way to Divine Knowledge, where Law, speaking through 
the mouth of John the simple shepherd, indicated that no scholar 
was needed to unravel the vision of the heavenly worship around 
the Throne of God in Revelation 4:2f. The vision did not belong 
to the category of riddle but rather of richness. In the vision 
the whole matter was apprehended "as if a Glance of the Majesty of 
Heaven had just passed by me". The whole thing was given and 
apprehended but only caught in 'a glance'. Genuine communication 
was assumed but the 'glance' required and invited further 
unfolding. See VII: 188. 
228. Cf. Zinzendorf's effort in 1747 to transpose the Augsburg 
Confession into a 'creed of the heart' in Twenty-One Discourses on 
the Augsburg Confession. "The twenty-one discourses did not 
correspond to the 'summary of doctrines' in the first twenty-one 
articles of the confession, but recast both the sequence and the 
content of those articles". See Pelikan, The Christian Tradition, 
V: 125. Pelikan notes that the Discourses did not open with the 
doctrine of God as Trinity as the Augsburg Confession had "but 
with an examination of the 'vast difference' between doctrine and 
faith, between 'being a believer' and merely 'acknowledging a 
truth'". 
229. Appeal to all that Doubt, VI: 82. 
230. Ibid., 25. 
231. Ibid., 62; cf. The Way to Divine Knowledge, VII: 218. 
232. Thus John Booty observes of Law: "His plan of devotional exercises 
in A Serious Call may seem impossible given the conditions of our 
modern lives. But then, true devotion may seem impossible. The 
Spirit of Love concerns the motivation which makes the impossible 
more nearly possible". See William Law, The Classics of Western 
Spirituality, 5. Austin Warren, in the same volume, almost 
reverses this, observing that for Law "The higher stages 
[mysticism] presuppose the lower [asceticism}", 32. 
Law recognized that 'the Masters of Morality and human 
Discipline' might 'tame and reform the outward Man' but it was 
only when the Spirit of God - 'the One Good and One Life' - had 
its birth in man "that the free genuine Works of Goodness flow 
forth with the Freedom of the Divine Life, wherewith the Spirit of 
God has made us free". In this condition one could do the "Works 
of Heaven with a cheerful and willing Mind". Such 'angelic 
Goodness' was thus done in freedom and joy. See The Way to Divine 
Knowledge, VII: 158. 
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233. Appeal to all that Doubt, VI: 82. 
234. Ibid., 67. 
235. Ibid., 61. 
236. Ibid., 102. 
237. Ibid., 82. 
238. See the discussion by Hoyle, The Edges of Augustanism, chap.lO 
239. Appeal to all that Doubt, VI: 82. 
240. Ibid., 83. 
241. Ibid., 89: "Now, the one great Doctrine of the Christian Religion 
and which includes all the rest, is this, that Adam, by his Sin, 
died to the Kingdom of Heaven, or that the Divine Life 
extinguished in him; That he cannot be redeemed, or restored to 
this first Divine Life, but by having it kindled or regenerated in 
him by the Son and the Holy Spirit of God". 
242. See e.g. The Spirit of love, VIII: 72f. In refuting the notion of 
wrath in God, Law states that "the Incarnation and Sufferings of 
Christ come from, and are given to us by the infinite antecedent 
Love of God for us, and are the gracious Effects of his own Love 
and Goodness towards us". Thus Law wants to talk about the mercy 
and benefits of Christ as "the free antecedent Gift of God Himself 
to us". 
243. Law equates 'Perfection of Life' with the life of 'angelic 
Goodness' - a possibility for mankind by virtue of the new birth 
of Christ within and the arising of 'the heavenly angelic Nature'. 
See The Way to Divine Knowledge, VII: 154ff, 166. 
244. Appeal to all that Doubt, VI: 57. 
245. Christian Regeneration, V: 177. 
246. The Spirit of Love, VIII: 129. 
247. Appeal to all that Doubt, VI: 73. 
248. Ibid., 82. 
249. Ibid., 83. 
250. Law was clearly operating within a tradition of Protestant 
aesthetics in which the writer understood himself or herself as an 
imitator of God's own creativity. The poet's model was the Bible 
which, by its very nature as God's word, stimulated rather than 
restricted the divine poet's highest flights. In this context 
logos realism authorized an abundance of free flowing expression. 
Law's prose represents a transposition of this understanding of 
poetry into prose. See Barbara K. Lewalski, Protestant Poetics 
and the Seventeenth-Century Religious Lyric (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979), esp. chap. 8 on John 
Donne. 
This feature of Law's later mystical theology has been 
examined by Talon, William Law, 85-96. Cf. Rupp's more critical 
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comment, "It has sometimes been said that Law's prose improved in 
his later writings. There seems more evidence that it was spoiled 
by being Teutonized .. ", Religion in England, 240. 
251. "Study not therefore how to find fault with me, or to dislike the 
Words, or Manner of my Style, for it is the Style of Love and Zeal 
for your Salvation •.. ". Demonstration of Fundamental Errors, V: 
84 
252. The Spirit of Love, VI I I: 108. Cf. Letter VI. ''In Answer to a 
Question", IX: 161. In commenting upon Christ's words "If any Man 
will be my Disciple, let him deny himself, take up his Cross 
daily, and follow me", Law said that "to read this one single Line 
of Christ, is to be led into the open, full Truth of the whole 
Nature, both of the Fall and Redemption". 
253. The Spirit of Love, VIII: 45. 
254. Ibid., 105. 
255. Ibid. 
256. Ibid., 105f. 
257. For Law, theology was the communication of the beauty of God's 
presence in the world and pre-eminently in humankind. It was 
correlated to the call of the Gospel to repentance and holiness of 
life in imitation of Christ. Stating the truth was completed in 
its performance in a virtuous habit of life. Yet such performance 
included the stating of the truth apprehended. Doctrine was 
directed to performance and belonged to a moment in that process. 
The purifying of the theological tradition thus contributed to the 
renewal of Christian discipleship. In more modern terms Law's 
mystical theology was nothing less than the theory of holy 
practice. For a useful recent discussion of descriptive and 
transformative functions of language in mystical awareness see 
Frederick J. Streng, "Language and Mystical Awareness" in Steven 
T. Kutz, ed., Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis (London: 
258. 
259. 
260. 
261. 
262. 
263. 
264. 
265. 
266. 
267. 
Sheldon Press, 1978), 150-157. Streng notes that "mystical 
language functions to recondition the expectations about the 
subjective factors in one's experience", 154. 
Ibid. I 41. 
Ibid. I 106. 
Ibid. I 108. 
Ibid. I 113. 
Address to the Clergy, IX: 94. 
Ibid. I 100. 
A Serious Call, 47. 
Letter I to Mr. J. L, IX: 41. 
Ibid. I 110. 
Address to the Clergy, IX: 41. 
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268. Ibid., 78f. 
269. Ibid., 93. 
270. Ibid., 48. 
271. Ibid., 114ff. 
272. Ibid., 117. 
273. Ibid., 118. 
274. Ibid. 
275. Letter VI. "In Answer to a Question", IX: 160. 
276. See e.g. Appeal to all that Doubt, VI: 147: "And to ascribe our 
Deliverance from Sin, or the Remission of our Sins more to the 
Life and Actions, than to the Death of Christ, or to his Death 
more than to his Resurrection and Ascension, is directly contrary 
to the plain Letter and Tenor of the Scripture, which speaks of 
all these Things as jointly qualifying our Lord to be the all-
sufficient Redeemer of Mankind; and when speaking separately of 
any of them, ascribes the same Power, Efficacy, and redeeming 
Virtue to one as to the other". 
Cf. "Every Part therefore of our Saviour's Character, or 
Process, has its full and equal Share in all that, which is said 
of him, as our Peace with God, our Righteousness, our 
Justification, our Ransom, our Atonement, our Satisfaction, our 
Life and new Birth; for all these different Expressions have no 
difference in Doctrine, but whether separately, or jointly taken, 
signify nothing else, but this one Thing, that he was the true and 
full Destroyer of all the Works of the Devil in Man, and the true 
Raiser of a Divine Life, in all that died in Adam •... Thus it 
was, and to this End, that 'God was in Christ Jesus' in his whole 
Process" (Letter IV. "In Answer to a Scruple", IX: 139). The co-
inherence of all doctrine was the logic of Law's view that the 
'sole End' of all doctrines was the imitation of Christ whose 
being co-inhered in God's (e.g. "Love is the Christ of God"). 
See, Christian Perfection, III: 216; The Spirit of Prayer, VIII: 
108. 
277. Letter VI. "In Answer to a Question", IX: 160f. 
278. Address to the Clergy, IX: 72. 
279. See chap.12 of this thesis on institutionality and belief. 
280. The Way to Divine Knowledge, VII: 202. 
281. Appeal to all that Doubt, VI: 66. 
282. The Spirit of Love, VI II: 21. "Light and Love ... was made Flesh 
to redeem the fallen Humanity first, and after that the whole 
material System". 
283. See Flew, The Idea of Perfection: "But the fact remains that 
nowhere is the thought of the communio sanctorum dwelt upon and 
drawn out as though it were congenial to the writer's [Law] mind", 
304. Cf. Rupp, Religion in England, who refers to the absence in 
Law of what Wesley called 'social holiness', 237. The 
relationship between inner life and social vision continues to be 
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discussed by writers on mysticism. See e.g. Rufus Jones, The 
Testimony of the Soul (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1936), chap.3 
"The Inner Life and the Social Order"; cf. R. Inge, Outspoken 
Essays (First Series) [London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1924], 
chap.9 "Mysticism and Institutionalism". 
284. The Way to Divine Knowledge, VII: 182. 
285. Ibid. 
286. Ibid., 183. 
287. Christian Regeneration, VI: 168. 
288. The Way to Divine Knowledge, VII: 183. 
CHAPTER EIGHT: SOME POST-ENLIGHTENMENT DEVELOPMENTS 
1. Thus Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690) can be 
understood as an inquiry into the capacity of human beings for 
making reliable judgements in relation to that objective reality 
which presents itself to an essentially passive human receptor. 
See e.g. Essay Bk.II, chap.1, para.24 and 25; c.f. Bk.II, chap.9, 
para.1. 
2. Kant's thoroughgoing 'turn to the subject' entailed not merely a 
modification of Locke's crude realism, but a radical disjunction 
between reality, and reality as assimilated by human beings. 
Human apprehension of reality was already shaped by the 
constructive activity of the human subject. Reality was both 
encountered and produced by human reason. Thus Kant argued that 
whilst reason must approach nature in order to be taught by it, 
"It must not, however, do so in the character of a pupil who 
listens to everything that the teacher chooses to say, but as an 
appointed judge who compels the witnesses to answer questions 
which he himself formulated". From Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, 
trans. N.K. Smith (London: Macmillan, 1933). In Kantian terms 
there can be no pure mediation of objective reality, reality is 
necessarily subjective; 'the thing-in-itself' is inaccessible as 
such. Cf. Thomas F. Torrance, Theological Science (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1969), 88f. 
3. See Livingstone, Modern Christian Thought, 68, and more generally 
63-76. According to Kant, belief in God is a rational postulate -
a necessary transcendental condition of morality - based on the 
requirements of practical reason. Such belief operates as a 
regulative ideal for morality. Accordingly, the doctrines of 
Church faith are, properly understood, particular constructions 
designed to further the claims of the moral law, and have neither 
their source nor reference in anything beyond the human 
understanding. Cf. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, on "The 
Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason", 532-549. 
4. For Kant symbolic anthropomorphism is legitimate because it 
concerns language only and not the object itself. Such language 
consists of statements about relations in which a concept of God 
remains for us, while God himself remains unknown. "The symbolic 
anthropomorphism, which Kant asserts as his position in his 
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analogous talk about God, has the very function of keeping God out 
of the world with the help of language". See Eberhard Jiingel, God 
as the Mystery of the World: On the Foundation of the Theology of 
the Crucified One in the Dispute between Theism and Atheism, 
trans., D.L. Guder (Grand Rapids, Michigan: W.B. Eerdmans 
Pub. ,1983), 279, and his fuller discussion 261-281. Accordingly 
Jiingel states: "In the last resort Kant is a deist", 58. 
5. See Livingston, Modern Christian Thought, chap.4. 
6. Schleiermacher developed his analysis of religion in his 
programmatic work, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured 
Despisers (1799), trans. by John Oman (New York: Harper & Row 
Pub., 1958). 
7. The following discussion of Coleridge on the articles tradition 
focuses on his later work, Aids to Reflection in the formation 
of a manly character on the several grounds of prudence, 
morality and religion, illustrated by select passages from our 
elder divines, especially from Archbishop Leighton (1825) as 
published in Bohn's Standard Library ed. of Coleridge's works as, 
Aids to Reflection and The Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit, to 
which are added His Essay on Faith and the Book of Common Prayer 
etc. (London & New York: George Bell & Sons, 1893). References 
will give title (AR- i.e. Aids to Reflection), and page number in 
above ed. 
8. See Essay on Faith, ibid, 345, where 'Reason' is referred to as 
'supersensual' and 'super-sensuous'; and cf. AR, 115, where 
Coleridge speaks of Reason as the 'Organ of Wisdom'. In this 
faculty human beings are capacitated for communion with God: 
"Whenever by self-subjection to this universal light, the will of 
the individual, the particular will, has become a will of reason, 
the man is regenerate: and reason is then the spirit of the 
regenerated man, whereby the person is capable of a quickening 
inter-communion with the Divine Spirit", (AR, 143). Reason in 
this respect had to be carefully identified in relation to 
understanding. See AR, 143-156: "On the Difference in Kind of 
Reason and the Understanding"; and cf. Essay on Faith, 341-349. 
9. Essay on Faith, 346. 
10. Ibid., 346ff. 
11. For Coleridge what man was - "his proper being his truest self, 
the man in the man" - was nothing less than the inbreathed life 
of God (AR, 4). Thus, from Coleridge's point of view, human 
reason and will, when properly used, "were seen to correspond to 
the divine reason and will which were themselves trinitarian in 
form". See Daniel W. Hardy, "Created and Redeemed Sociality" in 
Gunton and Hardy eds., On Being the Church. 
12. Engell, The Creative Imagination, 365. 
13. Ibid., 362-366, for an account of how Coleridge attempted to 
reconcile his dynamic philosophy with traditional Christianity. 
Engell draws out the important parallel between the logos as 
'communicative intellect in Man and Deity', as symbolised in the 
Scriptures and Christ, with the operation of the creative 
imagination. This of course is not surprising given Coleridge's 
attempt to interconnect logos as 'Reason' with the reasoning and 
willing activity in man. Cf. Coleridge's Essay on Faith. 
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14. Thus Coleridge notes that Reason "is a direct aspect of Truth, 
an inward beholding" (AR, 148), "the source of living and actual 
Truths" (AR, 115). Faith is not something different from, but the 
continuation of, reason beyond its own horizon. See J. Robert 
Barth, S.J., Coleridge and Christian Doctrine (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1969), 50. From this position Coleridge 
understood the peculiar doctrines of the Christian faith "Reason 
in its highest form of Self-affirmation'' (AR, xviii). However so 
to state the case was to move beyond the regulative ideas of 
reason in Kant. "Coleridge wished to assign ontological reality 
and validity to these (and later to other) ideas". See James D. 
Boulger, Coleridge as Religious Thinker (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1961), 75ff. It was the 'Higher Reason' (i.e. 
'than merely speculative reason'), that gave validity to Kant's 
merely regulative ideas, and could provide what Coleridge called 
'a Safety-lamp for religious inquirers' (AR, 114), i.e. a way of 
affirming conventional orthodoxy, albeit from a practical point of 
view. See further Livingston, Modern Christian Thought, 87-96. 
15. Thus in the Biographia Literaria Coleridge stated: "an IDEA, in 
the highest sense of that word, cannot be conveyed but by a 
symbol"; cited by Barth, Coleridge and Christian Doctrine, 21. 
This symbolising activity was the work of imagination, "that 
reconciling and mediatory power, which incorporating the Reason in 
Images of the Sense, and organizing (as it were) the flux of the 
Senses by the permanence and self-circling energies of the Reason, 
gives birth to a system of symbols, harmonious in themselves, and 
consubstantial with the truths, of which they are the conductors". 
[From Stateman's Manual (29) as cited in Engel!, The Creative 
Imagination, 338]. The point here is that "Reason must be 
transformed into a symbolic, sensual language before it can inform 
other faculties or communicate truth" (Engel!, ibid). Imagination 
gives reason a language and the ability to appear in concrete 
forms, yet since man's deepest apprehension of God and the 
spiritual life has no adequate expression then even the most vivid 
symbol "is only an approximation to that absolute Union, which the 
soul..... yearns after". (From the Friend quoted in Engel!, ibid, 
363). Thus symbolic expressions cannot but express "The same 
subject but with a difference" (AR, 136). Accordingly doctrine, 
and especially those peculiar doctrines of Christianity, genuinely 
mediate though never exhaust the truth symbolised. For further 
see chap.11 en.11 of this thesis. 
16. Revealed truths could be safely believed insofar as one focussed 
on their practical and personal significance. See AR, 108, 114, 
120; cf., Livingston, commenting on Coleridge in Modern Christian 
Thought: "Dogmas accepted by intellect or authority alone, and not 
evidenced by being lived in practice, are the very opposite of 
spiritual truths, for such truths are inextricably related to the 
moral Will", 91. 
17. AR, 134. 
18. AR, 120: 
realized], 
must have 
discuss the 
"Revelation must have assured it (i.e. the truth 
my Conscience required it - or in some way or other I 
an interest in this belief". Coleridge proceeds to 
doctrine of the Trinity in this light. 
19. AR, 195. Here Coleridge focuses on the doctrine's existential 
and moral significance, avoiding needless controversy on original 
sin as a consequence of Adam's fall; see generally, 188-195. 
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20. AR, 108, 113. 
21. .4R, 113. 
22. AR, 136. 
23. AR, 231, where Coleridge cites from Jeremy Taylor's, The Worthy 
Communicant. Cf. Boulger, Coleridge as Religious Thinker, who 
refers to Coleridge's quest for the constitutive principles of 
human beings in the emotional, 'volitional' and intellectual 
domains, 92. 
24. AR, 269. 
25. Thus in the Preface to AR, Coleridge gives, as one of his 
reasons for writing, "To exhibit a full and consistent Scheme of 
the Christian dispensation, and more largely of all the peculiar 
doctrines of the Christian Faith ... ", xviii. 
26. .4R, xviii. 
27. AR, 210. 
28. Coleridge here refers explicitly to 
essentials of Christian faith' ( AR, 
'fundamental truths' in .4R, 158. 
29. AR, 199. 
30. AR, 142. 
'the fundamental articles or 
210); cf. the reference to 
31. For Coleridge, the being and operation of the universe 
presupposed an antecedent unity - "a Universal Power, as the cause 
and pre-condition of the harmony of all particular Wholes" which, 
in relation to the existence of intelligent and self-conscious 
Beings - 'the great community of Persons' - meant a "One universal 
Presence, a One present to all and in all" ( AR, 40f). Though for 
Coleridge God's oneness was Triune (AR, 116ff), From this derives 
Coleridge's conception of the oneness of truth, which leads him to 
assert the impossibility of contradiction between truth learned 
from special revelation and truth learned from one's own 
reflections. The source of all truth is God, thus there can be no 
religion which is not revealed (AR, 120). Thus when it comes to 
the peculiar doctrines of Christianity, they belong in scripture 
'as organized parts of a great organic whole' (AR, 108). See 
further Barth, Coleridge and Christian Doctrine, 44ff; and Engel!, 
The Creative Imagination, 362-366. 
32. AR, 157. 
33. AR, 158. 
34. AR, 130. 
35. AR, 130. 
36. AR, 194f; cf. 206. 
37. AR, 195. 
38. .4R, 198. 
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39. AR, 130. 
40. AR, 170. 
41. AR, 241; cf. 140, 168, 232. 
42. AR, 130. 
43. See AR, xvi, where Coleridge, in speaking of the Christian faith, 
included in parenthesis in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd eds.: "in which I 
include every article of belief and doctrine professed by the 
first Reformers in common". Cf., 102f, 130f; and cf. Confessions 
of an Inquiring Spirit in same val., where Coleridge outlines "the 
creed, or system of credenda, common to all the Fathers of the 
Reformation overlooking, as non-essential, the differences 
between the several Reformed Churches", 292. 
44. AR, 103. 
45. This organic view belongs to Coleridge's understanding of the 
unity of all things in God (see above en.31), and the 
significance of linguistic symbolization in the communication of 
truth (see above en.15). Accordingly, Coleridge writes in the 
preface to AR, "For if words are not THINGS, they are LIVING 
POWERS, by which the things of most importance to mankind are 
actuated, combined and humanized", xix. Stephen Prickett comments 
about this verse that Coleridge is clearly thinking in terms of 
organic growth. Plato's ideas are dynamised. See Romanticism and 
Religion: The Tradition of Coleridge and Wordsworth in the 
Victorian Church (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 
30. Insofar as the Christian faith is for Coleridge 'the 
perfection of human intelligence' (AR, preface xvi. ), it is clear 
that doctrine will be fundamentally organic discourse upon a 
single but highly differentiated subject. Thus Coleridge states: 
46. 
47. 
48. 
49. 
50. 
51. 
"I affirm that the article of the Trinity is Religion is Reason 
and that there neither is nor can be any Reasons, any 
Religion, but what is or is a.n expansion of the Truth of the 
Trinity' [last sequence my italics; cited in Engel!, The Creative 
Imagination, 364]. 
AR, 198. 
AR, 168; and cf. AR, 116ff and above en. 45. 
AR, 210, 223. 
AR, 209. 
AR, 125. 
AR, 247. 
52. So Coleridge could state: "My inward Creed, as a Christian, 
remains without subtraction or addition as it stands in the Aids 
to Reflection .... My outward Creed is the Apostles as expanded in 
the Nicene" (cited in Barth, Coleridge and Christian Doctrine, 
101). Cf. "The sublime and obtruse doctrines of Christian belief 
belong to the Church; but the faith of the individual, centered in 
his heart, is or may be collateral to them. Faith is subjective. I 
throw myself in adoration before God, acknowledge myself his 
creature simple, weak, lost; and pray for help and pardon 
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through Jesus Christ; but when I rise from my knees, I discuss the 
doctrine of the Trinity as I would a problem in geometry; in the 
same temper of mind, I mean, not by the same process of reasoning, 
of course" (From Coleridge's Table Talk on 'Faith and Belief'; 
cited in Boulger, Coleridge as Religious Thinker, 199). 
53. AR, 258ff. 
54. Thus Bougler, Coleridge as Religious Thinker, refers to 
Coleridge's development of an "existential, empirical relationship 
between subjective consciousness and the historical facts of 
Christianity", 85. From a different angle Prickett, Romanticism 
and Religion, identifies Coleridge as one who looked at religion 
'from within' and in this way uncovered the inner rationale of 
Christianity as a conjunction of facts and experience, 266. 
55. Cf. AR, 269, where Coleridge criticises Descartes' mechanistic 
conceptions which produced "Nothingness and Phantom from the 
Plenti tude of Reality". 
56. Cf. Hardy, "Created and Redeemed Sociality", 23f. Cf. 
Prickett's criticism of the ascription to Coleridge of a 
'constructivist' account of Christian truth. See Romanticism and 
Religion, 27. 
57. AR, 1. 
58. Simeon's major work was his Horae Homileticae: or, Discourses 
now digested into one continued series, and forming a commentary 
upon every book of the Old and New Testament, 21 vols. (London: 
Holdsworth & Ball, 1832). Refer also to A. Pollard and M. Hennell 
eds., Charles Simeon 1759-1836: Essays Written in Commemoration of 
his Bi-Centenary by Members of the Evangelical Fellowship for 
Theological Literature, (London: SPCK, 1959). 
59. See Horae Homileticae, I: xx (preface); and cf. XIV: Sermon on 
"The Importance of the Leading Doctrines of the Gospel". 
60. Ibid., XV: 312-321, on "Predestination Considered", where Simeon 
notes that though the doctrine is important, nevertheless for 
those who cannot yet receive it, he exhorts them to pursue those 
matters 'of primary and fundamental importance', 317; cf. XIX: 
260f. Simeon also argued that the doctrine of assurance was not 
to be made an article necessary to salvation (XXI: 426). 
61. Ibid., I: xxv (preface). 
62. Ibid., 1: xv (preface). 
63. The quotation is from William Caries, ed., Memories of the Life 
of the Rev. Charles Simeon (Hatchard, 1848), 600; cited in 
Evangelical Preaching: An Anthology of Sermons, ed. with intro. by 
John Stott (Portland, Oregon: Multnomah Press, 1986), 35. 
64. Horae Homileticae, 1: xxiii (preface). 
65. Ibid., e.g. sermons on "The Gospel Message", XII: 196-211 and 
XXI: 409-427; "Christ Crucified", XVI: 32-48; "The Churchman's 
Confession", XVI: 406-421. 
66. Ibid., XIV: 163. Cf. XIX: 521: "the truth is that the way of 
salvation ••.. is very plain and simple: it is all comprehended in 
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these few words 'Faith working by love'". 
67. See e.g. ibid., XIV: 64f, where union with Christ is said to be 
"the most sublime and most important doctrine of our holy 
religion ...... the very cornerstone of religion". Cf. XVI: 32-48, 
sermon on the doctrine of Christ crucified; and XI: 221-225, "The 
Single Eye", where Simeon notes: "While Christianity in general, 
is allowed to be both good and necessary, there is scarcely any 
regard paid to its particular, and most distinguishing tenets. Its 
fundamental doctrines, such as original sin, justification by 
faith, regeneration by the Holy Spirit, are discarded as 
erroneous; and its most essential precepts of holiness and self-
denial are ridiculed as preciseness and enthusiasm", 223. 
68. Ibid., XVII: 82; and cf. XIV: 378-383. 
69. Ibid., XII: 198. 
70. Ibid., XIV: 136; and cf. XVII: 338f; XX: 478. 
il. Ibid., XIV: 136. 
72. See his four sermons on the Holy Spirit delivered before the 
University of Cambridge in ibid., XV: 209-264; and cf. his comment 
in relation to these sermons in I: xxvii (preface). The doctrine 
of the Holy Spirit was central. See Pollard and Hennell, Charles 
Simeon, 69. 
73. Ibid., XVI: 92. 
74. Ibid. I XIX: 1. 
75. Ibid. I XX: 537f. Cf. Pollard and Hennell, Charles Simeon, 55. 
76. Ibid., XIV: 437. 
77. Ibid., XVI: 419. 
78. Ibid. I II: 274. 
79. Ibid., II: 268. Simeon was eager to soften the application of 
the damnatory clauses of the Athanasian Creed which he considered 
an exception to the liturgy's moderation and candour. "The 
damnatory clauses should be understood only in reference to the 
doctrine affirmed, and not be extended to the parts which are 
adduced only in confirmation of it", 272. Thus if one believed 
that the doctrine of the Trinity was a 'fundamental article of the 
Christian faith', one could, said Simeon, 'without any breach of 
clarity' apply to that doctrine the damnatory clause. 
80. Ibid. 
81. The development of the 'School of Waterland' in the late 
eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth century has been 
traced by Nockles, Continuity and Change in Anglican High 
Churchmanship in Britain, 1792-1850. Esp. see chap.2 "The Rule 
of Faith", for the significance of the principle of 'fundamentals' 
for the School of Waterland, and the way in which Nockles 
understands this principle to have been abandoned by the 
Tractarians. 
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Coleridge was critical of Paley's latitudinarianism and 
preoccupation with external evidences for Christianity. See AR, 
232, 271ff. 
83. See William Van Mildert, An Inquiry i11to the General Principles 
of Scripture-Interpretation, Bampton Lectures for 1814, 3rd. 
ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1831), esp. Sermon 5. 
84. Ibid., 119. 
85. Ibid., 117-127; and cf. his notes on pp.305-315 for Van Mildert's 
useful list of sources. For reference to Christian Priesthood see 
125f. 
86. Van Mildert, Bampton Lectures, 126. 
87. Cf. Discussion in chap.1 p.20 of this thesis of the observation of 
the Roman Catholic Yves Congar that Catholic theology has, in 
recent times, focussed more on the formal authority for faith 
rather than its content. The declaration of Papal Infallibility 
in 1870 exemplified this development. Avis, Anglicanism and the 
Christian Church, notes that Palmer "departs from the mainstream 
of Anglican ecclesiology in not availing himself of the concept of 
fundamentals as the basis of unity", 178. Caution is required 
here. Palmer, in his appendix "On the Doctrine of Fundamentals", 
rejected the use of the term 'fundamentals' as leading to 
ambiguity. He did not doubt that a distinction was to be made 
between matters of faith and other doctrines, however he was 
critical of attempts "by human reasoning to weigh the importance 
of truths certainly revealed by Christ, relatively to each other 
..• [for] it is a necessary preliminary to any examination of the 
relative importance of doctrines, because Christian doctrines are 
so conatenated, that without a perfect view of all, it would be 
impossible even to attempt their comparison", 130. Thus behind 
the apparent rejection of the theory of fundamentals lay Palmer's 
fear of rationalism. It led him to reject unity in the faith as a 
visible mark of the Church of Christ, on the premise that it was 
too difficult an exercise to determine whether in fact any church 
actually maintained a unity in the orthodox faith (Treatise on the 
Church of Christ, vol.I, chap.5, sec.4). This of course led 
Palmer to reject that English tradition which had recognised the 
ecclesial status of the Nestorian and Monophysite churches by 
virtue of their adherence to the orthodox faith. They were "no 
part of the church of Christ, for .•.• the assumption that they 
hold what are called fundamental doctrines, and are therefore free 
from heresy, is founded on an uncertain and arbitrary distinction" 
(vol.I: 422). 
However the matter was not quite so simple. Palmer could 
refer to the "most vital truths of Christianity" including the 
doctrines of the "Trinity, the real divinity of Jesus Christ, 
Original Sin, etc" (vol.II: 34). Later he spoke of those 'not 
many' doctrines which "constitute the very heart of the christian 
religion" (vol.II: 125). Here he referred to those doctrines 
"extending little beyond the Nicene faith, the right doctrine of 
the trinity, incarnation, and grace" (ibid.). Palmer eschewed the 
use of the 'term' fundamentals but had not forfeited a notion of 
what was fundamental. His criteria here were the sanction of 
Scripture and the consent of the Universal Church. This provided a 
bulwark against the threat of rationalism and it was carried 
through into his ecclesiology where a heavy investment was placed 
upon what Avis has referred to as the 'apostolic paradigm'. The 
fundamentals apologia was, to this extent, rejected. Such was 
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the authority of the Universal Church for Palmer that he could 
argue that "when all lawful conditions are observed, individuals 
are not justified in opposing their own opinion to the decree of 
the universal church" (vol.II: 125). Palmer did not envisage 
future universal decrees adding new articles of faith, though 
there was an element of truth in Newman's claim that Palmer's 
ecclesiological principle implied that the faith was capable of 
development. See "Palmer's View of Faith and Unity" in Essa.vs 
Historical and Critical, vol.I: 212. The threat of rationalism 
led Palmer to reject the deployment of the fundamentals concept. 
However in doing so Palmer had developed a way of handling 
fundamentals discussion which had affinities with another strand 
in the high church tradition which could be identified with, among 
others, Herbert Thorndike (see Avis, Anglicanism, 147-150). 
See above en.87. In chap.4 p.103 of this thesis it was shown ho~enry Dodwell the elder (1641-1711) had developed a doctrine of 
the Bishop in the Church as the great fundamental for the securing 
of all other fundamentals. In such an ecclesiology the episcopal 
symbol operates as the bulwark against a rationalist reductionism 
in the faith. 
89. See Louis Allen, John Henry Newman and the Abbe Jager (London 
& New York: Oxford University Press, 1975). 
90. See esp. lectures 9 and 10 "On The Essentials of the Gospel". 
91. Consult Newman's Apologia Pro Vita Sua (1864), esp. parts 5 and 6. 
From 1839 Newman saw the 'hitch' in the Anglican argument: "I 
could not prove that the Anglican communion was an integral part 
of the One Church, on the ground of its being Apostolic or 
Catholic, without reasoning in favour of what are commonly called 
the Roman corruptions; and I could not defend our separation from 
Rome without using arguments prejudicial to those great doctrines 
concerning our Lord, which are the very foundation of the 
Christian religion. The Via Media was an impossible idea ... ", 
148. The radical rewor~ing of the doctrine of fundamentals that 
this view implied, bec'lne apparent in his 1843 sermon on "The 
Theory of Developments in Religious Doctrine" [in Newman's 
University Sermons, with intro. essays by D.M.MacKinnon and 
J.D.Holmes (London: SPCK, 1970), sermon 15.], and later in his 
Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine (1845). 
92. See e.g: Sykes, Identity, chap.5; Nicholas Lash, Newman on 
Development: The Search for an Explanation in History (London: 
Sheed & Ward, 1975); and more recently Stephen Thomas, Newman on 
Heresy: The Anglican Writings (Unpublished Ph.D thesis, Durham, 
1988). In particular, Thomas' study of Newman contains important 
discussion on Newman's handling of orthodoxy and the fundamental 
articles tradition. 
93. Sykes, Identity, 120. 
94. "Dr Wiseman's Lectures on The Catholic Church", The British 
Critic, Quarterly Theological Review, and Ecclesiastical Record, 
XX (1836): 373-403. Here, 383. 
95. See Tract 85 on "Scripture and Creed", in Discussions and 
Arguments on Various Subjects (London, 1873), 125, 127f. Newman 
was familiar with Edward Hawkins' comment: "In general too the 
more fundamental the doctrine, (unless it were a point 
particularly controverted at the time) the more likely would it be 
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rather to be implied, than directly taught, in the writings of the 
apostles addressed to societies of Christians, instructed without 
doubt by previous oral communication in the more elementary 
articles of belief". See A Dissertation Upon the Use and 
Importance of Unauthoritative Tradition, as an Introduction to the 
Christian Doctrines; Including the substance of a Sermon, Preached 
before the University of Oxford, May 31, 1818, Upon 2 Thess. II. 
15. (Oxford, 1819), 64. 
96. See The Via Media, vol. I, Lecture 8, "The Indefectibility of the 
Church", esp. 199-207. Newman was unwilling to specify exactly 
when unity was lost: "The principle is clear, the fact 
obscure", 207. He seemed content to align himself with those who 
placed the onset of schism around the fourth or fifth centuries, 
205-209. Cf. Allen, Newman and the Abbe Jager, 33. 
97. Via Media, vol. I, Lecture 9 "On the Essentials of the Gospel" 
217ff. The Nicene and Apostles Creed are said to be 'identical', 
the 'homoousion' being "merely an explanation of a great article 
of faith held from the first",227f. Cf. Allen, Newman and the Abbe 
Jager, 40, 44, 91f, 98. It seems that the authority of Nicea has 
a parallel for Newman in the Articles of Religion. However the 
issue is far from clear. Thomas, in Newman on Heresy (268), 
suggests that for Newman the 'homoousion' has the status of a 
'true but not necessary' article of belief. This recalls John 
Frith's treatment of the doctrine of transubstantiation, the 
ecclesiological significance he gave to the issue, and the 
difficulty this imported into the notion of adiaphora. See chap.3 
p.75 of this thesis. The category of 'true yet not necessary' is 
a category that emerges when ecclesiological issues dominate. In 
this context Thomas' suggestion makes sense of Newman's handling 
of the 'homoousion'. It would accordingly be a true expression of 
the Apostolic creed but not necessary for purposes of church 
communion. If the Nicene and Apostolic creeds were 'identical', 
Newman had in fact given himself a puzzle. 
98. Cf. John Jebb, Peculiar Character of the Church of England as 
distinguished both from other branches of the Reformation, and 
from the modern Church of Rome (London: Rivingtons, 1939), 18. 
99. Newman argued that his general line was taken from Stillingfleet 
upon Laud. He wished to avoid being identified with 
Chillingworth's avowedly Protestant formulation. To have taken 
Waterland's line might, he felt, have risked 'slipping between two 
stools', i.e. between Stillingfleet's and Waterland's basis for 
the theory. See Allen, Newman and the Abbe Jager, 154-162. 
Newman's comment upon Waterland in relation to Stillingfleet is 
revealing for there is no doubt that the former's careful analysis 
of the problem of fundamentals, if genuinely attended to by 
Newman, would have significantly modified the rigid line he had 
developed on fundamentals in the Via Media, at least insofar as 
Waterland was not so concerned, as Stillingfleet was, with the 
problem of infallibility. For further see chap.6 p.192 of this 
thesis. 
100. Sykes in "Fundamentals", is correct to observe that the theory of 
fundamentals espoused by Newman and his later Anglican critics 
"preserved a style of theological argument which had ceased to be 
current in the European context", 241. However it would have been 
equally correct to point out that the theological problem of the 
fundamental article continued to evoke important discussion among 
Continental theologians who were anxious to integrate an older 
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style orthodoxy with newer insights on development and the history 
of doctrine. It was a matter both of theoretical and practical 
importance in relation to Church union schemes. The point is that 
Schleiermacher's undermining of his inherited fundamental articles 
tradition jostled with other more traditionalist ways of handling 
the tradition in the new context. Even Schleiermacher allowed room 
for an appeal to certain fundamental articles common to sixteenth 
century Protestantism. See below p.305f; and cf. chap.1 p.14 of 
this thesis. Valeske, Hierarchia Veritatum, points out that the 
matter was also relevant to Roman Catholics such as Matthias 
Scheeben, 93-102. Cf. Congar, Diversity and Communion, 119. 
101. The analysis of Hooker (chap.3 pp.83-90) and Chillingworth 
(chap.4 p.98f) on this subject earlier in this thesis revealed a 
more dynamic handling of the tradition. This is important to note 
in view of the tendency to treat the tradition as one thing 
without differentiation. This is a fault in Thomas' fine study of 
Newman. Newman's theory is quickly identified with the classical 
theory of fundamentals, as if this was truly representative of the 
Anglican stance. Cf. Stanley L. Greenslade who, in comparing 
Hooker and Andrewes on fundamentals, tradition and authority, 
notes that while Andrewes 'followed Hooker' in finding place for 
the exercise of reason and judgement in discerning what is 
essential and what may be left as a matter of opinion, "he looked 
backwards rather than forwards" (my italics). See "The Authority 
of the Tradition of the Early Church in Early Anglican Thought", 
25. 
102. "Palmer's View of Faith and Unity" in Essays Historical and 
Critical, vol.I: 209f. 
103. The Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman, I. Kerr 
T. Gornall S.J. eds. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), vol.VI: 
and cf. Newman's important critique of Palmer's doctrine of 
fundamentals in "Palmer's View of Faith and Unity", ibid., 
221. 
and 
352; 
the 
179-
104. Prickett in Romanticism and Religion, refers to a Coleridge 
'minority tradition', to which both Maurice and Newman were 
indebted; e.g. 3f, 190f. Earlier John Coulson in Newman and the 
Common Tradition: A Study in the Language of Church and Society 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), developed the notion of a 'common 
tradition' linking the aforementioned. 
105. Coulson, Newman and the Common Tradition, preface. 
106 Ibid., chaps.1 and 2; and cf. above en.15. Newman's 1843 sermon 
"On the Theory of Developments in Religious Doctrine", exemplifies 
this conception. 
107. See "On the Introduction of Rationalistic Principles into 
Revealed Religion" in Essays Critical and Historical, vol. I: 41. 
Cf. Via Media, I: 257; and Allen, Newman and The Abbe Jager, 89. 
108. Via Media, I: 249-260. 
109. See the discussion in Sykes, Identity, 109-112. 
110. See An Essay on the 
(1845),chap.3, sec.3 [J.M. 
198f]. 
Development 
Cameron, ed. 
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111. For Newman this was a process of explication of that impression of 
the one truth that was held inwardly. To track the course of 
doctrinal development was to track the process by which the Church 
realised the truth of its own life: "Realizing is the very life of 
true developments; it is peculiar to the Church, and the 
justification of her definitions" (Sermon on Development, 337). 
Cf. Sykes, Identity, 112. 
112. Sykes, Identity, 112. 
113. This matter has been briefly discussed by Sykes, Identity, 
who, in agreeing with Lash states that "the argument about 
fundamentals is not overthrown by the argument of the Sermon" (302 
n.36). Sykes points out that the chief change is Newman's 
modification of the 'crude realism' in which the traditional 
fundamentals apologia was often expressed. However Lash, Newman on 
Development (195 n.28), cites the view of Stern [Bible et 
Tradition chez Newman: aux Origines de la Theorie du Development 
(Paris, 1967)] that the theory of the fundamentals was overturned 
in Newman's 1843 Sermon on Development. Observing the stress on 
the unity of the object of faith, Stern had noted: "ainsi se 
trouvre renverse le systeme des 'articles fondamentaux', bati sur 
i'hypothese d'une Revelation composee d'un certain nombre de 
verites distinctes les unes des autres", 185. Lash, in noting this 
conclusion, commented that he had found no evidence that the 
system of the 'fundamentals' was built upon Stern's hypothesis. 
114. The disintegration of the ecclesiological significance of 
the argument over fundamentals is precisely what occurs when the 
crude faith-church conception which had been such a controversial 
feature of the theory, was rendered no longer tenable. 
115. See Lash, Newman on Development, 131ff, Commenting on Newman's 
1847 work to Perrone, Lash notes that "whereas previously the 
distinction between Episcopal and Prophetical Tradition was 
material as well as formal (the 'essential' doctrines being 
ascribed to the former, and the non-essential to the latter), now 
the distinction is simply formed, and the whole of revealed truth 
is presumed to be held in each form of tradition", 132. 
116. Essay on Development, Cameron, 1845 ed., chap.III sec.3 (198f); 
cf. 1878 ed. chap.!!, sec.3, subsec.2. 
117. See Essay on Development, 1978 ed. {London: Longmans, Green and 
Co., 1900), chap.I, sec.1, subsec.3; chap.!, sec.2, subsec.10; 
chap.7, sec.l, subsec.3. Cf. Sykes, Identity, 115. 
118. Sykes, Identity, 118-122, 212. 
119. "You must accept the whole or reject the whole; reduction does 
but enfeeble, and amputation mutilate". Cameron ed. ( 1845), 199 
{chap. 3, sec, 3) . 
120. At the heart of the fundamentals apologia was a concern for 
doctrinal discrimination. The problem was discriminating in 
doctrine 'the greater from the less, the true from the false' [See 
Cameron, 1845 ed.,l67, {chap.2 sec.2)], These two kinds of 
distinctions are not the same. The fundamentals apologia concerned 
'the greater from the less' in the interests of ecclesiological 
polemics. Newman, having resolved his ecclesiological loyalty, 
was concerned in the Essay with vindicating Roman developments, 
i.e. he was concerned with discriminating the true from the false. 
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What Newman required was a justified integrated hierarchy in 
belief. In the process of achieving this he was led to identify 
what he regarded as 'primary' or 'central' belief, [1978 ed. ,199 
(chap.3, sec.1)]. Such beliefs were first in the hierarchy. He 
also noted that developments in such doctrines (Trinity, 
Incarnation) "are mere portions of the original impression, and 
modes of representing it" (1978 ed., chap.1, sec.2, subsec.9). Is 
there not here a basis for regarding such belief as more central 
to faith by virtue of its relation to the original impression 
given by God? Might it not be that for Newman, developments from 
and developments of the central doctrines, whilst both worthy of 
belief, were not of the same order? It is certainly the kind of 
argument that the Anglican theory of fundamentals would have been 
amenable to, though in the context of the Essay it is not pursued. 
Cf. Lash, Newman on Development, 130f. 
121. See Essay on Development, Cameron, 1845 ed., 176 (chap.2, 
sec.2); cf. 1878 ed., 89 (chap.2, sec.2, subsec.13). 
122. Via Media, I: 223; and see also 232f and comments by Lash, Newman 
on Development, 196 n.35. Cf. Essay, 1878 ed., 68 (chap.2, sec.1, 
subsec. 12). 
123. Cf. Apologia Pro Vita Sua, 227, wherein Newman speaks of the 
truths of the moral law, natural religion and the articles of the 
apostolical depositum as the 'boundary and foundation' for papal 
definitions. See esp. A Letter addressed to his Grace the Duke of 
Norfolk on the occasion of Hr. Gladstone's recent Expostulation 
(London: W. Pickering & Co., 1875), part 9, "The Vatican 
Definition", where Newman, on a number of occasions, speaks of the 
virtue of a 'wise and gentle minimism' in matters of faith. 
124. For Newman "The development of Christian doctrine is indeed 
story of the mental and spiritual growth of mankind 
(Prickett, Romanticism and Religion, 172; cf.173). 
the 
" 
125. Ibid., 195; cf. 173. See also Apologia, 226 on infallibility: 
"Its object is, and its effect also, not to enfeeble the freedom 
or vigour of human thought in religious speculation, but to resist 
and control its extravagance" (my italics). 
126. Prickett, Romanticism and Religion, 196. 
127. In a sense Newman's attempted reintegration of the articles 
tradition into the inner life of the Church reflects a return to 
his earlier ideal in which the mysteries of faith were most 
adequately safeguarded as they remained hidden in the bosom of the 
Church. Externalization of the faith into creeds and articles 
implied a distancing from the 'bosom of the church'. Thus in The 
Arians of the Fourth Century (1833), 5th. ed., (London: W. 
Pickering & Co., 1883) Newman argued that freedom from symbols and 
articles constituted 'the highest state of Christian communion', 
36. The problem with the fundamentals apologia for Newman was its 
overreaching of the objective pole in faith. His return to the 
Roman Church meant for him a regaining of the tension between the 
faith in its objectivity and hiddenness. Cf. Thomas, Newman on 
Heresy, who notes that in the Essay orthodoxy and church are 
organically identified, 324. 
128. Cf. Prickett, Romanticism and Religion: "Newman's idea of 
Christianity seems to grow according to an 'organic' principle so 
inflexible as to exclude the spontaneity we associate with human 
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growth", 165. 
129. Thus Prickett, ibid, notes that for Coleridge, organic 
development was balanced by the principle of dialectic: "Not 
merely does tradition make the writer, but also, the writer, by 
being new, re-makes the tradition. What we mean by 'tradition' is 
this constant interaction of history and the individual who 
creates, even as he is created by it". 
130. Ibid., 171, esp. Julius Hare's critique of Newman. Newman 
appears to envisage a kind of 'homogenous evolution' in 
doctrine. Thus Prickett notes: "He [Newman] makes it clear that he 
is writing about individuation of species - the process by which 
an organism strives to become ever more fully itself not the 
evolution of species", 162. What of course is crucial in the 
former model is the capacity to exclude the modifying effects of 
historical contingency. See further Thomas, Newman on Heresy, 
329ff, where it is shown how the problem of fixity and non-
contingency re-emerges in Newman's thought. 
131. See William Archer Butler, Letters on the 
Christian Doctrine, in Reply to Mr Newman's Essay, 
ed. (Dublin, 1850), 391. 
Development of 
T. Woodward, 
132. See e.g. David Nicholls "Newman's Anglican Critics", Anglican 
Theological Review XLVII (1965): 377-395. Also Nockles, 
Continuity and Change in Anglican High Churchmanship, chap.2 esp. 
163. 
133. James Mozley's critique of Newman was important and enduring, 
being taken up in the twentieth century by Charles Gore in The 
Holy Spirit and the Church (London: John Murray, 1924), chap.7. 
Mozley argued that Newman had neglected the possibility of 
corruption by exaggeration, a danger whenever the two classes of 
doctrines, primitive Nicene and later Roman, were identified as a 
whole development. All great corruptions required time for the 
process was continuous, subtle and gradual. See "Newman on 
Development", Christian Remembrancer XIII (1847): 117-265, esp. 
136-142, 260. 
134. Frederick Denison Maurice, The Epistle to the Hebrews, Being the 
Substance of Three Lectures with a Preface Containing a Review of 
Mr Newman's Theory of Development (London: J.W. Parker, 1846). 
135. See Prickett, Romanticism and Religion, chap.6, for discussion 
of these themes. 
136. Ibid., 165ff, 173. 
137. Thus when Newman wrote on the power of assimilation as a test of 
true development, a one-way osmotic process of corruption-
avoidance is envisaged. Here facts and opinions "are gradually 
attracted to a new influence and subjected to a new sovereign. 
They are modified, laid fresh, thrust aside, as the case may be. A 
new element of order and composition has come among them; and its 
life is proved by this capacity of expansion, without 
disarrangement or dissolution" [Cameron, 1845 ed., 131 (chap.!, 
sec.3, subsec.5)], Maurice, in his Hebrews preface (xix), 
commented: "So far from the fact of such incorporation implying 
corruption, development implies incorporation". 
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138. Maurice, Hebrews preface, xliif, lxff. 
139. The Life of Frederick Denison Maurice Chiefly Told in His Own 
Letters, Frederick Maurice ed., 2 vols. 2nd. ed. (London: 
Macmillan & Co.), 1: 348. 
140. Prickett, Romanticism and Religion, 126. 
141. Thus Torben Christensen has observed that for Maurice, "The 
Church is simply mankind when it has surrendered its lies and 
falsehoods and attained a true knowledge of reality". See The 
Divine Order: A Study in F.D. Maurice's Theology (Leiden: E.J. 
Brill, 1973), 254. In Maurice's view there were two possible forms 
of a universal society, 'this world' and 'the church', the latter 
element witnessing to humankind's common humanity in relation to 
God. For the recognition of the universality of this church 
element as constitutive of the human race it 'must be a distinct 
body'. The universality of God's relation to mankind is thus 
actualised through a particular societal ordering. See The 
Kingdom of Christ, 2nd. ed. 1842 rep. (London: James Clarke & Co, 
1959), I: 260f. 
142. Cf. e.g. Prickett, Romanticism and Religion: "The 
indwelling Spirit of Christ shapes and uses the corrupt form, but 
is not shaped by it. Everywhere man is subject to the divine 
dialectic: he cannot be content with a spiritual society that is 
not spiritual. Maurice's later Christian Socialism springs 
directly from this conviction", 142. 
143. Hebrews preface (lxxxviii-xcix). Cf. Life, II: 517, 572, where 
Maurice refers to Pusey, Newman and the Tractarians as having 
missed the centre of faith and ground of Catholic unity. See also, 
Kingdom of Christ, 1: 254ff. 
144. Kingdom of Christ, II, chap.4, sec.2. 
145. Life, I: 339. 
146. Ibid., II: 494f; Kingdom of Christ, II: 4. 
147. Hebrews preface, lxxxiif. 
148. Life, II: 354. 
149. See e.g. Kingdom of Christ, II: 3-7. Any hopes for a 
renewed and united Church required for Maurice an abandonment of 
all things save the 'old faith', the 'common faith of mankind'. 
He joined the Church of England precisely because it was not 
primarily bonded by opinion or certain doctrines. See Life, II: 
317, 325, 375, 386, 391, 571, 573. 
150. Subscription no Bondage - or the Practical advantages afforded 
by the Thirty-Nine Articles as Guides in all Branches of 
Academical Education •..• by Rusticus (Oxford: J.H. Parker, 1835) 
82-87. For reference to 'sinking' into a system see, Kingdom of 
Christ, II: 309. Cf. Life, I: 398; II: 154, 214, 392, 399, 604. 
151. Life, II: 357. 
152. Kingdom of Christ, I: 108-127, on 'Protestant Systems'; cf. 
Life, I: 261; II: 317, 575, 615. 
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153. See Theological Essays, 4th. ed. (London: Macmillan & Co., 1881), 
377-408. Maurice perceived that in the acceptance of this 
doctrine as a fundamental article "the whole Gospel of God is set 
aside", 405. Maurice was "obliged to believe in an abyss of love 
which is deeper than the abyss of death", 406. Cf. Life, II: 169. 
154. "To exhibit that truth [the Trinitarian name] not in 
notions but in a person has been and is the object of my life'' 
(Life, II: 231). 
155. "I look upon the language of scripture as the simplest, truest, 
most reasonable language of all that has ever been uttered ..... " 
(Hebrews preface, xxxviii). Cf. Prickett, Romanticism and 
Religion, 167. 
156. Life, II: 136f, 351. 
157. Cited by Sykes, Integrity, 18 [from The Kingdom of Christ 
(1838 ed. ), II: 338]. Cf. 1842 ed., II: 301, where Maurice refers 
to the English Reformers view of the Church as a 'Kingdom' 
focussed on a 'Person' rather than 'a system of dogmas'. 
158. See the discussion of this feature of 
Sykes, Integrity, 16-20. 
Maurice's theology in 
159. Cf. Daniel W. Hardy, "Theology through Philosophy" in D. Ford 
ed., The Modern Theologians, II: 30-71, for a discussion of the 
significance of principled common practice in the vision of 
English theology. 
160. The importance of the concept of 'linkaging' for the successful 
operation of the fundamental articles tradition is developed in 
chap.12 of this thesis. 
161. Refer to the discussion in chap.10 of this thesis on the 
of determining the impulse for the articles tradition in 
theology. 
problem 
modern 
162. See Lux Mundi: A Series of Studies in the Religion of the 
Incarnation (1889), Charles Gore, ed. (London: John Murray, 1902), 
190. Gore's essay in Lux Mundi entitled "The Holy Spirit and 
Inspiration", identified one of the most controversial issues of 
the day. For a lucid discussion of Gore's views on criticism and 
faith see "New Testament Criticism and Faith", The Pilot V ( 1901) 
124-126, 153-154, 180-182, 209-211; cf. The Basis of Angican 
Fellowship in Faith and Organization: An open letter to the Clergy 
of the Diocese of Oxford (London: Mowbray & Co., Ltd., 1914). 
163. For an account of the conflict in Anglicanism over the bible and 
creeds in the early decades of the twentieth century see Thomas 
A. Langford, In Search of Foundations: English Theology 1900-1920 
(Nashville, New York: Abingdon Press, 1969), chap.5. 
164. See chap.1 of this thesis p.6 and en.28. 
165. This received systematic exposition in Gardner's Exploratio 
Evangelica (1899). Gardner argued that in crtiticism of the creed 
one had to distinguish between the idea or general principle which 
"gives birth to the doctrine, and the expression which the 
doctrine finds in the intellectual sphere", 365. The idea is 
grounded in history and experience. The main principles of the 
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faith had a universal subjectivity. Permanence and continuity 
could be located in certain principles that cohered with common 
human experience. What was variable was the intellectual 
expression. Thus he could assert: "In so far as doctrine is the 
immediate expression in terms of intellect of the ultimate 
realities of religious experience, it remains true for all men and 
all time", 322. The doctrinal expression was the 'husk' to 
preserve the 'root principles of Christianity', 299. 
166. See Form and Content in the Christian Tradition (London: Longmans, 
Green & Co., 1916), 2. 
167. See e.g. ibid: "The' metaphysical' doctrines are inherently and 
absolutely unalterable ('permanent and unchangeable') in respect 
of their content; in respect of their form, they are conditionally 
unalterable, i.e. they cannot be altered unless and until some 
instrument, more perfectly adapted for describing the mutual 
relations of Reals, than was the old logic, is discovered", 148. 
This concession was purely theoretical, for in Williams' mind any 
alterations required the consent of the Universal Church! But cf. 
his further comment: ''I dare say that in regard to these doctrines 
['metaphysical' dogmas] there must always be a small margin of 
variation in the individual apprehension and assimilation of 
them", 150. 
168. Ibid., 149ff. 
169. The Gospel of Freedom (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1912), 77. 
170. Ibid., 78. 
171. See Inge's essay, "The Person of Christ" in Contentio Veritatis: 
Essays in Constructive Theology, by six Tutors (London: John 
Murray, 1902), 87. 
172. See T. Guyed., Liberal Evangelism: An Interpretation by Members 
of the Church of England (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1923), 36. 
173. See e.g. Paul Tillich's comment that protestant Hegelianism and 
Catholic modernism "have interpreted religious 
symbolically in order to dissolve its realistic meaning 
weaken its seriousness, its power, and its spiritual 
Systematic Theology, combined vol., I: 266. 
language 
and to 
impact". 
174. See chap.10 p.301f of this thesis for a discussion of the 
significance of Don Cupitt's idealism for articles of faith. 
175. See discussion in text and en.1 & 2, at beginning of this chapter. 
176. Refer to discussion in chap.10 of this thesis. 
177. See Phillip Thomas, The Lambeth Conferences and the 
Development of Anglican Ecclesiology, 1867-1978 (Unpublished Ph.D 
Thesis, University of Durham, 1982). 
178. Thus Thomas, ibid., writes: "The ecumenical movement, long 
germinating in the seed-bed of co-operation on the mission fields 
of the nineteenth century, came to life at the 1910 International 
Missionary Conference in Edinburgh", 112. 
179. See e.g. Henry R.T. Brandreth, 
Oxford Movement (London: SPCK, 
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this respect was Pusey's Eirenicon (1865) in which an appeal was 
made for reunion on the basis of the common dogmas shared by Rome 
and the Church of England. See Brandreth, chap.4. For F.D. 
Maurice the 'old creeds' constituted that necessary and sufficient 
dogmatic base for Christian unity. See Vidler, The Theology of F. 
D. Maurice (London: SCM, 1945), chap.8, "United Confession of the 
Name". 
180. William Wake (1657-1737), Archbishop of Canterbury from 1716, 
deployed the fundamental articles apologetic as a strategy for 
reunion efforts with the Gallican Church, and as a lever in 
facilitating reconciliation between Continental Lutheran and 
Reformed churches. His effort is well documented and continues to 
invite discussion. The major work on Wake is Norman Sykes 
William Wake: Archbishop of Canterbury 1657-1737, 2 
vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957). See esp. "The 
Care of all the Churches: The Gallican Correspondence", I, chap.4; 
"The Care of all the Churches: The Union of Protestants", II, 
chap.6; and "False Doctrine, Heresy and Schism", II, chap.8. 
Consult also: Rupp, Religion in England, 76-85 for perceptive 
comments; Sykes, "Fundamentals", 238f; McAdoo, The Unity of 
Anglicanism, lecture II. 
The fundamentals apologetic proved itself, as it had done in 
the seventeenth century, a useful strategy to initiate ecclesial 
dialogue but insufficient to secure genuine union. The problem 
was inherent in the distinction, for once having made this, Wake 
recognised that, ''It is indeed a work of greater difficulty, not 
to say danger, to distinguish the essential articles of doctrine 
from the rest, in such wise that nothing in them is either 
superfluous or lacking; that nothing essential to salvation is 
omitted, nor anything non-essential included in the number of 
essentials ... (Sykes, William Wake, II: 262). 
This matter had been important to the 'reasonable orthodoxy' 
of the famous 'Swiss triumvirate' with whom Wake was in close 
correspondence. See Rouse and Neill, A History of the Ecumenical 
Movement, I: 105-109. One of their number, Jean Alphonse 
Turrettini (1671-1737), had written in 1719 an important treatise 
on the issue of fundamentals with a dedicatory epistle to Wake. 
(Sykes, William Wake, II: 72f). What is significant but perhaps 
less well known is that Turrentini's fifty-six page preface was 
translated into English in 1720 under the title Discourse on 
Fundamental Articles in Religion. [Rep. with intro. Jared Sparks 
ed., A Collection of Essays and Tracts in Theology, 6 vols. 
(Boston, Mass.: 1823-1826), I: 3-91]. 
The efforts of Wake, Turrettini and colleagues to clarify the 
difficult borderline between things necessary and things 
indifferent was directed to the urgent practical issue of the 
reunion of the churches. Wake's deployment of a seemingly 
innocent theological strategy ultimately proved unsuccessful, a 
result to which political and ecclesiastical factors no doubt 
contributed (Sykes, William Wake, I: 298-302; II: 85f), However 
the tradition has shown itself to be anything but innocent, a fact 
which gives good grounds to reflect upon the pragmatics of using a 
strategy that in reality has proved highly volatile. Wake 
deployed the strategy as an 'olive branch' for the reconciliation 
of particular churches abroad but at home he seemed to view it 
more as a weapon to maintain the status quo against Dissenting 
churches and to suppress views that unsettled the received 
orthodoxy (Ibid., II: 167-187, 262ff; cf. Rupp's comments, 
Religion in England, 84f), 
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181. See Addendum VII, Gore's paper "On Unity with Diversity", 
Frere, Recollections of Malines (London: Century Press, 
119. 
in w. 
1935) 1 
182. Ibid. I 115. 
183. Ibid. Gore considered that this list corresponded with Vincent 
of Lerins' formula. Cf. The Holy Spirit and the Church, 213 n.3, 
for another list by Gore of fundamentals, including the doctrines 
of the Deity of Christ, the Incarnation and the Holy Trinity and 
'perhaps' the doctrines of the sacraments in general and the 
ministry and the resurrection. 
184. H.N. Bate 
Conference, 
165. 
ed., Faith and Order, Proceedings of the World 
Lausanne, August 3-21, 1927 (London: SCM, 1927), 161-
185. This is the .judgement of Stephen Neill in The Church and 
Christian Union, The Bampton Lectures 1964 (London, New York, 
Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), 383-387. 
186. Outspoken Essays: First Series (London: Longmans, Green, 1919), 
124. 
187. The Platonic Tradition in English Religious Thought, The 
Hulsean Lectures 1925-1926 (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1926), 
39f. 
188. Ibid. 
189. Ibid., 104f. 
190. Ibid. I 4. 
191. Ibid., 33, 81. Cf. Langford, In Search of Foundations, 119ff. 
192. See the discussion on consensus in chap.12 pp.369-371 of this 
thesis. 
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FUNDAMENTAL ARTICLES: 
The Logic of the Tradition 
CHAPTER NINE: THE PLACEMENT OF THE TRADITION 
1. Congar, Diversity and Communion, 116. 
2. The significance of ecclesiology for inquiry into the nature 
and truth of Christianity is highlighted by Dietrich Ritschl, The 
Logic of Theology: A brief Account of the Relationship Between 
Basic Concepts in Theology (London: SCM, 1986). He writes: "Not to 
begin there [in ecclesiology] but in another field of regulative 
statements [for theology] would lead to an artificial disregard of 
the field in which theological seekers find themselves from the 
start. There, in the church, is the cognitive starting point for 
all theology", 126. Cf. Karl Rahner, Foundations of Christian 
Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity (London: Darton 
Longman & Todd, 1978), part 7 esp. 342-346. 
3. Friedrich Schleiermacher, The 
T & T Clark, 1928), 103. 
4. Ibid., 106. 
Christian Faith (Edinburgh: 
5. In Ernst Troeltsch, The Social Teaching of the Christian 
Churches, 2 vols. (London & New York: George Allen & Unwin, 
Macmillan; 1931), ecclesial mysticism was developed as a third 
type of Protestant ecclesiology alongside the institutional and 
sect types. The sociological character of so-called 'spiritual 
religion' overcame the Church-Christianity disJunction through 
radical internalisation. But this manoeuvre made it difficult to 
develop strong institutional social bonds. See vol.II: 745-746, 
797-800. 
6. The idea of the Church as 'the extension of the incarnation' has 
been important in the development of Anglican ecclesiology. It was 
developed in the early nineteenth century by the Roman theologian 
John Adam Mohler: "Thus, the visible Church, ...• is the Son of God 
himself, everlastingly manifesting himself among men in a human 
form, perpetually renovated, and eternally young - the permanent 
incarnation of the same, as in Holy Writ, even the faithful, are 
called 'the Body of Christ'" [Symbolism: or Exposition of the 
Doctrinal Differences between Catholics and protestants, as 
evidenced by their Symbolical Writings, trans. J.B. Robertson, 2 
vols. (London: Charles Dolman, 1843), 1:6 ]. This idea of the 
Church as the permanent incarnation of Christ influenced the 
Tractarian Anglican Richard Wilberforce, who developed a triadic 
ecclesiology centred on the incarnation and flanked on either side 
by expositions of the doctrine of baptism and the eucharist. 
Wilberforce still wanted to talk about the sacraments as the 
'extension of the incarnation' but from the perspective of the 
Church as the continuation of the life of Christ, the 'Pattern 
Man' for humanity. Not surprisingly Wilberforce developed a highly 
institutionalized and objectivist ecclesiology in response to a 
perceived rationalising of the faith. See The Doctrine of the 
Incarnation of Jesus Christ, in its relation to mankind and the 
church (Philadelphia: Hooker & Co., 1849), esp. chaps.1, 11, 13. 
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For an important discussion of Wilberforce's linking 
ecclesiology to Christology and the influence of Mo ~hler see Peter 
Sedgwick, The Character of Christ: The Correlation of Moral 
Philosophy and Christology in Anglican Theology 1830-1870 
(unpublished Ph.D, Durham, 1982), 167-210. The theme of the 
Church as the extension of the incarnation was taken up by Walter 
Locke in his essay, "The Church" in Charles Gore ed., Lux Mundi: 
"It [the Church] is a visible body, because it has in some sense 
to represent the Incarnate Lord", 275. Gore spoke of the 
incarnation as the presupposition for the Church, the latter's 
role being to "perpetuate the presence, and represent the will and 
mind, of Christ". See The Church and the Ministry ( 1886), rev. 
ed. (London: SPCK, 1936), 5; and chap.! generally. 
7. See e.g. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio (London: 
Collins, 1963). "Thus from the utmost isolation concrete community 
arises; for in the preaching of the love of God we hear of the 
communion which God has entered into with each and every man who 
in his utter loneliness knows that he is separated from God and 
his fellow-man, and who believes this message", 109. For 
Bonhoeffer ecclesia is the result of the right hearing of the call 
(cf. 108). Emphasis on the right hearing of the call means that 
the sanctorum communio "is continually falling, coming into 
existence once more" (147); a movement of repentance and faith in 
response to the Word of God. 
8. For example, this rather static approach found expression in an 
Anglican view of ministry typified in Charles Gore's defence of 
Apostolic succession in The Church and the Ministry. The whole 
scheme became a rather mechanical affair. God's action, present 
in Christ, was carried on in the Church, through the appointed 
agents dispensing grace to the body. Some years later Michael 
Ramsey in The Gospel and the Catholic Church, attempted to 
overcome the rather static view implied in the notion of the 
Church as the extension of the incarnation. He developed a more 
dynamic ecclesiology in relation to the passion and resurrection 
of Christ. See esp. chap.! of his work p.5f. 
9. Rahner, Foundations of the Christian Faith, 345. One of the 
merits of Bonhoeffer's pioneering effort bringing sociological 
analysis to bear upon the consideration of the doctrine of the 
Church, was precisely the manner in which his inherited 'call 
type' ecclesiology was integrated into a fuller view of 
Christianity's essential sociality, a matter referred to further 
on in this chapter. 
10. See Edward Farley, Ecclesial Man, 182. 
11. Ibid. 
12. Ibid. I 182f. 
13. Ibid. I 185. 
14. Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio, 160. 
15. Ibid., 116. Cf. Bonhoeffer's statement: "Social community is in 
essence given with community with God. The latter is not without 
social community, nor is social community without community with 
God" [Cited in D. Hardy, "Created and Redeemed Sociality", 38; 
from E. Feil, The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1985), 8]. Commenting on this statement, Hardy 
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notes: "Bonhoeffer derives sociality directly from relationship to 
God; human sociality arises in (is given with) relationship with 
God - as a necessary part of it, not as a post facto addition to 
it". 
16. In this respect Karl Barth speaks not of an analogia entis but 
of analogia relationis: "God is in relationship, and so too is the 
man created by Him. This is his divine likeness". Church 
Dogmatics (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1960), III/2, 324. Human 
relationality is derived from the relationality which belongs to 
God's own being. Thus the relationship of Jesus to the disciples 
in John's Gospel Chap.l7 "is not original, but an exact copy of 
the relationship in which he stands to the Father and the Father 
to Him" (III/2, 220). Human community is thus grounded in the 
community of God's own being, the former is intended to mirror the 
latter which is present in the former in hope (III/2, 324). Thus, 
to the extent that human life is created in correspondence with 
God's own being, the human being is not solitary but a being-in-
relation. Cf. Farley, Ecclesial Man, who wants to speak of 
ecclesia in terms of a 'determinate intersubjectivity', in which 
intersubjectivity stands for the 'pre-given, socially structured 
consciousness' (95) presupposed in all acts of reciprocity and 
interpersonal relations. This focus, claims Farley "obviously 
eschews individualistic formulations of the situation of faith 
which interpret redemption wholly in psychological and existential 
terms" , 1 7 5 . 
17. The theological difficulties that arise from an overemphasis on 
the generation of sociality from redemption, to the virtual 
exclusion of sociality given in creation, has been recently 
addressed by Hardy, "Created and Redeemed Sociality". Created 
sociality includes the region of the interpersonal within a larger 
web of interconnectedness embracing the multifaceted dimensions 
relevant to human beings. Perhaps the problem is that when the 
region of the interpersonal is developed specifically and 
fundamentally out of redemption, the relevance of the 
interpersonal is rather too quickly confined to a particular act 
(Christ) in a particular place (the church). The sociality 
relevant to creation as such is bypassed. 
This criticism might be more applicable to Farley than Barth. 
For Farley redemptive existence is pivotal. However in Ecclesial 
Reflection Farley comments without committing himself: "It may 
even be argued that human beings are intersubjective before they 
are subjective, that their very individuality has 
intersubjectivity as its ontological matrix", 350. Barth's 
development of the analogia relationis in terms of man's 
createdness provides a basis for a more 'general sociality', 
though some kind of further development would appear necessary if 
this prom1s1ng start was to avoid the problem of the ultimate 
elimination of the significance of a created sociality present in 
the human condition as such. This can happen when the social 
transcendental is displaced in theology by the specific gift of 
God in Christ whose locus is the apostolicity of the Church. One 
result of this kind of specificity is that the world as such can 
only be treated as the arena upon which the work of the Church 
takes place. 
18. Hardy, "Created and Redeemed Sociality", 21-47. 
19. Ibid. The concept of reconstitution is the presupposition of 
the essay and emerges in discussion of the raising of the social 
transcendent to its true form (42), and in discussion of how human 
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social activity is involved in reconstituting (45) and 
transforming (46) itself. However in another essay, "Rationality, 
the Sciences and Theology" in G. Wainwright ed., Keeping the 
Faith, Hardy refers to Jesus as the "one in whom wisdom 
reconstituted the ways in which things and people in the world are 
'placed' in space and time (through their being, life and death), 
their sociality, economy, polity, interpersonhood and 
communication", 296. 
20. Hardy, "Rationality, the Sciences and Theology", 296. 
21. Hardy, "Created and Redeemed Sociality", 42. 
22. Farley, Ecclesial Man, refers to the attempt in one strand of 
contemporary Protestant theology, typified by H. Richard Niebuhr 
and Paul Lehmann, to rehabilitate ecclesiology by appealing to 
ecclesia as 'context' for theology and ethics. The fact that 
ecclesiality "tends to drop out of sight in the contextualist 
ethics which they inspired" (183), is not simply a failure of 
integration, as Farley seems to imply, but more particularly, it 
indicates the inadequacy of the concept of ecclesia as 'context'. 
The problem is not confined to Protestant theology. Karl 
Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, has maintained that 
ecclesiology does not represent the central truth of Christianity, 
"not the core of the ultimate truth of Christianity", 324. In the 
'hierarchy of truths', the central realities for a Christian have 
to do with Jesus Christ crucified and risen, faith, love and 
trust. There are, it seems, truths of Christianity more 
fundamental than those that relate to the ecclesial nature of 
Christianity. However it is unclear how this position, developed 
in part to avoid any suggestion of a militant ecclesiology, 
coheres with Rahner's portrayal of Christianity as "the personal 
self-communication of the mystery of God" (347), a self-
communication which can be successful for man whose essence is 
'being orientated to God'. The human being is thus characterised 
as 'a being of interpersonal communication' (322, cf. 347), such 
that 'wherever there are human beings there is Church', 342. Thus 
it would seem that Christianity must be understood ecclesially if 
it is to be understood at all. 
Is there not an incipient individualism in Rahner's 
ecclesiology, overlain with more fully social categories? The 
problem is exposed in Rahner's rather telling comment: "The Church 
belongs to Christianity, at least when Christianity really becomes 
conscious of itself and when it intends to maintain the continuity 
of a real history of salvation and has to prolong this 
continuity", 347 (my italics). The apologetic motive here betrays 
Rahner's fundamentally individualistic starting point. At the 
least, the problem of Christianity's ecclesiality remains somewhat 
ambiguous. Cf., from a different angle, Fergus Kerr's critical 
remarks on Rahner's individualism and the difficulty of 
reconciling this with his ecclesiology. See Theology After 
Wittgenstein (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 10-14. 
23. Farley, Ecclesial Man, 183ff. 
24. Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, III.1.4. 
25. Hardy, "Created and Redeemed Sociality", 42. 
26. Ibid., 25; cf., 9. 
27. Ibid., 44-47. 
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28. Thus the categories belong to the 'ordinary' materiality of the 
world. This includes the materiality of being bodily, living 
and dying in a place with others, as well as the mediums of 
exchange. See Hardy, "Rationality, the Sciences and Theology", 
296f. Hardy's categories are general, others may be possible. 
The matter remains undetermined. 
29. Hardy, "Created and Redeemed Sociality", 47. 
30. This follows the general definition adopted by the American 
Lutheran theologian Jaroslav Pelikan: "What the church of Jesus 
Christ believes, teaches and confesses on the basis of the work of 
God: this is Christian doctrine"; The Christian Tradition, I: 1. 
Cf. "Doctrine is what is believed, taught and confessed" (ibid., 
1:3), and his helpful discussion of the dynamic operating between 
the three elements in doctrine (1-7). 
31. See David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology 
and the Culture of Pluralism (London: SCM, 1981), 294 en.57. 
32. Bernard Lonergan in Method in Theology (London: Darton, Longman & 
Todd, 1972), defines 'Church doctrines' as ''the content of the 
Church's witness to Christ; they express the set of meanings and 
values that inform individual and collective Christian 
living" (311; cf. 327). He differentiates them, for example, from 
'primary sources', 'methodological doctrine' and 'theological 
doctrines', the last named belonging to an academic discipline, 
"concerned to know and understand the Christian tradition and to 
further its development" (311). As Lonergan points out, however, 
'theological doctrines' feed off Church doctrines, the latter 
being developed in this process (312f; 319-26). This dynamic 
entails a fuller systematic effort which "is concerned with 
promoting an understanding of the realities affirmed in 
•.. doctrines" (335f; cf. 349). Accordingly Lonergan argues that 
all form of doctrine "aims at a clear and distinct affirmation of 
religious realities; its principal concern is the truth of such an 
affirmation; its concern to understand is limited to the clarity 
and distinctness of its affirmations. On the other hand, 
systematics aims at an understanding of the religious realities 
affirmed by doctrines" (349). 
33. 
The above suggests that sharp distinctions are difficult to 
sustain. Common to all doctrinal forms is the fact that they are 
taught (295) and are constitutive both of the individual Christian 
"inasmuch as the doctrine is a set of meanings and values that 
inform his living, his knowing and his doing" (298) and the 
Christian community, "for community exists inasmuch as there is a 
commonly accepted set of meanings and values shared by people in 
contact with one another" (298; cf. 319). From this perspective 
the permanent truth "is the meaning of the dogma (fundamental 
doctrine?] in the context in which it was defined"(325). 
The proposal regarding fundamental doctrines is more fluid 
than Lonergan's analysis of doctrine; one result being that the 
concept of fundamental doctrines is applicable to doctrine in its 
various forms and stages of development. However, to the extent 
that fundamental doctrines express the fullness of truth in a 
concentrated form, the domain of 'Church doctrines' would seem to 
be the closest parallel. 
See Lonergan's discussion of the impact of successive 
differentiations of consciousness on the forms of theological 
discourse, ibid., Chap.12 esp. 302-305. The process of drawing 
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into explicit form, e.g. in 'Church doctrine' invites further 
exploration and understanding, the achievement of which requires 
further differentiations developed in systematics. In general the 
more intense and sustained is the opening of consciousness of 
faith, the greater the potential for understanding and the 
greater the possibility of good communications. 
34. This would seem to be the implication of David Tracy's discussion 
of the "genre of 'doctrine'". Tracy states: "Doctrine is an 
abstraction from the concreteness of symbolic, metaphoric, poetic 
language ..... Doctrines, as abstract, are relatively less adequate 
as expression than the originating metaphorical or symbolic 
language". The Analogical Imagination, 293 en.57. For further see 
Chapter 10 p.315f of this thesis. 
35. Paul Tillich's systematic theology is particularly aimed at 
overcoming the problem of 'dead' symbols that have been reduced to 
merely cultural conventions and have lost their luminosity to 
divine reality. See chap.1 en.28, for remarks by Tillich on 
symbolic reductionism in modern theology. 
36. The problem of believing as a source of social cohesion was 
briefly discussed towards the end of chap.B of this thesis. It 
is addressed quite directly in chap.10. 
37. See e.g. discussion in chap.3 on Jewel and Hooker; Chap.4 on 
Field, Laud and Stillingfleet; chap. 5 pp.149-154 on Locke; chap.6 
pp.184-187, 191ff on Waterland; chap.7 pp.210f, 227f, 245-248, 
on Law; chap.B esp. 263-269, on Newman. 
38. See p.78f of this thesis. 
39. This issue is faced by Dietrich Ritschl in The Logic of 
Theology. He refers to a hierarchy which is more akin to a 
balanced 'mobile' in which ecclesiology, anthropology, 
Christology and Trinitarian concerns coinhere, 119-123. Ritschl's 
starting point for theological discourse is ecclesiology (see 
en. 2). 
40. See for example the comments on Rahner's theology, en.22. 
41. Ibid. 
42. See chap.ll 'Excursus:The Genre of Regulative Communication'. 
CHAPTER TEN: THE PROBLEM OF CAPACITY 
1. See pp.22-25. 
2. See p.lf. 
3. The relevance of the concepts 'post modernism' 
modernity' to theology in the late twentieth century 
discussed by David Ford, "Epilogue: Postmodernism and 
in D. Forded., The Modern Theologians, II: 291-297. 
and 'late 
is briefly 
Postscript" 
4. The discussion of this problem draws from the analysis by Farley, 
Ecclesial Man, chap.l. Cf. idem, Ec_clesial Reflection: "the 
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problem of truth is at one time the problem of how reality comes 
forth, occurs, is manifest When we shift the scene to 
theology, [this] first sense of truth turns out to be the problem 
of reality" (304f; and 301-308 more generally). 
5. Farley, Ecclesial Man, 12. 
6. Ibid., 12. 
7. Thus e.g. Daniel W. Hardy and David Ford in Jubilate: Theology in 
Praise (London: Darton Longman & Todd, 1984), have identified the 
category of 'suspicion' in its common-sense and more sophisticated 
forms (Freud, Marx and Nietzsche) as one of the major threats to 
the praise of God in contemporary life. Suspicion of God as the 
object of human worship represents the logic of Feuerbach's 
reduction of the notion of God to that of merely human projection 
(11-13). 
8. Farley, Ecclesial Man, 9-13. 
9. Ibid., 15. 
10. Ibid., 15. 
11. This matter is taken up by Farley in Ecclesial Reflection, 
where the ambiguity relating to the subject matter of theology is 
said to be reducible to two major programmatic alternatives, "a 
thoroughgoing subjectivizing of theology's references and a 
linguistic therapeutic which would uncover the correlation between 
these references and their modes of availability", 181. 
12. The significance of this view can be gauged by the various 
strategies developed to treat Christian doctrine. For example, 
when doctrines are treated as strategic and practical necessities 
within particular 'meaning systems' it is clear that such a 
manoeuvre is an attempt to recover the true significance of 
religious language from the notion of it being simply a collection 
of important conventions. This problem is treated more fully 
later in this chapter. 
13. See pp.274-280. 
14. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, refers to a "contemporary 
antidoctrinalism", 77. 
15. Langdon Gilkey in Naming the Whirlwind: The Renewal of God 
Language (Indianapolis, New York: Hobbs-Merrill Co., 1969), refers 
to the 'antisymbolic' nature of modern consciousness; a product of 
a modern apprehension of the relativity of all things together 
with a correlative restriction of intelligible language to the 
immediately given, 51f. 
16. Ford, The Modern Theologians, identifies "the impossibility of 
getting beyond language 'to reality'", as a feature of post-
modernity (II:292). In fact, to put the problem in such a way is 
a peculiarly post-modern view. Cf. Lonergan, Method in Theology, 
for a brief but pertinent discussion of the task of finding common 
meaning (353-358). "As common meaning constitutes community, so 
divergent meaning divides it" (357). Common meaning calls for a 
'common field of experience' and, "when that is lacking, people 
get out of touch" (356). For Lonergan it seems that the common 
field of experience is constituted by intellectual, moral and 
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religious conversion. Doctrines are the linguistic form of such 
conversion and can be thus constitutive of community (298). 
17. In a recent useful discussion of the function of metaphor in 
religious language Soskice, "Theological Realism", refers to 
theological realists as "those who, while aware of the inability 
of any theological formulation to catch the divine realities, none 
the less accept that there are divine realities that theologians, 
however ham-fistedly, are trying to catch", 108. Against the 
background of the sense of loss or diminution of reality 
reference in contemporary Christendom the realist position is no 
longer a self-evident starting point in theology. 
18. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 80. 
19. See Bernard Lonergan, Doctrinal Pluralism (Milwaukee: Marquette 
University Press, 1971), who discusses the significance for 
doctrine of the shift from a classical to a contemporary culture. 
The important feature of classical propositional views of doctrine 
would seem to reside not only in the fact of ascribing doctrinal 
formulations an objective or ontological import per se, but also 
in the ascription of particular formulations as irreplaceable 
categories in which a one-to-one correspondence with reality is 
secured. This, as Lonergan points out, is no longer viable in a 
pluralistic culture. Failure to recognise this new context 
generates a naive realism which is easily transferred into the 
region of doctrine. Presumably a modified one-to-one 
correspondence might be argued for; a fact implicit in Lindbeck's 
recognition of the importance of recent contributions of the 
classical propositional type. It seems that Lindbeck, in 
distancing himself from classical propositionalism, is in fact 
desirous of disassociating his own position from cognitivist 
approaches to religion generally; see e.g. The Nature of Doctrine, 
24. 
When particular formulations of faith are simply re-presented 
from the past as the locus of doctrine's divine-human 
correspondence, then such formulations have begun to function as 
doctrinal conventions; objective facts to be assented to and 
undergirded by a naive realism. This is perhaps what Farley has 
in mind in speaking of the distorting effects upon the Christian 
faith associated with 'a correspondence theory of truth' 
(Ecclesial Reflection, 181). 
20. William s' traditionalist approach included an appeal to the 
Homoousian as an instance of an unalterable and irreversible form 
that would "most perfectly preserve the essential content till the 
end of time" (Sandy and Williams, Form and Content in the 
Christian Tradition, 32). Such forms had a universal significance; 
"they are the best terms which are ever likely to be hit upon by 
human beings", 33. William sJ position was a prime example of 
Lonergan's depiction of a classical propositionalism being 
projected into a modern context. Such a view could easily 
degenerate into what has been termed conventional objectivism. 
21. See chap.B, pp.269 of this thesis. Some of the manoeuvres 
possible within this view of doctrine to deal with the problem of 
doctrinal development have been inquired into as options relevant 
to Christianity's externality tradition. See Sykes, Identity, 
chap.9. Lindbeck, in The Nature of Doctrine, argues that the more 
sophisticated cognitivist theories of doctrine that include an 
experiential-expressivist dimension - as espoused by Karl Rahner 
and Bernard Lonergan - also fail to provide intelligible accounts 
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of doctrinal development (16-17). In this vein Lindbeck notes the 
tendency among both Roman Catholic and Protestant theologians to 
modify the classical propositional approach by distinguishing 
between a doctrine's ontological affirmations and the diverse 
conceptualities or formulations in which such affirmations can be 
expressed (80, 89 n.15, 90 n.19). 
22. Hence the remark of William Archer Butler (in Letters on the 
Development of Christian Doctrine), in response to Newman's Essay 
on Development, that "Christianity was born full-grown ... nothing 
could take His [God's] Dispensation by surprise", 391. 
23. See e.g. chap.5 pp.156f. 
24. See e.g. chap.6 pp.168-172. 
25. See e.g. chap.8. pp.267-269, 272-274. 
26. See chap.8 en.88. 
27. In this respect it is indeed an irony of the fundamentals 
tradition that George Bull in his Defence of the Nicene Faith 
employed the distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental 
doctrines to exonerate Origen's orthodoxy and thus strengthen 
Bull's argument for a 'patristic consensus' in the orthodox faith. 
Here the fundamentals apologia was turned on its head so to speak. 
The content of faith was no longer determined according to an 
assumed patristic consensus but rather an assumed orthodoxy was 
employed to secure traditional criteriology! There was of course 
an inevitable circularity in the argument but it was heavily 
slanted, nonetheless, towards the past. Cf. chap.2 en.11 and 
chap. 4 en.119. 
28. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, chap.l. The experiential-
expressive dimension of religion "interprets doctrines as 
non-informative and non-discursive symbols of inner feelings, 
attitudes, or existential orientations. This approach highlights 
the resemblances of religions to aesthetic enterprises and is 
particularly congenial to the liberal theologies influenced by the 
Continental developments that began with Schleiermacher", 16. 
29. Ibid., where Lindbeck notes that according to the experiential-
expressivist view doctrine is "not crucial for religious agreement 
or disagreement, because these are constituted by harmony or 
conflict in underlying feelings, attitudes, existential 
orientations, or practices, rather than by what happens on the 
level of symbolic (including doctrinal) objectifications", 17. 
Thus doctrines can alter without change of meaning and conversely 
religiously significant meanings can vary while doctrines remain 
the same. Clearly the implication here is that doctrine is of 
second order significance. This disjunction between doctrine and 
experience is widespread, a feature of what Lindbeck terms the 
'psychosocial context'. It is common in theology. For further 
discussion see chap.ll pp.314-316 and esp. en.7. 
30. To the extent that theology is made to rest upon human 
experience and reason, as in Lindbeck's notion of experiential-
expressivism, a distorted understanding of doctrine as 
interpretation emerges. Cf. Hardy, "Theology through Philosophy", 
where he speaks of 'a new kind of realism' in which human beings 
engage in 'interpreting things in relation to God', 38; an 
activity which displaces a realism in which the activity of human 
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judgement was intended to recall things to their true quality as 
given by God. Doctrine as 'interpretation' becomes a highly 
restricted activity within the 'new realism' spoken of by Hardy. 
Within this new schema there is a strong dichotomy between the 
Christ-event and subsequent interpretations of its meaning which 
can not be part of the event itself, 58. 
31. See Hardy, ibid., 54-59, for a discussion of John Hick in 
this regard. The same might be said of Maurice Wiles and to a 
lesser extent Bernard Lonergan. See further Hardy, "Rationality, 
the Sciences and Theology", 295, 308 n.36. 
32. Soskice, "Theological Realism", 108. 
33. Don Cupitt, Life Lines (London: SCM, 1986); 101. 
34. Ibid. I 3, 12. 
35. Cupitt, Taking leave of God (London: SCM, 1986), 9. 
36. These features of Cupitt's thought have been highlighted in an 
overview and critique of Cupitt's thought by Hardy, "Theology 
through Philosophy" in Ford ed., The Modern Theologians, vol. II: 
59-65. 
37. Taking Leave of God, 93. 
38. Ibid. 
39. Cupitt in Lifelines catalogues an array of different emergent 
forms of Christianity including mythical, 'doctrinal', 
'obedientary', 'designer', and 'metaphysical' realism. Each 
successive transformation to a new level of spiritual 
understanding approximates to a new stage in the human life-cycle 
and implies a new understanding of the nature of religious truth. 
Cupitt understands the development of Christianity as a move from 
objectification of God 'out there' to a radical internalization 
(13-16). Articles, on this account, operate as symbolic language 
for personal human concerns and are, as such, expressive of 
autonomous human freedom. 
40. Hardy in "Theology through Philosophy" notes that for Cupitt, 
"God is present through the willing of the good", 64. Doctrines 
on this account represent the sum of human moral aspirations. 
41. Cupitt refers to this as 'doctrinal realism' which can develop 
into 'obedientary realism', "a protestant, moralized and 
internalized version of doctrinal realism" (Life Lines, 69). 
42. Cupitt, Taking Leave of God, 8. 
43. Lindbeck, in The Nature of Doctrine, chap.1, refers to three 
familiar theological theories of religion and doctrine; 
cognitive-propositional, symbolic or experiential-expressivist, 
and a regulative or rule theory. 
44. Lindbeck himself seems to acknowledge this, by identifying both 
propositional and modified propositional theories (79f), and by 
recognizing the significance of two-dimensional theories of 
doctrine espoused by Rahner and Lonergan which combine both 
cognitive and experiential elements, 16f. For purposes of his 
analysis these variations are subsumed under the above basic 
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threefold typology. Critics of Lindbeck have likewise pointed to 
the difficulty of fitting the variety of ways of handling doctrine 
into the neat categories suggested by Lindbeck. See e.g. David 
Tracy's criticism, that Lindbeck has failed to take account of the 
major and varied developments that have taken place within 
Lindbeck's 'experiential-expressivist' category. Tracy rejects 
this category as inappropriate for the liberal tradition in which 
he (Tracy) stands. See David Tracy, "Lindbeck's New Program for 
Theology: A Reflection", The Thomist XLIX/3 (July 1985): 460-472, 
esp. 460-466. 
45. When this dynamic relation between Word of God and the 
articles tradition is refused or blocked the tradition itself is 
no longer able to operate as a response to the Word of God in its 
freshness and vitality. This was the basis for Barth's critique 
of the fundamental articles tradition of Protestant orthodoxy 
(Church Dogmatics, I/ 2, 863-866). 
46. Torrance, Theological Science, 173. 
47. Ibid. 
48. Ibid., 174. 
49. Hans Urs Von Balthasar, in The Glory of the Lord: A Theological 
Aesthetics, vol.I 'Seeing the Form' (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 
1982), speaks of faith as "the light of God becoming luminous in 
man, for, in his triune intimacy, God is known only by God", I: 
156. 
50. Ibid., 576. Cf. 153, where, at "the very centre of Christian 
revelation- the Word of God became flesh ..... we have before us 
a genuine, 'legible' form, and not merely a sign or an assemblage 
of signs". 
51. Remark made by Donald Mackinnon in his intro. (p.4) to the 
English ed. of Von Balthasar's Engagement with God, trans. J. 
Halliburton (London: SPCK, 1975). 
52. Von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: "the word of scripture 
and the form of the sacraments, both administered by the Church, 
are not only light from the light of Christ, but form from the 
form of Christ" (I: 252). 
53. Ibid., 242. Cf. Von Balthasar's statement that the dogma that 
Jesus Christ is the only Son of the Father "expresses the 
fundamental form of Christian faith" (I: 591). The formulation of 
this dogma in Chalcedon represents "a point of departure, a 
methodological and heuristic principle for a Christology that must 
be developed from it" (I: 77). The unfinished nature of this task 
ultimately derives from the fact that God "does not primarily 
communicate 'truths' about himself, but rather bestows himself as 
absolute truth and love" (I: 166). 
54. Thus Barth regards simplicity and plenitude as the character-
istic relations of the Lord of Glory (Church Dogmatics, II/I, 
327). For further discussion of Barth refer to chap.ll of this 
thesis in relation to 'The appeal of simplicity'. For Von 
Balthasar God's gift of himself to the world in Jesus Christ is 
the locus of God's plenitude such that "the image of this reality 
remains for all historical time open to ever deeper comprehension 
and penetration" (Glory of the Lord, I: 552). But this plenitude 
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is simplicity itself: "for eyes that have been illumined by faith, 
the image in its totality is simple and visible at a glance ('You 
have the anointing of the Spirit and you know everything', I Jn. 
2.20), and the superabundant fullness is not a threat but rather 
the description of this simplicity" (ibid.). It is the fullness of 
the fundamental form of God's being as mediated in the Scriptual 
image that gives rise to "the endless range of interpretability 
stemming from it.." (ibid. ) . Torrance refers to the Truth of God 
as it is in Jesus as being "so full and rich and inexhaustible 
that the more we know of it the more we realize the ineffable and 
infinite fullness of its reality which defies complete disclosure 
within the limits of our experience". See Theological Science, 
149. Thus Truth as mystery 'expresses the objective depth of 
rationality', 150. 
55. Chap.3 p.83-90 and esp. 90. 
56. Chap.2 p.56f and en.26 & 27. 
57. Chap.7 pp.238-245. 
58. 'Pure doctrine' is thus not a possession but a regulative ideal, 
its attainment eludes us. See e.g. Barth, Church Dogmatics, II/I, 
800ff. Again, it is the eschatological nature of doctrine that 
Barth saw as being forfeited in the fundamental articles tradition 
insofar as the locus of the tradition's purity was located in a 
past formulation. Similarly for Von Balthasar, dogmatic purity 
was not achieved by reduction to a few 'fundamental thoughts' but 
was demonstrated in the ongoing development of a multiplicity of 
forms which sought to make the primal form visible ( The Glory of 
the Lord, I: 552ff). From a somewhat different angle see the 
discussion in chap.3 pp.76-78 of this thesis on the concept 
of'pure doctrine'. 
59. Thus e.g. Barth in Church Dogmatics, writes: "In dogmatics, 
therefore, traditional notions as to what is fundamental or not, 
central or peripheral, more or less important, have to be 
suspended, so that they can become a matter for vital new decision 
by the Word of God itself" ( I/2, 865). Cf. Torrance, Theological 
Science: "Real theological thinking is thus alive and on the move 
under the control of the Truth that makes it free from 
imprisonment in timeless logical connections" (174; and cf. 145, 
196). 
60. See e.g. Thiemann, Revelation and Theology, for a critique of 
Torrance in this and other respects (chap.2). Cf. Paul Avis, The 
Methods of Modern Theology: The Dream of Reason (Basingstoke, 
England: Marshall Pickering, 1986), on Barth (49ff) and Torrance 
(210f). See also Hardy on Torrance in "Theology Through 
Philosophy" in The Modern Theologians I, esp. 85-89. 
61. Thus e.g. Jaroslav Pelikan, in The Christian Tradition, III: 303-
307, points to the significance of personal religious experience 
as an epistemological principle in theology for a number of 
thirteenth century writers but especially Bonaventure in The 
Journey of the Mind to God. This experiential tradition overlaps 
with what Sykes in Identity, chap.3 calls " The Tradition of 
Inwardness", with its roots in the Old Testament. Sykes refers to 
Christianity's 'internal or experiential aspect', 37. 
62. See Brian Gerrish, The Old Protestantism and the New, 197-205. 
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63. Ibid., 203. 
64. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, 50. 
65. Ibid., 5. Claude Welch, Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth 
Century, 2 vols. (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 
1972), substitutes 'determination' for 'modification' (1:65) to 
emphasise, it seems, that piety for Schleiermacher, "is never 
apart from its determination by the 'infinite' or the 'whole' 
(Speeches) or the 'whence' (Christian Faith)" (1:67). Cf. The 
Christian Faith, 16. 
66. The Christian Faith, 125; cf. 'image' (56), 'influence' (49). 
67. Thus in pis earlier On Religion: Speeches to its Cultural 
Despisers (1799), trans. J. Oman (New York: Harper & Row, 1958) 
Schleiermacher criticised those who identified the peculiar 
element in religion with "a definite quantity of religious 
matter", 218. For those who determined their religion in this way 
"there is a standing quarrel about essentials and non-essentials. 
They do not know what to separate as free and accidental .. ", 220. 
This issue re-emerged in The Christian Faith, though by relating 
dogmatics to "the fundamental inner act of Christian piety" (121), 
Schleiermacher had displaced rather than rejected the fundamental 
articles tradition in Protestantism. 
68. See The Christian Faith, 112-118. 
69. Ibid., 114. 
70. See e.g. chap.3 on Jewel and Hooker. 
71. The Christian Faith, 66. 
72. Ibid. I 67, 
73. Ibid. I 56; cf. above en. 67. 
74. Ibid., 121. 
75. Ibid. I 78. 
76. Ibid. 
77. Ibid., 76. 
78. See e.g. Welch, Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century, 
chap.3 for a useful discussion of Schleiermacher and the direction 
in which his thought was subsequently taken; and also Sykes, 
Identity, chap.4, who argues for the 'lasting significance' of 
Schleiermacher's 'methodological contribution to theology' in 
essence of Christianity definition. 
79. The Christian Faith, 92. 
80. Ibid. I 119; and cf. 78. 
81. Ibid. I 81. 
82. Ibid., 77. 
83. Ibid. I 81, 83, 85, 98. 
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84. Welch, Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century, notes that 
for Schleiermacher theological statements "are descriptions of the 
self in its awareness of dependence, and therefore indirectly, or 
at a second level, proper references to God as present in that 
relationship. They reflect the self's viewing of God, the actual 
disclosure of God in the self's experience of itself, but now in 
the form of dogmatic statements", I: 79. 
85. Ibid. I 78. 
86. The Christian Faith, 81. See further Brian Gerrish, 
"Friedrick Schleiermacher" in Ninian Smart et al. eds., Nineteenth 
Century Religious Thought in the West, 3 vols. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), vol.I esp. 145-149. 
87. From another point of view it is not at all clear how 
Schleiermacher's conception of doctrine moved beyond a concern 
simply for the pragmatics of human communication. See 
Schleiermacher's discussion on the impulse for 'the collection of 
dogmatic propositions', The Christian Faith, 85-88. In the 
movement from preaching to teaching the didactic form of 
expression functions to bring 'the idea in its clarity home to the 
consciousness', and/or isolates 'more definitely the immediate 
religious self-consciousness'. The greater the preciSion and 
independence achieved here, the more accessible becomes the 
preached message - i.e. there is a freeing from the conflict and 
ambiguity of metaphor. As a result doctrine becomes "the most 
important means to promote the living circulation of the religious 
consciousness", 87. Dogmatic theology is thus the science which 
systematizes the doctrine in circulation at any one time (88), and 
thus helps to clear up and prevent 'misconceptions' in 
communication (120). This is important but it seems that 
Schleiermacher has no means to conceive of doctrine as a required 
human response to God's redeeming presence in Christ. Doctrine 
springs from piety and only indirectly can it be a response to 
God. 
88. Pelikan, The Christian Tradition, vol V. chap.3. 
89. See Chap.4 p.108f. 
90. For Hammond see chap.4 p.109f. 
91. See The Liberty of Prophesying in Works, VI I: 442. 
92. See chap.8 pp.257-262. 
93. Welch, Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century, 1: 60. Thus 
for Law it was a question of learning to 'possess' everything that 
one believed (Chap.7 p.227); for Coleridge of refounding human 
participation in the Divine. 
94. For example, in Gardner's Exploratio Evangelica, the doctrines 
of faith are founded upon human experience of the Divine and are 
slanted in the direction of practical Christianity. However the 
notion of faith's cognitive component operating as an enrichment 
and enlargement of faith is ignored. Gardner is primarily 
concerned in a critique of the doctrinal overlay upon 'the root 
principles of Christianity'. See chaps.4-6, 25, 27-28. Cf. chap. 8 
en.165 of this thesis. 
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95. By finding a place for an enriched understanding of cognition in 
faith - faith was reason's continuation beyond its own horizon -
Coleridge moved in a quite different direction to Schleiermacher. 
See J.R. Barth, Coleridge and Christian Doctrine, 45-50. Cf. 
chap.B, 252-257 of this thesis. 
96. Developments in the field of hermeneutics provides the basis for 
David Tracy's critique of Lindbeck's appeal to an experimential-
expressivist category in religion and doctrine. See above en.44. 
On the issue of human experience David Kelsey identifies six new 
strategies for handling the modern turn to the subject; see "Human 
Being" in P.C. Hodgson and R.H. King eds., Christian Theology: An 
Introduction to its Traditions and Tasks (London: SCM, 1988), esp. 
156-67. See also the essay by James J. Buckley, "Revisionists and 
Liberals" in Ford ed., The Modern Theologians, I I: 89-102; cf. 
Nicholas Lash, Easter in Ordinary: Reflections on Human Experience 
and the Knowledge of God (London: SCM, 1988). 
97. The notion of experience as doctrine's 'companion' was used by 
Gerson (1363-1429). See Pelikan, The Christian Tradition, IV: 65. 
98. This is an issue raised by James J. Buckley in his assessment of 
modern theological revisionists and liberals who, he suggests, 
have placed great store on human beings as free subjects but may 
have failed to show how "the subject's self-constituting does 
justice to the material bases of human life - or aptly describes 
our identity before God not only as passive subjects but also 
agents". See "Revisionists and Liberals" in D. Forded. The Modern 
Theologians, II: 97. 
99. The phrase is Kerr's in Theology After Wittgenstein, 72. Kerr 
has some important remarks on God in relation to sociality: "what 
constitutes us as human beings is the regular and patterned 
reactions that we have to one another", 65; "Nothing is more 
foundational to the whole human enterprise than the community that 
we create in our natural reactions to one another as they have 
been cultivated and elaborated in a very contingent historical 
tradition", 76. These echoes of Wittgenstein suggest a social 
matrix in which the common practices of human community are 
recalled and conformed to a form of godly humanity. 
100. Cf. here Hardy, "Theology through Philosophy", 30-40. 
101. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, esp. 17-19 and chap.4. 
102. Ibid., 34. 
103. Ibid. 
104. Ibid., 41. 
105. Ibid., 35. 
106. Ibid., but esp. 79-84. "The novelty of rule theory, ..•. is that 
it does not locate the abiding and doctrinally significant aspect 
of religion in propositionally formulated truths, much less in 
inner experiences, but in the story it tells and in the grammar 
that informs the way the story is told and used", 80. Lindbeck 
wants to locate continuity in the endurance of rules or general 
regulative principles which are applied in different contexts. 
Thus the permanence and unity of doctrine is secured despite 
changing and diverse formulations. 
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107. See Lindbeck's "Excursus on Religion and Truth" in The Nature of 
Doctrine, where he attempts to show how and to what extent 
doctrine's referential significance is to be achieved within an 
'intrasystematic' performative understanding of religious 
language: "a religious utterance, one might say, acquires the 
propositional truth of ontological correspondence only insofar as 
it is a performance, an act or deed, which helps create that 
correspondence", 65. A regulative theory of doctrine as espoused 
by Lindbeck is designed not so much to answer the question of the 
'whence' of doctrine but rather highlight its function. How the 
two might be related is not adequately addressed by Lindbeck. 
108. Cf. Lee C. Barrett, "Theology as Grammar: Regulative Principles or 
Paradigms and Practices" in Modern Theology IV /2 (Jan. 1988): 153-
172, for a critique of Lindbeck's 'misleading' distinction between 
doctrine as 'formal syntactical rules' and their 'instantiation in 
practice', 161. Barrett argues that "the identity of Christianity 
should not be attributed to the continuity of formal doctrinal 
principles apart from the continuity of particular first-order 
truth claims, behaviour practices, and experiences", 161. 
Lindbeck, he argues, has unnecessarily placed "the entire burden 
of continuity upon abstract formal rules", 161. 
109. Thus Lindbeck distinguishes between the 'intrasystematic' and 
'ontological' truth of statements, the former only being relevant 
to the rule theory of doctrine he espouses. On this account 
doctrines of faith are intrasystematically true when they cohere 
with the 'total relevant context', which for Lindbeck is the 
particular religious system in view. But such truth ''in no sense 
assures their ontological truth or meaningfulness", 65. Rule 
theory is simply silent as regards the truth of correspondence to 
reality. In fact Lindbeck argues that the Nicene Creed "in its 
role as a communal doctrine does not make first-order truth 
claims", 19. 
110. Hence the significance of David Tracy's claim that Lindbeck's 
cultural linguistic theory of religion and doctrine is 
"confessionalism with occasional 'ad hoc' apologetic skirmishes". 
See Tracy, "Lindbeck's New Program for Theology: A Reflection", 
469f 0 
111. See Nicholas Lash, Easter in Ordinary, 257-266. 
112. Ibid., 261. 
113. Ibid., 266. 
114. Cf. Hardy, "Rationality, the Sciences and Theology", where the 
author argues that Lonergan "fails to recognise that it [doctrine] 
is required by response to Jesus as agent of wisdom", 309 n.36. 
Thus "Interpretation is exactly what Jesus' followers should do, 
and rational interpretation, in the form of statements of teaching 
and practice, is a perpetuation of the agency of Jesus in the 
impartation of wisdom", 295. The inner rationale for the 
generation of doctrine is essentially positive, a form of praise 
itself. See Hardy and Ford, Jubilate, where the communication of 
truth in language is a form of Christian praise; see e.g. 158. 
115. The problem reveals itself in the restriction of truth questions 
in theology to the 'intrasystematic' level of language, whilst 
supposing that the Church's communal life and believing refers to 
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a metasystematic reality. Thiemann's development of the notion of 
'background convictions' - in his case the prevenient grace of God 
- is an example of how Lindbeck's rule theory is in fact supported 
by a strong theological realism which can be affirmed only by a 
most indirect route. See further on Theimann chap.11 en.23 and 
'Excursus: The Genre of Regulative Communication'. 
116. "a religious utterance, one might say, acquires the propositional 
truth of ontological correspondence only in so far as it is a 
performance, an act or deed, which helps create that 
correspondence" (Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 65). Lindbeck's 
functionalist approach does not pursue the nature of its own 
foundations and might be said to produce a 'half-way house' to 
full realism or alternately a 'semi-realism'. 
117. For an insightful discussion of the notion of revelation as 
fundament see Ray L. Hart, Unfinished Man and the Imagination: 
Toward an Ontology and a Rhetoric of Revelation (New York: Herder 
& Herder, 1968), 83-97. Hart's use of the concept of fundament is 
taken up in this thesis in Chapter Eleven. 
118. Thus e.g. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, suggests that 
classical theists, adopting a performative view of religious 
utterances, proceed "as if God were good in relation to us ..•• ", 
67. Here a notion of fundament is proposed, but it operates more 
like a Kantian regulative rule, a working hypothesis for action. 
119. For a brief summary of how Locke, Waterland and Law 
these issues see the conclusions of the case studies in 
5, 6, and 7. 
CHAPTER ELEVEN: THE TASK OF COMMUNICATIONS 
developed 
chapters 
1. The notion of 'information' intended here ought not to be equated 
with a storehouse of available facts and op1n1ons or hard 
assemblage of data fragmented and without intrinsic meaning. The 
attempt to state the faith implies a power of selecting knowledge 
that matters, such knowledge being itself 'an aspect of wisdom'. 
See Mary Midgley, Wisdom Information and Wonder: What is Knowledge 
for? (London & New York: Routledge, 1989), 45, for above 
discussion and more generally (9-11, 43-45, 63-65, 179, 253) for 
references to 'information'. 
2. An example is the critical theory of communication developed by 
the social philosopher Jurgen Habermas. For an introduction see M. 
Pusey, Jurgen Habermas (London & Chichester: Tavistdk Pub., & 
Ellis Horwood Ltd., 1987), chap.3 "Communication and Social 
Action". 
3. This matter has received a helpful treatment in Baum and Greeley 
eds., Communication in the Church, Concilium III (1978), esp. the 
two essays in part 4, "Communication without Domination", which 
draws upon Habermas' work, and "Communication in the Church: 
Aspects of a Theological Theme". 
4. Ibid., 92, 98ff. 
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Communications embraces other forms besides linguistic, e.g. 
ritual, bodily actions, organizational structure, cultural 
symbols. 
6. See Hardy and Ford, Jubilate: "In the most fundamental sense, 
communication consists in the transmission of energy in form; and 
this is what occurs in all communicative activity, for example in 
speech, music and symbolic behaviour", 157. 
7. This matter arose in chap.10 in relation to the human subject as 
'interpreter' of what is given. The human being as 'reflector' 
upon what is given was found to be determinative for John Locke's 
handling of the fundamental articles tradition. The notion is 
implicit in much contemporary theology. It is presupposed in 
David Tracy's discussion of the genre of 'doctrine'. For Tracy, in 
The Analogical Imagination, doctrine 'reflects' and 'interprets' 
important aspects of 'the originating religious symbolic and 
metaphysical language'. Accordingly "doctrine is an abstraction 
from the concreteness of symbolic, metaphoric, poetic language" 
and, whilst doctrinal clarification can enrich community self-
understanding nevertheless "doctrines, as abstract, are relatively 
less adequate as expression than the originating metaphorical or 
symbolic language" (293 n.57). Leonardo Boff in Trinity and 
Society, trans. P. Burns (London: Burns & Oates, 1988), makes a 
rather simple distinction between reality and doctrine: "The 
reality of the Holy Trinity is independent of doctrines", 25. 
This issue requires some care. At one level the notion of 
theology as 'interpretation' or 'reflection' provides a strategy 
to break the domination in theology of 'conventional objectivism'. 
From this point of view rigid correspondence theories of truth are 
undermined and possibilities for inter-ecclesial communication are 
enhanced. This would seem to be at the basis of George Lindbeck's 
'rule theory' in which doctrines are said to be second-order 
rather than first-order propositions, i.e. "they make 
intrasystematic rather than ontological truth claims" (The Nature 
of Doctrine, 80). In this sense doctrine affirms "nothing about 
extra-linguistic or extra-human reality", 80. Doctrine, according 
to Lindbeck, may function symbolically or as a first-order 
proposition but to this extent the doctrine "cannot or need not be 
construed as a norm of communal belief or practice; it is not 
being used as a church doctrine". Lindbeck's concern is 
fundamentally directed to the needs of practical ecclesiology. In 
ecumenical dialogue he seeks a theory of doctrine that facilitates 
"doctrinal reconciliation without capitulation", 18. 
For Paul Avis, in Ecumenical Theology and the Elusiveness of 
Doctrine (London: SPCK,1986) theology, as interpretation, provides 
a way of recovering a personalist view of doctrine and overcoming 
an impersonal objectivism. Again, this theory provides a basis 
for churches recognising a shared, albeit tacit faith, that only 
imperfectly comes to form in doctrine. For John Hick, an 
interpretive theory of doctrine belongs to a universalized view of 
religion in which the Christian faith is one equal participant. 
For discussion of Hick see Hardy, "Theology through Philosophy", 
54-59, For Maurice Wiles, the 'interpretive' view of doctrine 
gives licence for considerable academic. freedom. See "The Role of 
a Critical Theology in the Church Today" in Explorations in 
Theology No.4 (London: SCM, 1979), 1-13. 
However the implications of this approach go deeper. It is 
one thing to reject a simplistic model of correspondence. It is 
quite another to develop an adequate understanding of God, who is 
inexpressible, yet can be thought, but "only within the context of 
the most rigorous discipline of silence" [from Donald McKinnon, 
513 
XI: Endnotes 
Themes in Theology: The Three-Fold Cord (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 
1987), 19]. McKinnon has discussed this matter with lucidity and 
sophistication. See further ''The Problem of the 'System of 
Projection' appropriate to Christian Theological Statements" in 
Explorations in Theology No.5 (London: SCM, 1979), 70-89. In 
tackling this difficult issue it is not sufficient to develop 
interpretive theories of doctrine which highlight the refracted 
and imperfect medium within which theology operates, and yet fail 
to show how the truth of God is properly present through the 
language of faith. It is a lack in theological discourse in this 
latter regard that betrays a more fundamental suspicion of the 
importance of the symbolic task of theology and leads to its 
displacement in ecclesial life as being merely of secondary 
importance. 
8. The problem here is reflected in the tendency to treat the 
development of doctrine in patristic theology as corrective 
strategies responding to false and dangerous modes of thought. 
Thus interpretation is occasioned by perceived heretical 
developments. See e.g. G.W.H.Lampe, "Christian Theology in the 
Patristic Period" in Herbert Cunliff-Jones, ed. A History of 
Christian Doctrine (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1978), esp. 28,98. The 
tendency in the modern period to identify such interpretations as 
the intrusion of alien (Greek/hellenistic) philosophical 
categories, a development typified in Adolf von Harnack's famous 
History of Dogma, is indicative of a failure to locate a positive 
rationale for theological discourse from within the nature of its 
subject matter (on Harnack see chap.2 en.14). Attempts to move 
beyond this negative assessment can not be said to be entirely 
successful. Thus Bernard Lonergan sees doctrine not as an alien 
intrusion but as a product of 'differentiated consciousness' 
(Method in Theology, 295-334). However the rationale for the 
dogmatic impulse is not exhausted by reference to certain 
historical contingencies (e.g. conflict and heresy), nor by the 
practical needs of an institution for security and direction, nor 
is it adequately accounted for as a product of human consciousness 
as such. In all these cases the rationale for theological 
discourse fails to illuminate the communication ideal, i.e. the 
transmission of energy in a form. The energy here is the energy 
of Jesus as agent of God's wisdom and these accounts of doctrine 
fail to see that this form of energy generates a reciprocal 
response: interpretation is thus a requirement of right response. 
See further chap.10 en.114. In terms of the argument in chap.9 
inadequate views of doctrine fail to accord the language of faith 
its true status as an intermediate form expressive of the 
ecclesial bond. 
9. If theology is properly to be a form in which energy is 
transmitted, then the prime concept cannot be 'distance' but 
'participation'. Interpretation cannot be achieved apart from 
participation in that which is transmitted. Fundamentally, 
theological discourse, as mediation of energy, shows what 
overcoming of distance might look like linguistically considered. 
It is thus a form through which the paradox of distance and 
proximity in the relationship of God to the world can be manifest. 
In a sense theology is 'second order' in the same way that all 
human life and creation is derived from and referred to God. The 
presupposition here is that language is a rich medium of God's 
relation to creation. This rules out both a conventional 
objectivist approach to doctrine and views which trade on the 
relativity of all theological effort. 
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10. This statement recalls the discussion in chap.10 of the 
relation between God's being as plenitude and the eschatological 
nature of doctrinal purity. See pp.304 and ens. 54 and 58. 
11. This arises insofar as language, as a form of symbolic mediation, 
has both manifest and latent meaning; a characteristic that leads 
Paul Ricoeur to state that "a symbol, in the most general sense 
functions as a surplus of signification". This surplus of meaning 
"is the residue of the literal interpretation. Yet for the one who 
participates in the Symbolic signification there are really not 
two significations, one literal and the other symbolic, but rather 
a single movement, which transfers him from one level to the other 
and which assimilates him to the second signification by means of, 
or through, the literal one. 
Symbolic signification, therefore, is so constituted that we 
can only attain the secondary signification by way of the primary 
signification, where this primary signification is the sole means 
of access to the surplus of meaning. The primary signification 
gives the secondary signification, in effect, as the meaning of a 
meaning". Quotations are from Interpretation Theory: Discourse and 
the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth, Texas: The Texas Christian 
University Press, 1976), 55. 
The double-meaning structure of symbolic language uncovers 
the dynamic of directness in indirectness. That which the symbol 
mediates is present directly only in indirectness. The symbol is 
in fact an indirect form of referring to something else which 
can not be communicated directly. This symbol opacity arises 
because linguistic discourse mediates a non-linguistic order which 
is inexhaustible in its depth, and resistent to complete 
thematization. Thus, as a region of mediacy, language can only 
indirectly refer to what is directly given. Theological discourse, 
insofar as it refers to the presence and activity of God in 
the world, focusses most sharply the unavoidability, indeed 
necessity, of directness through indirectness. This is the way in 
which theological discourse recognizes the nature of its own 
fundament. 
12. For useful if brief introductions to the subject of 
Foundationalism see: Rescher, Cognitive Systematization, chap.3; 
idem " Foundationalism, Coherentism, and the Idea of Cognitive 
Systematization", The Journal of Philosophy LXXI (1974): 695-708; 
Midgley 1 Wisdom Information and Wonder, chap.13, "What Foundations 
Are"; Anthony Quinton, "The Foundations of Knowledge" in B. 
Williams and A. Montefiore eds., British Analytical Philosophy 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971), 55-86. 
13. See Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, intro. and 
chap.3. 
14. An important early critique was made in 1935 by Karl Popper, The 
Logic of Scientific Discovery, 2nd.ed., (New York & London: 
Hutchinson & Co., 1960). In attempting to distance himself from 
the empiricist tradition which attempted to build a science by 
first collecting the basic or 'protocol sentences', Popper argued 
that such axioms were not entirely the product of immediate 
experience but arose in the application of theory. Basic 
statements were accepted in the course of testing theories 
proposed to explain experience. They arose in process and were 
subject to refutation. The persistence of 'basic statements' was 
indicative of rigorous testing that had not yet refuted them. Such 
statements were thus revisable but persisted by consensus, for the 
time being. This position led Popper to conclude: "Science does 
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not rest upon rock-bottom. The bold structure of its theories 
rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on 
piles. The piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but 
not down to any natural or 'given' base; and when we cease our 
attempts to drive our piles into a deeper layer, it is not because 
we have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied 
that they are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the 
time being", 111. More recently see Rorty, Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature, esp. 155-164. 
15. For an examination of the variety obtaining within 
foundationalism in modern science see Laurence Bonjour, The 
Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, Mass. & London: 
Harvard University Press, 1985), 26-30. 
16. For a critique of the foundationalist strategy in theology see 
Thiemann, Revelation and Theology. Thiemann argues that by 
associating revelation with a foundationalist epistemology - i.e. 
the conviction "that knowledge is grounded in a set of non-
inferential, self-evident beliefs" (158 n. 20), revelation 
mistakenly becomes the starting point from which the 
superstructure of Christian beliefs can be derived. In this 
respect Thiemann examines the foundationalist strategy as it 
appears in germinal form in John Locke and is developed in 
Friedrich Schleiermacher and Thomas Torrance. He finds all three 
united by their "same incoherent notion of intuition" (33), and to 
this extent their causal explanation theory of revelation 
collapses, 44. In Thiemann's view the problem with the 
foundationalist programme is that it attempts to justify 
revelation causally by reference to origins rather than according 
to content and argument. For Thiemann the "doctrine of revelation 
is not an epistemological theory but an account which justifies a 
set of Christian convictions concerning God's identity and 
reality", 7. Torrance's position may be a good deal more 
sophisticated than Thiemann grants (see Hardy, "Thomas Torrance" 
in D. Forded., The Modern Theologians, I: 76-82, on the nature of 
scientific intuition and the logic of discovery). However, the 
merits of Thiemann's critique aside, his discussion of theological 
foundationalism is important, particularly considering the 
continuing strong hold of foundationalist epistemology and 
ontology in Christianity. See Hardy "Rationality, the Sciences 
and Theology", 278f. For further see the recent work by D.Z. 
Phillips, Faith after Foundationalism (London & New York: 
Routledge, 1988), Part One. 
17. Thus e.g. John Jewel's Apologia Ecclesiae Anglicannae (1562) 
found the argument of a common secure foundation of faith an 
important means of affirming both the continuity of the English 
Reformation Church with the early Church (diachronic unity) and 
the unity of the then separated and diverse Protestant Churches of 
Christendom (synchronic unity). See chap.3 of this thesis. The 
appeal to such foundational truths became an important plank in 
Anglican ecclesiology (Sykes, Identity, 240). 
18. Thus Richard Field deployed the notion of fundamental beliefs to 
develop a notion of the unity of a Christendom by then 
sharply divided (chap.4 pp.91-95). 
19. See Laud's discussion of fundamental articles in chap.4 pp.95-97 
of this thesis. 
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20. See chap.4 pp.104-110 of this thesis; cf. Shapiro, Probability and 
Certainty, chap.3. 
21. Thus Rome, in the view of Anglicans like Laud, was guilty of 
having imposed non-fundamental belief. More Puritan elements in 
English Protestantism in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries, tended to reject the distinction between fundamental 
and non-fundamental beliefs on the basis that it was wrong to make 
such differentiations within the Word of God. For further details 
see chap.4 en.3. 
22. See pp.298-300. 
23. In this respect it might be argued that Thiemann, in Revelation 
and Theology, has really produced an inverted form of 
foundationalism, since the entire structure of his theological 
programme is designed to justify the key 'background conviction' 
of the prevenient grace of God. The problem Thiemann sees with 
this background conviction is that it is no longer, as it was in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, uncontroversial and 
universally accepted, 76. Therefore to begin with this belief 
requires a justificatory argument which inevitably flounders on 
some notion of intuition. Thus what Thiemann proposes is to begin 
in the forecourt of uncontroverted belief and show how such 
belief requires just such a background conviction, 76ff. He 
begins in the superstructure of belief and presses towards the 
belief essential for the Christian tradition. Prevenience is thus 
"retrospectively implied by a cluster of Christian convictions" 
(80), such that if these convictions are 'true' then "the belief 
upon which they rest" (81; my italics) is true. If this is not 
inverted foundationalism at the least it is a 'non-foundational' 
strategy designed to justify and hence secure what is 
foundational. What has altered is the direction of the argument. 
This may be important but it is difficult to see how Thiemann can 
avoid the pressing epistemological issues inherent in his 
programme. Revealingly Thiemann recognizes that the question of 
how the reader makes the transition from unbelief to belief cannot 
be explained within theology's descriptive competence, 150. 
William C. Placher, "Revisionist and Post liberal Theologies", The 
Thomist XLIX/3 (July 1985}: 392-416, briefly discusses the merits 
of the foundationalist charge made by Thiemann and others in 
respect of the 'revisionist' theologies of Tracy and Lonergan, 
411f. A case could be made that Thiemann's non-foundationalism is 
more correctly what Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, 
calls 'weak' foundationalism, "a kind of hybrid between moderate 
foundationalism and the coherence theories", 28ff. 
24. Hart, Unfinished Man and the Imagination, 84. 
25. Ibid., 85. 
26. Ibid., 87. 
27. Ibid. 
28. Ibid., 250. 
29. Ibid., 182. 
30. Ibid., 195. 
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31. Thus Hart writes "There is 'light' in events and 'light' in the 
mind [the] mind is possessed of a light whose rays chip a 
larger aperture in events: sometimes, as in poetry and scripture, 
to be met with a light more intense than itself. Such a light, in 
search of enlightenment, is active imagination", 90. Cf. Hardy 
and Ford Jubilate, 108-114, on the imagination and theology. 
32. For Hart 'imaginative' engagement is primary. But this may be 
unnecessarily restrictive. There are a range of other ways in 
which human beings participate with God in the world, e.g. bodily 
interactions, practical tasks, aesthetic concerns, as well as more 
explicitly rational and transrational (e.g. subject to subject, 
being with) forms. 
33. Lonergan, Method in Theology, 269ff. "If the ordered set consists 
in propositions, then the first will be the logically first 
propositions. If the ordered set consists in an ongoing, 
developing reality, then the first is the immanent and operative 
set of norms that guides each forward step in the process". 
34. Hardy and Ford, Jubilate, 63 and more generally 161-167. 
35. The case study on Waterland (chap.6) represented this way of 
handling fundamental articles. See also chap.8 on William Van 
Mildert, Newman's critics, Charles Gore and Norman Williams. 
36. See our discussion of Don Cupitt and his 'instrumentalist' view in 
relation to articles of faith in chap.10. 
37. See Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: 
Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), 
8-16 for a discussion of the terms objectivism, relativism and 
subjectivism. In this study the use of these words accords more 
with what Bernstein identifies as the more conventional view. 
38. See chap.8, p.268f of this thesis. 
39. This was very much the programme of Descartes. See Midgley, 
Wisdom Information and Wonder, 134ff. 
40. See Church Dogmatics (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1957), II./1, 449f: 
"It is very understandable that, complex as he is and suffering 
from his own complexity as he does, man would like to be 
different, i.e. simple". In Barth's view this desire for 
deliverance from complexity generated man's idolatries with the 
result that the true simplicity of God was impoverished. The drive 
for objectivity became a false human manoeuvre to escape from 
complexity to simplicity. 
41. This was precisely the point at issue in Karl Barth's critique of 
the fundamental articles tradition in Protestantism, See Church 
Dogmatics, I/2, 863-866. 
42. This dynamic by which our fundamental beliefs are continually 
reconsidered in relation to their own foundation has been 
succinctly described by Michael Polanyi in Personal Knowledge. In 
commenting upon St Augustine's method of exposition of fundamental 
beliefs in his Confessions, Polanyi states that "the process of 
examining any topic is both an exploration of the topic, and an 
exegesis of our fundamental beliefs in the light of which we 
approach it; a dialectical combination of exploration and 
exegesis. Our fundamental beliefs are continuously reconsidered 
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in the course of such a process, but only within the scope of 
their own basic premises", 267. 
This kind of provisionality in fundamental belief has been 
developed in theology by Thomas Torrance, who suggests that basic 
beliefs are continually tested and clarified in the light of 
reality as it is understood. Creedal statements are thus revisable 
in the light of God. Because fundamental belief is locked into a 
range that reaches beyond what we know, such beliefs are not yet 
completed, not fully justified, but as such our fundamental 
beliefs provide the heuristic impulse for further discovery. 
Increasing insight is thus facilitated in this process of 
conceptual refinement and enrichment. Our hold upon reality is 
accordingly strengthened in the process. See Thomas Torrance, "The 
Framework of Belief" in T.F. Torrance ed., Belief in Science and 
in Christian Life: The Relevance of Michael Polanyi's Thought for 
Christian Faith and Life, (Edinburgh: Handsel Press, 1980), 
chap.l. 
43. See chap.7 pp.229f. 
44. Coleridge recognised his debt to Law 
understanding of human life grounded in 
plenitude of God the Trinity. See e.g. 
Trinity, chap.8 en.45. 
45. See chap.8 pp.269-273. 
46. See chap.8 pp.257-262. 
47. See chap.7. pp.238-245. 
and developed 
the reality of 
his statement on 
an 
the 
the 
48. Rescher, Cognitive Systematization, 8-13. Cf. S.F. Barker, "On 
Simplicity in Empirical Hypotheses", Philosophy of Science XXVIII/ 
2 (1961): 162-171. 
49. Elliott Sober, Simplicity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 168. 
50. Ibid., preface, 
51. Mario Bunge, "The Weight of Simplicity in the Construction and 
Assaying of Scientific Theories", in Philosophy of Science, 
XXVIII/2 (1961): 120-149. This reference p.149. 
52. Mario Bunge, The Myth of Simplicity: Problems of Scientific 
Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963). 
53. See Sykes, Identity, 219-230. 
54. See Hartin, "Catechisms", 154-163. 
55. Ibid. , 155. 
56. A 1630 ed. of the work exists. Reprinted as A Pattern of 
Catechistical Doctrine, and other Minor Works (Library of Anglo-
Catholic Theology; Oxford: J.H. Parker, 1846). This reference p.6. 
57. See e.g. Hooker's reference to those 'few fundamental words' 
constitutive of the faith of the Church (chap.3 p.85). Hooker had 
in mind the Apostles Creed. He was followed by many other 
apologists including Chillingworth and Stillingfleet (see chap.4 
pp.99-101, and en.72). 
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58. One motive behind Hooker's sermon on justification was to defend 
the interests of a piety which agonized over the fate of those who 
had died whilst the Church had existed under Roman bondage. 
Hooker's argument suggested that one's forebears could indeed be 
saved in the Roman Church for it held to the foundation of faith 
and at least had not overthrown it directly. This fact could be 
established by virtue of its adherence to the few essentials of 
the faith. This argument would have been much less apparent and 
more difficult to commend had the fundamentals not been 
notationally simple and easily identifiable. To the extent that 
they were, such simplicities calmed the soul. See chap.3 p.85. 
For Locke, see chap.5 p.134ff, 154f. Refer chap.12 en.47 for a 
brief discussion of the link between simplicity and worship. 
59. See chap.4 p.106f. 
60. For patristic discussion on the unity of God see C. Stead, Divine 
Substance (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1977), 103-9, and 180-9. 
61. See Bunge, The Myth of Simplicity, chaps.4 and 5 for discussion 
of types of simplicities and chap.6 (pp.86-88) for consideration 
of motives. 
62. The reflexive relationship between simplicity and ordering is 
not fully recognised by Sykes in Identity, who writes: "A good 
simplifier will be someone who has thought carefully about 
priorities. On the other hand, not everyone who thinks carefully 
about priori ties will necessarily be engaged in simplification", 
223. He cites Schleiermacher as an example. Sykes' failure to 
identify the dynamic between simplicity and ordering in 
theological discourse arises because of an inadequate construal of 
simplicity as abbreviation. In fact simplicity operates more like 
the principle of cohesion Schleiermacher sought in essence of 
Christianity definition (cf. Sykes, ibid., 212). Simplicity cannot 
be reduced to 'simplification' or 'abbreviation'; rather it is a 
necessary moment in the organization of complex material, and good 
ordering of priorities will always include the operation of the 
simplicity concept. See further on Sykes below en.82. 
63. This has been an important component of Anglican apologetic and 
was initiated in John Jewel's famous Apology for the Church of 
England ( chap.3 pp.79-83). 
64. Thus "every simplification in the basis is paid for by a 
complication in the body of consequences" ( Bunge, The Myth of 
Simplicity, 64). Bunge argues that one has to distinguish the 
'manifest' from the 'latent' complexity of a theory's postulates. 
For Bunge "Simplicity is not so much a property of reality as a 
property of our approach to reality", 93; and further 80-84, 88-
93. 
65. Bunge, "The Weight of Simplicity", 148. 
66. David Kelsey, The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology (London: 
SCM, 1975), 163. 
67. See Bunge, "The Weight of Simplicity", 148; and cf. idem, The 
Myth of Simplicity, 88-90. 
68. Bunge, The Myth of Simplicity, 96-98, lllff; and cf. idem, "The 
Weight of Simplicity", 148f. Bunge argues that insofar as the 
goal of science is truth, progress towards this goal involves 
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increasing complexities. Truth is related not to 
but complexity. The policy of simplicity is thus 
in the attempt to penetrate the depth structure of 
69. Ibid. Thus in speaking of the positive content of wisdom to 
which knowledge is to be assimilated in order to be knowledge, 
Daniel Hardy states that such wisdom "seems to be so mysteriously 
deep as to require it to be seen as a complexity in which various 
aspects or levels are present. This depth leads to the 
supposition of an inner complexity which is incapable of being 
known without comparable complexities in the structure of 
knowledge and in the relation between knowledge and other 
aspects of the well-being of humankind, such as goodness and 
beauty", See "Rationality, the Sciences and Theology", 282f. 
70. Church Dogmatics, 11/1, 327. 
71. Ibid., II/1: 329; cf. II/1: 333. 
72. Ibid., II/1, 327. 
73. Ibid., II/1, 333. 
74. Ibid., II/1, 406. 
75. Ibid., II/1, 592. 
76. Cf. ibid., II/1, 326f; cf. II/1, 445f. 
77. Ibid., II/1, 447. 
78. Cf. Sober, Simplicity, who argues that simplicity is a question 
of relative informativeness, 19. That which requires the minimum 
extra information (10), i.e. that which is maximally informative, 
is the most simple. Simplicity is informativeness in its most 
concentrated form. Accordingly the desire for theories "in large 
measure reduces to a desire for simplicity", 168. This view of 
simplicity as economic communication has a parallel in Christian 
theology in the idea of the economy of God in salvation. See 
Symeon Lash, art., "Economy" in Richardson and Bowden eds. A New 
Dictionary of Christian Theology, 171f. 
79. The catechetical task is the obvious context for simplicities of a 
pragmatic kind. In the interests of ecclesiological apologetics, 
deeper and more important issues can remain repressed. In this 
respect see the criticisms of Henry McAdoo and Henry Chadwick in 
chap.1 pp.26-33 of this thesis. 
80. In the case of Waterland (chap.6) an over-riding divine 
monarchialism was reflected in a re-assertive mode of theological 
discourse unresponsive to contingency. The whole question of 
simplicity might be considerably enriched by developing it in 
relation to worship. Here simplicities are important for 
focussing and directing the worshipper, e.g. creedal affirmation, 
liturgical responses. However such concentrations are interwoven 
with more extended communication, e.g. sermon, prayer, 
song. Simplicities in worship are not necessarily to be associated 
with stale repetitive formalas, but rather operate in a fuller 
dynamic of communal and individual praise. The activity of 
worship would seem to require a strong element of repetitive 
communication involving simplicities of language. But such 
521 
XI: Endnotes 
repetition provides opportunities for maximal openness, quite at 
variance with an appeal to simplicity designed to thwart and close 
off communication. To recognise worship as an activity in which 
simplicities are relevant qualifies a too negative appraisal of 
repetitive . theological communication (see Sykes, Identity, 325 
n. 28). 
81. What is sought for in the fundamental articles tradition is truth 
preserving simplifications. Insofar as 'essence of Christianity' 
discussion is a theological form of the operation of the concept 
of simplicity, it is clear that essence definition is 
fundamentally a stage in a process. One does not arrive at an 
'essence of Christianity'. Thus discussion of simplicity in 
relation to the Trinity indicates that any attempt to develop an 
understanding of the essence of Christianity which is not 
simultaneously an affirmation of the abundance of the being of God 
in the world will end in impoverishment. Behind the essentialist 
mistake is a false or undeveloped notion of simplicity, a problem 
that lurks in Stephen Sykes' discussion of simplicity in relation 
to the 'essence of Christianity' definition ( See above en.62 and 
below en.82. ). 
82. Reduction in scale ought not to be identified with 'reductionism'. 
Sykes himself states that Hooker's essence of Christianity was "an 
abbreviation of the whole Christian tradition" (my italics; 
Identity, 228). But cf. "In such summaries [articles of 
fundamentum fidei of early Church] we are not dealing with a 
condensation of the whole context of Christian believing, but with 
a slightly elaborated version of a formal definition of the area 
which believing occupies", 257. It seems that Sykes is in danger 
of sliding between two quite different conceptions of simplicity 
here. His comment on Hooker suggests a qualitative compression 
of faith. This was certainly the thrust of Hooker's own 
apologetic. Sykes' second comment is much more in the quantifying 
strand of the fundamental articles tradition. Both strands can be 
found in John Locke. Thus he spoke of the article 'Jesus is the 
Messiah' as an 'abridgement'- 'the whole in a little'. Locke was 
not quite consistent here (see chap.5 en.172). Newman's discussion 
of the meaning of the Baptismal faith indicated that compression 
of faith did not imply reductionism per se (see Via Media, I: 249-
60). 
83. See e.g. discussion of fundamentals and ecclesiology in chap.5 
pp.149-157. 
84. Thus Locke suggested that one ought to stay with the text of 
Scripture where the fundamentals could be found 'safe and sound' 
(chap.5 p.137). 
85. The Reasonableness of Christianity, Works VII: 147. 
86. See chap.7 p.243. 
87. The epistemological significance of the reflexive relation 
between simplicity and hierarchy is illustrated in Luther for 
whom, Stephen Sykes argues, prioritizing and epistemology were 
'decisively linked'. See Identity, 224f, 298 n.26. Cf. the 
discussion of Luther in chap.2 p.63f of this thesis. 
88. Michael Polanyi in Personal Knowledge, Part 4 "Knowing and Being", 
recaptures the significance of a hierarchically conceived 
cosmology in his attempt to expose a real interrelation between 
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knowing and being. For an attempt to spell out the implication of 
this cosmologically conceived transcendence for Christology see 
Colin Gunton, "The Truth of Christology" in T. F. Torrance ed., 
Belief in Science and in Christian Life, 91-107, esp. 101-107. 
89. Cf. Midgley, Wisdom Information and Wonder, 45. 
90. Dietrich Ritschl in The Logic of Theology, has recognised the 
significance and difficulty of hierarchical ordering in the quest 
for truth (See 119-123). He is self-consciously drawing upon the 
insights of Michael Polanyi. Ritschl's attempt to uncover the 
'fundamental regulative statements' of theology presupposes the 
ordering of truth in some kind of structured form. 
91. Thus for Hooker, Laud and others, the quality of truths was to 
be decided by reference to their closeness or distance from the 
foundation of faith. A notion of 'relative fundamentality' was 
implied. See esp. chap.3 p.85ff and chap.4 p.96f of this thesis. 
92. For discussion of the concept of hierarchy in the sciences see 
L.L. Whyte et al., Hierarchical Structures (New York: American 
Elsevier Pub. Co. Inc., 1969). See esp. the introductory essay by 
L. Whyte for a brief but useful historical survey of the concept 
of hierarchy. 
93. Herbert A. Simon, "The Architecture of Complexity", General 
Systems, Yearbook of the Society for General Systems Research, L. 
von Bertalanffy and A. Rapoport, eds. (Ann Arbor Michigan: Soc. 
for Gen. Sys. Res., 1965), X: 63-76. Quotation is from p.63. 
94. Ibid., 73. 
95. See Mario Bunge "The Metaphysics, Epistemology and Methodology 
of Levels in Hierarchical Structures" in L.L. Whyte et al. 
Hierarchical Structures, 17-29: "Strictly speaking, a hierarchy or 
hierarchical structure is a set equipped with a relation of 
domination or its converse, subordination", 17. On this strict 
interpretation Bunge argues that hierarchies are a human invention 
for "in nature reciprocal action, rather than unidirectional 
action, seems to be the rule", 19. Bunge differentiates 
'domination' in which 'bossing' is in one direction only, from 
concepts to do with 'generation', 'production' or which may be 
construed as 'giving rise to'. He concludes that "one-sided 
domination seems to be an artifact", 19. For this reason Bunge 
prefers to speak of levels. Cf. p.52 for the reference to Bunge's 
'one-way bossing relation' in true hierarchy. Cf. The Myth of 
Simplicity, for discussion of 'levels' (37-48). 
96. See chap.4 p.95-98. 
97. See chap.8 p.269 and en.132 and 133. 
98. See e.g. chap.3 p.76-79, and 88f on Hooker; chap.4 pp.98-101 on 
Chillingworth, Stillingfleet; chap.5 pp.156-159 on Locke; and 
chap.8 pp.269-273 on Maurice. Important for these theologians was 
a desire to achieve a principled ecclesial practice as well as a 
rejection of the tendency to over define the faith. Accordingly 
the fundamental articles were never developed with the kind of 
sophistication apparent in the seventeenth century Lutheran 
orthodoxy of e.g. Nicholas Hunnias. 
99. Chap.6 pp.196-199. 
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100. This partly explains why Locke argued that belief necessary to 
become a Christian was quite different from that belief necessary 
to remain a Christian. Belief in the latter case would extend as 
far as peoples' capacity and presumably may even require them to 
believe mysteries! See e.g. chap.5 136f, 141. 
101. See chap.8 pp.269-273. 
102. Ibid., p. 271. 
103. Ibid. 
104. Ibid., p.270. 
105. Cf. the criticisms of Maurice around this point by Sykes, 
Integrity, 16-20. 
106. See chap.8 p.266f and en. 113, 115, 120. 
107. For the full text see Congar, Diversity and Communion, 126. 
108. See chap.1 pp.20, 24 and Congar, ibid, 126-134. 
109. See e.g. Fries and Rahner, The Unity of the Churches, where the 
authors present the Apostolicum, and the 'confession' of Nicea 
(325) and Constantinople (381) as "the totality of the fundamental 
truths of the Christian faith", 17. This is a familiar Anglican 
apologetic. Fries and Rahner employ a compression theory such 
that these creeds "contain a whole theology in shorthand", 18. Cf. 
Locke in his argument with John Edwards. Upon this basis future 
'interpretation and development' can be 'included' in the 
fundamental truths. This sanctions, for these two Roman 
theologians, the appeal to the 'principle' of the hierarchy of 
truths. This is a principle "not of selection but of correct 
interpretation" (20) in relation to the foundation of the 
Christian faith. Clearly for Fries and Rahner the hierarchy of 
truths is not envisaged as merely enumerative in intent. However 
these theologians, in their search for reconciliation between the 
churches, have adopted a familiar Anglican approach to fundamental 
articles, including notions of the compression of faith and 
quality of truth in relation to the foundation, and linked it with 
the Vatican II concept of 'hierarchy of truths'. So too has A. 
Dulles, "Paths to Doctrinal Agreement: Ten Theses". Thus Stephen 
Sykes is not right to suggest that the fundamental articles 
concept is enumerative and quantitative, in distinction from the 
'qualitative' concern expressed in the hierarchy of truths 
concept. See Identity, 226f. This history of the tradition 
indicates that 'fundamental articles' can be construed both 
qualitatively and quantitatively ( e.g. see above en.82). 
110. See chap.1 p.20 of this thesis. 
111. Fries and Rahner, The Unity of the Churches, have not escaped 
this danger: "The Confession of Nicaea and Constantinople is 
therefore a clamp which still holds the meanwhile-separated 
churches together. At the same time, it exhorts to ecclesiological 
communion, for which it is the historically established 
presupposition and condition", 17 (my italics). 
112. The Logic of Theology, 122. 
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113. See the discussion in the final section of this chap. 
'Excursus', on the genre of regulative communication, in which an 
alternative to the loci method in theology is presented. In 
this alternative an argument is developed to justify a range of 
hierarchical structures for the articles tradition. 
114. Chap.3 pp.76-79. Cf. chap.4 pp.99-101 on Stillingfleet regarding 
institutional belief. 
115. See e.g. chap.3 pp.79-83 on Jewel and chap.4 pp.101f on schemes 
for reunion and comprehension, and more recently Gore and Headlam 
(chap.8 pp.277-280). 
116. See e.g. 
Church, 
chap.6. 
John Bowker, "Religions as Systems", in Believing in the 
Report of the Doctrine Commission of Church of England, 
117. The problem of system in theology and belief was explored most 
fully in this thesis in relation to Daniel Waterland. See 
esp. pp.187-201. 
118. See chap.4 p.107f. 
119. pp.102f. 
120. See e.g. Rescher, Cognitive Systematization, who states: "A 
system is a collection of interrelated entities, the relationships 
among which are such that information about them affords a basis 
for inferring conclusions regarding the structure, modus operandi, 
or temporal history of the system as a whole", 14. 
121. Anthony Wilden, System and Structure: Essays in Communication and 
Exchange (London: Tavistock Publications, 1972), 357, and more 
generally 356-361. 
122. Thomas F. Torrance, Transformation and Convergence in the Frame 
of Knowledge: Explorations in the Interrelations of Scientific and 
Theological Enterprise (Belfast: Christian Journals Limited, 
1984), 146. 
123. Wilden, System and Structure, usefully illuminates the 
relationship between the concepts of 'information' and 'energy' in 
an open system: "the essential characteristic of an open system is 
its organization. Organization is controlled by information and 
fuelled by energy", 358. It seems that without information 
generation a system tends to decomposition or disorder. 
Information focusses the flow of energy and maintains or increases 
organization. 
124. Ibid., 359. 
125. Torrance, Transformation and Convergence, 135f; and cf. 140. 
126. Ibid., 136. 
127. Ibid. I 145. 
128. See above 42. 
129. See e.g. esp. chap.5 pp.138-148. 
130. See chap.6 pp.l96-199. 
525 
XI: Endnotes 
131. Ibid., 194-196. 
132. See e.g. chap.7 pp.238-245. 
133. Ibid., 248-250. 
134. The phrase is Ritschl's, The Logic of Theology: "What we are 
concerned with is the prophetic objection to a fixed, congealed 
system in which each of the loci has its firm place and in which 
God and human beings have become the prisoners of a theological 
system", 94. 
135. Cf., Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, who discusses this feature of 
what he terms an 'open stable system'. "It is a fundamental 
property of open systems, .•.••• that they stabilize any improbable 
event which serves to elicit them", 384. Though as Polanyi notes 
in relation to a stable flame, "The fluctuation which leads to the 
establishment of an open system does not vanish after the event 
.... The atomic configuration which ignited a flame keeps renewing 
itself within the flame", 384. In other words the dynamic is not 
dissipated but remains active within the system. 
136. See chap.1 p.23. 
137. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 3rd. ed. (London: Guild 
Pub., 1983), refers to aphorisms as 'terse general reflections'. 
Coleridge in Aids to Reflection, introductory aphorism xxv11, 
states: "Exclusive of the abstract sciences, the largest and 
worthiest portion of our knowledge consists of aphorisms: and the 
greatest and best of men is but an aphorism". His Aids to 
Reflection consists of a series of aphorisms which accords with 
his desire expressed in introductory aphorism II, to reflect on 
commonplace maxims. 
138. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary refers to 
quality of parabolic discourse. Cf. Junge!, God as 
the World: "a parable narrates while a metaphor 
narrative in a single word", 289. 
139. Junge!, ibid., 291. 
the narrative 
the Mystery of 
coalesces the 
140. See e.g, Parables of Kierkegaard, ed. with an intro. by Thomas 
Cohen (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978). 
141. Junge!, God as the Mystery of the World, 303. 
142. See e.g. David F. Ford, "Barth's Interpretation of the Bible" in 
S.W. Sykes ed., Karl Barth: Studies of his Theological Methods, 
55-87, esp. 63 where Ford refers to Barth's doctrine of God as a 
'metaphysics of the Gospel story'. Cf. Ritschl, The Logic of 
Theology (19-25), on narrative and its relation to theology, 
143. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. See Tillich's highly 
pertinent remark: "The statement that Jesus is the Christ contains 
in some way the whole theological system, as the telling of a 
parable of Jesus contains all artistic potentialities of 
Christianity" (my italics; III: 215), Tillich's systematics 
represents an expansion of this highly concentrated statement. 
144. See Fries and Rahner, The Unity of the Churches, 15ff. 
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145. Consult John H. Leith ed., Creeds of the Churches, rev. ed. 
(Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1973), 192-230. 
146. Ibid., 517-522. 
147. See Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 448-459. 
148. See Leith, Creeds of the Churches, 583. 
149. Baptism, 
(Geneva: 
Eucharist and Ministry, 
World Council of Churches, 
accompanying commentary. 
Faith and Order Paper No.111 
1982). What is novel is the 
150. Consult H. Schmidt, Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran 
Church, 92f. Cf. Charles Gore, The Solidarity of the Faith, 
Modern Oxford Tracts (London: Longmans Green & Co, 1914): "When we 
speak of an 'article' of the Christian faith we use a word which 
means originally a small limb or joint, a component part of a 
living whole; and in its transferred sense, as meaning an element 
in a connected statement of principle, it still retained the idea 
of interconnection and logical coherence between one article and 
all the rest", 9. Gore's point was that one was not at liberty to 
select from among the articles. The 'essential' articles of the 
Catholic faith cohere "so that the admission of one suggests the 
admission of all, and the refusal of one the refusal of all", 9. 
151. Ritschl, The Logic of Theology, 113. 
152. There is perhaps nothing peculiarly novel in this proposal 
though it has a certain logic that has been quite ingeniously 
depicted by Daniel Hardy: "If one cuts a hole in the inner tube of 
a bicycle tyre where the valve is and begins to pull the rest of 
the tube through the hole, what happens? The issue with modern 
understanding - though hardly fully appreciated yet - is that one 
can repeat the exercise at an infinite number of points on the 
tube, drawing the tube through after it has been drawn through at 
an infinite number of other points. That is a fascinating 
prospect, not only a testimony to the amazing creativity of human 
understanding but an indication of the possibility of an endlessly 
multiplying complexity in knowledge", See "Rationality, the 
Sciences and Theology", 305. Hardy wants to speak of the 
'indefinite plenitude' of knowledge. The significance of the above 
for the structure of theological discourse is yet to be unravelled 
though it seems clear that such a conception entails a dynamic, 
integrated series of discourses, representing different 'holes on 
the tyre' through which fuller and fuller knowledge is generated. 
153. The Logic of Theology, 90. 
154, Ibid. 
155. Ibid., 91. 
156. See p.290ff. 
157. "Ultimate Beliefs and the Scientific Revolution" in T.F. Torrance 
ed. , Transformation and Convergence in the Frame of Knowledge, 
chap.5. 
158. Ibid., 199. 
159. Ibid., 199f. 
527 
XI: Endnotes 
160. See The Logic of Theology, index for references to regulative 
statements, but esp. introductory preface. 
161. Ibid., 79. 
162. Ibid., 126. 
163. Ibid., 124. 
164. Ibid., 110. 
165. Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, 270. 
166. Ibid. I 131. 
167. Ibid., 298. 
168. Cf. ibid.' 319. 
169. Ibid., 142. 
170. See Thiemann, Revelation and Theology, llff. 
171. Ibid., 71ff. 
172. Ibid., 3. 
173. Ibid., 149. 
174. See above en.23. 
CHAPTER TWELVE: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INSTITUTIONALITY 
1. See esp. chap.9 p.290ff. 
2. Barth, Church Dogmatics IV/2, 676. 
3. Ibid., IV/2, 696. 
4. "The term ecclesial institutionality suggests something more 
specific, more concrete, than the ideal-historical term ecclesial 
existence. It describes some empirical-historical manifestation 
of ecclesial existence in a determinate community, a visible 
society" (Farley, Ecclesial R:Jlection, 262). 
5. Ibid., 205; and cf. idem, Ecclesial Man, 107. 
6. Thus Karl Barth, in depicting that 'definite form' of ecclesia 
which corresponds to righteousness and truth, states that this 
form "is nothing more nor less than the whole human being and 
action of the Christian community as a provisional representation 
of the sanctification of man as it has taken place in Jesus 
Christ", (my italics; Church Dogmatics, IV/2, 677). The quality of 
this provisional representation is the criterion of the true 
significance of Church considered as an institution. 
7. For a recent interesting discussion of institutionality see Mary 
Douglas, How Institutions Think (New York: Syracuse University 
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Press, 1986). 
8. Hans Dombois, "The Church as Koinonia and Institution" in 
N. Ehrenstrom and W.G. Muelder eds. Institutionalism and Church 
Unity (London: SCM, 1963), 108. 
9. Niklas Luhmann, "Institutionalized Religion in the Perspective of 
Functional Sociology" in Baum and Greely, eds., The Church as 
Institution, Concilium XCI (1974): 47. 
10. Ibid. 
11. Ibid., 55. 
12. Luhmann has developed these matters to a high degree of 
sophistication in A Sociological Theory of Law, trans. from 1972 
German ed. by E. King and M. Albrow (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1985). See esp. chap.2, subsec.3, on 'Handling of 
disappointments'. Luhmann notes that "Expectational structures 
which selectively decrease complexity and contingency are a life 
necessity'' (40), but they simultaneously raise the problem of 
disappointment. "It is for this reason that the social system has 
to supervise and channel the process of disappointments of 
expectation - and this not only to enforce effectively the right 
expectations (such as legal norms), but in order to create the 
possibility of counter-factual, disappointment-prepared and 
normative expectation in the first place. The expectant person 
must be prepared and equipped in case he arrives at a discrepant 
reality. He would otherwise not have the courage to expect 
normatively, and therefore with determination. The channelling 
and cooling out of disappointments is part of the stabilization of 
structures", 41. 
This suggests that institutionalization provides a social 
mechanism for endurance in failure. Stabilizing explanation of 
disappointment "is dependent on societal sources for cognitive 
plausibility and, at the same time, is equally dependent on the 
particular accepted horizon of beliefs - whether it be magic, 
religion or science", 44. 
13. Thus Luhmann, ibid., states: "Law is in no way primarily a 
coercive order, but rather a facilitation of expectation. The 
facilitation depends on the availability of congruently 
generalized channels of expectation, i.e. a high degree of 
harmless indifference to other possibilities, which lowers the 
risk of counter-factual expectation significantly" (78 and more 
generally 73-83). 
14. Farley, Ecclesial Man, 98. 
15. Ibid. 
16. Ibid., 175: "Whatever else it is , ecclesia is a specific form of 
corporate existence .••... In some sense of the word ecclesia 
means a specific community". 
17. Thus Farley, Ecclesial Man, notes: "An impetus toward 
institutionalization exists in any group which wishes any kind of 
permanence and effectiveness. Because a given group would 
scarcely retain any continuity apart from repeatable and visible 
repetitions, it tends to originate customs, rules, organizational 
structures, rites, and symbols which express and maintain the 
purpose or purposes of a group", 175. This point is ignored by 
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Avery Dulles, S.J., in Models of the Church (Dublin: Gill & 
Macmillan, 1976), chap.2. Dulles discusses the idea of the Church 
as an institution, but does so from a critical Roman Catholic 
perspective. "By institutionalism we mean a system in which the 
institutional element is treated as primary", 32. From Dulles' 
point of view institutionalism is a 'deformation of the true 
nature of the Church', but institutionality is 'fitting and 
proper', for what seems to be good practical reasons. But he 
fails to push the discussion into genuine analysis of the 
rationale for institutionality. 
18. Gotthold Hasenhiittl, "Church and Institution" in Baum and Greely 
eds., The Church as Institution, Concilium XCI: 14, referring to 
the thesis of the Protestant theologian Rudolph Sohm (1841-1917). 
19. Cf. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV/2, 679, for critique of Sohm 
and Emil Brunner (1889-1966). 
20. Hasenhuttl, "Church and Institution", refers to the limited and 
weaker forms by which Protestantism affirmed ecclesia's 
insti tutionali ty. "There are tendencies which limit themselves to 
particular elements (preaching, two sacraments), or even only 
allow the institution conditional existence. The institution 
belongs (dialectically) to the Church as response to certain 
needs. As a whole, however, Protestants do not deny that the 
Church is an institution", 13. 
21. Barth, in Church Dogmatics, IV/2, 670, refers to the "slipping of 
the community into the sacralization in which it not only cuts 
itself off from its own origin and goal and loses its secret by 
trying to reveal it in itself, but also separates itself .•• from 
poor, sinful, erring humanity •.•.•. Sacralization means the 
transmutation of the Lordship of Jesus Christ into the vanity of a 
Christianity which vaunts itself in His name but in reality is 
enamoured only of itself and its traditions, confessions and 
institutions". As such, sacralization 'means the end of the 
community'. For Barth this was not limited to Roman Catholicism. 
22. See e.g. Thomas O'Dea, "Pathology 
Institutions" in Baum and Greely 
Institution, Concilium, XCI: 125. 
23. Farley, Ecclesial Man, 185. 
and Renewal of 
eds., The 
Religious 
Church as 
24. Ibid., 182-185., and cf. Hodgson and King, eds., Christian 
Theology, 223f, 238ff. 
25. Franz-Xaver Kaufmann, "The Church as a Religious Institution" in 
Baum and Greely eds., The Church as Institution, 81, uses this 
phrase, of which he finds Karl Rahner's theology culpable. 
26. Farley, Ecclesial Man, 185. 
27. In this respect Stanley Hauerwas' comment on John Rawls' theory of 
justice is telling: "he [Rawls] represents the ultimate liberal 
irony: individualism, in an effort to secure societal cooperation 
and justice, must deny individual differences". See A Community 
of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethic (Notre 
Dame & London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 83. Cf. in 
the same work Hauerwas' remark that "one of the great ironies of 
our society is that by attempting to make freedom an end in itself 
we have become an excessively legalistic society," 75. In a 
530 
XI I: Endnotes 
somewhat more popular vein, but with penetration and wisdom is M. 
Scott Peck, The Different Drum: Community-Making and Peace 
(London, Melbourne, Auckland, Johannesburg: Rider Books, 1987). 
Particularly relevant is Peck's discussion of stages of community 
making in chap.5. The author observes a tendency for social groups 
to oscillate between pseudo-community (in which individual 
differences are denied) and a condition of chaos in which 
individual differences erupt and conflict is generated. One way 
out of chaos, notes Peck, is through organization, though this can 
easily degenerate into a masked pseudo-community. 
28. In this argument ecclesia's institutionality is taken with the 
utmost seriousness. It is the logic of the argument begun in 
Chapter Nine concerning the ecclesial bond as the bond in which 
those constituents of human social life are given a reference to 
God. The view of institutionality proposed here is thus derived 
from an understanding of God in creation concentrated in Christ 
(Colossians I:16 - "all things were created through him and for 
him", R.S.V. ), Cf. Hebrews 9:11- "Christ appeared as a high 
priest of the good things that have come", RSV ('already in 
being', N.E.B. ). This rendering is supported by B.M. Metzger, A 
Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament (London & New York: 
United Bible Societies, 1975), 668. The supposition is that God in 
Christ is in relation to creation as it is already constituted. 
The natural and ideal reference of human and created life is to 
him. Thus our life is 'hid with Christ in God' (Colossians 3:3). 
In ecclesia's institutionality this godward reference is 
actualised in concrete form. Thus the wisdom of Jesus Christ is 
not 'independent' of, nor understood as 'occasionally addressing' 
the above constituents of social life but Christ is "one whose 
being and behaviour is the presence of wisdom in those mediums. 
Nor is his reality to be seen 'shining through' these mediums, 
epiphany-like. He is to be seen as the coincidence of wisdom with 
them, and not accidently so" (Hardy, "Rationality, the Sciences 
and Theology", 296). 
29. Luhmann, "Institutionalized Religion and Functional Sociology", 
54. 
30. Cf. Sykes, Identity: "systematic theology is a form of 
professional generalizing, a kind of 'general practice' theology", 
13; "it is in relation to the doctrinal tradition that internal 
conflict becomes most explicit and manageable", 30. Conflict is a 
concomndtant feature of the richness, diversity and complexity of 
reality. Organising, and thus giving sense to things belongs, in 
the nature of the case, to the task of 'theological generalizing'. 
For further refer to the discussion on simplicity in Chapter 
Eleven. It is surely misleading of David Tracy, The Analogical 
Imagination, to state that doctrine is an 'abstraction from' more 
'concrete' forms of communication (293 n.57). The attempt in 
theology to state the theory of the practice of Christianity is 
distorted and falsified when the theory is identified as an 
abstraction, with the implied suggestion that the endeavour is 
somewhat removed from where things really happen. 
31. William A. Christian, SR., Doctrines of Religious Communities. 
32. Ibid.,2. Primary doctrines for Christian are doctrines explicitly 
held and proposed for belief, in contrast to governing doctrines 
that operate more at the tacit level as parameters for doctrinal 
formation. This is not to say that governing doctrines cannot be 
explicitly formed and known. 
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33. Ibid. 
34. Ibid.,33, citing Robert S. Summers, ed., Essays in Legal 
Philosophy (Berkley: University of California Press, 1968),49. 
35. The strength of such governing doctrines has shaped the Anglican 
fundamental articles tradition in its conventionally recognised 
form. The classic expression of their force is found in Newman's 
Lectures on the Prophetical Office of the Church (1837), esp. 
lectures 2, 8, 9, 10. The apologetic motif was central "for unless 
we can appeal to the past, how can we condemn the present?" See 
Newman on "Palmer's View of Faith and Unity" in Essays Critical 
and Historical, I: 212. Cf. Congar's criticism of such criteria 
in Diversity and Communion: "But one cannot stop the life of the 
church in the truth at a past moment of its history," 124. Cf. 
discussion on H. McAdoo in chap.1 for a modern exponent of the 
'preservative' tradition in Anglican theology. 
36. See Christian, Doctrine 
further examples derived 
176ff. 
37. Ibid., 179. 
38. p.77. 
39. Chap.3 p.77 and 79. 
of Religious Communities, 
from Anglican formularies 
40. See e.g. chap.4 p.106ff and chap.5 on John Locke. 
179 and for 
see 87ff, 
41. For Newman the Anglican and Palmer, the appeal to tradition in 
fundamental belief went hand in hand with their heavy investment 
in an episcopally ordered church. Both provided a bulwark against 
rationalism. See Sykes and Gilley, "'No Bishop, No Church!' The 
Tractarian Impact On Anglicanism". 
42. See chap.6 p.190ff. 
43. Mozley, A Review of the Baptismal Controversy, 2ff. 
44. "Discourse of Fundamentals", Works,V: 76. 
45. A Review of the Baptismal Controversy, 1. 
46. Ibid., 2. 
47. Cf. Sykes, Integrity, chap.5; Bryant ed., The Future of Anglican 
Theology; Avis, Ecumenical Theology; and more recently H. McAdoo, 
"The Influence of the Seventeenth century on Contemporary Anglican 
Understanding of the purpose and functioning of Authority in the 
Church". All these writings can be understood in terms of the 
search for and clarification of the operation of governing 
doctrines in Anglicanism. For example, discussion of Anglican 
methodology in terms of a 'synthesis' of disparate elements, or 
'symbiosis' ("the permanent union between organisms each of which 
depends for its existence on the other" [ McAdoo, The Unity of 
Anglicanism, 73]), or of 'polarity', i.e. truths in tension (Avis, 
Ecumenical Theology, 122ff.), propose guidelines for determining 
the way a community is to hold and express its truth concerns. 
Sykes, Identity, draws attention to the priority of worship as 
that "theatre in which doctrine, ethics, myth, social embodiment, 
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ritual and inward experience are integrally related", 267. The 
implicit governing doctrine here concerns both the 'what' and the 
'how' of belief, i.e. authentic belief must admit of being 
actualised in Christian worship. 
48. Cf. The discussion in chap.l of McAdoo's handling of fundamentals. 
By extolling the 'Classical' method McAdoo assumes he has also 
identified the content of fundamental belief. However, in his 
repeated attempts to propound the 'Classical' view of the 'hapax' 
the faith once delivered - McAdoo presents a highly simplified 
way of treating Christian doctrine and its development. When 
rules are viewed primarily in their preservative function there is 
always the tacit assumption that following the rule will lead to a 
form of faith already assumed to be the case. This can only lead 
to anxiety and preoccupation with getting the method correct, i.e. 
identifying the correct 'rule' to follow. 
49. This might be a problem in Stephen Sykes' discussion of 'formal 
definition' of Christianity, which describes not so much content 
but context of Christian believing. See chap.l.41f. 
50. Perhaps the real issue here lies in the tacit assumption that 
questions of theological method, i.e. matters to do with 
governing doctrines can be discussed without reference to 
matters of theological content. In fact questions of method and 
content co-inhere; attention to one implies and provokes concern 
for the other. However, when questions of methodology are 
discussed as though the issue of content had already been settled, 
then methodological inquiry simply operates in the service of 
maintaining the status quo. The interrelatedness between method 
and content is undermined, and continued preoccupation with 
methodology thwarts more constructive and self-critical 
theological discourse. See further, Sykes, Integrity, chap.5 and 
esp. e.g. his comments on Richard Hanson's view of 
comprehensiveness (69f), in which Sykes discerns a failure to 
integrate method and content in theology. 
51. Christian, Doctrines of Religious Communities, 
52. This classification has a certain artificiality, however it does 
represent an attempt to open up more fully the dynamics of how an 
institution's doctrinal structure operates to maintain the 
institution's truth concerns. See Lindbeck, The Nature of 
Doctrine, for a reference to 'operational' doctrines which later 
become 'official',75. 
53. See chap.3 p.85f. 
54. From the statement of the Anglican-Lutheran 
Continuation Committee, Wimbleton, 1986 report; 
sec14(d) of The Niagara Report. 
55. See chap.7 p.240ff. 
56. See chap.4 p.l09. 
57. See chap.4 p.109f. 
58. See Allison, The Rise of Moralism, 96-106. 
International 
Appendix III, 
59. The uncharted territory of the emergence of 'conditional' covenant 
theology in Anglicanism from the mid-seventeenth century was 
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briefly touched on in the discussion of Locke's doctrine of 
justification. See chap.5 p.131f and en.127, 128, 129. 
60. Ibid. 
61. Chap.8, p.261f. 
62. Classification according to type is implicit in Christian's 
analysis and Lindbeck's reference to operational doctrines that 
later become official. In Lindbeck this development is 
referred to as a shift from implicit to explicit belief. Cf. also 
Lonergan, Method in Theology, 295-299. In this study the question 
of type of doctrine is important in considering the way in which 
communication is achieved through doctrine. 
63. Pelikan, The Christian Tradition, V: 282. 
64. "Analyzing its institutions; man discovered that he has always 
been creating them •... And now these institutions impose claims 
and obligations upon man, even though he seems to be their creator 
and master. Obligation and existence seem to be synchronized in 
institutions .... ". Wolf-Dieter Marsch "The Concept of Institution 
in the Light of Sociology and Theology" in N. Ehrenstrom and W. 
Muelder eds., Institutionalism and Church Unity (London: SCM, 
1963), 39. 
65. Doctrines of Religious Communities, 2. 
66. See on Luke 17: 21, I. Howard Marshall, The Gospel of Luke 
(Exeter: Paternoster Press, 1978), 655f. 
67. Farley, Ecclesial Man, 169-174. 
68. Thus for Bonhoeffer, a person's hearing of God's call 
same time a hearing of the call of the other person. 
acts in which people recognise and respond to the needs 
are constitutive of the community of love. See 
Communio, esp. 126-136. 
is at the 
The social 
of others 
Sanctorum 
69. In this respect Mary Douglas refers to "the saving of energy from 
institutional coding and inertia". The point being that frequent 
use 'makes some words hardy' and partially resistent to constant 
change. Thus she notes: "Thanks to the weight of institutional 
inertia, shifting images are held steady enough for communication 
to be possible" ( How Institutions Think, 63). Thus the encoding 
of complexity in institutions through rendering the undefined into 
more determinate forms, provides the possibility for more 
economical communication of information in an institution. 
70. Farley, Ecclesial Man, 176ff; and cf. Ecclesial Reflection, 88-92, 
and chap.12. 
71. Cf. Ronald Modras, "Creedal Statements: Functions and 
Limitations", in H.Kung and J. Moltmann eds., An Ecumenical 
Confession of Faith, Concilium CXVIII (1979): 36-44. 
72. Thus the tradition indicates the boundary contours of safe beliefs 
and tacitly indicates in what direction 'danger-beliefs' might lie 
in regard to matters of social cohesion and control. See further 
on institutional boundary making and its significance (including 
'danger-beliefs'), Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: an Analysis of 
Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (London: Routledge & Kegan 
534 
Paul,1966), 
as Systems" 
describe the 
development. 
XI I: Endnotes 
intro. and chap.7. See also John Bowker, "Religions 
in Believing in the Church, for a recent attempt to 
operation of the concept of boundary in system 
73. See chap.11 p.325. 
74. John Locke, .4 Third Letter on Toleration, cited in Michael 
Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 266. 
75. Ibid. 
76. Ibid. Cf. for a more qualified assessment of Locke's contribution 
to this state of affairs, S.N. Williams, "John Locke on the Status 
of Faith" (see chap.5 en.8). 
77. The reduction of belief to the status of personal choice was 
recognised by Newman as the corollary of the rejection of the 
dogmatic principle. The result of such a false view was: "That 
truth and falsehood in religion are but matter of op1n1on: that 
the Governor of the world does not intend that we should gain the 
truth; that there is no truth; that we are not more acceptable to 
God by believing this than by believing that; that no one is 
answerable for his op1n1ons; that they are a matter of necessity 
or accident; that it is enough if we sincerely hold what we 
profess; that our merit lies in seeking, not in possessing; that 
it is a duty to follow what seems to us true, without a fear lest 
it should not be true; that it may be a gain to succeed, and can 
be no harm to fail; that we may take up and lay down opinions at 
pleasure; that belief belongs to the merely intellect, not to the 
heart; that we may safely trust ourselves in matters of Faith, and 
need no other guide, - this is the principle of philosophies and 
heresies, which is very weakness". See An Essay on the Development 
of Christian Doctrine (1845), Cameron ed., 357. 
78. This strategy is exemplified in the writings of Don Cupitt. In 
the interests of personal freedom from traditionalist oppressive 
views of a God 'out-there', Cupitt ends up denying the legitimacy 
of those views different from his own. He begins with a highly 
inclusivist approach and maintains it by 'squeezing out' a whole 
range of options that he considers distorted. (See esp. Life 
Lines). In such radical liberal individualism any notion of a 
community of faith evaporates. See chap.10 p.301f. 
79. For example, Hans Kung, On Being a Christian (Collins Fount 
Paperbacks, 1978) states that "whether he [Jesus Christ] is in 
fact to be the model for me is a wholly (my italics) personal 
question. It will depend on my wholly personal decision", 515. In 
the context Kung means 'wholly' in the sense of free from any 
constraints whatsoever. It is an idealised view and supports 
Kung's unsympathetic handling of the doctrine of the Trinity (472-
478). In the issue of 'wholly personal decisions' this doctrine 
can be, it seems, disregarded. 
80. The significance which is attached to believing as a source of 
social unity might, for example, be indicated by the tone of a 
controversy: "The tone of a controversy is a direct indication of 
the hearts of the controversialists. How controversialists argue 
has a close bearing upon what is intended in Jesus' achievement" 
(Sykes, Identity, 260). In this case the 'tone' might indicate 
whether what was affirmed or denied in controversy was actually 
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considered to determine social bonds. However, it is also the case 
that the placement of belief per se is suggestive of its secondary 
significance for institutional cohesion. Believing in large 
measure concerns one's personal convictions, choices made, but, it 
seems, unrelated to the enduring life of a community: "For the 
life of faith is shaped not by a set of clear-cut beliefs, but by 
a whole rich tradition of imagery, of worship, and of patterns of 
life and conduct. It is these that provide the assurance, the 
deepening and the direction that man needs". See Maurice Wiles' 
essay in Christian Believing, Doctrine Commission of the Church of 
England, 131; and cf. Wiles, Explorations in Theology No.4. 
(London: SCM, 1979), 12. 
81. See pp.275-280. 
82. See chap.9 of this thesis, 'Loss of Capacity'. The problem is 
nicely encapsulated by Maurice Wiles in Explorations in Theology: 
"But the only ultimate security is in God himself. Other things -
buildings, institutions, formularies - may help to mediate the 
reality of God's eternal changelessness to us. But none of them, 
however good, must be allowed the absoluteness that belongs to God 
alone. That is idolatry", 12 (my italics). What is neatly 
sidesteped in such arguments is precisely how mediation works and 
'how good' it is, issues not pursued by Wiles. 
83. This is exemplified in the structure of the report of the Doctrine 
Commission of the Church of England, Christian Believing, in which 
individual essays accounted for almost 100 of the 156 pages of the 
report. 
84. The possibility of identifying 'normative doctrine' is grounded 
for Lonergan in the constitution of human community in shared or 
'common meaning.' Such common meaning requires a common field of 
experience, complementary ways of understanding, common 
judgements, values, goals and policies. The genesis of common 
meaning is "an ongoing process of communication, of people coming 
to share the same cognitive, constitutive and effective meanings". 
In this way Lonergan suggests common meaning 'constitutes' 
community and divergent meaning divides it. See Method in 
Theology, 356ff. 
However exactly how such 'common meaning' assumes normative 
form is controversial. The 'Excursus' on the genre of regulative 
communication in chap.11 highlighted the dynamic involved between 
common meaning and normative forms, e.g. Ritschl's analysis of 
'regulative statements.' In a 'post' -or 'late modern' context 
the search for normative belief appears highly problematic given 
the difficulty of identifying a substratum of 'common meaning'. 
For one way of dealing with this see Edward Schillebeckx, The 
Understanding of Faith (London: Sheed & Ward, 1974), 55-70. The 
author develops a notion of the 'proportional norm' for orthodoxy, 
i.e. "models of structurisation of faith, of which the scripture 
supplies the first and therefore the normative ones", 62. This 
theoretical norm requires the criterion of Christian orthopraxis. 
This "is not a consequence of a previously given, communal unity 
of faith, but the manner in which such a communal unity and 
conviction is realized", 68. Normative belief is achieved in right 
practice. This does not lessen the importance of the question of 
the theoretical norm, but it does bring into focus the issue of 
how consensus in faith ought to be construed. Farley's proposals 
in Ecclesial Reflection represent one strategy for normative 
statements in theology following the collapse of the traditional 
'house of authority'. 
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XII: Endnotes 
85. Luhmann, The Sociology of Law, 51 and his discussion generally 51-
55, 73f. 
86. P.62f. 
87. See Pelikan, The Christian Tradition, V: 235-242 (Dort), 274-290 
(Trent). 
88. Luhmann, The Sociology of Law, 51. 
89. Luhmann's pragmatic realism leads him to state that institutions 
"do not depend on actual agreement between determinate expressions 
of opinion, but on their successful overestimation. Their 
continuity is guaranteed, as long as more or less everyone 
presumes that everyone agrees; possibly even when nearly everyone 
presumes that nearly everyone presumes that nearly everyone 
agrees" (ibid., 55). This suggests that with increasing social 
complexity, institutional stability requires the successful 
"concealment of the actual chances of consensus"(55), or more 
positively the strengthening of anticipations of consensus. The 
fact that actual consensus is rare means for Luhmann that 
institutional homogeneity is largely fictional and thus highly 
sensitive to the communication of facts. 
90. For Luhmann the consensus ideal cannot be simply directed to 
increasing factual consensus: "With the institutionalization of 
behavioural expectations it is only a matter of the better use of 
a minimal degree of concurrent and equivalent experience, 
distributing it equally to the socially important bearers of 
meaning and forces making consensus expectable and available on 
demand. But more than anything else it is a matter of covering 
the existing preparedness for consensus, so that the 'general 
societal consensus' needs only to be matched in certain respects 
and moments by the actual experience of some people" (ibid., 51). 
Luhmann concludes that "the function of institutions depends, 
therefore, less on the creation than on the economy of consensus". 
The saving is achieved mainly by anticipated consensus in the 
expectation of expectations, acting as a presumption and not 
normally even requiring a concrete test". 
91. Cf, e.g. Avis, Anglicanism and the Christian Church, 306, where 
the author is critical of 'undialectical notions of consensus' he 
discerns in recent ecumenical dialogue. He proposes a dialectical 
concept of consensus which he finds implicit in the idea of 
fundamental articles in Anglicanism. 
92. See chap.3 p.79. 
93. Ibid., p.75f, 
94. Ibid., p.89. 
95. For example see chap.4 pp.99ff, chap.5 pp.15lff on toleration, and 
chap.8 pp.269ff, for Stillingfleet, Locke and Maurice. 
96. See e.g. chap.8 p.273f; cf. chap.11 p.335f on Maurice and the 
notion of hierarchy in theology. 
97. See chap.4 pp.91-95. 
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XI I: Endnotes 
98. In chap.4 p.97 Laud's 'wooden' handling of the fundamental 
articles was referred to. In chap.6 Waterland's treatment of the 
tradition was dominated by the notion of Covenant and law. 
99. See chap.8 on Newman and his Anglican critics. Cf. discussion in 
chap.10 pp.298-300 and 302-304. on 'classical' and 'modified' 
propositional theories of doctrine. 
100. Ecclesial Reflection., 318. 
101. Ibid. 
102. Ecclesial Man., 119. 
103. Ibid., 125 and generally 119-126. 
104. Ibid., 117. 
105. Ibid., 118. 
106. Ibid.; cf. Ecclesial Reflection; 'primary 
'fundamental imagery' (325). 
107. Ecclesial Man., 118. 
108. Ibid., 120. 
109. Ibid. I 121. 
110. Ibid. 
111. Ibid. 
112. Ibid., 121f. 
symbol' ( 321), 
113. Ibid.; cf. Ecclesial Reflection, 293f, on the truth intention in 
doctrine. 
114. Ecclesial Man., 122. 
115. Ibid. 
116. Ecclesial Reflection, 246. 
117. Ibid., 251, 295. 
118. Ibid., 293ff. 
119. Ibid., 291f; cf. 329. 
120. In Ecclesial Man Farley talks about 'translation' (124). In 
Ecclesial Reflection this is further clarified as 'linkage' 
creation, 318. Reconstitution is thus achieved in this 
'linkaging' process, i.e. doctrinalization. 
121. Ecclesial Reflection, 247. 
122. Ibid., 292. 
123. Ibid., 247. 
124. Ibid., 329f. 
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XII: Endnotes 
125. Ibid., 296-298. 
126. See chap.11 en.40. 
127. For Farley in Ecclesial Reflection, this manoeuvre belongs to what 
he terms the 'house of authority' in which the authoritative 
carriers of redemptive existence have become identified as its 
locus. See esp. chaps.4 and 5. 
128. Ibid., 248: "The self-identity of ecclesial existence is not so 
much a cluster of ideas as a genre of historical being, and it has 
obtained expression in a sedimented linguistic deposit.... The 
continuity of ecclesial existence is that self-identity as it 
transforms various provincial spaces and thereafter obtains 
solidification of the new, transformed space". 
129. The phrase is Colin Gunton's in his essay "The Church on Earth: 
The Roots of Community" in Gunton and Hardy eds., On Being the 
Church, 79. 
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